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Abstract: -, -, - 
Ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam: An Examination ofJonathan Edwards'Account of God's 
Setf-Glorification 
This work. seeks to explore the theological logic and the appropriateness of Edwards' 
mature statement of God's purposes in creating, arguing the thesis that at a crucial 
point Edwards fails to let his account be sufficiently informed by Trinitarian logic 
derived from the gospel story. After the introductory material, the development of 
that mature statement is considered, through a series of Miscellanies entries, before a 
fuller discussion of End of Creation, in which Edwards' final position, that God 
created the world for His own self-glorification, is expounded. A brief series of 
comparisons serves to illuminate the distinctive features of Edwards' account (notably 
its Trinitarian grammar), and to introduce the line of questioning that is adopted. The 
central chapters of the thesis examine the working out of this position in Edwards' 
accounts of creation and redemption, indicating in passing how this theme casts light 
upon his theological concerns, but chiefly examining the adequacy of the basic 
account. The result of this is to suggest that there is a flaw in the area of perdition, 
and so Edwards' writings on hell are considered in order to refine the criticism. The 
thesis concludes that Edwards - failed to apply - his own'Tiinitarian grammar of 
glorification to his account of hell, and so suggests an inconsistency in his theology 
here. This conclusion is used to explore the study of Edwards as a theologian, and 
also aspects of the Reformed tradition of theology. 
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A particular form of inflation affects the world of advertising, whereby superlatives 
become devalued in currency - an example that any traveller on London's tube system 
cannot have missed concerns music compilations; the issuers of 'The Best 60s Album 
in the World - Ever' should have realised the trouble they were storing up for 
themselves, and their announcement of 'The Best 60s Album in the World Ever IF 
was greeted with appropriate hilarity. I mention this only becausea similar form of 
inflation seems to have been active in Ph. D. stu&nts' acknowledgements to their 
supervisors. To merely thank Dr X or Professor Y might today be in danger'of 
suggesting barely-concealed antipathy; to reach for words that express a sense of a 
happier and more fruitful relationship than most would result in phrases that, to my 
English ears at least, would sound over-effusive in the extreme. When, therefore, I 
say that my time and my relationship with Professor Colin Gunton have been very 
happy, that I greatly value his friendship, and that the manner of his supervision and 
the quality of his advice have contributed substantially to whatever value may be 
found in this thesis, I can only ask that the words are not discounted, but taken in their 
natural sense. 
I am also greatly indebted to the Revd Dr John E. Colwell. John was formerly my 
tutor at Spurgeons College, and first introduced me to the works of Jonathan Edwards. 
I have been teaching at Spurgeons under John's guidance whilst working on this 
thesis, and he was kind enough to read sections of the work whilst it was in progress, 
and to make many useful comments. These facts can only give a partial sense of the 
value I place upon John's friendship and conversation over the last few years.. 
I am grateful also to many others at Spurgeons College; the quality of the theological 
education I received there whilst preparing for ministry will not be adequately 
conveyed to the reader of this work, and the College's willingness to take me on as 
their Research Fellow provided the time and the funding that made this work possible. 
Fellow students, members of staff, and the students whom I have taught have all 
offered support and help when asked, and I am grateful for too many acts of kindness 
to list. Particular mention, however, must go to the Revd David Harper, the chairman 
dr 
of the College Council, the Revd Dr Michael Quicke, College Principal, and Dr 
Martin Selman, Academic Dean, for their help, friendship and support which in the 
case of Michael and David stretches back to the days before I applied to train for 
ministry. 
Whilst working on this thesis I have also been a part of a second academic 
community,, at King's College London. The Research Institute in Systematic 
Theology there, which brings together postgraduate. students, staff, and others, has 
provided constant stimulation through its weekly' seminars and occasional 
conferences, and has resulted in some close friendsýips. --- For my last year of working 
on this thesis, I have been teaching at Kings as well as Spurgeons, and I am grateful to 
the Department for taking me on. I have learnt much and benefited in many other 
ways from my colleagues there. 
Over the years of this project, I have come to the fixed opinion that almost the sole 
use of electronic bibliographical aids is to demonstrate the absolute indispensability of 
good librarians. Mrs Judy Powles, librarian of Spurgeons College, has been 
invaluable, not just in her professional capacity, but as a friend. Staff at libraries in 
King's College, the University of London, Cambridge University, the British Library 
and the Beinecke Library in Yale have been of great help at different times. My time 
at the Beinecke was also enriched by conversations with, and practical help from, Ken 
Minkema and Peter Thuesen, the editorial staff of the Yale University Press project to 
publish Edwards' works. 
For the first two years of work on this thesis I was Assistant Pastor of West Wickham 
and Shirley Baptist Church. Heather and I are grateful to that Christian community 
for their support for us, and I am particularly grateful to my Senior Pastor, the Revd 
John Maile, whose friendship and help has been invaluable in many ways. We are 
also grateful to Ashford Baptist Church, and its minister, the Revd Ian Morris, who 
have welcomed us more recently. 
The life of a Ph. D. student can be a lonely one, and the life of a Christian minister 
more lonely still, in some ways. I am grateful, therefore, to a number of close friends 
who at times and in different ways have meant more to me than I can adequately say: 
Dave and Erica, Chris and Sureka, Mike and Hester, John and Claire, Brian and 
Sarah, Phil and Claudia, Shirley and Phil, and Brett. 
Some time ago, one of those friends said to me that he had recently realised just how 
much his parents had got right in the inexact art of fulfilling that role, and told them 
so. I reflected at the time that my own parents had given almost the best imaginable 
start to their three sons, and continue to support us wonderfully, but, rightly or 
wrongly, this was not something I could imagine saying to them. I wonder if writing 
it will do instead? Heather's parents have also supported us in all sorts of ways 
through the years we have been married - and before then as well. 
Finally, I must try to find words to thank Heather, my wife these last six years and, I 
hope and pray, for many more to come, for her love, understanding and support. It 
seems somewhat arrogant to borrow Jonathan Edwards' last words, but I can find no 
others so well suited: thus far at least 'an uncommon union, of such a nature as I trust 
is spiritual, and so will last forever. ' 
s 
Prefatory Note: Language, Quotations and Abbreviations' 
In recent years, the lack of a personal, gender neutral, third person singular pronoun in 
English has become' notorious. The days when Charlotte Bronte could 
unselfconsciously refer to herself as 'he' in a letter are gone, whether this is to be 
celebrated or bemoaned. No wholly satisfactory solution to the various questions 
raised has yet been proposed, and a writer can only make his or her (! ) own attempts 
to use the language as well as possible. In this thesis I have let gender-specific 
language in passages'I am quoting pass without comment: cases where the sense is 
not obvious are extremely rare, and I see no reason to edit texts to conform to current 
linguistic practice on this point any more than on the issue of the old forms of the 
second person singular pronoun. In my own writing I have sought to be non-gender 
specific, on one occasion trusting the authority of the most recent Oxford dictionary 
sufficiently to use 'they' as a singular pronoun. This much, I trust, is uncontroversial. 
The more inflammatory issue concerns pronouns applied to God; here, I have reverted 
to the traditional practice of capitalising masculine forms. This has the twin 
advantages of preserving traditional usage whilst alerting those readers who claim to 
need such alerting to the fact that the referent is not simply another male human 
person. 
A second issue concerns citations from as-yet unpublished manuscripts; Edwards' use 
(or, rather, non-use) of punctuation in his own notebooks makes his style rather 
difficult to read, and he regularly uses a set of abbreviations which, whilst never 
obscuring the sense, are at least aesthetically difficult. When I have quoted from such 
material, however, I have chosen to perform only minimal editing on the text, 
regarding accuracy as a higher call than aesthetics in a work of this nature, at least. I 
have expanded a few regular abbreviations without comment ('X' for Christ, 'G' for 
God, 'ch' for church, and so on), and have supplied punctuation where Lthink that the 
text verges on the incomprehensible without it. I have also omitted any indication of 
places in the text where words had been crossed out. I do not think there is any point 
in this thesis where this level of editing is in any danger of determining, or changing, 
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the meaning of the text, and so I trust these minimal cosmetic procedures will prove 
acceptable. In the case of the Miscellanies entries, I have used Thomas Schafer's 
typewritten transcriptions, stored in the Beinecke library, without further adjustment, 
with the exception of a few longer entries of which the editorial team of the Yale 
edition of Edwards' works were kind enough to give me printed copies of their more- 
or-less prepared edition. These entries were numbers 1091,1174,1219,1245 and 
1352, and I have used the copies given to me without variance. In the case of one or 
two other manuscripts which I have transcribed myself, I have indicated uncertain 
readings in footnotes. 
Finally, I should note the abbreviations used in this thesis. For primary works, I use 
YEn to refer to volumes of the Yale edition of Edwards' works and BTn for volumes 
of the older Banner of Truth edition. Full details of both editions may be found in the 
Bibliography. The only secondary works I have used abbreviations for are CD. for 
Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics and 'Heppe' for the English translation of Heppe's 





Jonathan Edwards, Theologian? 
19. That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the 
invisible things of God as though they were clearly percepiible in those things which 
actually happened 
20. He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and 
manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross. 
21. A theology ofgIory calls evil good and good evil. A theology ofthe cross calls the 
thing what it actuallý is. I 
Jonathan Edwards does not deserve to be called a theologian. That is, if the thesis I 
shall argue in the pages that follow is carried, and if the critique of the theologia 
gloriae that Luther offered for dispute at Heidelberg is accepted, then this conclusion 
follows. Of course, Luther's assertion is harsh, almost intolerably so - but it points 
directly towards what I shall argue is a systematic flaw in the theology of Jonathan 
Edwards. 
A concern for a particular vision of divine self-glorification runs throughout Edwards' 
theology, and at a crucial point that vision fails to be sufficiently cross-centred, and so 
becomes a theologia gloriae. It would be insufferably proud to claim to have found 
the flaw in Edwards' system, but I offer my particular interpretation of his theology in 
the hope that it will add to the steadily-growing sum of our knowledge about this 
great and, I have found, very likeable thinker. 
This initial chapter will seek to place both Edwards and my study of him in context by 
means of an analysis of some of the recent literature on Edwards that will indicate the 
sources of a series of positions that I shall take as axiomatic throughout the remainder 
of the study, and also illuminate the range of contexts in which other scholars have 
placed Edwards. This survey will also serve to remove the question mark from the 
chapter title, arguing that the most significant result of recent study of Edwards has 
I Luther, Theses for the Heidelberg Disputation found in Works (ed. J. Pelikan and H. H. Lehmann) 
vol. 3 1: The Career ofthe Reformer I Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia, 1957 pp. 52-53. 
II 
been a strong appreciation that a profoundly theological vision Nýas at the centre of his 
thought. With this in place, the second chapter will be an exploration of Edwards' 
understanding of divine self-glorification through the teleology of End of Creation, 
and the notebook entries that show his progress towards that final statement. Three 
chapters will then explore this theme with reference to creation, redemption and 
perdition - the last deserving an entire chapter because it is Edwards' understanding of 
hell that, I shall argue, is not sufficiently informedby the gospel. The final chapter 
will be an attempt to show some theological consequences of my thesis, both for the 
interpretation of Edwards and for the wider systematic task. 
1.1 Preliminaty Survey of Recent Literature 
Edwaras is, on the evidence of the sheer weight of published studies, the most 
"however: interest in fascinating figure in pre-revolutionary America. More than-this, 
Edwards comes from an almost bewildering variety of directions. A given study may 
be biographical or historical in scope, exploring 'Edwards the man' or 'Edwards the 
Puritan'; it may focus on 'Edwards the American' asking how he exemplifies or 
shapes the nascent society and culture '-(often' in combinatiod' with Franklin). 
Considered as a scholar in his own right, 'Edwards the philosopher' and 'Edwards the 
theologian' are obvious perspectives, as is 'Edwards the early American writer' - but 
'Edwards the rhetorician' and 'Edwards the psychologist' have been essayed, with 
good reason, and the material is surely available for an interesting study on 'Edwards 
the scientist'. 
In part, of course, this range of interests is merely a historical artefact: it is the present 
age of overwhelming specialisation that is out of step with the majority of human 
experience, not the polymathic day in which Edwards lived. But the 'Renaissance' 
ideal - to seek to be accomplished in several areas of human endeavour - is one thing; 
to be sufficiently able to excite interest nearly three centuries later in such a variety of 
fields is another, and a most unusual one. 2 This range makes the question of the title a 
2A comparison with Isaac Newton may perhaps make this point: Newton's greatness in one field is 
undeniable, but he wrote in other areas (notably theology), works which have long since been 
consigned to the status of historical curiosities. Even Edwards' scientific juvenilia remain important 
and of interest for their philosophical content, as I hope to show later in this thesis. Perhaps a 
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valid one, however, even without Luther's strictures: can Edwards be claimed as a 
theologian more than a philosopher, a preacher or a religious psychologist? If there is 
a coherence to the variety of interest his thought has provoked, is it an explicitly 
theological coherence, or does the centre lie elsewhere? Such questions are a part of 
the burden of this chapter. 
Two scholars who have explicitly commented on the range of approaches to the study 
have chosen glassy metaphors to explore it. A recent article by Peter Thuescn3 has 
described Edwards as 'the Great Mirror' in which every interpreter sees him- or 
herself. Thuesen presses the image of the mirror to ask what it is that makes 
Edwards' thought so amenable to this sort of re-presentation, and suggests size and 
subtlety as the characteristics that make a mirror reflective (one may note in passing 
that Thuesen, unlike Edwards, does not build his metaphor on the best science of his 
day), so the close-textured, finely organised nature of Edwards' thought, and the sheer 
volume of the corpus, allow each interpreter to find whatever he or she may be 
looking for. 
Thuesen's image is a suggestive - perhaps even useful description of the way 
Edwards has been treated through American intellectual history. The following 
passage in particular rings true of that story: 
... seeing Edwards as a Great Mirror means conceiving of him as an 
imposing - yet 
acquiescent - fixture on the cultural landscape. Ever since his death, Edwards has 
been like an ornate looking glass hanging above the mantle in America's living 0 
room. When we turn towards him, he shows us ourselves, but at all other times he 
hangs passively on the wall, in silent grandeur. 4 
Of course (and Thuesen is well aware of this, although he persists with the, at this 
point unhelpful, metaphor of the mirror) the image that is seen is not always the 
image of the observer; oflen writers have discovered their opposites in Edwards - 
comparable figure would be Blaise Pascal, whose mathematical and scientific work is of abiding 
significance, but who also wrote theology that continues to be read and studied, and is regarded as a 
very significant figure in French literature. 
3 Thuesen, Peter J. 'Jonathan Edwards as Great Mirror' Scottish Journal of Theology 50 (1997) pp. 39- 
60. 
4 ibid. pp. 4344. 
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Harriet Beecher Stowe famously described his theology as 'an instrument of torture', 5 
and even as sympathetic a biographer as Ola Winslow describes Edwards' 'bondage' 
to an 'outworn dogmatic system' as 'a tragic pity'. 6 Here Edwards is not so much 
'the great mirror' as the United States of America's own version of the Picture of 
Dorian Gray: by heaping her (supposedly repressive and unpleasant) Puritan heritage 
on her greatest son, the United States can be untainted by such things - by, that is, 
theology - and embrace her true heritage as a progressive and Enlightened nation. 7 
Thuesen's article could be read as a challenge to read Edwards- more deeply and 
widely -a grasp of the whole corpus, minutely examined to observe and explore that 
fine structure, would allow us to examine the composition of the mirror itself, rather 
than just the reflection we see in it. This does not seem to be his intention, however: 
he seems to be engaged in a particular form of historical hermeneuticsg - asking why 
Edwards has been read like this, and (by implication) why it is certain that he will 
continue to be so read. The multiplicity of Edwardses I described at the start of this 
chapter is inevitable and no more than a testimony to the particular character of his 
thought. None of them is a 'right' or 'wrong' way of viewing him and, if they tell us 
anything, it is about the interpreter not about Edwards, who remains no more, and no 
less, than a mirror. -Edwards is not a theologian, he just looks that way to the 
theologians who read him. 
5 For this and similar opinions from Mark Twain and Oliver Wendell Holmes see May, Henry F. 
'Jonathan Edwards and America' in Hatch, N. O. and Stout, H. S. (eds) Jonathan Edwards and the 
American Experience Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988 pp. 19-33. p. 23. 
6 Winslow, Ola E. Jonathan Edwards 1703-1758: A Biography Octagon Books, New York, 1973, 
pp. 326-327. 
7 Phyllis McGinley's couplets have become almost cliched as an example of this way of viewing C, 
Edwards, although only written in the 1950s: 
And if they had been taught aright, 
Small children carried bedwards 
Would shudder lest they meet that night 
The God of Mr. Edwards, 
Abraham's God, the Wrathful One, 
Intolerant of error - 
Not God the Father, or the Son 
But God the I loly Terror. 
(from 'The Theology of Jonathan Edwards' in Times Three: Selected Versefrom Three Decades with 
Seventy New Poems Secker & Warburg, London, 196 1) 
8 'The juxtaposition of different interpretations of Edwards thus becomes an important interpretive 
exercise. ' art. cit. n. 15 p. 42. 
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The second glassy metaphor comes from Conrad Cherry, and provides more hope for 
the student who, in offering an interpretation of Edwards, would like to think that he 
has more to show than a self-portrait. Cherry's book offers this assertion: 'In a 
theologian[! ] of Edwards' stature, there are a number of fundamental and distinctive 
motifs operative, and his outlook cannot be reduced to any one of them. 
Nevertheless, any one of a number of motifs may serve as a window through which 
we may observe other aspects of his thought. '9 To press this metaphor: a structure 
forms a more-or-less coherent, but certainly connected whole, and windows offer 
partial views of the whole. In all but the simplest structure, no window will offer a 
complete picture, and so a description of the whole may only come from combining 
carefully observed views from different perspectives. 
So, for example, Edwards' preaching may be envisioned as one wing of the house. 
Early American Literature, the Puritan tradition, classical rhetoric and Edwards' own 
theology are some of the windows - they each offer a different way of looking at this 
subject, and each must be employed to form a view with any claim to'being 
comprehensive. The variety of approaches to Edwards is testament to the richness of 
his thought - each approach is valid, although judgement may be made about the 
relative importance of each, and a particular position, whichever approach it may 
come from, may be, judged more or less adequate on the basis of the evidence 
available. If Edwards is to be called a theologian, it is because, having viewed him 
from a variety of angles, this set of concerns rather than any other has been seen to be 
central. 
If this understanding of the variety of approaches that are made to Edwards is correct, 
then by reason of his greatness the task of expounding 'Edwards' thought' as a whole 
becomes a major one indeed. It is not my purpose in -this thesis to do anything so 
ambitious, but, concentrating on the explicitly theological, rather than any other area, 
to offer a particular view of Edwards' theology, a look through a different window 
which, integrated with earlier studies, will, I hope, prove illuminating. Wis 
introductory chapter is intended to put the study in some context, however, firstly by 
bringing some order to the profusion of studies of Edwards that are available, in order 
9 Cherry, C. The TheoloSy ofJonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal Doubleday, Garden City, 1966 p. 7. 
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to offer a view - albeit limited, personal, and partial - of the current state of 
scholarship, and secondly by briefly placing Edwards within intellectual and historical 
contexts which will be important for the arguments that follow. I 
Two books will serve as useful termini for this survey: There is widespread 
agreement that the single most significant text in sparking the renewal of interest in 
Edwards that has taken place during this century -was Perry Miller's Jonathan 
Edwards, 10 and this will make a useful terminus a quo. II At the point when 
* 
Miller's 
study appeared, for some decades Edwards had been remembered as little more than a 
fiery Puritan preacher, and even within the churches only by groups on the fringes, in 
intellectual and theological terms at least: traditional Calvinists knew him as a 
powerful exponent of their position; revivalists knew him as the preacher of the Great 
Awakening; the supporters of the Evangelical missions knew him as Brainerd's 
biographer. 12 Miller highlighted Edwards' philosophical genius, and the use he had 
made of Locke and Newton. He also (as one of the moýt significant historians. of 
colonial America) introduced Edwards as a key figure in interpreting the American 
culture, whilst down-playing the significance of Edwards' theology - for - Miller, 
Calvinist dogmatics was merely the medium Edwards used to express his art, which 
could as well (or better) have been expressed in poetry or literature or perhaps even 
music. Edwards was great precisely because it was not decisive to view him as a 
theologian. 
Not quite forty years later, Robert Jenson's America's TheologianD succeeded in 
weaving together the same threads as well as anyone since Miller, although the 
tapestry created showed a very different picture. This will serve as my terminus ad 
10 Miller, PertyJonathan Edwards William Sloane Associates, n. loc., 1949. 
11 1 will, of course, make reference to significant studies written before Miller's work, but the field of 
scholarship is vast enough that some limits must be imposed, and Miller (as I will argue) certainly 
marked the beginning of a new epoch in the study of Edwards. 
12 It is perhaps instructive to ask how much of the revival of interest in Edwards' thought has been due 
to the intellectual mainstream recognising that its dismissal of traditional theological orthodoxies and 
evangelistically-minded Christian practice was too-hasty and unjustified - not to say arrogant. 13 Jenson, Robert W. America's Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1988. 
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quenz. 14 For Jenson, Edwards was first and foremost a theologian, albeit a 
philosophically informed and aware one. The influence of Newton and Locke is still 
recognised, but their thoughts are made subservient to an overarching theological 
vision. And it is as a theologian that Edwards speaks to American culture, not as an 
interpreter, but as a sharp critic. The Arminianism that Edwards devoted himself to 
combating was the first stirring of America's very own cultural religion, and so 
Edwards' responses to that Arminianism, and the alternative vision that he expounds, 
are challenges to the heart of the American nation. 
There have been several significant studies of Edwards in the decade or so since 
Jenson wrote, of course, but nothing that quite brings the various threads together in 
the same satisfying way and, in my estimation, nothing that is anything like as 
penetrating in exposition and analysis. So, to try to impose some order on the field of 
Edwardsean studies, I intend to explore three trajectories - philosophical, cultural and 
theological - from Miller to Jenson. A fourth section will note some of the more 
important (for my purposes, at least) of the profusion of minority approaches that will 
not fit this scheme neatly. I acknowledge freely that the scheme is in some degree 
artificial; but merely listing texts in order of publication lacks both interest and utility, 
and so some heuristic scheme must be devised. 
Before I begin, one apparently glaring omission in all of the above must be addressed: 
what of biography? The brief, and slightly depressing, answer is that Edwards is in 
need of a biographer. Not that there has been any shortage of biographies, but none 
of the volumes currently available can be regarded as satisfactory. The early 
biographies of Hopkins and Dwight naturally remain indispensable, but are of course 
not sufficient. 15 If I may pass over the nineteenth century in a somewhat cavalier 
manner, the standard modem biography is still Ola Winslow's Jonathan Edwards, 16 
published nine years before Miller's work, and so unable to take advantage of the 
intellectual advances made in the last half-century - not just in understanding 
14 Jenson's own preface (pp. vii-ix) shows his awareness of being about the same task as Miller, in 
distinction from the more specialist studies that had appeared between. 
15 An abridged form of Dwight's biography can be found in BTI pp. xi-cxcv; Hopkins is reprinted in 
Levin, David (ed. ) Jonathan Edwards: A Profile (American Profiles Series) Hill and Wang, New York, 
1969. 
16 op. cil. 
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Edwards' thought, but in our grasp of colonial American life - and such important 
advances as the patient work that has resulted in accurate dates for Edwards' 
manuscripts. 
There have been a number of book-length biographies of Edwards since Winslow and 
Miller, but in every case they are unsatisfactory for one reason or another. Some 
simply lack comprehensiveness or insight. Others - add something to our 
understanding of Edwards, but fail if considered as biographies (Elisabeth Dodds' 
Marriage to a Difjficult Man (197 1), succeeds more than any of the volumes in giving 
us a feel for Edwards in all his humanity - perhaps because the book is focused on 
Sarah, so he is not centre-stage - and is a delightful book. It is not an adequate 
biography, whether in terms of content or insight, however). Others still are useful 
studies of limited scope (Holbrook's Jonathan Edwards: The Valley and Nature, 17 for 
example, argues a convincing case for the importance for our understanding of the 
physical landscape in which Edwards lived). More texts, and more limitations could 
be mentioned. 
Special mention here must go to lain Murray's Jonathan Edwards: A New Biography 
(1987) which is the most ambitious and most useful, of the more recent biographies. It 
is well written, careful and comprehensive factually, and sympathetic to, Edwards. 
Not unusually for Murray, however (one thinks of his volume on Spurgeonig) the 
reader cannot help feeling that the author's apologetic concern for a particular brand 
of Reformed piety is in constant danger of obscuring the subject. 19 This is, finally, a 
great shame, as this should have been the biography for which students of Edwards 
are waiting. 
17 Holbrook, Clyde A. Jonathan Edwards: The Valley and Nature., An Interpretive Essay Associated 
University Presses, London, 1987. 
18 Murray, lain H. The Forgotten Spurgeon Banner of Truth, London, 19732. 
19 To cite merely one example: throughout his book, Murray. does not have a positive word to say 
about Perry Miller's study. Whilst I share the current consensus view that Miller fails badly to 
understand Edwards' theology, and so finally fails badly to understand Edwards, there remains much of 
interest and value in his book - not least in the attempt to place Edwards philosophically. Murray is 
apparently blinded to these strengths because of the seriousness he ascribes to the fault, and so has little 
or no time for philosophical issues, leading finallý to a failure to see what is distinctive about Edwards' 
version of Calvinism. 
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So I have not included biography in my scheme, because there is so little to report. 
Miller's volume claimed to be biographical, but was a discussion of ideas rather than 
events and personalities; Jenson makes no such claim. A standard biography to 
replace Winslow is desperately needed, and Edwards students can only hope that even 
now an able scholar with an eye to the tercentenary in 2003 is at work. 
1.2 Recent Philosophical Interpretation of Edwards 
Nineteenth century America gave us 'Edwards the philosopher'. His Calvinism, and 
hence all his theology, was an embarrassment; his sermons so many abhorrent 
barbarisms, unfit for civilized ears. As Murray says, '[t]hey wdre certain that if 
Edwards were to be appreciated at all it must not be in terms of his theology... Only as 
a "philosophee,, it seemed, could he retain some respectability. 120 In his biography, 
Hopkins gave us the memorable image of a thirteen year old boy poring over Locke's 
Essay with 'more Satisfaction and Pleasure in studying it, than the most Greedy miser 
in gathering up handsful of Silver and Gold from some new discover'd Treasure. 121 - 
an image which Miller's study could almost be said -to be builý , 
around - this, for 
Miller, is the defining moment of Edwards' life, not conveision, or the revivals', or the 
sermon at Enfield in 1741. Edwards' other early biographer. ' Sereno Dwight, first 
published 'The Mind', the most purely philosophical of Edwards' notebooks, on 
which his reputation as a philosopher was largely. built. The contents of 'Tbe Mind' 
led to most nineteenth century studies describing Edwards as an idealist, and to a 
series of attempts to discover from whence this idealism was derived. 
Miller's study, as I have already noted, depicted Edwards as a Lockean, and so an 
empiricist, rather than an idealist. 'In Edwards, ' he claims, "'idealism" is an 
incidental argument, and except for the act that his mind moved for a few paragraphs 
along the same path as Berkeley's, a path that was unmistakably laid out by Locke, 
Edwards and Berkeley have little in common. 122 I will offer my own assessment of 
the similarities and differences between Edwards and Berkeley in chapter 3 of this 
thesis; the present point is the impetus Miller gave to the study of Edwards' 
philosophy. It was no longer sufficient to regard Edwards' philosophy as thejuvcnile 
20 Murray, op. cit. p. xx; italics original. 
21 See YE6 p. 17 for the relevant paragraph. 
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idealism of a genius who unfortunately devoted his mature thought to less profitable 
subjects; for Miller everything Edwards wrote was determined in its form by these 
early philosophical commitments, and the need was not to trace the source of these 
teenage speculations, but to trace their issue, to find that there was philosophical gold 
in the Calvinistic dross of the mature treatises - or perhaps, that the common stone of 
Puritan dogmatics had been sculpted into philosophically beautiful forms by 
Edwards' consummate artistry. 
This is not however, Miller's only contribution to the understanding of Edwards' 
philosophy. As well as making much of Locke, he recognises the -significance for 
Edwards of an early reading of Newton. 23 Anderson, who has edited Edwards' early 
scientific manuscripts, regards him as 'nearly unique' amongst naturalists in the 
American colonies in focusing his interest on problems of physics, rather than those 
of botany or Zoology. 24 However, Edwards' interest was not in becoming a 
Newtonian physicist - in a reassuring glimpse of humanity in the genius, he became 
one of the first of many students who could make neither head nor tail of the 
differential calculus! 25 Edwards' use of Newton, as Miller was the first to recognise, 
was once again philosophical. Miller offers the example of the collapse of causality: 
from the Aristotelian profusion of pre-Newtonian physics, Edwards was left with one 
meaningful cause, the instrumental, and (suggests Miller) one of his most carefully- 
argued sermons can be read as an attempt to rewrite the doctrine of justification by 
faith alone within constraints imposed by this rcduction. 26 
Miller's reconstruction of Edwards' philosophical genius is now widely regarded as 
wrong-headed at almost every turn, but that is not the point. Miller's book is 
important not because it is right, but because it opened up vistas in Edwards' thought 
that few had imagined were there. 
22 op. cit. p. 62. 
23 ibid. pp. 72-74. 
24 YE6 p. 39. 
25 'Always, when I have occasion to make use of mathematical proof, to acknowledge my ignorance in 
mathematics, and only propose it to 'em that are skilled in the science whether or no that is not a 
mathematical proof' Number 16 of 'Cover-Leaf Memoranda' from the Natural Philosophy Notebook - 
YE6 p. 194. 
26 op. cit. pp. 74-79. 
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After Miller, many studies have sought to explore these wide open spaces. One or 
two writers, it, is true, refuse to accept Miller's basic contention that the more 
philosophical early writings and the more theological mature works cannot be 
separated. James Carse, for example; claims that there is a discontinuity here. 27 This 
opinion may be safely discounted, however. 28 Others, without denying Miller's 
position, continue the earlier quest to trace the sources of, and influences on, 
Edwards, philosophically. Of particular note here are Norman Hering's study, 
focusing particularly on the background in British moral philosophy, and ý William 
Sparkes Morris, whose vast thesis is in danger of being too complete to be useful. 29 
These two studies are certainly useful in tracing connections' and influencqs, and so 
helping us to understand where Edwards was genuinely novel. The latter, however, is 
sometimes in danger of assuming a similarity must imply an influence. Edwards, well 
read as he was, had not read every European philosopher of the previous century, and 
so was unlikely to have been influenced by them all. Morris' basic argument, that 
Edwards found a middle way between British empiricism and European idealism, is 
nonetheless a useful corrective to the either-or position left by Miller's assault on the 
earlier interpretations. Leon Chai's recent study is probably best included here: 30 
although he is seeking to use Edwards to explore Enlightenment forms of rationality, 
rather than tracing influences on him, one of the results- is usefully to situate Edwards 
philosophically. The majority of philosophical studies, however, address the 
challenge of finding an interpretation that will demonstrate the coherence that runs 
through the corpus. 
27 Carse, James Jonathan Edwards and the Visibility ofGoJ Scribner's, New York, 1967 pp. 34-35. 
28 Carse's suggestion is that Edwards gave up philosophy and set out on a new intellectual quest. 
Quite apart from the anachronism of separating philosophy and theology in this manner, something 
Edwards would never have conceived of, this argument relies on a now-disproven dating of the Notes 
on the Mind manuscript. Anderson's discussions in YE6 pp. 324-329 demonstrate that Edwards was 
certainly using the Mind entries in preparing even his last works, the Two Dissertations, and also that 
he was adding to it as late as 1756-1757 (this last from a quotation from Cudworth's Intellectual 
System, which Edwards had not read until around this date - see YE6 p. 329). 
29 Fiering, Norman Jonathan Edwards'Aforal Thought and its British Context University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981. Morris, W. S. The Young Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstruction 
Carlson, Broklyn, 1991 (this is an unrevised posthumous publication of a thesis completed in 1955). 
30 Chai, Leon Jonathan Edwards and the Limits ofEnlightenment Philosophy Oxford University Priss, 
Oxford, 1998. 
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A recurrent theme has been aesthetics, with book-length studies by Roland Delattre 
and Terence Erdt being the most sustained contributions. 31 Delattre's careful work in 
establishing the key aesthetic categories and their relationships in Edwards' writings 
is as useful as it is impressive, and Erdt applies this theme to a key question in 
Edwards' psychology of conversion, the precise nature of the 'sense of the heart' of 
which he regularly speaks. Jenson recognises the significance of this theme and adds 
his own contribution by pointing out that the beauty Edwards Privisions is more nearly 
the sequential or dynamic beauty of a piece of music than the static beauty of a 
painting. 32 As a result of this work, the centrality of the third of the classical 
transcendentals for Edwards has been established, and I will make use of this theme 
regularly throughout this thesis, but particularly in discussing Edwards' metaphysics 
in chapter 3. The central point that I will return to is theological - again and again, 
when asking about reasons for God's actions, Edwards will claim that such and such a 
course is appropriate for God because, in the light of who God is, it is beautiful. 
Aesthetics has importance in every area of Edwards' thought, but particularly perhaps 
in ethical discussions. This relationship was established and explored by'Clyde 
Holbrook, 33 whose study was also the first of the recent works to trace the distinctions 
Edwards makes between redeemed and unredeemed virtuous action, a distinction 
which should now be recognised as key to his ethics. Fiering's study, already 
mentioned, traces the secularising tendencies in the new field of 'moral philosophy', 
and suggests that Edwards, clearly schooled in this nascent discipline, devotes himself 
to attempting to reverse this. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson explored a morality based 
on Lockean psychology, which (potentially) had no need for divine reward and 
retribution in its account of motives; Edwards argued vigorously in response that 
ethics must be theocentric - 'True Virtue' could only exist in a God-directed, Spirit- 
empowered, Christ-like life. Finally, in this area, Post takes the story forward, in 
31 Delattre, Roland A. Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards Yale University 
Press, London, 1968. Erdt, Terrence Jonathan Edwards: Art and the Sense of the Heart University of 
Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1980. 
32 Jenson, op. cit. pp. 194-196. 
33 Holbrook, Clyde A. The Ethics of Jonathan Edwards: Morality and Aesthetics University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1973. 
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seeking to trace the influence of Edwards in ethical debate, 34 and particularly the 
source of the notorious suggestion that a saint should be willing to be damned for the 
love of God. Although this latter attitude cannot be found in Edwards, from the very 
first pages of Holbrook's study it is clear that his ethics are theocentric, built around 
the recognition of God as the centre of the universe, and Fiering and Post's studies 
wnply support this contention. 
Moving on, Douglas Elwood's significant monograph3s argued that a concept of 
divine immediacy enabled Edwards to hold together his traditional Calvinism with an 
almost Neoplatonic panentheism, thus introducing the question of ontology. From a 
very different direction, if under an identical title, Sang Hyun Lee also considered the 
issue of ontology, 36 arguing that the use of concepts of 'habit' or 'disposition' enabled 
Edwards to speak meaningfully of unactualised being, and so offering a reading of 
Edwards' doctrine of creation that does not need to rely on Neoplatonic categories. 
Such ontological questions will become decisive in my criticisms of Edwards in the 
latter half of this thesis. Once again, the question reduces to a theological one (as 
Elwood's focus - on divine immediacy and Lee's suggestion that God's being is 
definitive for creaturely ontology both suggest): God is 'being in general' according 
to Edwards, so that ontological questions are no more than theological ones phrased 
in a certain manner. 
Lee argues that his account of Edwards' 'dispositional ontology' provides the 'key to 
the particular character of Edwards' modemity; 37 the final theme in my survey of 
recent philosophical approaches to Edwards could be called the 'postmodern' strand, 
as a number of scholars have used his writings to advance or explore characteristically 
postmodem themes. Stephen Daniel's discussion of serniotics assumes and asserts 
34 Post, Stephen G. Christian Love and Sey'-Denial. An Historical and Normative Study ofJonathan 
Edwards, Samuel Hopkins, and American Theological Ethics University Press of America, London, 
1987. 
35 Elwood, Douglas The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1960. 
36 Lee, Sang Hyun The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1988. 
37 ibid. p. 4. 
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that Edwards is not a modernist thinker, 38 and even compares his thought to that of 
Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva. Wainwright similarly uses Edwards as one of a 
number of conversation partners in his discussion of the nature of reasoning in an 
implicit attack on the modernist paradigM. 39 Clearly Edwards was not postmodem; 
the etymology of that title alone should convince us of that. The use of these studies, 
however, is in highlighting the possibility of a different account of the history of ideas 
from the Enlightenment myth of progress. Edwards' Calvinism need not be thought 
of as 'primitive', just as incompatible with the dominant thought-forms of nineteenth 
century America, and so difficult for people in that culture to cope with. When 
Jenson suggests that Edwards shows a different way of being American, and so offers 
a theological challenge to a nation that came to birth after his death, it is this sort of 
theme he is implicitly drawing on. 40 What is perhaps missing in these postmodernist 
interpretations of Edwards 'is the realisation, central to Jenson, that this is a 
theological critique, that its basis and power come from an assertion of the priority of 
God. 
In order to suggest a way of drawing together this range of approaches to Edwards' 
philosophy, I have indicated my conviction as I have discussed each approach that 
any common ground will be theological rather than philosophical. In a recent article, 
Michael McClymond has argued this point persuasively. He suggests -that the 
theocentric nature of Edwards' thought will establish the connections and he offers 
indications of how this might work with regard to ontology, epistemology, idealism 
and aesthetics. 41 Miller had sought to paint Edwards as a philosopher who happened 
to write his philosophy in the fonn of Calvinist dogmatics; McClymond shows that 
38 Daniel, Stephen H. The Philosophy ofJonathan Edwards: A Study in Divine Semiolics (The Indiana 
Series in the Philosophy of Religion) Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994. For the particular 
point see, for example, p. 4: 'Edwards's texts assume practices which are simply unimaginable in terms 
of modernity. ' 
39 Wainwright, W. J. Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason 
Cornell University Press, London, 1995. Chai's book (n. 26 supra) also should be mentioned here, as 
pursuing a similar programme. 
40 op. cit. passim, but particularly pp. 11-12,194-196, & the entire section entitled 'Community', 
pp. 139-185. 
41 McClymond, Michael J. 'God the Measure: Towards an Understanding of Jonathan Edwards' 
Theocentric Metaphysics' Scottish Journal of Theology47 (1994) pp. 43-59. This artic16 has been 
incorporated into Professor McClymond's monograph on Edwards, Encounters with God: An 
Approach to the Theology ofJonathan Edwards Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1998, where it forms 
ch. 2, without substantial alteration. Chapter 4 of the book extends the argument concerning 
theocentricity to include Edwards' ethics. 
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only by recognising Edwards as what might be termed a 'radical Calvinist' with an 
uncompromising assertion of the centrality and sovereignty of God, can his 
philosophy be understood. With this latterjudgement I heartily concur. 42 
1.3 Edwards and American Culture in Recent Scholarship 
Perry Miller appears in this study mainly because of one book on Edwards. His 
significance, however - and by any standards he was a significant scholar - lies more 
in his historical work on colonial America. 43 His work resulted in a new appreciation 
of early American history, and an interest in finding the genius of America in those 
early years. A major motif of this search, a motif which can already be found in 
Miller's own writingS, 44 has been the polarity between Jonathan Edwards and 
Benjamin Franýklin. 45 
This polarity has taken various forms. Sometimes it is clearly present, but its precise 
nature is indistinct, as when a recent history of American literature describes Edwards 
and Franklin as 'two men who between them seem to realize and sum up the changes 
of American thought and the variety within it'. 46 Sometimes Edwards is the bugbear, 
the personification of aristocracy, superstition and intellectual slavery fr9m which the 
new, young nation was to free itself, and Franklin, as the personification of 
democracy, of the American dream of eaming one's position in society, offers 
salvation from this bugbear. 47 In other versions, there is less of a value-judgement 
implied, as for instance, Jones, following Brooks, who sees a complementarity 
42 A nice conceit suggests itself in placing yet a third interpretation on the question I have taken for my 
title in this chapter: the strictest use of the word 'theologian', or at least of its Greek root, was reserved 
for one who spoke of God as He is in Himself, as opposed to the oeconomia - hence Gregory of 
Nazianzus receives the title as a result of preaching the 'theological orations'. McClymond's great 
argument, with which I ag ., ree, 
is that in this sense also Edwards is a theologian. 
43 See (amongst other works) the two volumes of The New England Mind (The Seventeenth Century 
and From Colony to Province both Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1954 and 1953); The 
Puritans (with Thomas H. Johnson, revised edition: Harper and Row, New York, 1963) Errand Into 
the Wilderness (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956). 
44 Jonathan Edwards p. xiii. 
45 For a brief overview of the history of this comparison see the 'Introduction' in Oberg, Barbara B. 
and Stout, Harty S. (eds) Benjamin Franklin, Jonathan Edwards, and the Representation ofAmerican 
Culture Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 3-8. 
46 Ruland, Richard and Bradbury, Malcolm From Puritanism to Posimodernity. - A Ifistory ofAmerican 
Literature Penguin, London, 1992 p. 38. 
47 So, for example, Vernon L. Parrington Main Currents in American Thought. An Interpretation of 
American Literature from the Beginnings to 1920: Vol. 1 1620-1800., The Colonial Mind Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., New York, 1930. See especially pp. 148-178. 
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between the heirs of Edwards the idealist philosopher in American academic life, and 
the heirs of Franklin the utilitarian in business life. 48 
Alongside this attempt to use Edwards as an interpretative tool for American culture, 
there is a parallel (to the extent that the separation is not always recognised) attempt 
to use Edwards as an interpreter of American culture. For Miller, Edwards reminds 
the nation that sometimes, beyond the satisfaction and the solace that can be found in 
a new refrigerator, or a paid-off car (one can imagine Miller arguing, as the consumer 
boom of the 1950s began), there is something darker, and wilder a, nd more elemental, 
that must occasionally be faced (the consumer boom, after all, took place in the 
shadow of the Bomb). 49 For Jenson, Edwards is America's prophet as much as 
America's theologian. He sees with inspired clarity the failures and contradictions 
that will come from the nation's particular idolatrieS, 50 and in theological treatise as 
much as jeremiad, calls the nation - not back, but to a different way of moving 
forward. 51 
Clearly, what is at stake here is as much an interpretation of American culture as an 
interpretation of Edwards. But in fact the disagreements run deeper than that: as 
Jenson sees with some clarity, Edwards' vision, inspired by Locke and Newton, is of 
a different way of being Enlightened than that which, the Enlightenment in fact 
followed, personified so well in Benjamin Franklin. 52 - The Declaration of 
Independence and the nation that was born from it represent, in a sense, the great 
48 Jones, Howard Mumford 0 Strange New World: American Culture- The Formative Years Chatto 
and Windus, London, 1965 pp. 197-200. Van Wyck Brooks published a number of works around the 
turn of the century in the area of what would now be called American Studies, and several are listed in 
Jones' bibliography. He gives no precise reference to where this idea may be found in Brooks, and I 
have not been able to trace it. 
49 Miller describes Edwards as 'an aboriginal and monolithic power ... a reminder that ... there come 
periods, either through disaster or through self-knowledge, when applied science and Benjamin 
Franklin's The Way to Wealth seem not a sufficient philosophy of national life. ' op. cit. p. xiii. 
50 Miller, too, sees Edwards as a commentator on what America was to become: '... though he met the 
forces of our society in their infancy, when they had not yet enlarged into the complexity we now 
endure, he called them by their names and pronounced as one foreseeing their tendencies. If the 
student penetrates behind the technical language, he discovers an intelligence which, as much as 
Emerson's, Melville's, or Mark Twain's, is both an index of American society and a comment upon it. ' 
(ibid p. 13) 
51 This theme runs throughout Jenson's book, but is particularly noticeable in the first chapter (pp. 3- 
12) and in the section entitled 'Community' pp. 139-185. 
52 Again, the point can be found passim, but see particularly the closing comments on pp. 194-196. 
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Enlightenment social experiment. 53 Edwards was out of step with that experiment, a 
representative of a different possible Enlightenment and a different possible America, 
and interpretations of his place in the history of American culture will depend in large 
part upon evaluations of that experiment. 
Prior to Miller's study, there seems to have been substantial agreement that Edwards 
was to be considered as anachronistic even in his own day: Puritan, even medieval, a 
representative of an old order that was even then passing and has now long passed. 54 
Miller, in seeking to paint Edwards as a Lockean philosopher, argues for a thoroughly 
Enlightened Edwards, so modem, in fact, that in some ways we are only just catching 
up with him. 55 In either case, there is a shared premise: that of human progress. On 
the one hand, Edwards, however brilliant, is left behind by the march of progress. On 
the other, his brilliance is shown by the way that he steals a march on progress. Either 
way, the assumption is that there is a general forward movement in human history, 
that every century, if not every day, in every way, we are getting better and better. 
Perhaps beginning with Auschwitz, or perhaps Much earlier, this attitude has been 
seriously damaged this century. In his recent Drew Lecture, Richard Bauckham has 
argued that we are witnessing 'the end of secular eschatology'56 -'the final failure of 
the forward-looking optimism that has characterised post-Enlightenment Western 
societies. This is not to say that the 'myth of progress' is dead - studies making all 
the same assumptions are still regularly published57 - but it is to say that this attitude 
should no longer be assumed, that it, too, is open to question, that, perhaps, the next 
53 Or one of the two great Enlightenment social experiments, but the other, beginning with the French 
Revolution, has a much more messy history, being entangled in European wars from the beginning and 
often since. 
54 Parrington (cit. ) will again serve as an example of this attitude. 
55 '... he speaks from an insight into science and psychology so much ahead of his time that our own 
can hardly be said to have caught up with him. ' op. cit. p. xiii. 
56 The title of the Drew Lecture, 1998. As-yet unpublished, but the text is held by the library of 
Spurgeon's College. 
57 An attractive illustration may be found in A. Owen Aldridge's paper in the volume edited by Oberg 
and Stout (cit. ), 'Enlightenment and Awakening in Edwards and Franklin' (pp. 2741). The whole 
paper demonstrates this attitude, but it is encapsulated in a pair of literary comparisons - Edwards with 
Shakespeare, Bard of an old world and an older age, and Franklin with Pope, a contemporary author 
who became the chief hymnographer of the anglophone Enlightenment. Again, Elizabeth Dunn's 
paper in the same volume, '"A Wall Between Them Up to Heaven"' (pp. 58-74) contains a long 
endnote categorising commentators according to whether they describe Edwards as 'modem,, 
'premodern' or some mixture of the two. 
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great intellectual step forward will be to realise that great intellectual steps go in 
directions other than simply forward. 
If the Enlightenment was not the historically necessary next step from Newton and 
Locke, if the Declaration of Independence was not fated - or 'self-evident' - but 
merely one possible movement, then Edwards' relationship to American culture is 
capable of a multiplicity of interpretations. The options are no I, onger restricted to a 
series of points on a (temporal) linear scale - anachronistic, prophetic, or some 
ambiguous mixture of the two. A two-dimensional map is now available, and 
Edwards (and Franklin) might be pointing down different roads from the one the 
Founding Fathers walked, might even have been farsighted enough to see some of the 
difficulties on that road, and other paths that were clearer. This is certainly, as I have 
indicated, the opinion of Professor Jenson. 
My interest in this thesis is not particularly in EdwaTds as an interpreter of America - 
that, surely, is a theme for Americang - and I claim no specialist knowledge of 
Franklin. But the history of scholarship from Miller to Jenson, and beyond, in this 
area represents an opening up of possibilities for discussing Edwards in terms of the 
Enlightenment and modernity. My consideration of the philosophical strand of the 
literature ended with notice of scholars for whom Edwards pre-empts postmodern 
criticisms, and what a theologian may take with some gratitude from the field of 
American studies is that Edwards need not be judged by modem categories, but may, 
in some senses, stand himself as a judge of modernity. And, echoing the conclusion 
of the previous section, what a theologian may perhaps offer to this other field is the 
suggestion that it is explicitly theological analysis, a thoroughgoing criticism based on 
the gospel, rather than any independent insight, that enables Edwards to speak so 
penetratingly and so searingly to his nation. 
1.4 Recent Theological Interpretations of Edwards 
Miller's attempted rehabilitation of Edwards proceeded in spite of Edwards' theology. 
At one point he quotes Holmes as saying that 'Edwards' system seems, in the light of 
to-day, to the last degree barbaric, mechanical, materialistic, pessimistic, ' and Miller 
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heartily concurs: 'No civilized man in our day, any more than in Dr. Holmes', can say 
otherwise if he dwells only on the doctrinal positions. 158 This is presumably a 
calculated rebuke to the Princeton theologians who had until a decade or two before 
Miller wrote held Edwards' name in high honour precisely as a theologian. , 
This is, in many respects, a continuation of the early nineteenth century evaluation of 
Edwards. On the one hand, defenders of a version of Christian orthodoxy saw him as 
the head and founder of their school; on the -other novelists and philosophers 
recognised a man of genius but found his ideas abhorrent and (once again) remnants 
of an older world that had, thankfully, passed. The theme is becoming recurrent: 
Edwards was out of step with an Enlightenment liberalism that has been the most 
intolerant of all intellectual systems, regarding any other way of thought not as a rival 
to be argued against, but as an anachronism to be dismissed or patronised. 59 
But the response too is becoming recurrentj and this we owe to Miller. Edwards was 
not an anachronism, a backwoods preacher a century behind the times. He grasped 
the implications of Locke and Newton decades before almost anyone else on the 
American continent. Miller, however, sees Edwards as modem - 'he speaks with an 
insight into science and'Psychology so much ahead of his time that our own can 
hardly be said to have caught up with him' - despite his theology - 'he speaks from a 
primitive religious conception which often seems hopelessly out of touch with even 
his own day'. 60 Miller is still a child of the Enlightenment, and tries to make Edwards 
one too. Perhaps, half a century after Miller wrote, our own day has finally caught up 
with Edwards: there are other answers, other ways forward, where the doubts of 
Hume lack force and so Kant's erection of a noumenal barrier is no longer necessary; 
where the imposing systems of thought based on 'self-evident' truths can be 
deconstructed and exposed as power games, as deceitful operations of self-love, in 
Edwards' terms. But where Edwards differs from the thinkers moving in the same 
59 op. cit. p. 328. 
59 The continuance of this attitude is evident today in (even the most serious) media commentary. So 
often Islamic attitudes, for example, are treated as unintelligible objects of wonderment or amusement, 
rather than engaged with the respect they deserve. To add a personal example, I recall a situation from 
my student days, in which I was told, with no hint of irony, 'You can't say that - we're tolerant here. ' 
60 op. cit. p. xiii. 
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directions two centuries later is in his recognition that all this can, indeed must, be 
done theologically. 
Probably the most significant single text in the decades after Miller in this area was 
Conrad Cherry's The Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Reappraisql. 61 Cherry 
patiently and carefully, unravels Edwards' thought from the perspective of his 
understanding of faith, but this particular focus is less significant than the general 
claim: 'for good or for ill, Edwards was a Calvinist theologian'. 62 An intellectually 
respectable Calvinist theologian was something novel; and a series of studies of 
greater or lesser length followed, examining Edwards' theology. 
Amongst the diversity of published work, two themes may be picked out with relative 
ease. Firstly, the most well-covered area has been conversion, particularly the nature 
of the 'new sense of the heart' about which Edwards talked so frequently. 63 This 
theme has been seen to link together Lockean psychological positions and Puritan 
questions about the nature and morphology of conversion, and so offers fertile ground 
for an exploration of the theological use to which Edwards put, his philosophical 
positions. I 
Secondly, a steady stream of works interpreting Edwards from within a traditional 
Calvinist position have appeared. The best of these (amongst which Cherry may be 
counted) illuminate the study of Edwards by placing him within another intellectual 
context: Puritan and Orthodox Reformed theology. 64 Others suffer from a too- 
obvious apologetic intent: authors who lack knowledge of, or interest in, Edwards' 
philosophical commitmentS65 expound his thought in classic Reformed categories in 
order to reclaim him for a particular theological school and so finally offer'a system 
61 Op. Cit. 
62 p. 3. 
63 Book length studies focusing here include Simonson, Harold P. Jonathan Edwards: Theologian of 
the Heart Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1974 and Erdt, op. cit. Cherry and Wainwright's volumes (cit. ) 
both devote considerable attention to the topic. A significant number of irticles and papers have also 
been published, some of which may be found referenced in my bibliography. 
64 In addition to Cherry, Paul Heim's insightful introduction to Edwards' Treatise on Grace and Other 
Writings James Clarke, Cambridge, 1971 may be included in this category. , 65 1 suspect, but make no attempt to demonstrate here, that a version of the Scottish 'Common Sense 
Realism' is retained as a part of commitment to these particular theological schools, and so Edwards is 
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that differs little from that of (say) Warfield and lacks penetration into the distinctive 
elements of Edwards' thought. 66 
I will regularly suggest throughout this study that Edwards has not yet been 
sufficiently well placed within the Reformed tradition of theology. I will also, 
however, claim that he is creatively within this tradition: his is a distinctively 
Enlightened Puritanism, a Calvinism that has found (particularly in the doctrine of the 
Trinity) ways to reshape its own distinctives so that they can stand without apology in 
an intellectual climate shaped by the heirs of Locke and Newton. This is necessarily a 
different orthodoxy (but orthodox nonetheless) from that Edwards would have learnt 
from van Mastricht and Turretin; it is also a different system from that developed by 
the Edwardsean. tradition that followed him, precisely because this clear-sighted 
appreciation of the significance of Locke and Newton was lacking in that tradition. 67 
Beyond this, a number of writers have fruitfully treated different areas of Edwards' 
theology; as my thesis is primarily theological I will address these individually at the 
most appropriate point in my own discussion. 68 Jenson's book is a powerful summary 
of Edwards' theology, recognising (for perhaps the first time) the theological use he 
made of Newton, alongside Locke, and covering almost every topic in some depth. A 
very recent volume by Michael McClymond69 also attempts a survey of Edwards' 
theology. It is constantly insightful, but does not cohere so well as a whole, and is of 
narrower compass than Jenson's work. 
read as if he operated using such a philosophy. One may say many things of Edwards' philosophical CP a 
commitments, but that they were determined by 'common sense' is not one of them! 
66 The best of these works is John H. Gerstner's three volume The Rational Biblical Theology of 
Jonathan Edwards Berea Publications, Powhatan VA, 1991-1993. Gerstner organises Edwards' 
thoughts in a meticulous and extremely helpful manner, but rarely offers commentary that is at all 
incisive, and at times is guilty of simple anachronism. No matter how dear the position may have been 
to Dr Gerstner's heart, Edwards was not a Biblical inerrantist, and indeed, provides precisely the 
theological positions required to avoid the total capitulation to Enlightened values that the doctrine of 
inerrancy represents. Murray's biographical volume (cit. ), as earlier noted, is open to a similar set of 
criticisms. 
67 Jospeh Haroutunian's fine book Piety vs Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology 
Harper & Row, New York, 1970, first published in 1930, shows great insight into both the greatness of 
Edwards' theology, and what was lost in the tradition that came after him. 
68 Probably the most significant current work is the series of introductions to the Yale Edition of 
Edwards' Works. I will be interacting with most of these throughout this thesis, and shall seek to give 
each its deserved praise in turn, but the series editors deserve great praise for the consistently high 
standard achieved. There is not yet a single volume for which a close reading of the Introduction will 
not be of great value to any scholar. 
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1.5 Other Currents in the Study of Edwards 
Although most writers since Miller have sought a theological corrective to his picture, 
the attempt to demythologise Edwards' religious writings to find a modem 
psychology has continued - or perhaps re-surfaced from time to time. 70 Within the 
same scientific field, a better interpretative practice, recognising Edwards' theological 
commitments, nevertheless finds something worthy of study in the early scientiU 
writings. 71 
Moving from scientific approaches to literary ones, Edwards has long been a standard 
example of early American literature, with 'Sinners in the Hands of an angry God' 
vastly over-anthologised, and the 'Apostrophe' to Sarah Pierrepont also frequently 
noticed. The over-exposure of this one sermon is reflected in recent secondary 
literature, with a steady trickle of articles analysing it. 72 In a slightly more specialised 
area, Wilson Kimanch has ploughed what seems to have been a lonely furrow, but 
one producing a great harvest, in his decades of rhetorical and literary studies into 
Edwards' sermons. 73 
This list could be multiplied, but one final, and idiosyncratic, entry V411 complete it: 
building, I suppose, on the 'Apostrophe, and Edwards' last recorded words, 74 there 
has been a small tradition of writing the history of Jonathan and Sarah Edwards as a 
love story. Mrs. Dodds' delightful book75 is the first sustained treatment that I am 
aware of, but it was followed by a chapter in a volume on ethics by James 
69 Encounters with God, cit. 
70 A paper by David R. Williams, comparing Edwards with B. F. Skinner, would be one example. 
'Horses, Pi-eons and the Therapy of Conversion: A Psychological Reading of Jonathan Edwards's C, 0 
Theology' Harvard Theological Review 74 (198 1) pp. 337-352. 
71 This area is decisively affected by the recent re-dating of Edwards' manuscripts, and so the few 
pages of Anderson's 'Introduction' to YE6 under the heading 'Edwards as a Scientist' (pp. 37-52) are 
the best available comment, although Anderson refers to a number of earlier discussions in his 
footnotes. This is perhaps an area where some historical work could profitably be done. 
72 For example, Steele, Thomas J. and Delay, Eugene R. 'Vertigo in History: The Threatening Tactility 
of "Sinners in the Hands"' Early American Literature 18 (1983) pp. 242-256. 
73 Various essays in collections may be found, but the crowning glory is the massive (258pp. ) 
'Introduction' to the first volume of Edwards' collected sermons, YE10. 
74 'Give my kindest love to my dear Wife, and tell her that the uncommon union which has so long 




McClendon. 76 The attraction of this is, amongst a literature that can be and in the 
extreme, as McClendon puts it 'at [the story's] center glows a love that was truly 
gracious and truly human, too ... earthy, human love. 177 The famous portrait 
(attributed to Joseph Badger) of Edwards shows the Puritan theologian in gown, 
bands and wig - but there is just a hint of a smile at the comers of the mouth, easy to 
miss, but there -a suggestion of humour and humanity lying beneath the surface, but 
ready to break oUt. 78 
The ideal of the Enlightenment philosopher'was perhaps most closely approximated 
in Immanuel Kant, the sage of K6nigsberg who was unaffected by the world around 
and left it alone as well, his only appearance his daily walks regular enough to set a 
clock by. Edwards was not an Enlightenment philosopher. He was a Puritan 
theologian, and theologians of an Incamational religion cannot be aloof and separate 
from the world, but must be full of both humour and humanity to fulfil their calling. 
Contrary to popular repute, Puritan theologians knew this better than most, and 
Edwards most certainly did. His private letters have now been published, 79 and give 
us some glimpse of this, but for me at least, it was the love story that moved me from 
admiring the theology to beginning to love the theologian, so that in the preceding 
paragraphs the love story gets far more space in this thesis than, on strictly intellectual 
terms, it deserves. 80 
Jonathan Edwards was a Reformed preacher and theologian. His undoubted greatness 
as a writer, a philosopher, even his early promise as a scientist, should not be allowed 
to obscure this truth. This is what the four decades of scholarly endeavour between 
Miller and Jenson demonstrate. The greatness and continuing significance of Miller's 
76 McClendon, James W. Systematic Theology: volume I. - Ethics Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1986 
pp. 1 10-131. 
77 ibid p. 13 1. 
78 Thuesen makes a similar point about this portrait. art. cit. 
79 yE16. , 
80 As with any thinker personal circumstances no doubt affect Edwards' theology in all sorts of ways. 
To offer merely one example, he constantly returns to the 'wedding of the Lamb' imagery in talking 
about the final destiny of the, Church. It could not be demonstrated, but is surely not unreasonable to 
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work is that it demonstrated that Edwards had something to say to America. 81 
Building on what had come between, and adding much of value of his own, Jenson is 
able to insist that what Edwards had to say was explicitly and irreducibly theological. 
It might not - should not - be 'Sinners... ' but if we are to hear Edwards' voice it will 
be a sermon. 
I began this introductory chapter by suggesting that the question mark in its title could 
be justified on two possible grounds. One has been relatively easily disposed of, by 
an appeal to the literature; it is to the other, the suggestion that in an important area of 
his theology, Edwards works with a theology of glory, rather than a theology of the 
cross, and so, according to the strictness of Luther, does not deserve the title 
'theologian', that I will turn in the rest of this thesis. The next chapter will prepare 
the ground by suggesting the centrality of a particular vision of God's glory for 
Edwards. It will begin, however, with a scene from a detective novel. 
suppose, that his predilection for this particular image was in part a result of his own happy experience 
of marriage. 
81 Being English, however, I would want to insist not just to America, not least because the history of 
my own, British Baptist, denomination was decisively affected by Edwards' writings -a story that I 
shall tell in the conclusion to this thesis. A preliminary observation will make the point, however: one 
of the most striking pieces in the Edwards archive at the Beinecke Library in Yale is a single sheet filed 
under the title 'Notes on Imputation and Free Grace' (Beinecke collection Box 19 Folder 1232). Ibis 
is a large sheet, of about A3 size, containing a proclamation from the Governor of a day of 
thanksgiving on the 76November 1734, which Edwards has used to make notes. The back is covered, 
as might be expected, but the front also has boxes drawn and filled with comments wherever there is 
blank space and, in one or two instances, where there is not. No doubt a certain sort of reader, coming 
across this sheet, would feel , that scribbling all over the royal crest and the legend 'God Save the King' 
is entirely appropriate, but considered merely as an artefact this sheet is a revealing testimony to both 
the scarcity and price of paper, and to the British culture that was still strong in the colonies. 
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Chapter 2 
An Increasing Vision of Glory: Edwards'Quest for God's 
Fundamental Purpose 
[Lord Peter Wimsey and Chief Inspector Parker are following a mysterious trail of 
footprints 
.. I 'It's all right - I've got him. He's tripped over a root. 
'Serve him glad, 'said Lord Peter viciously, straightening his back 'IsayI 
don't think the human frame is very thoughtfully construcledfor this sleuth- 
hound business. If one could go on all-fours, or had eyes in one's knees, it 
would he a lot more practical. 
'There are many difjlculties inherent in a teleological view of creation, ' said 
Parker placidly. I 
There are only occasional hints in the various novels in which he features of Miss 
Sayers' intention to grace Chief Inspector Parker with an interest in systematic 
theology, specifically of an Evangelical flavour, but we, may speculate that it was 
from an Edwardsean that he learnt this final, truth, and this comment, albeit ripped 
cruelly from its context, will serve admirably as a motto for this chapter, and indeed, 
this thesis. A teleological view of creation, asserting that a fundamental reason could 
be given for God's decision that there should be something other than an eternity of 
His own perfection, was a commonplace amongst the Reformed orthodOX2 
theologians of the seventeenth century from whom Jonathan Edwards learrit much of 
his theology. 
The answer given by these writers to the question of the ultimate purpose of creation 
was very simple: God creates for the promotion and display of His own glory. This 
often stood as a simple assertion that was neither argued for nor discussed. 3 Edwards, 
I Dorothy L. Sayers Clouds of Witness Hodder & Stoughton New English Library, 1988 p. 58. 
2 The theological movement that sought to defend and defirie the new Protestant positions is variously 
described as 'Protestant scholasticism' and 'Protestant orthodoxy', with the words 'Lutheran' or 
'Reformed' replacing 'Protestant' when more precision is required. Whilst neither of these terms are 
especially helpful, they have the merit of long use, and I wil I be adopting the latter. 
3 For example: '... he has determined to show forth the glory of his power, wisdom, and goodness in 
the creation and preservation of all things. ' Wollebius IV. 1.2 (Beardslee's translation - Reformed 
Dogmatics p. 50); 'He has by an unchangeable counsel and purpose specified and resolved on the things 
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by contrast, but like the good Chief Inspector, saw the many difficulties inherent in 
such a view, and wrestled with these problems throughout his life. This process of 
reflection can be seen in the Miscellanies - perhaps most conveniently in Harvey 
Townsend's collected chapter of many of the references, at least until Thomas 
Schafer's definitive edition for Yale is complete. 4 The results can be seen in the first 
of the posthumously published Two Dissertations, the Dissertation Concerning the 
Endfor Which God Created the World, or End of Creation as it is usually now 
known. 5 
Edwards' discussion begins by assuming the answer assumed by the orthodox, and 
ends by exploring it, but between he veered away from this position to explore others, 
which contributed greatly to his understanding of what it meant to say that God's 
purpose in creating was the display and promotion of His own glory. This chapter 
will be taken up with an exposition and critique of this position. To address this 
question, I will begin with a brief account of the Christian doctrine of creation, which 
will both clarify'the question and set limits on the possible answers. I will then 
explore Edwards' various discussions, before addressing at some length the concept 
that lies at the heart of his final answer. This will set the scene for the rest of this 
thesis, as the application he makes of this answer to various areas of theology will be 
explored with a view to testing the adequacy of his account. 
2.1 The Doctrinal Background 
The place to begin, perhaps, is in reflection on the question, rather than the various 
proposed answers. Why, asks Edwards, and the orthodox before him, did God create 
the world? He is not, in asking this question, making an implicit statement about the 
that were to come into being outwith Himself in time, together with their causes, operations and 
circumstances and the manner in which they are bound to be made and to exist, for proof of, 11is glory. ' 
(Heidegger VA; q. Heppe p. 137); Examples could be multiplied, but see especially Barth, C. D. IL/2 
pp. 128-129, where Barth identifies a primal divine decision to display glory as fundamental to both 
supralapsarian and infralapsarian schemes, and CD. 11/1 p. 643 where the definition of the gloria Del is 
'the self-revealing sum of all divine perfections, ... the emerging, self-expressing; and self-manifesting 
reality of all that God is... ' - and this definition is followed by the assertion 'Many of the older 
theologians understood the glorla Del in this way. ' Also, Balthasar, Hans Urs von The Glory of the 
Lord. ý a Theological Aesthetics vol. VI. - The Old Covenant pp. 25-26 & n. II (p. 26), where Balthasar 
discusses, albeit briefly, the medieval scholastic heritage which informed Reformed discussions. 
4 Townsend, Harvey G. (ed. ) The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private Notebooks 
University of Oregon Monographs Studies in Philosophy no. 2. University of Oregon, Eugene, 1955 
pp. 126-153. Schafer's first volume, covering Miscellanies a-500, is YE13. 
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ordering of the works of creation and redemption in the Divine plan, for he is 
certainly numbered amongst those who would insist that God's prior purpose is to 
redeem. 6 Edwards' question is rather why God should do anything at all: He is 
entirely sufficient in Himself, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, perfect in His own 
Triune life, so what purpose is served for Him in bringing into being the legions of 
angels, the expanses of the universe, and the sinful race of human beings? 7 
Any survey of recent works on the doctrine of creation will reveal two things: firstly, 
that there is near-unanimity on the key contours of the doctrine from early in the 
Patristic period to the Enlightenment at least, and secondly, that in recent decades this 
consensus has been under serious attack. 8 The consensus can be summed up in the 
key Christian affirmation of creatio ex nihilo; the attack concerns the coherence of 
this idea. For my purposes, the level of agreement up to Edwards' day is helpful, as a 
general statement of the Christian doctrine will provide all the necessary background. 9 
As regards the more recent attack, this must be put to one side for the purposes of my 
discussion. 10 
3 This can be found in YE8 pp. 403-536. 
6 This will become clear in my discussions of End of Creation infra, so one example here should 
suffice: Edwards describes the crucifixion of Christ as '... as it were the cause of all the decrees, the 
greatest of all decreed events, and that on which all other decreed events depend as their main 
foundation. ' (Miscellanies 762; as yet unpublished, but an (edited) text may be found in B72 p. 528) 
The 'decreed events' here certainly include creation. In passing, let me merely highlight that, in 
contrast to his favoured dogmatics text (that of Turettin), Edwards is numbered on the side of the 
supralapsarians. That he should adopt this logically rigorous position and seek to answer the question 
of the justice of the scheme, rather than embracing the infralapsarian attempt to evade the full force of 
the logic of predestinarian doctrine, is characteristic. His account of these questions will be explored in 
chapter 4 below. 
7 This question is heavily nuanced, of course, by the particular account of God's aseity that is 
adopted, and I will discuss this issue in some detail below. 
8 See, for example, Gilkey, Langdon Maker ofHeaven and Earth: The Christian Doctrine ofCreation 
in the Light of Modern Knowledge University Press of America, London, 1959 pp. 1-14; Tanner, 
Kathryn God and Creation in Christian Theology: 7ýranny or Empowerment? Blackwell, Oxford, 
1988 p. I. 
9 Although I will be making reference to Turretin, whose work was Edwards' theology text at Yale, in 
order to demonstrate that these general positions were indeed part of Edwards' specific heritage. 
10 Briefly - and grossly oversiniplifýbg - responses can be characterised as (a) an acceptance of the 
critique and a revision of the classical doctrine (as, for instance in the various 'process theologies') (b) 
an attempt to support the classical doctrine by an appeal to natural theology (as in Peacocke, A. P, 
Creation and the World of Science Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) or (c) an insistence that the only 
proper response for theology is to assert its own ground and produce doctrines that are coherent on its 
own terms (so Tanner, op. cit. ). 
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Creation, according to Christian theology, II is wholly given its being by God - it is ex 
nihilo. 12 Its being, however, is genuinely other than God - pantheist and panentheist 
accounts have always been resisted by the Church13 - although it depends for its being 
on God; aseity and necessary being are divine perfections, not given to creature or 
Creation. It is this combination of dependency and yet genuine otherness that the 
statement creatio ex Whilo seeks to protect. 14 
At this point, my purposes demand that a somewhat artificial division be made 
between what may be termed the 'howT and the 'whyT questions concerning 
creation. The 'howT question - the account of the relationship between God and His 
world, between eternity and time - is one I will explore in chapter 3 of this thesis, 
where I will consider Edwards' idiosyncratic account of creaturely identity and 
agency. The 'whyT question, to be addressed here, is about - in Edwards' own terms 
- 'God's chief end in creating the world' -a question about purpose, rather than 
means. 15 Edwards will not accept any account of any freedom, including God's own 
freedom, that enýbraces 'liberty of indifference', or contingent actions, so confronted 
with the decision to create we may, indeed must, ask why - what is it in God that 
makes this decision appropriately perfect or beautiful, whereas the converse would 
have been less so? 
As I have indicated, the answer Edwards gives in his mature statement is many-sided 
but summed up in one word, and that borrowed from the tradition - glory. God's end 
in creating is the display and the overflow of His own glory. Understanding what it 
11 For important recent re-statements of the Christian doctrine of creation, see Barth CD. 11111; Gilkey 
op. cit.; Gunton, Colin E. (ed. ) God and Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy T. &T. 
Clark, Edinburgh, 1997; Gunton, Colin E. The Triune creator., A Historical and Systematic Study 
Edinburgh University Press, Ecinburgh, 1998; Pannenberg, W. Systematic TheoloV vol. 2 (tr. G. W. 
Bromiley) Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1994 pp. 1- 174. 
12 Turretin V. I. V. 
13 1 will discuss how successfully Edwards' own understanding of the immediacy of God's 
relationship with Creation preserves this note of genuine otherness in chapter 3 below. 
14 On this, see Jenson, R. W. 'Aspects of a Doctrine of Creation' in Gunton (ed. ) The Doctrine of 
Creation (op. cit. ) pp. 17-28. 
Is This division may be regarded as defensible particularly given Edwards' supralapsarianism: the 
question of God's purposes for the world is clearly separate, and prior, to the question of God's 
relationship with the worK according to this scheme. John If. Gerstner finds this division in Edwards: 
'Jonathan Edwards was surely interested in the creation, but he was far more concerned with what 
happened behind the creation scene. ' The Rational Biblical TheoloSy ofJonathan Edwards vol. 2 Berea 
Publications, Powhatan VA, 19932 P. 189. 
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means to say this will be the burden of the rest of this chapter, and the rest of this 
thesis. 
As so often in seeking to answer theological questions, there is a dangerously narrow 
course to be steered here between two dangers: the need is to discover an adequate 
reason for God to create the universe, without making God's own fulfilment 
dependent upon the creation. Although there is no discussion of these two dangers in 
Edwards' works, throughout his discussions he can be seen to be attempting to find 
this middle course. Without any apparent awareness of the patristic discussions, he 
does this by the same theological method: invoking the doctrine of the Trinity to 
explain both God's self-sufficiency and the genuinely other nature of the creation. 16 
John of Damascus, following Athanasius, 17 distinguishes between generation, which 
is an cpyov ýucrccoq and creation, which is an cpyov 06%ijaccoq. A similar distinction 
may be found in scholastic theology between necessary and voluntary acts of will. 18 
It is, according to this distinction, of the nature of God to beget the Son (and to spirate 
the Spirit), because God could not be God without so doing. 19 By contrast, it is 
16 1 am indebted to my colleague, Dr. John Colwell, for the suggestion that the development of the 
doctrine creatio ex nihilo only became possible in the context of explicitly Trinitarian discourse. 
Whilst space precludes a MI development of this argument, some pointers may be given: Prof. Young 
argues that creatio ex nihilo, far from being a borrowing from intertestamental Judaism, is first 
encountered in Tertullian (Young, F. ' "Creatio ex Nihilo": a context for the emergence of the Christian 
Doctrine of Creation' SJT 44 (1991) pp. 139-151; see also May, Gerhard Creatio ex Nihilo: The 
Doctrine of Creation out of Nothing in Early Christian Thought (tr. A. S. Worrall) T. &T. Clark, 
Edinburgh, 1994). The co-incidence between the development of adequate statements of both 
Trinitarian doctrine and the doctrine of creation in patristic thought is clear, particularly in Ireneaus and 
Tertullian. Again, theological response to Newtonian mechanistic ideas of creation during the 
Enlightenment was confined to explicitly Trinitarian thinkers - notably Samuel Taylor Coleridge (on 
this, see Gunton, Colin E. The One, the Three and the Many. Gog Creation and the Culture of 
Modernity Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, and my own unpublished Master's 
Dissertation Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Knowledge of God (University of Wales M. Th. 1996)). 
In chapter 3 below I will be arguing that Edwards' theological appropriation of Locke is saved from the 
pantheism of Berkeley's similar scheme only because it is Trinitarian in form. The repeated co- 
incidence of this understanding of creation with Trinitarian ideas is at least suggestive. 
17 According to Barth, CD. I/I p. 434, who references Ekdosis 1.8 and Onc-Ar. 2: 29, but the 
Athanasius reference seems to be wrong. Or. cAr. 1: 29 contains the relevant ideas, but not the 
terminology. 
Is See Aquinas ST la q. 41 art. 2; for the same distinction in the Reformed Orthodox, see Turretin, 
3.14; also Turretin 3.29.22, where this is raised specifically in connection with the eternal generation of 
the Son. 
19 'He does not have this freedom in respect of His being God. God cannot not be God ... His freedom 
or aseity in respect of Himself consists in His freedom, not determined by anything but Himself, to be 
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merely God's good pleasure to create. He could have not done so, and His perfection 
would not have been altered or lessened in any way. 20 
The importance of this for the idea of aseity concerns the possibility within a 
Trinitarian account of God of se6ing an inner dynamism to the divine life. If God's 
perfections must find exercise - as Edwards will argue - then there is a need either for 
this or for creation. A non-trinitarian account would have, at this point, to make 
creation necessary to God's bene esse, if not His esse. This will become clearer as I 
consider Edwards' struggles with the issue, to which I now turn. 
2.2 The Development of EdwardsPosition in the Miscellanies 
Harvey Townsend, in his collection of the Miscellanies, has gathered into one chapter 
a number of references to God's purpose in creating. 21 These, together with other 
entries now published in YEM show an interesting development towards the mature 
statement in End of Creation, which will illuminate certain themes in that mature 
work. In analysing the latter, then, I intend to start by exploring Edwardsjoumey to 
that point. 
The journey begins with entries written during Edwards' brief pastorate in New York. 
In entry gg22 (1722-1723), Edwards' argues that a universe without immortal 
intelligent beings Would profit God nothing - He 'could neither receive good himself 
nor communicate good. 123 This is picked up in kk, where it is argued that religion 
(rather than social morality) must be the chief business of humanity. 
God, and this means to be the Father of the Son. A freedom to be able not to be this would be an 
abrogation of His freedom. ' Barth, CD. I/I p. 434. For the same point in Edwards - although not in 
connection with Trinitarian doctrine - see my discussion of The Freedom ofthe Will in ch. 4 below. 
20 Controversially, Barth, at least is not prepared to say the same about the doctrine of election, 
which, famously, he makes a part of the doctrine of God. see C. D. IL/2 pp-3-93. 
21 Townsend, Harvey G. (ed. ) op. cit. pp. 126-153. Most of the entries I cover are in this chapter, 
although not all. Miscellanies entries may also be found in Thomas A. Schafer's volumes in the YE; 
vol. 13 covers a-500, with a useful introduction; further volumes are eagerly awaited! This, once 
complete, will be the definitive edition for some time, so I have referenced to Schafer rather than 
Townsend where possible. All dates are from Schafer. 
22 The Miscellanies contain two alphabetica! series before the main numeric series starts, numbered a- 
z and aa-zz. Entry gg is, therefore, the thirty-first entry (as j and v are missing from the first 
alphabetical series). 
23 YE13 p. 185. 
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Townsend's series begins with entry it (1722-1723), where Edwards addresses the 
question of the usefulness of devotion. He argues against the suggestion that an 
excessive practice of devotion reduces a person's usefulness to the common good of 
the universe, and so is inappropriate. If, Edwards claims, the common good is the 
highest good, then the universe as a whole can have no purpose - he invokes the 
illustration of a clock (later to be used for very different purposes by Paley), and 
points out that the parts of a clock work together to turn the hands to provide purpose 
by reference to something outside itself. The lesser creatures exist for the greater, 
until at last humanity is reached - who can have usefulness and purpose only in 
reference to the Creator: 'He was undoubtedly made to glorify the Creator, so that 
devotion must be his highest end.? 24 This finds a particularly attractive presentation in 
entry 3, where 'Happiness is the end of creation ... because creation had as good not 
be as not rejoice in its being. '25 Again, creation exists to glorify God (this, a position 
which Edwards will 
, 
later reach by careful argument, is here simply asserted, 
presumably as a result of the Reformed heritage already discussed), which is to say 
creation exists to rejoice at the glory God has displayed. 
Up to this point, Edwards has assumed the creation, and asked about its purpose. In 
Miscellanies 87 (Nov. -Dec. 1723), the question is raised as to why God should create 
at all - why He desires to make known His attributes - His 'power, wisdom, etc. ' The 
answer given is that, of all God's attributes, goodness contains within itself the desire 
for its own display. One may be wise without desiring to display wisdom, one may 
(indeed, perhaps can only) be just without desiring to display justice - but goodness 
includes the desire for the opportunity of its own exercise. Therefore God created the 
world in order to be good to it - i. e. in order to make intelligent beings, happy. 
Happiness is the perception of excellency, so the world is created that angels and 
humanity may see God's perfections and rejoice in the sight. Entry 92, written at a 
similar time, is a response to Rev. 4: 11 'For thy pleasure they are and were created. ' 
How so? asks Edwards, if human (and, presumably, angelic, although he makes little 
24 ibid p. Igo. 
25 ibid p. 199. 
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of it) happiness is the end of creation. The answer is simply that God enjoys making 
others happy. 
Thus far, Edwards' theology is heart-warming, but dangerous -a danger he 
recognises. The above is very close to making God's own happiness dependent on 
creation. If God is good, and that goodness includes the inclination to exercise itself, 
to communicate happiness, then God cannot be fully Himself without exercising that 
desire - without, given what Edwards has offered so far, creating. That is to say, in 
the language of the distinctions offered earlier, that creation is at this point apparently 
an epyov ýuuccoq, or a 'necessary act of will'. This danger is addressed in entry 96, 
where it is argued that perfect goodness desires to communicate perfect happiness, 
which means happiness equal to the happiness enjoyed by the communicator. Hence 
God's perfect goodness must find its fulfilment in an 'equal' - this offered as proof of 
the doctrine of the Trinity. 26 In entry 104, Edwards realises that now, according to his 
earlier accounts, God bas no reason to create: 'the Father's begetting of the Son is a 
complete communication of all his happiness, and so an eternal, adequate and infinite 
exercise of perfect goodness ... '27 The problem is created by Edwards' embracing of 
Trinitarian doctrine, and it is to that doctrine he turns for an answer: the Son also has 
the desire to communicate Himself, to be good to another - and this other is the 
Church, which is said to be the completeness of Christ (Eph. 1: 23). The corollaries of 
this include the insistence that the Son created theworld, and the Son was the Person 
who revealed Himself in the Old Testament theophanies. 
This is brilliant, but still fails. To the first question raised: why is the response to the 
Father not an adequate exercise of the Son's goodness? Edwards suggests that the 
Son did not take the initiative in the relationship, and so has a desire to communicate 
26 The word 'proof' here needs care: Edwards is not, at this point, operating as a natural theologian; 
rather, he is arguing on the basis of the biblical revelation about God (perfect goodness, inter alla) that 
this demands God to be understood in a Trinitarian way. Careful analysis of his concept of 'goodness' 
might also demonstrate that it is bassed on fundamentally Biblical ideas, adding further weight to this 
point. The Trinitarian argument Edwards uses here will be of significance when I come to offer 
comparisons of his understanding with modem writings on hell in ch. 5 below. 
27 YEM p. 272. 
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Himself on His own account. 28 This, of course, leaves Edwards in precisely the 
position he was before: now the Son's Hfilment depends on the creation, so God still 
needs the world and creation remains an cpyov ýuaccoq. Edwards, however, seems 
not to see either this difficulty or any solution to it, as he is silent on the subject for 
nearly four years, until a spate of entries begins with 271, in late 1726. If God is not 
to need the world, His act of creation must be for His own sake. It is this idea that 
Edwards begins to discuss here, using again his Trinitarian apparatus, and he 
apparently recognises that to speak of God making 'himself his end' sounds 
dangerously like ascribing selfishness to God, and so he proposes God making His 
Son His end. Once again, the language is beautiful: 'It perhaps was thus: God created 
the world for his Son, that he might prepare a spouse or bride for him to bestow his 
love upon; so that the mutual joys between this bride and bridegroom are the end of 
the creation. ' Once again, the problem is God's dependence on the world for His own 
Mfilment - the 'joys' of the Son are not complete without His creaturely Bride. Still, 
God cannot be what He wants to be without the creation - His aseity is still 
endangered. 
In 24329 Edwards adopts a different angle of approach and first proposes a separation: 
to communicate goodness is indeed an ultimate end, an end in and of itself worthy of 
God, but so is the display of God's glory. ' 'Mat is, for God to be glorified is not a part 
of His communication of happiness, but something separate but equally worthy to be 
God's motive. 30 Edwards is led to this, according to this entry by passages of 
Scripture: Jn. 17, '12: 28, Is. 42: 8,48: 11 'and many other such. It is not a solution to 
the problem I have raised, 'but prompts a new line of thinking about God's glory as an 
ultimate end. Just four entries later (247), we find analysis and definition of this 
concept: 'For God to glorify himself is to discover himself -in his works or, to 
communicate himself in his works ... in his acts ad extra to act worthy of himself, or 
28 This, in passing, is further evidence that Edwards' account of the Trinity was more nearly 
Cappadocian that Augustinian. The Spirit is mentioned several times in the Miscellanies entry under 
discussion, but the references are not integral to the line I am tracing. 
29 According to Schafer's dating, 271 precedes 243 and 247 - seeYE13 Table 2, facing p. 90. 
30 At this point, Edwards' departure from Reformed orthodoxy becomes significant, although he will 
later find in Mastricht the way to resolve this. See section 4 below. 
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to act excellently ... the glory of God is the shining forth of his pcrfections; and the 
world was created that they might shine forth.. 131 
This is perhaps an appropriate point to pause for some preliminary reflections. 
Edwards has introduced various possibilities for God's ultimate purpose in creating 
the world, which all overlap to some extent: the exercise of God's goodness; the 
communication of God's happiness; the display of God's glory. These begin as 
simple suggestions, but are quickly developed as Edwards sees problems and 
solutions. In particular, an awareness of both the ' threat to God's aseity implied by 
making Him somehow dependent on the creation, if not for His esse, then at least for 
His bene esse, and an acute awareness of the impropriety of making God's motives 
somehow selfish are addressed, if not totally solved, by a conscious invocation of 
Trinitarian doctrine. In this, Edwards has laid the foundations of his approach: what 
will follow will essentially be an analysis of the nature of, and relationships between, 
goodness, communication, and glory in a Trinitarian context in an attempt to avoid 
both the charge of selfishness and the threat to aseity. 32 With this map in place, I 
return to the historical analysis. 
In entry 332 (late 172833) the beginnings of an answer to the threat to God's aseity 
start to become apparent: the language chosen now is that of communication, but what 
is new is an analysis of God's fulfilment: 'It don't make God the happier to be 
praised, but it is a becoming and condecent and worthy thing for infinite and supreme 
excellency to shine forth: 'tis not his happiness but his excellency so to do. '34 This is 
a key advance, in that here it is appropriate for God to create, rather than in some 
sense necessary. With this insight, creation is finally an epyov Oc%ijcrc(oq - 
something appropriate and beautiful for God to do, but not something necessary for 
His perfection. A hint of a second theme is also present: 'the communication of 
himself to their understandings is his glory, and the communication of himself with 
31 YE13 pp. 360-361. 
32 Although, as I have indicated above, Edwards is following the same line as the Fathers took, it 
seems he is doing it without any conscious borrowings from Patristic theology. 
33 There is a misprint in Schafer's Table of dates: under '1726 Sept. ' the confusing entry '331-3141 
appears; as p. 84 of the introduction makes clear, this should read '311-314. ' 
34 YE13p. 410. 
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respect to their wills, the enjoying faculty, is their happiness. 135 Although it is 
undeveloped here, we shall see that this division becomes a Trinitarian one in 
Edwards' thought, with Word and Spirit as God's two hands in the world, the fonner 
reaching out to the understandings of His creatures and the latter to their wills. 
A year later, in late 1729 and early 1730, Edwards produced three entries (445,448 
and 461) which take these thoughts further. 445 is a long analysis of the place of 
exercise of goodness and display of glory as joint ultimate ends. Goodness must be 
exercised for its own sake, or it is not goodness, in distinction from every other 
attribute which is glorified. Edwards invokes the example ofjustice, and the argument 
he has used previously: God can be just without ever acting justly - so long as He 
never acts unjustly; God cannot be good without ever acting in a good way. 461 
continues this theme, arguing on the basis of Scripture that 'God delighteth in the 
creatures' happiness in a sense that he doth not do in their misery. '36 This, surely, is a 
significant statement, and Edwards takes it further: 'the glory of God cannot be 
considered as the proper end of God's acts ofjustice. "37 God actsjustly because He is 
just, although He might have had in mind the glorifying of Himself when He gave 
Himself occasion to actjustly. God enjoys His creatures' happiness, and God enjoys 
their knowledge of, and delight in, His perfections. The latter demands the display of 
those perfections, and so may involve (in the case of justice) suffering for some 
creatures, but this is a bad thing, an inappropriate thing, in itself, although outweighed 
by the good of God's perf6ction being seen in the final analysis. There is little need to 
draw attention to how far we are from visions of Edwards' God as 'the cosmic sadist' 
at this point. 
Miscellanies 448 takes up Trinitarian analysis once again: God's self-glorification ad 
intra occurs in two ways: in knowing Himself in His own perfect idea, the Son, and in 
flowing forth in love and delight for Himself - the Spirit. Correspondingly, His glory 
ad extra is in two ways: being known by His creatures and being loved and en oyed 
by His creatures. In this, the fullness consists in God's delight in giving to His 
creatures; He cannot receive anything from them. All His communication of glory ad 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. p. 502. 
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extra is an overflow of the dynamics of His own inter-Trinitarian life. God is given 
nothing by creation, so His aseity is preserved, but God enjoys giving something to 
the creation, and so He creates. 
In entry 547, Edwards brings in another necessary complication to this story: the 
reality of history. Providence, Edwards asserts, has a goal, which will be reached at 
the end of the world. At that point, it will have been necessary for each moment in 
history to have happened, or 'providence never would have ordered them. The world 
never would have been in such a state. '38 Edwards actually uses this as a proof of the 
survival of intelligent beings, as their memories are all that remain of the inten-nediate 
states of history. This corollary is in danger of being inconsistent with Edwards' own 
metaphysics, which ascribes existence to reality in the mind of God, and history to the 
sequential nature of that reality, 39 but the attempt to account for the fact of history is 
significant, and will become a part of Edwards' final position. 
Entry 553 is alsý significant, as in it Edwards pulls together much of what has gone 
before, and makes a further move: the removal of goodness from its prime place 
arnongst the attributes. All divine attributes, Edwards now argues, are exercised only 
because of creation, and 'it is fit that the divine attributes should have exercise. '40 
This is not because God needs to exercise his perfections, but because He delights to. 
In fact, God exercises His perfections ad intra, in that 'He infinitely loves and 
delights in Himself, ' and this contains the ad extra exercise, but is not precisely the 
same. Hence, it is appropriate for God to give Himself ad extra exercise - to create. 
And this, broadly, remains Edwards' settled position until the burst of activity that 
accompanied his desire to publish his conclusions in End of Creation. In the 
Miscellanies a few entries still appear, but add little: 581 and 586 reiterate that all 
things God creates are for His own purposes; three entries in the 600s show Edwards 
trying to refine his language to avoid any weakening of aseity. These deserve some 
comment: 662 uses the language of appropriateness once again: 'it was meet that His 
37 ibid 
39 Townsend, op. cit. p. 135. 
39 On this see ch. 4 below. 
40 Townsend, op. cit. p. 136. 
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attributes and perfections should be expressed. 141 679 asserts that God does not need 
creatures, but would be less happy if His desire to display His own goodness were 
frustrated, a point which is refined still further in entry 699: 'God don't seek His own 
glory for any happiness He receives by it, as men are gratified in having their 
excellencies gazed at ... but God seeks the display of His own glory as a thing in 
itself excellent. 142 This is a theme Edwards develops elsewhere: 43 God, in putting 
Himself first, is not being selfish, in that it is appropriate for all things - including 
God - to put God first. 
One further entry from around this time is interesting in this connection. In entry 
681,44 Edwards links the gift of happiness to creatures with their (eschatological) 
being in God, so as to essay a link between God's self-glorification and God's gift of 
happiness to His creatures. The saints are indeed 'exalted to glorious dignity' and to 
'fellowship' and even 'union' with God Himsclf, 45 but 'care is taken' (by God, we 
presume) that this is not their own glory, but that it comes to them as they are 'in a 
pers6n that is God'. Edwards' conclusion is full of admiration for the systematic 
cleverness of this arrangement: 'Thus wisely hath God ordered all things for his own 
glory that however - great & marvelous the exercises of his grace & love & 
condescension are. to the creature, yet he alone may be exalted & that he may be all in 
all. '46 Here, Edwards discovers, almost in passing, is a way to talk about God's gift of 
goodness as another way of His act of self-glorification. 
Following this, there is a gap of over three hundred entries without reference to the 
question of the end of creation. 47 Then, beginning with 1066, a spurt of entries occurs 
41 ibid p. 138. 
42 ibid p. 139. 
43 For example, the notion of consent to 'being-in-general' (Le. God) in True Virtue; seeYE8 p. 540 & 
passim. 
44 Thus far published only in the Dwight edition of Edwards' Works in 1830; the quotations about all 
come from the fourth page of Thomas Schafer's transcript of the entry. 
45 Edwards will even say that the saints are given to be 'in some respects divine in glory and 
happiness'l 
46 The grammatical idiosyncrasies and (particularly) the lack of punctuation, are characteristic of 
Edwards' unpublished notebooks. The editors of YE are (quite rightly) silently tidying up the English 
as they publish, but in the absence of their authoritative edition, I have chosen to reproduce it as exactly 
as possible. 
47 Although the ideas that Edwards had been developing do arise in passing in other contexts. To cite 
merely one example, some relevant comments may be found in Miscellanies 864 (as yet unpublished, 
but an adequate text may be found in B72 pp. 511-514), discussing the moral government of the world. 
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representing the creative effort Edwards put into systematising his thoughts for 
publication in End of Creation. Rather than analysing all these before turning to that 
statement, I will next address the published work, and make reference to Miscellanies 
entries where relevant. 48 
2.3 Edwards'Mature Position in the End of Creation 
Concerning the Endfor which God Created the World is the f irst of two dissertations 
Edwards was preparing for publication on his death. 49 It is a characteristically careful 
attempt to answer a question which, as the foregoing will have made abundantly clear, 
Edwards had been thinking about throughout his life. In offering a reading of it, one 
important hermeneutical point must be made: as Paul Ramsey, the modem editor of 
the Two Dissertations, makes clear they should be read together, not apart. 50 This is 
more of an issue, perhaps, in the interpretation of True Virtue (as Ramsey's examples 
show5l) but will also affect a reading of the first dissertation in important ways, as I 
hope to demonstrate. This section, then, will contain a (necessarily52) full exposition 
of End of Creation coupled with a briefer reading of True Virtue to make Edwards' 
final account of the teleology of creation clear. 
End of Creation begins with an introduction defining terms and setting forth axioms, 
in which Edwards is concerned to make distinction between a 'chief end, ' an 'ultimate 
48 It is perhaps worth noting that Edwards does make occasional reference in the Miscellanies to other 
works that have clearly influenced him as he was preparing to write End of Creation. Apart from the 
obvious Biblical interest (see, for instance, entries 1080 and 108 1), Edwards transcribes a passage from 
Ramsay's Philosophical Principles of Religion that clearly influences, or at least supports, Edwards' 
own argument in entry 1253 (see particularly p. 5 of the Schafer transcript), and also a series of 
quotations from Thomas Goodwin in entries 1275 and 1277a. 
49 The companion volume is True Virtue, both may be found in YE8. 
50 YE8 pp. 5-6. Miscellanies 1208 (which is published in an edited form in both Townsend (pp. 140- 
149) and the Miscellaneous Remarks) demonstrates this point quite well. It is headed 'END of the 
CREATION. GLORY OF GOD Nature of REDEMPTION. SATISFACTION OF CHRIST Nature of TRUE VERTUE 
& RELIGION', which might be considered an ambitious programme for one notebook entryl The 
contents, however, demonstrate the close linkage between the theses of the 7wo Dissertations in 
Edwards' mind. 
51 ibid p. 6 n. 5.. 
52 Necessary because there is so little attention paid to this Dissertation in the secondary literature. 
Jenson's account (op. cit. pp. 3843) is characteristically insightful, although brief, and Gerstner makes 
occasional comments throughout his Rational Biblical TheoloV (cit. ). Other than this, very little has 
been published. 
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end' and a 'subordinate end. '53 Starting with the last, a subordinate end is something 
sought for the sake of something else - the example of buying a medicine, not because 
of a desire to own it, but because of a desire to regain health is offered. 54 An ultimate 
end, by contrast, is sought purely for its own sake. Clearly, there may be a chain of 
subordinate ends leading to the one ultimate end, and a thing may be both an ultimate 
end and a subordinate end - sought partially for its own account and partially for the 
sake of something else. 55 Contrasting with both of these is a chief end, which is the 
thing 'most valued. ' This is not the same as an ultimate end -a person may have 
several ultimate ends - things valued for themselves - but only one will be the chief 
end. On the basis of these distinctions, Edwards makes a series of comments 
concerning purposefulness, which lead in to a discussion of God's aims and goals in 
creating the world. Edwards suggests that, if there is only one ultimate end, this may 
therefore be termed the 'supreme end'. 56 He indicates here that he will show this to 
be the case with God; although as yet no argument for this position is offered. 57 The 
act of creation is directed towards this supreme end, although God having created, a 
number of other ultimate ends (which Edwards terms 'consequential ultimate ends') 
come into view. It is pleasing to God to act justly, for instance, and so this is an end 
in itself after the fact of creation; but not the reason for creating. All God's works 
will clearly be governed by His supreme end, but any given act of God may also be 
governed by consequential ultimate ends as well. 58 Any general work of providence, 
however, will be governed by God's original ultimate end. Finally in this section, 
Edwards raises the possibility of multiple original ultimate ends in God, and although 
he has already indicated that he will argue that this is not the case, the position may 
not yet be assurned. 59 
Thus far, Edwards has merely clarified the question he is asking: what is (are) God's 
supreme end(s) in creating the world? He begins his answer with a chapter entitled 
53 ibid. pp. 405415. A note in the Miscellanies between entries 1355 and 1356 shows Edwards 
working on these ideas. 
54 ibid. p. 405. 
55 ibid p. 406. 
56 ibid p. 410. 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. p. 413. 
59 ibid. p. 414415. %IV 
49 
'What Reason Teaches. 960 This is because, he explains, he is engaged in apologetic 
work, and so must begin with reason to meet objections based on reason. In the first 
section of this chapter, six general dictates of reason are offered: 61 
1. God's aseity. 
2. That anything' presupposed by God's work cannot be its end (e. g. God's own 
existence). 
3. The most valuable thing attainable by creation must be God's end. 
4. Hence, if possible, God will be His own end in creating, so that God's self- 
revelation is an appropriate end. 
5. Whatever is valuable in itself, which can be shown to be God's purpose in 
creation, must be an ultimate end. 
6. Therefore, any valuable thing resulting from God's creation can be assumed to be 
an ultimate end. 
On the basis of this, the second section of the chapter asks what good things are the 
consequence of creation. ý2 Four are listed. Firstly, the exercise of God's attributes is 
valuable in itself. if God delights in His attributes, then He will delight in their 
display. Secondly, it is more valuable if these perfections are not just exercised but 
seen to be exercised, and so God's perfection is known by other beings. Thirdly, this 
is again more valuable if His perfections are not just seen and known, but loved and 
delighted in. Finally, God's fullness of perfections, beauty and happiness is capable 
of communication, and this is also valuable in itself. So, Edwards asserts: 'it was 
[God's] last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite 
fullness of good ad extra, or without himself, and the disposition to communicate 
himself or diffuse his ownfullness, which we must conceive of being originally in 
God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. '63 
The fourth thesis of the first section in this chapter had suggested that, if possible, 
God should be His own end in creating. Edwards' third section of this second 
chapter64 is devoted to demonstrating that, in each of the four points made above, this 
60 ibid pp. 417463. 
61 ibid pp. 419427. 
62 ibid pp. 428-435. 
63 ibid pp. 433-434. These arguments may be seen developing in Miscellanies 1182 (Townsend, 
p. 140). 
64 ibid pp. 436-444. 
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is precisely what God is doing. The first three points are trivial: God's love of His 
own perfections naturally implies that He values their display, and their being known 
and loved. The fourth end, -the communication or emanation of God's fullness, is 
more difficult. Edwards starts by drawing a distinction between love in general, 
which is God's disposition to love, and love in a strict sense, which presupposes an 
object to be loved. Given this, it is God's delight in His own glory which causes Him 
to communicate and difluse it. The church is called the 'fullness' and the 'glory' of 
Christ, so the Church is God's end in creating: 'His exercising his goodness, and 
gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the spring of all God's 
proceedings through the universe. 165 But God Himself must be the ultimate end: the 
Church can only be a consequential end. This is explained by reference to the 
communications that God makes: God communicates divine knowledge, but the 
creature's knowledge of God is simply participation in God's knowledge of Himself. 
God communicates virtue and holiness, and the creature participates in God's own 
moral excellency. God communicates happiness, and the creature, rejoicing in who 
God is, is participating in God's own joy in Himself. In all of this, the concept of 
participation, the Church being in Christ and the Spirit being in each particular 
Christian, is clearly key. Because, in Edwards' soteriology, the Church participates in 
the divine life, 66 in making the Church His end God is making Himself His end. The 
more we participate in these perfections, the closer we draw to God: 'The image is 
more and more perfect, and so the good in the creature comes forever nearer and 
nearer to an identity with that which is in God. "67 This is movement towards a 
fulfilment of Christ's own prayer recorded in John 17, as we share the unity He has 
with His Father, 'being, ' in Edwards' words, 'as it were, one with God. '68 
So in each of the ends postulated in the second section, God makes Himself His own 
ultimate end. Edwards' position is now basically in place; the last section of this 
65 ihid. p. 440; see also Miscellanies 952 (in the continuation, which occurs after entry 954 in the 
manuscript; p. 10 of Schafer's transcript) '... the churches of Christ (for whose sakes chiefly all heaven 
& earth is made)... ' Robert Jenson makes the same point in a recent essay: 'the church is responsible 
for the world in the elementary sense that were it not for the church there would be no world! Jenson, 
'The Church's Responsibility for the World' in Braaten, Carl E. & Jenson, Robert W. (eds) The Two 
Cities of God: The Church's Responsihilityfor the Earthly City Eerdmans, Cambridge, 1997 pp. 1-10; 
P. 1. 
66 On this point see ch. 4 below. 
67 ihid. p. 443. 
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chapter turns to objections to what has come before. 69 Firstly, the objection that this 
impairs God's aseity - that He is apparently here fulfilling a lack within Himself. 
Edwards answers that God's pleasure is pleasure in Himself, which nothing can 
hinder, so His happiness is genuinely independent. Aseity is threatened by any 
account that assumes that there is a reason God created the world, and, by making 
God His own end; Edwards is as far from threatening it as any other account can be. 70 
The second objection is that God is selfish, if He acts as He is presented here. 
Edwards here invokes His metaphysics: God's self-regard is regard to, being in 
general, and so in God selfishness and unselfishness are meaningless terms, or at least 
they have the same definition. Because of this, God's interests exactly coincide with 
the interests of the whole, and God's self-regard causes Him to regard the interests of 
the creature. 71 Thirdly, Edwards anticipates that his account will lead to accusations 
that God is ignoble, in that He should not be interested in seeing Himself applauded. 
Once again, the identity of God's being with being-in-gen'eral provides a response: 
love of self and love of all (i. e. true virtue) are not distinguished, so love of self is 
virtuous, not ignoble., A second response asserts that it is not unworthy of God to 
value the opinions of His creatures, because- of His 'infinite grace and 
condescension. '72 Finally, if esteem is deserved it is not ignoble to value it. 73 The 
final objection Edwards deals with is the suggestion that this account diminishes the 
grace of God, and hence the obligation to gratitude placed on the creature. Once 
again, Edwards resorts to his metaphysical position to insist that God's glory and the 
creature's good are not distinct: 'God in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of 
his creatures: - because the emanation of his glory implies the communicated 
excellency and happiness of his creature. '74 
69 ibid 
69 ibid pp. 445463. 
70 ibid pp. 445450. Edwards does not here identify the cpyov ýuaeo); - epyov Oektjaea); distinction 
that I have been working with, but the underlying concept seems to be present, if not articulated. He 
teaches it expressly in a sermon, The Excellency of Christ (B77 pp. 680-689), where he says '[Christ's] 
proceeding from the Father, in his eternal generation or filiation, argues no proper dependence on the 
will of the Father; for that proceeding was natural and necessary, and not arbitrary. ' (p. 682; italics 
original). 
71 ibid. pp. 450453. See fin-ther my discussion of True Virtue below. 
72 ibid p. 457. 
73 ibid. pp. 453458. 
74 ibid. pp. 458-463; quotation from p. 459. 
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Edwards turns in his second chapter to ask 'What is to be learned from Holy 
Scriptures concerning God's last end in the creation of the world. 175 Firstly, Scripture 
is constantly clear that God makes Himself His end - He is both the 'first cfficicnt 
cause' and the 'last final cause' of all things; this is the meaning of 'Alpha and 
Omega', language, as well as the teaching of many texts. 76 Having established this 
initial position, Edwards outlines the exegetical principles he will be adopting in 
examining it in more detail - in particular, in asking in what sense God makes Himself 
His end. 77 
The first group of principles insists that those things that are spoken of most 
frequently, and most generally as God's purpose are most likely to be His ultimate 
end. 78 Then Edwards proceeds to explain the theological basis of the exegesis he will 
perform. The moral (i. e. 'spiritual', in current usage) world, he asserts, is the reason 
for the rest of creation to exist, so whatever is spoken of as the end of the moral 
creation may be assumed to be the end of all creation. 79 The purpose of a thing may 
be inferred from its use, and providence is the description of the use of creation, so the 
aim of God's works of providence will be the end of creation, particularly as they are 
applied to the moral realm. 80 Again, theologically, the moral world is made for that 
part of it that is good, 81 so the purpose of this part may be seen to be the purpose of all 
creation. On the basis of this, Edwards makes a series of more precise assertions: 
that which defines the goodness of the moral world, 82 that which makes this goodness 
admirable, and that which is the reason for the commendation of pious people in the 
Scripture, can each be regarded as the chief end of all creation. These prepare the 
way for the final exegetical position: Jesus Christ is both the head and goal of the 
75 Chapter title; ibid p. 465. 
76 ibid. pp. 467468. 
77 ibid. pp. 469474. 
78 Positions 1-3; pp. 469470. 
79 Position 4; pp. 47047 1. See chapter 3 below for a discussion of this doctrine of creation. 
90 Positions 5-6; p. 471. 
81 Recalling Jenson's phrase in n. 65 above, it is the church that is the reason for creation, not merely 
humanity in general. 
82 1 e. the ethical commands of Scripture. 
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moral world, and the chief pattern of piety, so whatever He sought as His great 
purpose is the chief end of God in creating. 83 
Edwards' purpose in offering these exegetical positions would seem to be twofold: to 
narrow the question asked, from a general one about creation to a more specific one 
about the church and, particularly, Jesus Christ; and to widen the available evidence, 
since Scripture speaks far more of the church (including of course, in Edwards' terms, 
Israel) and of Christ than it does about general questions. In the next few sections, 
Edwards goes'on to offer, on the basis of these principles, a series of answers drawn 
from Scripture to the question of God's ultimate end in creating, before working 
theologically with these answers to. demonstrate their coherence with each other, and 
with the positions reached by means of 'reason' in the earlier chapter. 
Applying these principles to Scripture, then, will offer various possible answers 
concerning God's ultimate end in His work. Firstly, God's 'glory'84 is regularly 
described as God's ultimate purpose --i it is the purpose of the church, and what Christ 
sought as His highest end. 85 Again, God's 'Name' and 'praise' are both spoken of in 
Scripture in significant placeS86 as the purpose of God's actions. Finally, picking up a 
theme which I noted as important in the development of his position, Edwards still 
insists that the exercise of God's goodness is appropriate in itself in a way that the 
exercise of His justice is not: 
According to Scripture, communicating good to the creatures is what is in 
itself pleasing to God: and that this is not merely subordinately agreeable, and 
esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a further end, as it is in 
executing justice in punishing the sins of men; which God is inclined to as fit 
and necessary in certain cases, and on account of the good ends attained by it: 
but what God is inclined to on its own account, and what he delights in simply 
and ultimately. 97 
So, Edwards finds 'glory, ' 'Name, ' 'praise' and 'communicating goodness' as 
appropriate ultimate ends for God, according to Scripture. Before discussing their 
83 Position 12; YE8 p. 474. 
94 At this point Edwards simply uses the word. His discussion of its meaning will follow later. 
85 YF, 8 pp. 475-492. 
96 e. g. the various events surrounding the Exodus are said to be 'for the sake of God's name' p. 494, 
referring to Il Sam. 7: 23; Ps. 106: 8; Is. 63: 12. 
87 p. 503. 
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inter-relation, he offers a brief exposition of what Scripture means when speaking of 
God's 'glory' and 'Name'. The etymology of kavod in Hebrew carries the idea of 
weightiness or greatness, sometimes just possessed, sometimes in their display. 
'Glory', then, refers firstly to the internal greatness, majesty, excellency and dignity 
possessed by (or inherent in) a person, and the satisfaction or happiness that this 
produces. Secondly, it denotes this internal glory in its display, or visible exhibition. 
Applied to God this means the display of His goodness and grace, particularly in the 
gift of salvation in Jesus Christ. 88 But, Edwards insists, it means more that this: not 
just the exhibition of God's goodness and fullness, but their communication. 89 
Thirdly, 'glory' can mean the apprehension, and hence knowledge, of displayed 
glory. 90 Finally, it may also be a synonym for 'praise' - the creature's delight in, and 
celebration of, God's glory. 91 Finally here, Edwards indicates that 'Name' is virtually 
synonymous with 'glory' in the Scriptures. 
So, Edwards has gathered up 'gl 
* 
ory, ' 'Name, ' 'praise, ' and the communication of 
God's goodness into, one multifaceted concept involving God's perfections, and 
particularly His mercy and grace, being displayed, known, rejoiced in and 
conununicated. Thus, what Scripture teaches concerning God's ultimate end in 
creating the world is shown to be co-incident with the results of the investigation into 
'what reason teaches'. The final section makes explicit the unity of God's ultimate 
end, and suggests that the 'most common and most apt' name for it is 'the glory of 
God. '192 
98 p. 518-521; a footnote to this section (p. 518 n. 5) comments on Rom. 9: 22-23 in the following terms: 
'In the 22d verse where the Apostle speaks of God's making known the power of his wrath, saith he, 
rd "God willing to show his wrath, and make his power known. " But in verse 23 (sic) when he comes to 
speak of mercy, he saith, "That he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of 
mercy. "' This, in passing, suggests that Ramsey's desire to link God's glory with God's wisdom, 
power, justice and goodness (YE8 p. 514 n. 7) is misconstrued: glory has properly to do with mercy and 
goodness in a way it does not with justice and power, at least in Edwards' thought 
89 'The word "glory, " as applied to God or Christ, sometimes evidently signifies the communications 
of God's fullness, and means much the same thing with God's abundant and exceeding goodness and 
grace. ' p. 518. 
90 pp. 521-522. 
91 pp. 522-523. 
92 p. 526. Edwards had reached this position early in the spurt of entries in the Miscellanies that show 
him beginning to work up to writing this dissertation. Entry 1066, for example, (Townsend, p. 139) 
begins by asserting that language seems to lack a term that is adequate for God's ultimate purpose ('a 
proper general word to express the supreme end of the creation'). However, having further identified 
the problem as the need for a word which will cover both God's self-glorification and His self- 
communication, Edwards finally asserts that both these are described as 'God's being glorified' in 
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This has been demonstrated biblically, in that the term 'glory' will cover all these 
areas in its Scriptural use. Edwards will now demonstrate it theologically; these 
different components 'are all but the emanation of God's glory; or the exceeding 
brightness and fullness of that divinity diffused, overflowing, and as it were enlarged; 
or in one word (sic! ) existing ad extra. 193 The demonstration is achieved by what I 
take to be a Trinitarian argument, although at no point is it explicitly so. Edwards 
argues that 'God's internal glory, as it is in God, is either in his understanding or 
Will. 194 His glory in the former is His self-knowledge; in the latter His holiness and 
happiness. Now, the psychological analogies of the Trinity are a part of Edwards' 
heritage, 95 and in his Essay on the Trinji), 96 Edwards explicitly identifies the Son with 
God's perfect knowledge of Himself in His understanding and the Spirit with God's 
perfect delight in Himself in His will, a passage Edwards he invokes when talking 
about the end of creation in Miscellanies 679, if not in the final work. It is surely not 
unreasonable, then, to see Edwards offering a Trinitarian account of. God's glory 
here. 97 
Such a reading is supported by a number of the Miscellanies entries that Edwards 
writes as he is gathering his material for the End of Creation, where we have a 
Scripture. Again, in entries 1082,1084 and 1092 (all unpublished), Edwards can be seen working at 
the different senses that the word 'glory' bears in the Scriptures. 
93 p. 527. 
94 p. 528. 
95 1 have indicated my reasons for thinking Edwards' account of the Trinity is more nearly 
Cappadocian than Augustinian in a number of places throughout this thesis; the current observation 
does not weaken this point, in that whilst psychological analogies point strongly towards an undue 
emphasis on divine unity at the expense of the real hypostatic existence of the Three Persons, the link is 
not inevitable. This is particularly the case within a Puritan tradition which operated with a 'faculty 
psychology' that so stressed the division between understanding and will in human beings that the two 
were in danger of becoming hypostatised. Certainly, under Locke's influence, Edwards decisively 
modified this view, but his move was not necessarily a flat denial of the distinction of the faculties. It 
could as well be seen as retaining the relative independence (and hence hypostatisation) of the faculties 
but insisting that their interdependence also be recognised (that an analogy of perichoresis be adopted). 
See YE2 pp. 11-15. For an account of Puritan faculty psychology and Edwards' rejection of it see 
Cherry, Conrad The Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal Doubleday, Garden City, 1966 
pp. 10-22. 
96 In Helm, Paul (ed. ) Treatise on Grace and Other Posthumously Published Writings James Clarke, 
Cambridge, 1971 pp. 99-13 1. 
97 The pervasiveness of psychological analogies in the tradition may even permit an assumption that 0 
Edwards expected his readers to recognise Trinitarian references here without any explicit mention. 
Jenson's comment perhaps makes the point: 'And yet all this language [concerning the glory of God] is 
in fact christology, though only tentatively so. ' America's Theologian p. 4 1. 
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repeated insistence on the parallel between the twofold going forth ad extra that 
Edwards sums up with the word 'glory' and the twofold going forth of the Father's 
substance ad intra which is the generation of the Son and the procession of the 
Spirit. 98 These entries are actually rather repetitive, with the same basic argument 
being presented in slightly different words each time. The flowing out of God's glory 
is twofold, consisting in the communication of knowledge to the creature and the 
communication of love to the creature. These correspond99 to the internal begetting of 
the Son, or Logos, or Wisdom, of God, and proceeding of the Spirit, or Love, of God. 
In entry 1082, these are described as 'only a second proceeding of the same persons; 
their going forth ad extra as before they proceded [sic] ad intra. ' 
This repetition works because Edwards sees all God's glory and perfections as 
summed up in the perfection of knowledge in His understanding and the perfections 
of virtue and happiness in His will: 
The whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz. his 
infinite knowledge; his infinite virtue or holiness, and his infinite joy and 
happiness. Indeed, there are a great many attributes in God, according to our 
way of conceiving or talking of them: but all may be reduced to these; or to 
the degree, circumstances and relations of these ... And therefore the external 
glory of God consists in the communication of these. 100 
Ile creature who knows God is participating in God's perfect knowledge of Himself, 
and so the display of God's perfections is equivalent to the communication of His 
knowledge. Equally, the creature who loves and delights in God is the recipient of the 
communication of His happiness and joy. True holiness is nothing but superlative 
love for God's beauty, so the creature who loves God is also participating in God's 
holiness, and so is the recipient of the communication of God's holiness. The 
underlying Trinitarian conception suggests that participation in the Son and Spirit is 
99 This may be found in entries 1082,1151,1218 and 1266a. Of these, only the parts of 12 18 that are 
in Townsend (pp. 149-152) are published in any convenient source. 
99 In entry 1082 'answer'; in 1151 'are agreeable to' or are 'correspondant to'; in 1218, again, 'are 
agreeable to'; in 1266a 'are answerable to'. Too much should not be read into the precise wording of 
Miscellanies entries, however; Edwards was here recording his thoughts for private use, not seeking an 
exact statement to communicate them to the public. 
100 p. 528; it is worthy of notice, in passing, that in this passage Edwards has succeeded in gathering up 
the whole tradition of discourse about the attributes of God into an overarching Trinitarian framework. 
Edwards makes the same point in his Essay on the Trinity, as I shall discuss later. See further my 
comparison of Edwards with Barth on the divine perfections at the end of this chapter. 
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what is intended, 101 and so that notions of the indwelling Spirit and salvation as 
participation in the Son are not far from the surface here. Further, Edwards argues, 
our creation in the imago dei, as having both knowledge and will, means that the 
distinctions in the overall concept of glory are suited for our appropriation, not just 
God's gift. Thus the end of creation is one: 'God's internal glory or fullness extant 
externally, or existing in its emanation. '102 
Edwards has one final point to make: he has argued earlier that it is fitting for God to 
make Himself His end, but this overflow of glory appears to be directed towards the 
good of the creature. The response offered is a reiteration of the central concepts of 
communication and participation: the creature's knowledge, love and joy are God's 
own knowledge, love and joy given (communicated) to the creature, and then returned 
to God. A lengthy quote is perhaps useful here: 
In the creature's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, 
the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fullness is received 
and returned. Here is both. an emanation and remanation. The refulgence 
shines upon and into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The 
beams of glory come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded 
back again to their original. So that the whole is of God, and in God, and to 
God; and God is the beginning, middle and end in this affair. (italics 
original)103 
Once again, the language seems to demand Trinitarian interpretation, but that is not 
the key point. God, in communicating, Himself to the creature, is known, loved, 
rejoiced in - is, in short, glorified. So God is, in a sense, His own end in creation. 
But implicit in this is a stricter sense in which this is true. Another quotation, if only 
because the position is so surprising, found so far west of the Danube: 
God's respect to the creature's good, and his respect to himself... are united in 
one, as the happiness of the creature aimed at is happiness in union with 
himself. The creature is no further happy with this happiness which God 
makes his ultimate end than he becomes one with God. The more happiness 
the greater union: when the happiness is perfect, the union is perfect. And as 
the happiness will be increasing to eternity, the union will become more and 
101 'Thus that which proceeds from God ad extra is agreable (sic] to the twofold subsistcnccs which 
proceed from him ad intra which is the Son & the holy Spirit the Son being the Idea of God or the 
knowledge of God & the holy Ghost which is the love of God and joy in God. ' Miscellanies 1218. 
102 p. 53 1. 
103 p. 53 1. 
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more strict and perfect; more and more like to that between God the Father 
and the Son; who are so united that their interest is perfectly one ... in this view, the creature must be looked upon as united to God in an infinite 
strictness. 104 
Everything that has gone before has, in fact, presupposed this full-blown iheosis 
doctrine, but still, perhaps, it is a sho 
, 
ck. Nonetheless, with this in place the position is 
coherent and consistent. God's first purpose is to share His own life, and so His 
fullness overflows to creatures that they may be drawn in to the eternal life of God. 
An image Edwards used very early on in his quest, in Miscellanies 271 (1726) which I 
have already quoted, 105 and returned to repeatedly, recurs once again at the end of this 
text, as the 'one flesh' union between husband and wife becomes a type of the final 
union between Christ and His church. An earlier statement is more attractive, if less 
careful, so it is perhaps fitting to end my exposition by one more time from the 
Miscellanies: 'The end of the creation of God was to provide a spouse for his Son 
Jesus Christ that might enjoy him & on whom he might pour forth his love, & the end 
of all things in providence are to make way for the exceeding expressions of Christ's 
love to his spouse & for her exceeding close & intimate union with & high & glorious 
enjoyment of him. '106 Only now, it is not just the love of the , 
Son, but the mutual 
love, knowledge and holiness of the Trinity that is given to the church. 
The argument of this dissertation will be central to my thesis, and it is not well 
known, so I have spelt it out at very great length. The process of exploring the 
adequacy of this account will be the burden of all that is to follow, and addressed 
finally in my conclusions in chapter 6, but some initial remarks may usefully be made 
here. Firstly, Ramsey, in his editorial notes on the text, constantly raises the issue of a 
suspicion of Neoplatonism, particularly in regard to the language of 'emanation'. 107 
His response is to seek to use textual analysis to demonstrate that this is not what 
104 pp. 533-534. 
105 n. 47, on p. 52. 
106 Miscellanies 7 10, appendix (thus-far published only in the Dwight edition of 1830; my quotation is 
taken from Schafer's transcript). As I indicated in n. 80 to chapter I (on p. 36), this image is recurrent in 
Edwards' writings. Just a few entries later in the Miscellanies, it appears again: 'There was (supply 
gas'] it were an eternal society or family in the Godhead in the Trinity of persons it seems to be Gods 
[sic] design to admit the church into the divine family as his sons [sic] wife... ' (entry 741, again, 
published only in Dwight). 
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Edwards meant; how successful this may be is a question I leave to others, because 
my contention is that a neoplatonic reading of Edwards is simply inconceivable, if my 
Trinitarian reading is accepted. The - Fathers, after, all, avoided platonizing 
emanationisms precisely by asserting the doctrine of the Trinity. 108 
Secondly, concerns about morality may be raised. Is God not, despite all Edwards' 
arguments to the contrary, painted as simply selfish here? The objection has apparent 
force, in that there is little in End o Creation to defend against such charges'09 - but )f 
then it is only one of Two Dissertations. An understanding of the account of virtue 
Edwards offers in True Virtue will be sufficient to answer this charge. 
The second dissertation has been much more widely received and read than the first, a 
fact which Ramsey suggests has skewed many interpretations. ' 10 Nevertheless, this 
familiarity, and the fact that it is less central to my purposes, will enable me to offer a 
briefer reading of the second work. Edwards' concern is to analyse virtue; it is, he 
asserts, simply beauty in the'moral realm, III so the question - becomes one of analysis 
of beauty. This is a task Edwards attempted early in his career, in the Notes on the 
Mind, 112 where he had argued that 'all beauty consists in similamess, or identity of 
relation'l 13 - i. e. that proportion, symmetry and harmony are the essence of the quality 
we call beauty or excellence. Edwards returns to this same point in the posthumous 
work:, and expands it: true virtue is 'general beauty', that is 'beautiful in' a 
comprehensive view as in itself and as related to everything that it stands in 
connection with. '114 So, stated baldly, true virtue is 'love to Being in general'. 115 
'Love' can be analysed into 'love of benevolence, which desires good for its objects 
regardless of their worth, and 'love of complacence', which delights in the beauty of 
its object. The object of virtuous love is not beauty or gratitude, since these would 
107 SeeYE8 p. 433 n. 5; and footnotes later taking the same theme forward. 
108 On this, see Jenson art. cit. in Gunton (ed. ) The Doctrine ofCreation (cit. ). 
10' Although there are hints which become more obvious when the work is read with the conclusions 
of True Virtue in mind. 
110 YE8pp. 5-6. 
III ihid. p. 539. 
112 YE6 pp. 332-393; begun in 1723 (see Anderson's Introduction in YE6 pp. 313-33 1). 
113 ihid. p. 334. 
114 YE8 p. 540. 
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make virtue its own object, a meaningless position. So the ob ect of virtue must be j 
'Being, simply considered'I 16 - which is to say Being-in-general. So, virtue may now 
be analysed. It will produce love to any individual being, but only so long as that is 
not in conflict with a higher love - love for Being-in-general. In particular, a being 
that is opposed to Being-in-general will be opposed and hated by the truly virtuous 
heart. Thus the strength of benevolence that the truly virtuous person will feel for any 
given being can be determined: it will first be proportional to the 'degree of existence' 
of that being, and next to the virtue it has - if my primary concern in towards Being- 
in-general, then I will, as a result of that concern (which is simply virtue) value 
another being that shares such a concern more than I would if it did not. 
Now, after this philosophical analysis Edwards turns (again - this is the second of two 
works) to explicitly theological considerations. God has infinitely more being than 
the whole creation together, so love for 'Being-in-general' is simply love for God. 
Human virtue, then, is wholly composed of love for God, and other loves - spouse, 
family, country, animal creation - are virtuous to the extent that they are a part of this 
love. To the extent that they are raised above this love, they are simply and precisely 
idolatry, which is not virtuous. A truly virtuous mind, however, seeks the promotion 
of God's glory above all other things, the position reached in the first dissertation. 
God's virtue has the same definition, so it 'must consist primarily in love to himself. ' 
This is, however, immediately - and crucially - defined: 'the mutual love and 
friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons of the 
Godhead. '117 The corollary is obvious: God's love to created beings is, as End of 
Creation demonstrated, entirely dependent on His love to HimselL Edwards' position 
is now complete, and the remainder (and greater part) of the dissertation is an analysis 
of this position, and a demonstration that systems of ethics that do not make love to 
God their foundation must be defective. 
115 ibid p. 541. 
116 ibid p. 544. 
117 ibid p. 557; italics original. A precursor of this position can be seen in Miscellanies 1077 
(Townsend, p. 184), where the fact that God is 'as it were, the sum of all being' means that Ilis holiness 
'consists mainly and summarily in his infinite regard or love to himself. ' 
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This, then, is virtue - an entirely theological account, as may have been expected. Are 
God's motives, according to the first dissertation, selfish or yirtuous on these 
grounds? The immediate answer is both, since in God self-love and love to Being-in- 
general coincide exactly, but Edwards' account of this introduced the crucial nuance: 
God's self-love is not the self-love of some arbitrary deity, but of the Triune God of 
the Christian gospel. It is a love of eternal mutual self-giving, not of selfish solipsism. 
Once again, the doctrine of the Trinity is central to understanding Edwards' logic - 
and it is invoked explicitly this time. Selfishness cannot be an issue with this doctrine 
in place. 
On the basis of all this, the question may be put again to the first dissertation: even if 
God's self-regard is not selfish, it presents a danger for Christian devotion; after all, if 
God makes His own life His end in all His works, one wonders why human beings 
should be interested - if God's love is not love for us, there is little relevance in 
discussing it. 
Jenson. 118 suggests that Edwards recognised this danger, and its converse: describing 
God as making His creatures His end, and so making God simply an excuse for our 
selfishness. The answer he finds in the dissertation is surely correct: that, through the 
logic of his metaphysics (the discussion of God as 'being in general' in True Virtue), 
Edwards cuts through the dichotomy: God, in making Himself His own end, makes 
us His end, and vice-versa. This is clear in a passage I have already quoted: 'God's 
respect to the creature's good, and his respect to himself ... are united in one, as the 
happiness of the creature aimed at is happiness in union with himself. 'I 19 The theosis 
doctrine, made possible only by the adoption (albeit sub voce) of Trinitarian 
discourse, offers Edwards a way through this difficulty. 
My preliminary account of Edwards' understanding of the purpose of creation is now 
complete. God's end in creating is His own glory. This means the communication of 
His own knowledge, love and joy to His creatures, and their consequent participation 
I IS op. cit. pp. 38-39. 
119 YE8 p. 533. See also Miscellanies 68 1, which I have discussed above on p. 47. 
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in Him in increasing measure. The position appears coherent, and adequate in the 
account of God's character, and of His relationship to creation, that it offers. The 
remainder of this, chapter will be taken up with a discussion of Edwards' account of 
glory, before exploring how he applies his understanding of God's purpose in creation 
to various areas of God's action in history in the remainder of the thesis. 
2.4 The Glory of God: A Historical and Systematic 
Comparison 
I have already indicated that the bare assertion 'God created for His own glory' was 
common amongst the Reformed orthodox; detailed descriptions of what is meant by 
'the glory of God' are less common. 120 One exception, however, stands out, and is 
key: Petrus van Mastricht, in his Theoretico-Practica Theologia, treats at some length 
of glory - the same work that Edwards describes in a letter as 'for divinity in general 
doctrine, practice and controversy; or as a universal system of divinity ... much better 
than Turretin, or any other book in the world, excepting the Bible, in my opinion., 121 
Barth, whose, knowledge of Reformed orthodoxy is enviable by any standards, 
'follows Mastricht on this issue in his account of the divine perfections, commenting 
'So far as I can see, he alone among the Reformed orthodox attempted a detailed 
examination and presentation of the concept of the gloria Dei in a way that does 
justice to all the biblical statements and references. '122 My exploration of Edwards' 
doctrine of glory must start here. 
The Pars dogmatica ofý van Mastricht's chapter on the majesty and glory of God 
spells out what glory means in a fourfold development. 123 Firstly, God's glory is His 
infinite eminence of being and perfections (infinita eminentia ... compelit ... tum ab 
essentia... lum ab attributis). But this perfection naturally shines, and so God's glory 
120 Turretin, for instance, does not treat the subject at all in his third topic - 'On the One and Triune 
God'; the same may be said of Wollebius in 1.1 - 'The Essence of God'. Heppe, in his synopsis, lists 
glory alongside majesty, perfection and blessedness as the final content of all God's attributes - V. 43 
(p. 104). 
121 Letter of Jan 15 1746/7 to Joseph Bellamy, YE16 pp. 216-2 18; the quotation is from p. 217. 
122 CD. II/I p. 649. 
123 van Mastricht, Theorellco-Practica Theologia 11.22.3-10. Mastricht has, to the best of my 
knowledge, never been translated into English. I include extensive Latin quotes in my discussion only 
because my own Latin is not of a standard to provide a reliable translation. 
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must also include in its definition the brilliance of His perfections and eminence 
(perfectionis & eminentiae istius q. fulgor). But if this brilliance shines out, it is 
inevitably recognised, and so the recognition of this eminence, called God's face 
(agnitio istius eminentiae a quafacies Dei dicitur) is the third part. And these three 
together eminence, brilliance and recognition, make up the internal glory of God, 
which is coeternal with Him. 
Mastricht's derivation of God's glory is not yet complete, however. Fourthly and 
finally, glorification - the reception and manifestation of internal glory - must be 
included (agnitae per fulgorum eminentiae, celebratio seu manifestatio, quae magis 
proprie gloriflicatio). This includes eternal acts of glorification internal to the Trinity: 
'Pater glorificat Filium ... Filius vicissim ... Patrem.,. Spiritus 
S Filium ... & Palrem 
... 1 It also includes the glorification of God by the recognition and praise of 
His 
internal glory in creation - not just the direct praise of angels and human beings, but 
also the recognition of God's glory in His works - in the gospel, in providence, and so 
on. These should prompt worship and praise from the intelligent creation, 'quibus 
omnibus Dei omnipotentia, omniscientia, inexhausta bonitas; agnoscitur & 
extollitur. ' 
The similarity to Edwards' account is evident, but so also are the moves Edwards 
made. Whilst ideas of overflow and participation are implicit in Mastricht, they have 
none of the prominence that Edwards was to give to them. This is perhaps explained 
by the second dissimilarity: in van Mastricht Edwards would have found little or 
none of the Trinitarian grammar that is so crucial to his mature statement. It is this 
move, understanding that the. word 'God', spoken in Christian discourse, demands 
Trinitarian content, and working out what that means consistently, that is distinctive 
to Edwards., Van Mastricht leaves the reader with the feeling that God's glory is seen 
across a gap - an infinite qualitative distance; a feeling that God remains outside the 
world He has created, looking in - and perhaps occasionally reaching in, but not 
intimately involved. Edwards' consciously Trinitarian language offers the possibility 
of speaking of God as simultaneously other than, and involved with, His world: 
speaking of God giving not just a vision, but genuinely Himself to His creatures, and 
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calling His creatures to share in the fullness of joy that is His own life., This is the 
heart of Edwards' advance. 
So much for the background to Edwards' thought. Continuing my initial exploration 
of this theme, I next turn to a comparison with two recent writers who have made 
much of the concept of glory. Firstly, a writer within the Reformed tradition who also 
learnt from van Mastricht on this subject - Karl Barth; and then a friend of Barth's 
whose attempt to renew aesthetics as a theological theme focused on the Biblical 
language concerning glory, Hans Ur von Balthasar. A conversation with these two, 
exploring possible contemporary perspectives on Edwards' account, will conclude 
this chapter. 
Barth's account of the divine perfections is found in CD. 11/1, pp. 322-677, and is split 
into three (unequal) sections - an introduction to the divine perfections, an account of 
the perfections of the divine loving, and an account of the perfections of the divine 
freedom., The basic definition of the reality of God that Barth is working with here, 
'the One who loves in freedom', is itself a Trinitarian fonnula, 124 and so he, like 
Edwards, can be seen to be attempting to gather up all the language concerning God's 
attributes that is found in the tradition into a more basic (and indeed credal) form. 
Language of divine 'glory occurs at the beginning and the end of this account, 
indicating the importance of this language for Barth. 
The initial section on "The Perfections of God'125 uses the word 'glory' to sum up the 
fullness and the overflow of all the divine perfections. Barth's concern is to find a 
way to insist (as theologians have almost always sought to insist and, according to 
Barth, almost always failed to insist) that God's perfections are genuinely His, 
essentially and immanently, and so our knowledge of them is knowledge of God 
Himself. - 
124 As is made clear by a phrase very early on in this section: '... God is Father, Son and Holy Ghost, 
i. e., loves in freedom... ' CD. 11/1 p. 323. 
125 ibid. pp. 322-350. 
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Barth's whole discussion of the divine perfections ends with a subsection on 'The 
Eternity and Glory of God' which serves to bring together all that has gone before. 126 
Barth's first definition of glory follows Biblical usage: 'God's glory is His dignity and 
right not only to maintain, but to prove and declare, to denote and almost as it were to 
make Himself conspicuous -and everywhere apparent as the One Ile iS. 1127 In 
developing this, Barth follows Reformed orthodoxy: 'It is the self-revealing sum of all 
divine perfections. It is the fullness of God's deity, the emerging, self-expressing and 
self manifesting reality of all that God is. It is God's being in so far as this is in itself 
a being which declares itself'128 This is spelt out in a fourfold account which follows 
van Mastricht, and a discussion of the category of beauty, which Barth will not make 
central, but regards as important. Finally, Barth's insists that it is proper to God's 
glory that it should become known: 'It belongs to the essence of the glory of God not 
to be gloria alone but to become glorificatio. '129 
What is striking when this account is placed alongside Edwards' is the similarity: not 
just the categories of communication and overflow adopted from van Mastricht, but 
the use of the concept of beauty, and the attempt to bring all this language into a 
Trinitarian framework. There is no evidence that Barth had any knowledge of 
Edwards' work, but one cannot help thinking that he would have recognised a kindred 
spirit in at least some'areas. This is not, perhaps, surprising: Barth and Edwards 
stood in the same, Reformed, tradition, although both (Barth probably more so) 
modified it in new and creative ways. 
Beyond the similarity, however, differences present themselves. The first of these, I 
suggest, is that Edwards is more thoroughly Trinitarian in his discussion of the divine 
perfections than is Barth. To demonstrate this, I will explore briefly Barth's attempts 
to avoid nominalism in this area: in his first section on the divine perfections, Barth 
points to the theological relevance of the nominalism-realism debate, and suggests 
that it turns on this doctrine. 130 
126 C. D. II/I pp. 608-677. 
127 ibid. p. 641. 
128 ibid p. 643. 
129 ibid p. 667. 
130 C. D. 11/1 pp. 325-335. 
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There are two basic errors to be avoided here. The extreme nominalist error, which 
Barth charges to Eunomius, Occam, Biel and Schleiermacher, is to view the divine 
perfections as in no sense divine, merely projections of human qualities on to a divine 
Being who Himself (the temptation at this point to write 'itself is almost 
overpowering) is nothing but naked being. 131 The opposite, realist, error is to 
hypostatise the perfections so that they are independent entities within, or above, the 
being of God. Against this Barth insists that there is no 'second, alien divinity in 
God'132 and that 'There are not first of all power, goodness, knowledge, will, etc. in 
general, and then in particular'God also as one of the subjects to whom all these 
things accrue as a predicate. '133 
The mainstream of theological history, according to Barth, lies between these two, but 
is still flawed. Citing thinkers ranging from Irenaeus and John of Damascus to 
Thomas, Calvin and the Reformed orthodox, Barth recognised a desire to identify the 
divine perfections economically I rather than immanently with God, - i. e. to make 
knowledge of the perfections part of the accommodation of God to our 
understandings, denying that they are part of God's knowledge of Himself. 134 Thus 
there is a nominalistic tendency present, what Barth calls a 'partial nominalism', 135 
which, he contends, must also be resisted. 
The way forward Barth offers depends first on a recognition of the fundamental basis 
of the doctrine of God. The problem is one form of that of the One and the Many, and 
so calls for Trinitarian resolution: '... the fact that the idea of God was not determined 
by the doctrine of the Trinity, but that the latter was shaped by a general conception of 
God ... was now avenged at the most sensitive spot ... the 
idea of the divine simplicity 
was necessarily exalted to the all-controlling principle, the idol, which, devouring 
131 ibid p. 327. 
132 ibid p. 331. 
133 ibid. p. 334. 
134 ibid. pp. 327-330. 
135 ibid p. 330. 
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everything concrete, stands behind all these fonnulae ... 1136 Following this, Barth 
offers three 'explanatory propositions' in order to protect a correct statement. 137 
Firstly, the diversity of the divine perfections belong to the being of the one God, and 
not to any second dývine nature. Secondly, this diversity is a diversity of God's 
simple being - 'In God multiplicity, indiv . Iduality and diversity do not stand in any 
contradiction to unity. '138 Thirdly, this diversity of perfections is immanent and not 
merely economic. 
Barth's fundamental insight - that the underlying problem here is a failure throughout 
the tradition to be rigorously Trinitarian whenever God ý is spoken of !- is certainly 
sound. And the three propositions he advances are certainly adequate to the problem, 
if they can be held to constantly. My concern with the formulation, however, is the 
lack of any obvious connection between the fundamental insight and the propositions. 
If this really is a question of Trinitarian discourse, should it not be possible to derive 
those propositions which are necessary to an adequate statement from Trinitarian 
doctrine? Put another way, Barth proceeds by laying down boundary conditions. If it 
were possible, would not an answer formulated in Trinitarian terms that could be 
shown to lie within these boundary conditions be preferable? My contention here is 
that Jonathan Edwards offers just such an answer. 
As so often, seemingly, with Edwards, it is a position offered in passing, en route to 
an answer to a different question. In a passage in the Essay on the Trinity, Edwards 
says this: I. 
It is a maxim amongst divines that everything that is in God is God which 
must be understood of real attributes and not of meer (sic) modalities. If a 
man should tell me that the immutability of God is God, or that the 
omnipresence of God and authority of God, is God, I should not be able to 
think of any rationai meaning of what he said ... But if it be meant that the real 
attributes of God, viz. His understanding and love are God, then what we have 
said may in some measure explain how it is so, for deity subsists in them 
distinctly; so they are distinct Divine persons. 139 
136 ibid p. 329; it is perhaps worth noting (particularly in view of my use of it in Ch. 5 belowl) that 
Barth certainly does not reject the doctrine of divine simplicity, but argues that it be understood aright, 
citing Augustine's phrases multiplex simplicitas and simplex multiplicitas - ibid 
137 ibid pp. 330-335. 
139 ibid. p. 332. 
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This dense passage contains several surprising features. Firstly, Edwards is 
uncompromising in his commitment to a serious Trinitarianism in the Cappadocian 
mould: the only available referents for the word 'God' are the 'distinct Divine 
persons'. The residue of a common 'essence' which was so pervasive in Western 
theological discourse is wholly absent, and Edwards claims to be unable to think of 
$any rational meaning' behind the standard language that describes the essence. 140 
Secondly, however, his approach is clearly that of a child of Augustine: the Trinity of 
the mind, the mind knowing itself/God and the mind loving itself/God is straight from 
the master's work, and so he does not fall into this century's characteristic error of 
assuming that the language of persons must have meant three minds, three 
knowledges and three wills, rather than three Persons with one perfect will and the 
rest. So, and thirdly, Edwards makes a striking move: the Father's perfections are 
only and precisely the Son and the Spirit. As noted earlier in this chapter, this is not 
an isolated statement, but occurs in End of Creation as well. With these passages in 
view, even Edwards' adoption of the classical language of the Reformed tradition in 
Religious Affections seems lodded: 
there are two kinds of attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving 
him, his moral attributes, which are summed up in his holiness, and his natural 
attributes, of strength, knowledge, etc. that constitute the greatness of God; so 
there is a two-fold image of God in man, his moral or spiritual image, which is 
his holiness ... and God's natural image, consisting 
in men's reason and 
understanding, his natural ability, and dominion ... 141 
There is, then, in Edwards a move to subsume the doctrine of the divine pcrfections 
under the doctrine of the Trinity. 142 In this move we see that he takes with full 
seriousness the warnings in the tradition (that Barth claims the tradition itself was 
139 Helm (ed. ) op. cit. p. 119; my italics. 
140 The practice of discussing the attributes of God under the locus of the One God and so identif*g 
them with God's essence was pervasive throughout scholasticisms both before and after the 
Reformation. 
141 YE2 p. 256; this passage is certainly less clear than those in the -Essay on the Trinity and End of 
Creation, and it may be that Edwards moved away from traditional language towards the end of his life 
(a difficult contention to prove, since no more accurate date than later than 1727 has been offered for 
the Essay to the best of my knowledge - see Helm, ed. op. cit. p. 5). However, reference may be made 
once again to the pervasiveness of the psychological analogies in the tradition, which would support a 
Trinitarian reading of this passage. 
142 Edwards' 'Outline of "A Rational Accounf" -a note indicating how he intended to arrange his 
projected Summa - is very brief, and too much should not be read in to it, but the line 'Trinity, and 
God's attributes' surely lends support to my reading. YE6 p. 396. 
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unable to heed) that the perfections; of God are truly the being of God - the position 
Barth is arguing for - and offers a way of understanding it built on the doctrine of the 
Trinity, gathering all the perfections of God up into the Son and the Spirit. Let me 
immediately say that this is radical within the tradition. The quincumque vult, after 
all, asserts that Father, Son and Spirit are alike all wise, yet there are not three that are 
all wise, but one, and even in Barth the assertion that the perfections belong to the one 
essence of God remains. 143 Yet once the move (resisted by Augustine) from 
psychological analogies to psychological accounts144 had been made, Edwards' 
further move is an obvious one. 
Obvious it may be, but is it valid? Given that the patristic doctrine never intended to 
suggest three centres of knowledge and will in its language of Three Persons, 145 the 
question becomes one of appropriation and perichoresis. Edwards is essentially 
seeking, to appropriate different perfections of the divine phusir to particular 
hypostases. To the best of, my knowledge, this is a move unique in the tradition, a 
radical extension of the doctrine of appropriation (which classically refers to the ad 
extra acts- of the Trinity). - -I suspect that, provided the doctrine of perichoresis is 
remembered and asserted, a form of this move could be developed that would not 
damage Trinitarian theology in any fundamental way, but Edwards did not live to do 
this, and it is impossible to say how he would have aligned these ideas with his 
broader Trinitarian theology, or indeed whether questions like those raised above 
would have led him to abandon them. He offers, however, the beginnings of a way to 
formalise what Barth merely asserts: that only by a thoroughgoing re-appropriation of 
the fundamentally Trinitarian nature of Christian theism can a satisfactory doctrine of 
the divine pcrfections be offered; which is almost to say that this is the only route to a 
143 C. D. 11/1 pp. 322-350passim. 
144 By 'psychological accounts' I mean the attempt to project the analogies found in the mind of 
humanity back into the life of God. With Augustine's psychological analogies in place, this is an 
obvious move, invited by the Biblical language of Logos - rationality, idea - and Wisdom (and indeed 
Love, if Augustine's identification of the Spirit with Love is accepted). This is particularly the case if 
the Puritan faculty psychology is adopted - although to what extent this was derived from this sort of 
Trinitarian account is a historical question I am not competent to answer. 
145 On this see Prestige, G. L. God in Patristic Thought S. P. C. K., London, 1952 pp. 242-264, 
especially pp. 263-264, where a passage of Ps. -Cyril which John of Damascus incorporated into The 
Orthodox Faith is referred to: "Mere is ... one ousia, one goodness, one power, one will, one energy, 
one authority; one and identical; not thi-ee similar to each other, but a single identical motion of the 
three hypostaseis ... the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit are in every respect one entity, save for 
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satisfactory doctrine of God, within the Reformed tradition, given the centrality of the 
discussion of the divine perfections within the doctrine of God in most Reformed 
dogmatics. 
So, a comparison with Barth demonstrates both a common inheritance in the 
Reformed tradition and the strength of Edwards' Trinitarian re-working, but a third 
comparison may be made, and one that is more central to my thesis: apparently Barth 
is not prepared to let this language of glory take centre stage when he comes to 
discuss the 'end of creation'. Rather, he returns to his basic statement concerning 
God, 'the One who loves in freedom', and so brings the doctrine of election into the 
doctrine of God in order to speak of those God is free to love. 146 
This bare assertion needs some care, since Barth's whole account of the divine 
perfections has been an attempt to spell out the content of the statement 'the One who 
loves in freedom, ' and the language of glory lies at the beginning and end of that 
attempt. For Edwards, however, language of glory is language of God's primal 
decision, whereas for Barth language of glory is a description of God's nature. God's 
primal decision, by contrast, 'which'is d* efinitive of who God is, is the decree of 
election, which is both an inner-Trinitarian event (Jesus Christ, elected and electing) 
and a movement outward in loving freedom to the creation. 
Once again however, care is needed: this primal decision, for Barth, is God's self- 
definition and so this must be what gives content to the doctrine of the divine 
perfections - and the language of glory is the summary of these perfections. The 
conclusion is surprising, but difficult to avoid, that Barth could have spoken of divine 
glorification as God's primal decision without materially changing his doctrine. 
Indeed, when we read the account of the divine election of grace, language of glory is 
often present. 147 
ingeneracy and generation and procession. ' Prestige argues that this is a summary of the position held 
by the Greek Fathers firom. Origen, citing Athanasius cnd the Cappadocians in particular. 
146 C. D. IL12 pp. 3-93. 
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This is a difficult place to reach. A comparison with Barth has found more 
similarities than differences, and yet it is undeniable that Edwards' theology and 
Barth's feel very different. The reason I will suggest for this will point to the heart of 
my critique of Edwards, but in order to introduce it clearly, a second, briefer 
comparison is . required. Hans Ur von Balthasar, who of course was a friend of Karl 
Barth as well as a significant Roman Catholic theologian, places categories of beauty 
and glory right at the centre of his thought. Once again, there is no evidence that von 
Balthasar ever read Edwards, but echoes can be heard. 
von Balthasar's The Glory of the Lord[48 is the first part of a massive trilogy, but has 
thus far been seen as the most significant of his writings. In it, he attempts to restore 
aesthetics to its place within theological thought - arguing that the beautiful should 
find its place alongside the good and the true as the appropriate object of Christian 
discourse. 149 It would be impossible to do justice to the sweep of von Balthasar's 
thought in a few paragraphs here, but the key discussion of the last two volumes of 
this work will highlight the point I am interested to make. These volumes present a 
powerful and original Biblical theology, vol. 6 on The Old Covenant and vol. 7 on The 
New Covenant. In them, von Balthasar shows the disintegration of the old notion of 
divine glory during and after the exile, which established the possibility for a radically 
new concept, gathering up the broken pieces and re-forging them in a hitherto 
inconceivable way. 
The Old Testament records a journey out of paganism, a journey from an unreflective 
vision of what 'glory' might mean to the verge of a new and unlooked-for possibility. 
The fundamental basis for this journey is God's revelation, but that also provides the 
most intractable problem: God's glory, as it is perceived by His people is marked 
above all by dialectic, not to say contradiction. Whichever way the subject is looked 
at, we are forced to speak of both 'knowing and not knowing', 'seeing and not 
seeing', of a 'dazzling darkness'. 150 This is because the divine glory spoken of in the 
147 A glance at the index to CD. W2 will perhaps make this point bcstý but see especially pp. 169-170, 
where election is explicitly identified with the overflowing of God's inner glory. 
148 von Balthasar, Hans Ur The Glory ofthe Lord. A Theological Aesthetics (7 vols) tr. Erasmo Lciva- 
Merikakis; ed. Joseph Fessio and John Riches T. &T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1982-1989 
149 ibid. Vol. I p. q. 
150 All titles of sections taken from Vol. VI pp. 374 1. 
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Scripture is itself an attempt by the Hebrew theologians who were the redactors of the 
Biblical books to make sense of the apparently incompatible witnesses to God's 
revelation that are contained in the earlier traditions. 151 
God's glory attains its most concrete form in the creature, particularly the human 
creature, created in God's image, and in the covenant-history of Israel. In both 
creation and covenant God is active in giving His creatures space; but the creature 
uses that space to reject God. Now 'one on von BaIthasar's basic commitments comes 
into play: this history is not merely history, but, as Biblical history, has a decisive and 
distinctive shape as that which reveals God's revelation, God's glory. 152 This 
commitment, however, poses a problem: the revelation of God's glory under this 
scheme is overwhelmingly a story of God's rejection, of the breaking of His covenant 
and the apostasy of His people. The prophets provide glimpses of what obedience 
should be, but still, the history is one of disobedience, and so the liturgy of the 
Lamentations has a peculiar place in that history: here, Israel prays as the people from 
whom the Lord has departed, and so the prays end, not with affirmation, but with 
question 'Or hast thou utterly rejected us? Art thou exceedingly angry with US? ' 153 
At this point, von Balthasar turns to consider Job, who knows this experience of being 
forsaken by God. In his case, however, it is not a result of unfaithfulness, and so Job 
allows the question to be asked: could it be that God's glory will be revealed even in 
the destruction of His temple, in the exile and shame of His people? Could there be a 
new way of conceiving God's glory that will gather up the shattered remains? The 
vocation of the anonymous prophet whose words are recorded in Isaiah 40-55 is to 
give an affirmative answer to such questions. 154 
151 So, for example, p. 53. 
152 This is the content of von Balthasar's argumentum exprophefla in the concluding pages of vol. VI, 
for example. 
153 Lamentations 5: 22, so von Balthasar vol. VI p. 280; some modem translations turn these questions 
into statements, but the Hebrew at least admits the standard reading. 
154 For better or worse, von Balthasar accepts most of the standard critical results concerning the 
composition of the Old Testament: Isaiah is treated as three books, rather than one, and the Pentateuch 
is analysed through unraveling J, D, E and P. In his treatment of the Saul narrative, however, he insists 
that the final redaction is what must be interpreted (VI. 226). This suggests a degree of inconsistency. 
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The literature dating from after the return of the exiles (in which von Balthasar 
includes Trito-Isaiah and Daniel, as well as those books usually regarded as 
apocryphal by Protestant churches) demonstrates the attempt of an abandoned people 
to rediscover God's glory in their own situation, with the shekinah gone from the 
temple; the king gone from the land, and the Word gone from the prophets. There are 
three parallel attempts: a renewed prophecy, seeking to predict the immediate coming 
of the messianic glory of God; a retreat into the mysticism of apocalyptic, which 
discounted the historical experience of God's people as something shadowy and 
irrelevant; and a wisdom tradition seeking glory in all of creation and in danger of 
syncretism. 155 These attempts were doomed to failure, but were necessary to show 
the impossibility of the synthesis of the fragments that were all that was left of the 
vision of God's glory. 
Turning to the New Testament, von Balthasar sees all these fragments gathered up, 
and the old prophetic tradition renewed for the last time, in the person of John the 
Baptist. 156 This gathering up, however, is only for the purposes of handing over, and 
it is Jesus, the Incarnate Son, who is the final revelation of the astonishing synthesis 
of His glory that is the final and decisive determinant of what it means to be God. 
Political messianism finds its fulfilment in the Suffering Servant; the unveiling of that 
which is truly apocalyptic happens not in war in the heavens, but in the humble death 
on the tree; the wisdom of the world is confronted with God's foolishness. In Jesus, 
all the old expectations of what 'glory' should have meant are fulfilled, but they are 
transformed in their fulfilling. Von Balthasar can speak for himself on this point: 
What God's glory in its good truth is, was to be revealed in Jesus Christ, and 
ultimately in his absolute obedience of Cross and Hell. The unique ray of the 
divine majesty of love is to become visible from the unique momentum of this 
event, establishing the norm for everything that can lay claim to the predicate 
6glorious', at whatever distance and periphery it may be. From here sentence 
and judgement are passed on everything that calls itself 804a in the sphere of 
creation ... Inasmuch as the central event, 
Christ's obedience unto death, is no 
myth but the final self-revelation of God in history, all other glory is 
'demythologised' by it ... 157 
155 Listed in summary in Vol. VI p. 303, and discussed at some length in the pages afterwards. 
156 Vol. Vll pp. 40-54. 
157 Vol. Vll p. 243. 
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Biblical language of glory includes, indeed centres on, that of the fourth gospel, and 
so the cross must be seen as the fundamental locus of God's self-glorification. This 
dimension, clearly present in Barth's account of election, is notable by its absence in 
Edwards' End of Creation. So my discussion of von Balthasar forces a return to the 
question I am asking of Edwards, borrowed from Luther's criticism of the Meologia 
gloriae at Heidelberg: 'He deserves to be called a theologian ... who comprehends the 
visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross. '158 Under 
this condition, does Edwards 'deserve to be called a theologian'?. 
158 Luther, Heidelberg Disputation, Thesis 20. In Works (ed. Helmut H. Lehmann) vol. 3 1: The Career 
ofthe Reformer I p. 40. 
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Chapter 3 
No Creature so Small and Abject: 
The Display of God's Glory in the Created Order 
Ifthy heart were sincere and upright, then every creature would be unto thee a 
looking-glass of life, and a book of holy doctrine. Yhere is no creature so 
small and abject that it representeth not the goodness of God 
Thomas a Kempis, The Imitation of Christ H. 1V I 
The previous chapter introduced a separation between the 'how' and the 'why' 
questions concerning creation, which I acknowledged to be artificial at the time. In 
this chapter this artificiality must become explicit: if the 'why' question is correctly 
answered, then that answer must be visible in the 'how' question - put another way, 
the being of creation must be affected by its purpose. Not just the heavens, as the 
psalmist insists, but every created being and every moment of created history must 
declare the glory of God, or Edwards' account as described in the last chapter cannot 
be accepted. The purpose - the end - of creation in its entirety and in its detail is to 
give glory to God through promoting the knowledge and love of God in His 
intelligent creatures. If any part of creation, or any moment of history, is not able to 
serve this end, then it has no reason to be - and so God would not have created it. 
So, on his own terms, Edwards must show that creation glorifies God. Withoutdoubt, 
he rose to this challenge: Images and Shadows of Divine Things' shows him finding 
4sermons in stones' as ardently as any sixteenth century Puritan (or playwright); and 
the Notes on the ApocalypsO demonstrate the parallel attempt to read contemporary 
history into the Biblical narrative. These are merely the two clearest examples of a 
recurrent practice: again and again in his writings, Edwards sought to uncover the 
I YEII pp. 49-142; the two subtitles that Edwards attached to this notebook perhaps make the point 
even more forcefully: 'The Book of Nature and Common Providence' and 'The Language and Lessons 
of Nature'; see YEI I p. 50. 
2 YES pp. 95-305. This volume is edited by S. J. Stein, who appears to feel the need to apologise in his 
introduction for Edwards' practices in this direction: 'The book of Revelation fascinated Jonathan 
Edwards ... a fact that has been a source of bewilderment and embarrassment to some students of American thought ... This volume does not promise to raise Edwards' intellectual or religious stock... ' YE5 p. 1. 
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moral meaning that his teleological commitments told him must be present in God's 
creation. 3 
Of course, these examples merely demonstrate Edwards' Puritan heritage, 4 a heritage 
that held to the 'medieval' assumption that the cosmos had a rationality that could 
provide uncomplicated access to the mind of God. Here at least it would appear that 
Edwards' thought is uninformed by, or in direct opposition to, the coming 
Enlightenment. Certainly, Edwards engaged with enthusiasm in the Puritan games of 
tracing the outcome of Biblical prophecies in the history of his own day, and of 
seeking providential words from God in the events of nature, and part of the purpose 
of this chapter is to ask whether these practices were, in the final analysis, simply pre- 
Enlighterunent anachronisms, or whether the suggestion that Edwaýds recast Puritan 
theology in a form that could stand up to its Enlightened (cultured? ) despisers can be 
supported even in these most 'medieval' areas of his thought. Living in a time of 
change, did Edwards' theology merely avoid that change, or engage with it? 
The key shift here is a change in the perceived comprehensibility of the world. 
Grossly oversimplifying, the medieval assumption was that the world was morally, 
rather than mathematically, comprehensible - that, as the good creation of God, the 
world should reflect the goodness and the authority of its Creator. Modem thought, in 
contrast, assumed (and assumes) that the world should reflect mathematical order, but 
denied (and denies) the possibility of finding moral meaning in particular events. 5 An 
earthquake was a bizarre and unusual happening to the medieval mind (to use a 
sweeping generalisation), and could (indeed, should) be read as an expression of 
God's displeasure. Modem thought, coming to maturity in the Enlightenment, sought 
to see the world as comprehensible mathematically: physical events followed certain 
3 Throughout this chapter, I will be speaking of moral and teleological dimensions of creation as 
interchangeable; whilst this need not always be the case, it is within the terms of Edwards' thought as 
outlined in the last chapter. 
4 One does not need to look far in Puritan literature to find attempts to impose a Biblical metanarrative 
on the world they inhabited; ffie pictures of New England as the New Israel and the 'City on the hill' 
provide obvious examples. 
5 'Descartes, for example, denied that final causes are operative in nature; and modem [Le. classical] 
physics was based on the presupposition that final causes are not operative in nature.. ' Foster, M. D. 
'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modem Natural Science' in Russell, Colin A. (ed. ) 
Science and Religious Belief- A Selection of Recent Historical Studies University of London Press, 
London, 1973 pp. 294-315 for the article and p. 295 for the quotation. 
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laws of nature, best expressed in mathematical terms, and could not be invested with 
moral significance: an earthquake was a result of natural processes, which were 
inevitable and amoral - stones could not be held responsible for their actions, after 
all. 6 Perhaps the most graphic illustration of this movement was indeed an earthquake 
- in Lisbon, in 1755. The change in responses that I am describing can be traced in 
the various responses to this disaster, as the clergy sought to insist that it was a 
terrible warning of God's judgement, and the philosophes scoffed at such superstition 
and preferred to speculate about subterranean fire and other possible causes. 7 
If this description is accurate, then already Edwards appears to be unusual: he will 
not fit into this either-or, but rather insists that the world is comprehensible both 
physically and morally. 8 Following his early reading of Newton, Edwards produced a 
cluster of writings on the borders of natural science and metaphysics - borders which 
were not so sharply drawn in the day, of course - which assert the physical rationality 
of the created order, and that in mathematical terms, but deny the underlying picture 
of a 'world-machine'. 9 If this position can be successfully held, then it makes 
possible an account of creation that permits moral rationality whilst accepting natural 
11 Some conclusions of Keith Thomas in his classic study Religion and the Decline of Magic are 
pertinent here: '... the religion which survived the decline of magic was not the religion of Tudor 
England. When the Devil was banished to Hell, God himself was confined to working through natural 
causes. "Special providences" ... gave way to the notion of a Providence which itself obeyed natural laws accessible to human study ... Theologians were now more readier [sic] to accept the frequency of 
unmerited suffering ... The achievement of natural theology was to effect a final break in the 
association between guilt and misfortune which had been integral to so many of the primitive beliefs 
we have considered. The mechanical philosophy of the later seventeenth century could then be 
comfortably reconciled with orthodox religious teaching... ' (Thomas, Keith Religion and the Decline 
of Magic. - Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1973; pp. 765-766). 
7 The best-known example is Voltaire's Candide, which satirises both approaches. Pangloss is found 
amongst the ruins of Lisbon speculating about underground lava, and is then burnt as a heretic because 
the Jesuits feel that an auto dafe is the obvious response to the disaster. For further responses, and 
some worthwhile analysis, see Kendrick, T. D. The Lisbon Earthquake Methuen, London, 1956. 
8 This attempt was common enough in the day; Kendrick (ibid. ) describes many clergy who wanted to 
speak of God working through the physical order, even as it was described by the new natural science. 
There is little evidence, however, that any of them were aware of the philosophical questions such a 
practice raised. The final position available within this simple morphology, denying both forms of 
comprehensibility, is characteristic of late (or post-) modemity, of course. 
9 Such 'theistic Newtonianism' was not an unusual position amongst early readers of Newton. See 
Gay, Peter The Enlightenment., 4n Interpretation (2 vols) V61.2: The Science of Freedom W. W. 
Norton, London, 1977 (originally published 1969) pp. 140-145 for some indications of the rise and 
decline of the movement; also, Anderson's comments in YE6 p. 58 for the direct influence on Edwards. 
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science; 10 an account of creation, that is, in which the creation itself can still be a 
locus for God's self-glorification. Edwards attempted to give content to this by an 
appropriation of the tradition of typological exegesis, a move that will form the 
subject of the latter part of this chapter. I will begin, however, with an. exploration of 
the metaphysics Edwards developed in response to Newton. 
3.1 -EdwardsMetaphysics, or 'Calvinism and Hobbes' 
Central to the recent revival of interest in Edwards has been the recognition of the 
importance of his early reading of Locke and Newton. II In the present context, with 
Edwards' Enlightened credentials in question, it is important to note the central 
importance of Locke and, particularly, Newton for the nascent Enlightenment. Peter 
Gay's interpretation of the movement12 offers eloquent testimony: lists of the 'greatest 
men in history' which inevitably featured Newton and Locke, and then added either 
Bacon or Leibniz abounded; 13 in referring to Newton, 'the adjectives "divine" and 
"immortal" became virtually compuIsory', 14 and these examples could be multiplied 
many times over. This given, a credible restatement of Reformed theology, 
particularly in the Anglophone world, would have to take seriously these two 
thinkers. 15 
10 In Foster's terms (see n. 5 supra), a modem physics that accepts the possibility (and the actuality) of 
final causes -a restatement that should make clear the radical nature of the enterprisel An interesting 
theological dislocation is visible here: Foster's argument is that the doctrine of creation that was 
operative in the early modem period provided the intellectual basis for natural science - the same 
natural science that demanded a denial of the doctrine of providence. One of the happy results of 
Edwards' unusual language of 'continuous creation' (which will be considered in more detail later) is 
the insistence that creation and providence are inextricably linked, and so the refusal to countenance 
this particular systematic dislocation. 
II See my comments on this in chapter I pp. 35-37. 
12 Gay, op. cit. 
13 ibid. p. 130. 
14 ibid. p. 13 1. 
15 An illustration of this assertion can be found in Samuel Johnson's letters to Berkeley (Samuel 
Johnson the tutor at Yale, not the English Johnson whose appreciation of philosophy seems, for all his 
brilliance, to have reached no higher than his famous 'refutation' of Berkeley for Boswell). The first 
difficulty that Johnson raises with Berkeley's philosophy is 'its repugnancy to and subversion of Sir 1. 
Newton's philosophy in sundry points; to which [some] have been so much attached that they can't 
suffer themselves in the least to call it in question in any instance... ' See Berkeley's Works It pp. 265- 
294 for the correspondence, and p. 272 for the particular quotation. 
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Edwards' interaction with Locke is well known and has been extensively commented 
on, at least in relation to his religious psychology in defence of the Awakening. 16 His 
reading of Newton, whilst regularly noticed, has occasioned less theological interest. 17 
Whilst (self-confessedly) not a mathematician, 18 Edwards read Newton with alertness, 
and his metaphysical refutation of materialism can be considered to start from a slight 
ambivalence in Newton's writings, the refusal to speculate on the nature of 
gravitational attraction. 19 As a result of this, Gay comments, Teibniz charged that 
Newton had reintroduced the old, discredited notion of the scholastic occult qualities, 
with his mysterious doctrine of gravitation; [and] that Newton had converted the 
physical career of the world into a perpetual miracle... 120 The young Jonathan 
Edwards, with a very different purpose in view from the philosophes, seized on the 
same point in his scientific writings in order to prove Leibniz's charge to be precisely 
true. Gravity, and. indeed the preservation of all bodies in existence moment by 
moment, was nothing other than an immediate action of God. 21 Here, Edwards 
recognised, along with other theistic NewtonianS, 22 was an adequate answer to the 
then popular materialism that derived from Hobbes. 
The refutation of materialism was seen by many in the early eighteenth century to be 
a pressing apologetic task, and Edwards devoted himself to it in his early writings. 23 
Whilst this aim is tangential to my main thesis, the writings that address it are 
important, and so a brief history of the controversy is appropriate. 24 Hobbes' 
assertion that only matter was genuine substance25 could not be accepted, but 
16 Beginning, at least in the recent renewal of interestý with Perry Miller's study; I will discuss this 
further in chapter 4 below when I consider Edwards' account of conversion. 
17 The only significant account to sustain a recognition of Newton's influence that I am aware of is, 
once again, Jenson's America's Theologian; see especially pp. 23-30. 
Is See 'Cover-Leaf Memoranda' from the Alatural Philosophy Notebook no-16: 'Always ... to 
acknowledge my ignorance in mathematics... ' YE6 p. 194. 
19 Famously, 'I frame no hypotheses"General Scholium' to the Principia. 
20 op. cit. p. 143. 
21 Anderson argues that Edwards developed his theories largely on the basis of the concept of 
gravitation. YE6 pp. 4547. 
22 Notably Richard Bentley; see Anderson's footnote in YE6 p-234 n-5- 
23 See YE6 p. 54, where Anderson asserts 'he consciously undertook to develop a metaphysics that 
would be a conclusive answer to materialism. ' 
24 For a fuller account, see Anderson's Introduction to YE6 pp. 1-143, and especially pp. 52-136. The 
present discussion owes much to Anderson, whose work will, I suspect, prove to be near-definitive. 
25 According to Leviathan 1.4, 'incorporeal substance' is merely an 'insignificant sound', like 'round 0 
quadrangle'. 
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resonated with the times. The failure of scholastic accounts of -substance was 
everywhere accepted, and the rising popularity of atomism made materialist accounts 
seem attractive. The reactions were various, but generally based on some form of 
dualism. The reality of matter went uncontested (the influence of atomism), but 
atýempts were made to prove that it was not the only reality. 26 An alternative 
approach sought to demonstrate that the existence of matter was contingent - for 
exampl--, Henry More's argument that its basis is infinite necessary space. 27 
However, both these approaches have problems that centre on the issue of causation. 
If causation is held to operate only within a substance-world, then the mental and 
spiritual world can have no effect upon the material world, 28 and its separate reality is 
of little relevance. If, in contrast, causation operates across substance-worlds, then the 
one undoubted philosophical success of the day, the discovery of regular universal 
scientific laws, is placed in jeopardy. Faced with this dilemma, English philosophy 
found a different route, not so much around the problem as away from it altogether: 
the empiricism of Locke and Newton ceased to build physics on the problematic basis 
of metaphysics, and sought to build it on observation instead. The world-machine 
was seen to work; and whether I can explain why or not, I can describe the laws by 
which it operates. 29 This way forward, of course, is an open invitation to return to 
materialism: belief in the 'world-machine', does not prevent belief in 'spiritual 
substance, ' just so long as it has no effect on matter, including our own bodies. So 
Berkeley, who saw all this with uncommon clarity: 'Matter once allowd, I defy any 
man to prove that God is not matter. 130 
26 So Descartes seeks to demonstrate the separate realities of his body and his mind - Meditations 6. 
27 See Copleston's History of Philosophy vol. V p. 64. More was a significant influence on Edwards, 
and some similarities in thought can be discovered - YE6 p. 54. 
28 The 'Two clocks' theory of Geulincx, a Dutch Cartesian is a good example. Consider two clocks, 
wound up and set so that one strikes the hour when the other shows it. The two events are 
simultaneous, determined and unconnected. So it is, according to this theory, with body and soul, 
which have been so ordered by God that a volitional impulse to lift my left arm is co-incident with the 
physical movement of my arm - but has no causal effect upon that movement. See Russell's History of 
Western Philosophy pp. 583-584. 
29 The success of this programme was sufficient to delay the widespread acceptance of Hume's 
recognition that observation is a basis at least as problematic as metaphysics. The failure of the 
Kantian project to find an answer to this is at least a part of the cause of the widespread disruptions in 
modernity in recent years. 
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Against this background, Edwards begins his analysis of matter in a short work 
entitled Of, 4tOMS. 31 The essence of an atom, he argues, is not size but solidity, as any 
body that cannot be broken is, by definition, atomic. A body cannot be broken if it is 
perfectly uniform, since there is no point where it is weaker than any other, so applied 
force will result in it breaking at every point simultaneously, and so total annihilation, 
or no fracture at all. Edwards believes annihilation through applied force to be an 
absurdity, and so suggests atoms are preserved by an infinite power, which is to say 
an immediate action of God. The eleventh corollary to this discussion asserts that 'it 
follows that the certain unknown substance, which philosophers used to think 
subsisted by itself, and stood underneath and kept up solidity and all other properties, 
which they used to say it was impossible for a man to have an idea of, is ... nothing 
but the Deity acting in that particular manner in those parts of space where he thinks 
fit. 132 
So, Edwards points out, the so-called 'laws of nature' are merely descriptions of 
God's usual ways of acting - causation, after all, by supposition of the materialists 
themselves, has its roots in substance. 33 This argument will also serve as a proof of 
God's existence - or rather (Edwards is careful in his choice of words) a proof of 'the 
being, infinite power, and omnipresence of God. '34 Edwards' next attempt at 
sustained natural philosophy, Of Being, 35 returns to the attempt to demonstrate the 
being of God, with an interesting version of the ontological argument. It is impossible 
for us to conceive of absolute nothingness, asserts Edwards; indeed, such a state 
would be the basic contradiction, since it is in relation to non-being that we 
demonstrate all other contradictions. 36 So, since nothing, or non-being, is a 
30 Works vol. 1 p. 77. 
31 YE6 pp. 208-218. 
32 ihid p. 215. For a discussion of the influence of More and Locke on Edwards' argument at this 
point see Anderson's Introduction pp. 63-66.4 
33 Edwards is careful here and in other places where he follows a similar train of argument to insist 
that it applies only to material substance. 
34 Corol. 7, p. 214. 
35 YE6 pp. 202-207; again, Anderson's discussion is illuminating; pp. 68-75. 
36 'absolute nothing is the aggregate of all the absurd contradictions in the world, a state wherein there 
is neither body, nor spirit, nor space: neither empty space nor full space, neither little nor great, ... 
neither infinitely great space nor finite space, nor a mathematical point ... a state wherein every 
proposition in Euclid is not true, nor any of those self-evident maxims by which they are demonstrated; 
and all other eternal truths are neither true nor false. ' YE6 p. 206. 
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contradiction, something, or 'being' must exist eternally. 37 Thus Edwards attempts 
not to demonstrate the existence of the greatest conceivable being, but simply that of 
being. Existence exists; to assert otherwise is meaningless. 38 
Edwards includes several attempts to state this argument, suggesting perhaps that he 
was not entirely happy with it. Its validity is not really an issue here, but Edwards' 
point is not so ridiculous as it might at first sight seem: 'no-thing' is a relational term, 
even if that relation is one of negation. It is meaningless without a prior concept (and 
hence, in Edwards' terms, existence) of 'thing'. Perhaps a (thoroughly Edwardsean) 
mathematical illustration will help: in a recent article on the nature of zero, Ian 
Stewart comments ' "Nothing" is - well, nothing. A void. Total absence of 
thingness. Zero, however, is definitely a thing. It is a number. It is, in fact, the 
number you get when you count your oranges and you haven't got any. '39 According 
to Edwards 'nothing' is just as much a thing as 'zero' is a number, the ontology of the 
non-existent oranges is just as real as their quantity. 
This argument, if it works at all, must work equally well at all times and places, so 
'being' must be eternal (or at least onmitemporaneous; Edwards seems to assume that 
the latter implies the former) and omnipresent. 40 So, just as OfAloms argued for the 
existence of that which is omnipresent and omnipotent, Of Being argues for being 
which is omnipresent and eternal. All that remains, as with any attempted proof of 
the existence of God, is the identification of what has been proved with God who is 
37 As an afterthought, Edwards proposes a second demonstration of this position, arguing that the 
question 'can absolute nothing beT is itself a contradiction, since the being of anything is incompatible CP 
with a state of absolute nothingness. YE6 p. 207. 
38 Edwards seemed both to be impressed by this argument, and to be unsatisfied by his statements of 
it, as he tried several times during his life to restate it in a better form. In Miscellanies 650 (Townsend, 
p. 82), he offers a construction turning on the assertion 'if anyone says there may be nothing he 
supposes at the same time that nothing has a being... '. In Miscellanies 880 (Townsend, pp. 87-103) he 
attempts a more carefully logical version: '[t]here is a reason to be given why God should have a 
Being. The reason is because there is no other way. There is nothing else supposable, to be put with 
the Being of God as the other part of the disjunction. If there be it Is absolute and universal Nothing. 
A supposition of something is a supposition of the being of God ... God is the sum of all being and there is no being without his being ... But there is no such thing supposable, as an absolute universal 
nothing. We talk nonsense when we suppose any such thing.... 
39 Ian Stewart, 'Zero, Zilch and Zip' New Scientist 2131 (25th April 1998) pp. 41-44. 
40 YE6 p. 202. 
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Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The distance remaining is perhaps best measured by the 
assertion Edwards makes at this point: 'space is God. '41 
The remainder of Of Being dates from some time later, and elaborates arguments 
which Edwards first introduces in a Miscellanies entry, pp. 42 'We know that there was 
being from eternity, ' Edwards begins, 'and this being must be intelligent. ' Must, 
because existence depends on being known. The reasons offered in the Miscellanies 
entry are elaborated in the latter part of Of Being, where the example of a universe 
without intelligent beings is offered: 'I demand in what respect this world has a being, 
but only in the divine consciousness. Certainly in no respect. There would be figures 
and magnitudes, and motions and proportions - but where? Where else but in the 
Almighty's knowledge. 143 And so, he goes on to argue, with colours and sounds and 
temperatures - all existence is onlý in being perceived - esse estpercipl. 44 
Anderson, in his discussion of Edwards' philosophical development, links this to the 
theme of this thesiS. 45 He argues that Edwards reaches this position (esse estpercipl) 
through reflection on two early assumptions: firstly, that religion was the highest 
purpose of the universe (an early position in the discussion of teleology I outlined in 
the previous chapter); and secondly that the essence of religion was knowledge of 
God. Of particular note is Miscellanies gg46 where Edwards argues that the universe 
must have a purpose, and that purpose is the religion of intelligent beings - so that the 
role of the intelligent creation in glorifying God is the teleological focus of creation. 
Add to this Edwards' conslant assumption (which I will explore later in this chapter) 
that God may be known through appropriate contemplation of the creation, and the 
position that the creation exists in order to be known by intelligent beings is secure. 
Thus we can see that Edwards" much-vaunted idealism depends in part on the 
teleological interest which is the focus of this study. 
41 ibid p. 203. 
42 YE13 p. 1 88; for dating details see Anderson's introduction to YE6 and, for a summary of the results, 
Schafer's Table of Dates in YE13 pp. 91-109. 
43 YE6 p. 204. 
44 1 will address the obvious, and much-discussed, similarities with Berkeley below. 
45 YE6 pp. 77-80. 
46 YE13p. 185. 
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Edwards' interest in this sort of metaphysics seems to have declined, but one can 
imagine how this position would develop if built on his mature account of the purpose 
of creation. Firstly, creatures' knowledge of God is participation in God's own 
knowledge of Himscif, so Edwards would have been able to incorporate God's own 
knowledge of creation as a key point in the argument, a move that is clearly necessary 
if the argument is to work. Secondly, it is not just the creatures' knowledge of 
creation that is its purpose (i. e. that brings God glory) it is also the creatures' delight 
in creation, and so Edwards' assertion that to be is to be known would have to become 
'to be is to be known and loved; esse est percipi el ainarl -a position offering 
significant possibilities of developing a relational ontology similar to those current in 
this century, and built finally on Trinitarian grounds. 
I lcft Edwards' version of the ontological argument in Of Being with the unpromising 
assertion 'space is God'. A way forward from here is now available: 'Space' - the 
substratum wherein things 'move and have their being', where the possibility of 
existence is available - is indeed God. To be precise, it is the mind of God, apart 
from whose knowledge nothing can CXiSt. 47 Material things are objective, arc other 
than each other, because God knows them to be so, because that is how God thinks of 
them, and His faithfulness is the only guarantor (and the only one needed) of that. In 
the more developed form of this metaphysics I have postulated, die creation exists 
through being known and loved by God, and so the Father holds the creation in being 
through His Son and His Spirit. Edwards, it seems, opened die possibility for a post- 
Newtonian restatement of the orthodox doctrine of creation first developed by 
Ircnacus. Lcibniz's accusation - that Newton made the 'career of the world into a 
perpetual miracle' - seems abundantly justified, as do the fears that presumably lay 
behind it, that Newton's thought might be used by some in the Church to oppose, 
rather than support, the nasccnt Enlightcruncrit in its rqjection of thcistic rcligion. 
The serious question raised by this account is the nature of material reality: for too 
much of Christian history, the attitude to matter that the Gnostics Icarnt from Greek 
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philosophy has prevailed, and material being has been denigrated, if not actually 
regarded as necessarily evil. The crcdal confession of the 'resurrection of the body' is 
a check on this tcndency,. but is also in constant danger of being replaced by a belief 
in the immortality of the soul., An idealist philosophy such as Edwards' would seem 
at first sight to be in particular danger of failing into this trap. Edwards does not. Ile 
clearly and unambiguously asserts the goodness of created material reality, and it is in 
fact precisely his so-called idealism that enables him to do this. 'To be without the 
body, ' he insists at one point, whilst considering the intermediate state between death 
and resurrection, 'is in it self [sic] an evil because tis a want of that which tile soul of 
man naturally inclines to and desires... 1.49 11iis relics on the critique of the 
Enlightenment: for the Enlightened, the fundamental ontological and noctic 
distinction lay between spirit and matter. This given, it is incontrovertible that God is 
spiritý and so the natural tendency for any (Enlightened) theist is to denigrate matter. 
Even for a non-thcist, the heights of human achievement arc spiritual (art, for 
instance), and so the same temptation is present. 
Edwards, however, has cut through this dualism, and returned to the fundamental 
ontological insight of Irenacus and Athanasius: the only relevant ontological 
distinction that can be made is between creature and creator. In an (unpublished) 
Miscellanies entry, number 777, Edwards discusses the progressive nature of heaven's 
joys (I will rcturn to his celebration of temporality later in this chapter, but in passing 
this is further evidence for the ontological points I am making, as tcmpomlity tends in 
the tradition to be linked to materiality as marks of ontological provisional ity). His 
argument begins with a rousing assertion that the relevant ontological gap is bctwccn 
creatures and the Creator, as lie 'insists that only Christ fully knows God, and that all 
other creatures depend on 'means or ... manifestations or signs 
held forth. ' The 
fundamental sign is, of course, the Incarnate One who bridges the gap, but my point in 
mcntioning this argument is to notice what Edwards will not say: it is not our matcrial 
natures that prevent us knowing God fully, or cvcn our sin; it is our being as creatures. 
Tbc same assertion of an ontological, and so noctic gap between creature and Creator 
occurs in a much later cntry, Miscellanies 1358, where Edwards asserts that '... we 
47 A similar argumen4 based on more recent science, can be round In Torrance, T. F. Space, Time and 
incarnation TAT. Clark. Edinburgh, 1997. See particularly p. 12. 
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can have no other proper manifestations of the divine nature, but by some effects of it: 
for we cant [sk) immediately look upon and bchold God & see what he is intuitively. ' 
Even Scripture, according to Edwards, is only a testimony to God's works: 'T'he word 
declares, but the works are the propcr evidence of what is declarcd. ' I le goes on to 
insist that we can know God through His mighty works: creation, providcnce, 
redemption, regeneration, final judgement, and others. Tlicsc, however, arc all works 
attributed to Christ in the Scriptures, and so again, we know God only through Clu-ist, 
bccausc the ontological gap is between creature and Creator, not the Enlightenment 
dualism of matter and spirit. 
It is perhaps appropriate at this point to step back and survey the argument so far. 
Edwards developed a metaphysical system which found not just gravitation, as 
Leibnitz feared, but the very solidity, reality, and pcmiancncc of die physical world to 
be 'merely' thoughts in the mind of God. 49 In doing so, he answered a central 
question of the philosophy of the day, concerning the nature of 'substance', the thing 
which 'stood underneath and kept up solidity and all other propcrtics... '. 50 Edwards 
argued that, in these terms, the only proper substance , 
is God, who only can give 
permanence and reality to the world. Any other answer will eventually insist on 
something else that is a so, which can exist of itself without reference to God. fl 
Ed%vards' answer, then, is surely the only appropriately Christian answer, if the 
question is framed in these tcrms, 52 and shows that it is precisely this Christian answer 
that can avoid the denigration of matter. More than this, however: by making the 
movement of bodies under Newton's physics 'a perpetual miracic', Edwards does 
establish die possibility of a natural science that is not inimical to moral meaning in 
creation, and hence to teleology. 
48 Afiscellanks 644 (as yet unpublished). 
49 'Mercly'l What could be a greater basis of being than to be known and loved by God? 
50 YE6p. 215. 
31 That is to say, any other answer will finally deny the key Christian affirmation of creallo ex Whilo. 
S2 Although it Is at least arguable that this Is an unhelpful way to frame the question. 
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Edwards makes a third early assault on ontological questions, one that he did sustain 
into his later life, in the various entries in the Notes on the Afind. 53 This begins with 
an aesthetic analysis of the nature of 'excellency': 'One alone, without any reference 
to any more, cannot be excellent; for in such a case there can be no manncr of relation 
no way, and therefore, no such thing as consent. 154 Beauty consists only in 
relationship; one alone cannot be cxccllcnt. 55 All excellency consists in relational 
categories such as harmony, symmetry and proportion. Edwards analyses this in 
relation to the physical world, exploring how all physical beauty is reducible to such 
catcgoriCS, 36 but this seems to be all by way of preamble; the decisive move comes 
with the assertion 'spiritual harmonics arc of a vastly larger extent; i. e., the 
proportions arc vastly oftcncr redoubled, and respect more beings, and require a vastly 
larger view to comprehend them, as some simple notes do more affect one who has 
not a comprehensive understanding of music. 'S7 
Why should beauty be defined by harmonious relations, in either the spiritual or the 
physical rcalm? The answer comes through a tcrsc statement of a surprising move, a 
return to ontology: 'being, if we examine it narrowly, is nothing else but proportion! 
Tbc explanation of this is only slightly less gnomic: '[w]licn one being is inconsistent 
%%ith another being, then being is contradicted. But contradiction to being is 
intolerable to perceiving being, and the consent to being most picasing. '58 There is a 
return to the centrality of perception here with a volitional element added to it; from 
this Edwards develops his basic statement of aesthetics: excellency is being's consent 
to being, and degrees of excellency are consent to %%, idcr and wider circles of being. 
True excellency - that is, true beauty, or true virtue - is being's consent to bcing-in. 
general, which is to say (as was made clear in the previous chaptcr59) being's consent 
to God. 
53 round in YE6 pp. 311-393. 
54 Ibld p. 337. 
55 The settled nature of this position for Edwards is demonstrated by its centrality in True Virtue (see 
my analysis in the previous chapter, pp. 64-66). 7"he Idea thus appears both in early metaphysical 
speculations and in one of the last works that Edwards wrote. 
36 YE6 pp. 332-336. 
57 ibid p. 336- 
58 ibid 
59 See my comments on True Virtue on pp. 64-66. 
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So it is that one alone cannot be excellent; one alone cannot be in relation, and so 
cannot consent to anything. Were God, even, to be a perfect monad, alone, it would 
be meaningless to speak of His beauty, excellency or moral perfection. Once again, 60 
Edwards refuses to rind the answer to God's need for relationship in creation; rather it 
is in being Father, Son and Holy Spirit that God is truly God: 'We have shcwn that 
one alone cannot be excellent ... Iliercfore, if God is excellent, there must be 
plurality in God. 161 This is a very similar move to the one I indicated was open to him 
from his earlier writings: if, as Edwards has claimed, being is merely proportion, or 
relation, then love becomes an ontological category to set alongside knowledge. 
Edwards here reaches a genuinely relational ontology through introducing the 
volitional or affectivc aspect of reality alongside the cognitive aspect that he had been 
working with previously; esse cst percipi el anzari or percipere et anlare; the 
knowledge and love of God arc dcrinitivc of all created existence. 
It is perhaps now appropriate to refer briefly to the most famous, or perhaps notorious, 
aspect of Edwards' doctrine of creation: the idea of 'continuous creation. This is a 
fixed position, found in an early Miscellanies cntry, 62 and present still in Original Sin, 
finished the year before Edwards' dcath. 63 It should now be clear that this idea, and 
the accompanying one of an occasionalist account of causation, 64 arc merely 
consequences of prior commitments to the positions outlined above. Existence is, for 
created realitics, the condition of being present to the mind of God; without trying to 
divine Edwards' underlying conception of the nature of God's ctcmity, this position 
nevertheless surely demands that Edwards says what he does about continuous 
creation: for God to think of the beginning of a creature and to think of the continued 
60 See the previous chapter, pp. 4648. 
61 Afiscellanies 117; YEIJ p. 284. 
62 'Tis certain with me that the world exists anew every moment, that the existence of things every 
moment ceases and is every moment renewed. ' entry 125[a]; YEIJ p. 288. 
63 'God's upholding created substance, or causing its existence In each successive momen4 is 
altogether equivalent to an immediate production out ofnothing. at each momentý because its existence 
at this moment is not merely in part from God, but wholly from him, and not In any part, or degree, 
from Its antecedent existence. ' Italics original; YEJ p. 402. 
64 'indeed, in natural things means of effects In metiphysical strictness are not proper cause of die 
effects, but only occasions. God produces all effects. ' Miscellanies 629 (as yet unpublished). The 
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existence of a creature arc not radically different divine acts in the way that creating a 
material substancc-world, and sustaining it, arc. This is an interesting result, as the 
American Reformed tradition that looks back to Edwards has tended to assume that 
this doctrine of continuous creation is a minor aberration in the account which can be 
discarded at will. 6s Rather, as the discussion above should have demonstrated, it is an 
inescapable result of basic metaphysical commitments. If the universe is to give glory 
to God the way Edwards sees it doing, it must be possible to describe it as created 
4anew each moment. ' 
Having said this, it is important to rcalisc that Edwards' various comments on 
continuous creation, at least in works he prepared for publication, speak of providence 
as bcing 'cquivalent to' continuous crcation, rathcr than insisting on the actual truth of 
that theory. 66 Edwards' concern -can perhaps be seen in the context of this chapter to 
be a polemical insistence on the radically dependent nature of creation, attacking the 
assumptions of matter that is itself a se or a 'world-machinc' that, having been set 
going by God, does not need His upholding to continue. Perhaps Edwards goes too 
far in the other direction, but his conccm to speak strongly against these prevalent 
positions is surely undcrstandabIC. 67 
Thus far in this chapter I have outlined Edwards' early metaphysical explorations. 
Although these apparently originated in reflection on Newton, I have indicated that a 
previous sentence suggests that in saying 'God produces all effects', Edwards in thinking specifically 
of the Spirit of God. 
63 Gerstner, Rational Biblical TheoloV IL 189-202, offers sufficient testimony for this point. Gerstner 
himself does attempt to link the Idea of continuous creation with Edwards' metaphysics, but does not 
appear to have observed the closeness of connection for which I am arguing. 
66 The statement in Original Sin, cited in n. 52 above, makes this point effectively, as does 
Afiscellanies 1358 (in Townsend's collection. p. 262): '[Ulpholding the world In being. and creating of 
it. are not properly distinct works; for tis manifes4 that ... creating of the world is but the beginning of 
upholding it, if I may so say; the beginning to give the world a supported and dependent existence: and 
preservation Is only continuing to give it such a supported existence. ' This Interpretation Is further 
supported by the various statements of the Idea of continuous creation amongst the Reformed 
Orthodox; see I leppe, pp. 251-263 & especially pp. 257-258. 
67 In stressing the considered nature of die comments In works offered for publication. It is perhaps 
also possible to notice a shift through time. The most outspoken assertions of the literal truth of the 
Idea of continuous creation are all early - Aftscellanles 125 & 346, and YE6 p. 24 1. The more careful 
statements are later - Afiscellonlej 1039 & 1358, and Original Sin (cit. supre). Theologically. It Is 
tempting to link this shift to Edwards' awakening interest In the Trinitarian mediation of creation 
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commitment to the teleological positions that I outlined in the previous chapter is 
basic to their developed and lasting forms, notably idealism and the idea of a 
&continuous creation'. Tbus Edwards' account of the being of creation depended 
upon his understanding of its purpose - on, that is, God's sclf-glorification. Further, 
his attempts to rind a different basis for Newtonian physics allowed him, to the extent 
that they are successful, to continue to hold a teleological view of creation in an 
Enlightened and modem intellectual context. Ilus the possibility of creation 
rcflccting its purpose, of every creature, however 'small and abjcct', representing the 
goodness of God, is established. I will go on to explore how creation rcflccts its 
purpose, according to Edwards, in considering his creative re-applications of the idea 
of typology, but before that a brief cxcursus comparing the idealistic metaphysics thus 
far uncovered %vith those of Berkeley will prove instructive. 
Edwards' similarity with Berkeley has oflcn been noticed and commented upon, but 
us ar. I attempts to prove dependence arc generally considered to have failed, th f6 
Rather, a common theistic re-appropriation. of Locke, MaIcbranche and Bayle is 
assumcd. 69 Berkeley's idcaliSM70 begins in a response to Locke on the question of 
4matcrial substance'. Locke had asserted that the knowledge of the external world 
comes to us only by sensations; the causes of these sensations arc the 'powers' that 
objects possess to cause them, which he called 'qualitics'. 71 Ile then proceeded to 
divide these into secondary qualities, which cause a sensation in the mind of the 
beholder but bear no relation to the nature of the object itself, and primary qualities 
which arc attached to the substance of the objccL72 Berkeley objects that this 
distinction, although it has a long history in philosophy prior to Locke, is confused 
(discussed in the previous chapter), but the textual evidence Is too scarce to make this anything more 
than a speculation. 
68 See YE6 p. 76 n. 3 for a useful bibliography of the debate. 
69 On this see Morris, William S. 71e Young Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstruction Carlson, Brooklyn. 
199 1, pp. 137-139; 257. 
70 Berkeley's Works have been edited In nine volumes by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (pub. 'Momas 
Nelson and Sons, London, 1948-1957). rollowing the opinion of most commentators, I will take the 
Principles of Human Knowledge (Works 11 pp. 19-113) as the basic expression of Berkeley's 
philosophy, making reference to other works only when they offer clearer statements of a particular 
position. Basic secondary works include Warnock. G. J. Berkeley Pen&uin, I larmondsworth. 1953 and 
Berman, David George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man Clarendon, Oxford. 1994. 
71 Ejsay Il. i-viii. 
72 EjSayll. viii. 9.10. 
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and meaningless: cithcr all qualities arc present only in the mind or all are posscsscd 
by the 'substance' of the objCCt. 73 Berkeley proceeds to demolish the conccpt of 
'substance', asking simply how we can know of its existence: Locke had admitted that 
it cannot be observed, as only the sensations caused by qualities can be obscrvcd. 74 
ýcithcr 
can it be argued for on the basis of the existence of sensations, since it is clear 
that (through memory or imagination) we can generate sensations in our minds of 
things that arc not thcrc. 75 So, it is simply a supposition; albcit a necessary one, 
according to Lockc, to account for the order and rcgularity of the world: a certain 
appearance, smcll, tastc, and fccl coincide in my experience at regular intervals, and I 
call the combination all orange; does this not imply that thcrc is some tiling that 
causes this particular collcction of scrisations? No, says Bcrkclcy, this may be 
accounted for entirely by the goodness of God. 76 All admit God to be the Creator of 
the world, why suppose that I Ic has created numberless beings without any purpose to 
their cxistcnCC? 77 His clinchi6g argumcnt relics on a presupposition: assuming, as 
Bcrkeley does, that only volitional bcings (Le. spirits) can properly be said to 'cause' 
anything, to speak- of substancc causing scrisations is mcaningless. 78 
So, no material substance exists. What does exist is a world of spirits causing 
sensations in themselves and cach odicr. 77lic orderliness and regularity of our 
cxpcriencc of the world as other than us (in comparison to, say, a dream) is a gift of 
the good God; the laws of nature, for example, arc not descriptions of physical cause 
and cffect -a m=inglcss tcnn - but evidences of the faithfulness and constancy of 
God. 79 
With this, admittedly brief, overview of Berkeley's philosophy in place, a comparison 
with Edvmrds may be made. The similarities arc obvious and striking, but certainly 
the suggestion that most can be accounted for by a common response to Locke seems 
73 Principles 9.15 (Worb 11 pp. 4447); the arguments are more forcefully stated in the tint of the 
Three Dialogues (if orks II pp. 187-194). 
74 Principles 4-6 (Works 11 pp. 4243). 
75 Principles IS (Works II pA 8). 
76 Principles 30-33 (Works If pp. 53-54). 
77 Principles 19 (Worb IIp. 49). 
78 Mid 
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plausible: Locke's conception of primary and secondary qualities is without doubt 
confused, and once this is criticiscd his discussion of substance is clearly vulnerable. 
What is more interesting is the diffcrcncc between Ed%vards and Berkeley; the obvious 
in. itial point concerns the relational and aesthetic note that Edwards introduces to his 
account with the Notes on the Alind, which is wholly lacking in Berkeley. This points 
to an underlying difference that is of the grcatcst moment: the thoroughly Trinitarian 
nature of Edwards' account. Not that Berkeley disbelieved in the Trinity - lie was an 
Anglican bishop, af1cr all - but, in his philosophical writings, lie speaks of God 
without thinking of God as Trinity, and so the doctrinc has no significance in his 
account of the matters I am discussing. 
This differcricc serves to rescue Edwards in some measure from a criticism that has 
been made recently of both these thinkers, that they insist on the immediacy of God's 
dealings with crcation. 90 I'lic rclationality of Edwards' account provides an 
illustration of the first point of response to this criticism: with Berkeley, one can get 
the sense that God preserves each creature individually in His thoughts; Edwards' 
strcss on relationship means that God is seen as preserving die creation as a whole, 
and each creature in its place within the whole. Already the immediacy, although still 
present, is of a different, and perhaps less vicious, form to that found in Berkeley; " 
there is some attempt to rescue the internal coherence of the creation that die old 
scholastic idea of second causes had preserved. But Us argument can be taken 
further: for both Edwards and Berkeley, existence is finally in being known by God, 
but for Edwards this is, as I have argued, a category of Christological participation. 92 
79 Principles 65-66 (Works 11 pp. 69-70). 
20 11is criticism has particularly been made by Colin Gunton In a number of places - see, for example. 
Me End of Causality' in Gunton (ed. ) The Doctrine of Creation (cit. ) pp. 78-79, Prof. Gunton's point. 
that a doctrine of creation must speak of mediation, but mediation through Son and Spirit, rather than 
any created (or eternal) forms, archetypes or substances, Is well made; my concern here Is to suggest 
that Edwards has more of such a doctrine than Gunton gives him credit for. 
It An illustration will perhaps help: 7rhere is a sense In the creation account In Gen. 1: 1-2: 3 that the 
whole Is greater than the sum or its parts - not only Is each put of creation pronounced 'good' In Its 
own particularity, but the whole brought together Is declared to be 'very good'. My suggestion Is that 
Edwards' account of creation, with Its awareness of relationality, Is equipped to account for this text, 
whereas Berkeley's Is not so equipped. In discussing soteriological questions, however, Edwards does 
see God as immediately present to a given Individual. I will discuss this In the following two chapters. 
82 As will become clear in my discuision of History of the Work of Redemption (p. p. 105-112 below), 
this Christological participation Is firmly rooted in the gospel narrative. The same could not be said of 
Edwards' account of the role of the Spirit, which remains slightly Idealistic, and to this extent Gunton's 
criticism retains rorce. 
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Again, as Edwards develops his ontology in the Notes on the Afind, 'consent' or love 
becomes an important category: if to be is to be known and loved by God, then in 
Edwards' terms, created ontology is the gift of the Father through His Son and His 
Spirit. 83 
Unfortunately, interest in Edwards' idealism has been largely limited to the 
philosophical community, and so the implicit Trinitarianisni of the account has 
seemingly been overlooked. It perhaps becomes more obvious when placed alongside 
Edwards' more direct statements about the work of creation. John 11. Gerstner has 
provided abundant textual evidence spanning Edwards' adult lirc to show that lie 
regularly spoke of God creating the world through His Son and His Spirit. 94 My 
argument is simply that these passages ought to be allowed to interpret his idealism; 
there arc, as I have indicated, several suggestions that the idealist language of 
knowledge and love is implicitlý Trinitarian, and occasional passages where it is 
explicitly so. I have argued in the last chapter that be regularly uses the language of 
God's knowledge and God's love to speak of the Son and the Spirit, and that such 
language was natural within the tradition. There seems little doubt, then, that 
Edwards' is saying the same thing in his more philosophical statements of idealism as 
he is in his explicit references to Trinitarian agency in creation and providence. 
llmt Edwards never drew these thrcads togctlicr in the way that I have suggested is 
natural is only to say that lie never embarked on his projected Summa, an observation 
83 This latter move Is explicit in the Notes on the Alind 45, where Edwards first argues that the 
personal Holy Spirit' Is God's 'infinite beauty, and this Is God's infinite consent to being in generaV. 
and then goes on to Insist that 'his love to the creature Is ... the communication of himself ... his I loly Spirit. ' YE6 p. 364. 
84 Rational Biblical 77seoloV 11.189-202, and especially pp. 189-190 & 198-199. A few of Gerstner's 
citations will give the flavour. - '[I 11cre Is a consultation of the Persons of the Trinity about the Creation 
of man for every Person had his particular and distinct concern in it its well as In the Redemption of 
men. The Father employed the Son and the Holy Ghost on this work. ' (Blank Bible on Gcn. 1: 26); 
'Thercrore both the beginning of the world and the end of the world are by Christ for both are subject 
to the great purposes of the work redemption. Ile is therefore both die Creator and the Judge of the 
world ... the alpha and die omega. ' (ibid. on Eph, 3: 9); 'it was made especially the I loly Spirit's work 
to bring Vic world to Its beauty and perfection out of the chaos; for the beauty of the world is a 
communication of God's beauty. ' (Afiscellanies 293). This last quotation also demonstrates my point 
that Edwards did not separate Idealist language and Biblical language when speaking of creation. 
Gerstner does not mention Miscellanies 1349, although it makes the point as clearly as any text: -tis 
manifest by the Scripture, that the world was made by the I loly Ghost or Spirit of God, as well as by 
die Son of God... ' 
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that is hardly novcll Nevertheless, Edwards has two regular ways of describing God's 
relationship with Ilis creation, in terms of his idealism, and as explicit Trinitarian 
agency. In a writer like Edwards, who scamlessly combined philosophy and theology 
and would certainly not admit a gap, it is natural to assume not only that these two can 
be reconciled, but that in his own mind they were. This given, and with the evidence I 
have offered for reading the idealist language in Trinitarian terms, the combination I 
have suggested seems the obvious one. In his later works, at ]cast, Edwards appears 
to be working with a concept of Trinitarian mediation, couchcd in Augustinian 
language. 
11is section has been sonicthing of an extended cxcursus; I began the chapter by 
indicating that Edwards, context demanded that lie find an intellectually satisfying 
Ilicistic Nmionianism" before lie could begin to assert any tclcological content to the 
being of creation. That his idealism (so-called) is appropriately Newtonian was 
cstablislicd by the carlicr parts of the section; that it is appropriately theistic, in the 
fullest Christian sense, lias been the burden of the latter discussions. The result is the 
claim that Edwards offers an account of creation that could, in principle, allow him to 
assert the presence of moral meaning - teleology - in a way that could provide a basis 
for natural science, and so was appropriate to the early modcrnity that formed his 
intellectual context. 17he remaining question is whether, and how, Edwards actually 
sees God as glorifying Himself through the crcatedordcr. 11obbcshadinsistcdthatall 
true knowledge of creation was either natural history or political history; IS the 
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to exploring the tool Edwards uses to 
uncover God's sclf-rcvclation in both these spheres - the exegetical method of 
typology. 
3.2 Typology and the Meaning of Creation 
Typological exegesis has its roots in the earliest days of the Church, where it was 
eagerly adopted and honed as a Christological licrmcncutic with which to appropriate 
the Old Testament as Christian scripturc. 86 Although varieties of typological and 
Is Leviathan 1.9. 
96 For the early history of typology, see: Goppelt, Leonhard 7)pos. - The 7)pological Interpretation of 
the Old Testament In the New (E. T. Donald 11. Madvig) E-erdmans, Grand Rapids, 1982 (for Biblical 
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spiritualizing exegesis can be found throughout the history of the Church, 87 The 
imniediatc background to Edwards' use of this method was the Reformed rc- 
appropriation of typology which occurred in the wake of the attempted rejection of all 
forms of allegorizing by the first 11cformcrs. 's Lowancc89 traces Edwards' Puritan 
inheritance in a helpful way, but there was also an inheritance from the continental 
Reformed Orthodox, and he could have found typology used freely in standard 
theology texts, Wolicbius9O and Turrctin9l for instance. It is no surprise, then, that 
Edwards adopted a typological method of exegesis; nor is it particularly relevant to 
my concerns in this chapter. What is both surprising and interesting, however, is 
Edwards' appropriation of typology as a method of finding meaning and coherence in 
the created order and tile course of ýuman history. 1"hesc moves will be the burden of 
this section. 
17he ccntrality of typology to Edwards' intcrprctations of Scripture has ofIcn been 
notcd. 92 as has his extension of typology to the natural and historical realMS. 93 What 
background); Danielou, Jean Front Shadows to Reality., Studies In the Biblical 7)pology ofthe Flathers 
(E. T. Wulstan Ilibbcrd) Bums & Oates, London, 1960 (the classic text on Patristic usage); 
Woollcombe. K. J. 'The Biblical Origins and Patristic Development of Typology' in Lampe, G. W. 1 1. & 
Woollcombe, K. J. (eds. ) Essays on 7)pology SCM Press, London, 1957 pp. 39-75 (for a briefer 
overview of both aspects). 
17 For a useful overview see Froehlich, Karlfreld ' "Always to Keep to the Literal Sense In I loly 
Scripture Means to Kill One's Soul": The State of Biblical I lermcneutics at the Beginning of the 
Fifteenth Century' in Miner, Earl (ed. ) Literary Uses of 7)polojy: From the Late AfiddleAges to the 
Present Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977 pp. 2048; a more complete study can be found in 
Preus, James S. From Shadow to Promise: Old Testament Interpretation from .4 ugustine to the 11oung Luther I larvard University Press. Cambridge, 1969. 
Is For this history see Lowance, Mason 1. The Language of Canaan: Aletaphor and Symbol In New 
Englandfrom the Puritans to the 7ýanscendentallsls I larvard University Press, London, 1980 pp. 13. 
27. 
19 Ibid 
90 See Beardslee, Reformed Dogmatics pp. 80-82. 
91 Institutes 12: 7. 
92 In discussing Edwards' Notes on Scripture, its modern editor Stephen J. Stein asserts that It 
'documents the consuming Interest In typology' (YE15 p. 3). lie goes on to say that 'The collective 
result of his exegesis Is a scriptural organon with the typological principle at its foundation, a system 
composed of biblical themes that Edwards regarded as central to Christianity... ' (YEIS p. 4). Wilson 
if. Kimn3ch, who is editing Edwards' sermons, calls him an 'ardent practitioner' of typology (YE10 
p. 228) and an 'avid typologist' (YE10 p. 229). 
93 On this see: YE10 pp. 230-236; YE11 passim. (Oils volume contains Edwards' texts on typology-, 
close attention to both the texts and the excellent Introductory material by Wallace E. Anderson and 
Mason 1. Lowance is invaluable in discussion of this subject); Afiscellanies 119 (VE13 p. 285) and 362 
(YE13 pp. 434435); Perry Miller's edition of, and introduction to, Image$ and Shadows of Divine 
Things, Yale University Press, New I laven, 1948, 
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is perhaps less often seen, but crucial to my purposes in this thesis, is the motivation 
bchind this extension of typology. 94 Edwards argues thus: 
... the whole outward creation, which is but the shadows of bcings, is so made 
as to rcprcscnt spiritual things ... it's agreeable to God's wisdom that it should be so, that the inferior and shadowy parts of his works should be made to 
rcprescnt those things that arc more real and excellent ... the highest parts of his work ... T'hus God glorifies himself and instructs the minds he has madc. 95 '17he physical world is created and ordered to rcilcct and to show forth the spiritual 
world - God, and His relationships with His crcaturcs - so that, through knowing 
God, wc will glorify Ilim. Tlius, typology, too, is made to scrvc the overarching 
tclcological conccrn that I am highlighting. 
In order to explore this extension of typology to other areas it is, unsurprisingly, 
necessary to be aware of the key features of typology in its original, exegetical, form. 
As already noted, this stretches right back to the Scriptural %vritcrs themselves - 
indeed, some writers see typology used even within the Old Testament, as the 
prophets employ stories from the Torah in original ways to speak of what will happen 
to Isracl. 96 This prophetic typology is perhaps best illustrated by an example, which I 
%%ill borrow from DanjiloU. 97 The return of the exiles that is prophesied in Isaiah 40- 
55 is spoken of repeatedly as a typological fulfillment of the Exodus story. God's 
people have completed their 'hard service' (40.2); and He will once again lead His 
people out (40: 11). The comparison is at times explicit: the God who 'made a way 
th. rough the sea, a path through the mighty waters' is now'making a way in the desert, 
and streams in the wasteland' (43: 16,19). Again, memories of the first. Exodus arc 
invoked with the command to come out in 48: 20-21. But typology is more than 
simple repetition; God is doing greater things, repeating with elaborations what He 
has done in the past: 'This is what the LORD Says - he Who made a way through the 
sea, a path through the mighty waters, who drew out the chariots and horses, the army 
and reinforcements together ... "Forgct the former things; do not dwell on the past. 
See, I am doing a new thingl ... I am making a way in the desert... ". ' Whereas the 
94 The attention that has been given to this subject has usually, thus far, come from studcnts of 
American literature, and so Edwards' purpose has been given less attention than the path he paved for 
Emerson, et at See, for example, Lowance The Language ofCanaan (cit. ). 
93 Miscellanies 362 (YE13 p. 434). 
96 For instance. see Dani0ou, op. clt. pp. 12-13 for typologies of pwadise in Ilosea. Ezekiel, Amos, 
Micah and Isaiah; pp. 70-73 for flood typologics In Isaiah and the Psalms; and particularly pp. 133-157 
for qpologies of the Exodus throughout the later Old Testament writings, but preeminently in Is. 40-55. 
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first Exodus was rcmcmbcrcd by the unleavened bread, because the people fled 
without tinic to bake properly (Ex. 12: 39), now God says 'Depart, depart from there ... 
but you will not Icavc in haste or flight ... ' (Is. 52: 11-12). Jeremiah completes the 
picture: this new salvation will rcplacc thc Exodus in the minds of all people: 'the 
days arc coming ... when pcopic will no longer say, "As surely as the LORD lives, 
who brought the people up out of Egypt, " but they will say "As surely as the LoRD 
lives, who brought the descendents of Israel out of the land of the north ... 99.11 
(Jer. 23: 7-8); and flicre will be a new covenant attaclicd to the new Exodus, written not 
on tablets of stone but on human hearts (31: 31-33). 
Old Tcstament prophetic typology, thcn, looked forward to mighty acts of God that 
rcpcatcd what had gone before in a more significant and more 'spiritual' way. 98 It is 
this background that is taken and developed by the New Testament writers to provide 
the texts wWch arc the foundation of Christian typological cxcgcsis. " Ile key 
diffcrcncc is that, whereas Old Týstamcnt typology looked forward, seeking to disccm 
the contours of a coming act of God through a retelling of what had gone before, New 
Testament typology looks backward, showing how cvcry act of God in the past found 
its true meaning and true fulfillment in Jesus Cluist. Whether it is the Matthcan 
tradition of seeking correspondences to events in the life of Christ, 100 or Johannine 
sacramental typology, 101 the New Testament exegesis of the Old oflcn depends on a 
nc%v, but still typological, hcnncncutic. 102 
Most of die witers referred to arc very concerned to distinguish typology from 
allcgory. 103 At times this distinction can fccl like little more than 'types arc 
interpretations I accept, allegories are those I do not, ' but there is a legitimate basis to 
it. When the (unquestionably allegorical) Old Testament interpretation of Philo is 
97 op. clt. pp. 155-156. 
98 More spiritual in that (for example) the new covenant was to be written in hearts, not on stones. 
99 Typological exegesis was, of course, practiced and developed in die intertestanictital period, and In 
Judaism or the New Testament period (Philo Is particularly relevant here), but such developments are 
not important for my current purposes. See Goppelt, op. di. pp. 23-58 for some details. 
100 e. g. Mt. 2.15-1 8; 3: 14-16; 12: 17-2 1; 27: 9-10. 
101 See Daniflov6qp. dLpp. 160-I6I. 
102 Old Testament stories as types of the spiritual life of the Christian also feature Oust) In the New 
Testament - If PCL2 provides one example. This form of typology becomes very significant in the 
rathers, of course. 
103 For example: Daniflou, pp. 202-226; Woollcombe, pp. 404 1; Goppelt, pp. 48-53. 
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compared to the New Testament and the early Fathers (particularly Ircnacus), a 
difference in approach is clear: Philo moves 'upwards', from a historical to a 
Gspiritual' sense; Ircnacus moves forwards, from a historical prcriguration to its 
historical fulfillment - and, crucially, finds every fulfilimcrit in the person of Jesus 
Christ. 104 Two characteristics thus distinguish the legitimate (because Biblical) 
typological method from the illegitimate allegorical one: historicity - or perhaps 
better, cschatological nature - and Christocciitricity. 103 
Passing over 1500 years of history in a somewhat cavalier way, we can see that the 
typology that Jonathan Edwards inherited only just managed to keep hold of these 
distinctivcs. Samuel Mather's standard manual, Figures or 73pes of the Old 
Testament, certainly insisted on them in its dcfinition, 106 but respected works could 
break- cithcr rule (although seemingly not both). So, central to the sclf-undcrstanding 
of the New England Puritans was die typological assertion that they were the New 
Israel, and so the attempt to apply'dic Old Testament typologically not to 'hold forth 
something of Christ', but to find prophecies of their own livcs. 107 Equally, Puritanism 
on both sides of the Atlantic found images of Christ's redemption in the ordinary 
things of life, not just the history of redemption recorded in Scripture. 108 71cre are 
cven instances of both rules being ignored, of a thoroughgoing natural theology that 
sought to read God's will for the people directly from the events of naturc. 109 Ille 
scene was set, then, for Edwards to rc-forge typology in ways that would serve his 
o%%n theological purposes. 
104 On Philo see Danidlou pp. 202-216; on Ireneaus ibid pp. 3047. 
10S 11is statement Is an oversimplification, alLhough adequate for my purposes. For more complicated 
assessments, see Danidlou, pp. 287-288 and Woollcombe, p. 75. 
106 'A Type is some outward or sensible thing ordained of God under the Old Testament, to represent 
and hold forth something of Christ In die New. ' Quoted in YE11 p. 27; see also Lowence, The 
Language ofCanaan (cit. ) pp. 74-88. 
107 A number of illustrations of this. together with an analysis of its changing expression through time, 
may be found in Lowance. ibid. pp. 57-61. For examples of Edwards doing something very like this, 
see Afiscellanles 691 (on the Sabbath) and 694 (on baptism) (both as yet unpublished), where Edwards 
'argues theological points by using a typological hermencutic to Interpret the Old Testament. 
108 Tbe classic example, and a work Edwards used and respected, is John Flavel's 11usban&Y 
spiritualLred. See YE11 p-23; Lowance, op. cit. pp. 69-72. 
109 Lawance pp. 63-67. 
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On the basis of the theology of creation I have described earlier in this chapter, 
Edwards was in a position to construct a doctrine of general revelation. If creation is 
not self-sufficient, but instead upheld and preserved by the knowledge and love of 
God, by'Son and Spirit, then it is natural to assume that the world is morally and 
theologically meaningful, that with the right hcrmcncutic God's rcvclation may be 
found in creation as well as in the pages of Scripture. Puritan developments in 
typology offered the necessary licrmcncutic, which Edwards eagerly adoptcd. The 
various notebooks published under the title Týpological Writings in the Yale 
Edition'10 demonstrate his abiding interest in this area, but traccs can be found 
throughout the corpusill - 'natural typology' was a fixed tuid important part or 
Ed%urds' worldvicw. 
Edwards' essays in this form of typology could be seen as just anothcr prc. 
Enlightenment attcmpt to discover some form of general revelation. 77his doctrine has 
not had the best reputation amorigst theologians in recent decades, with a resounding 
Nein! still echoing whenever it is mcntioncd. 112 In Edwards' own inheritance, the 
particular theory he advances would hardly have been mainstream, a fact he 
rccogniscs when he candidly admits that 'I expect by very ridicule and contempt to be 
called a man of a very fruitful brain and copious fancy, but they arc welcome to it. I 
am not ashamed to own that I believe the whole universe, heaven and earth, air and 
seas, and the divine constitution and history of the holy Scripturcs, be full of the 
images of divine things... '. 113 Ilowcvcr, this would be a too-facilc dismissal of 
Edwards' position, albeit one he invited; here, as elsewhere, his theories are integrated 
into his theological and philosophical commitments, and coherent with the overall 
system he presents. 
110 YE11. 
III See YE10 pp. 227-236 for a discussion of Edwards' use of typology In his preaching; the various 
entries headed 'Types' In the Afiscellanles; or YE8 pp. 25-26 for the centrality of typology in Edwards' 
ethical theories. 
112 Although Edwards' caveats would presumably gain approval from Barth: 'Ile whole of Christian 
divinity depends upon divine revelation. For tho there are many truths concerning God and our duty to 
him, that are evident by the light of nature; yet not one truth Is taught by the light of nature in that 
manner in which It Is necessary for us to know It. ror the knowledge of no truth In divinity is of any 
significance to us, any otherwise than it some way or other belongs to the gospel scheme. or has 
rclition to Christ the hlcdiatour. 1 Miscellanies 837. 
113 YE11P. 152. 
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The key assertion, on which all Edwards' efforts in natural typology arc based, is that 
the natural, physical world has been dclibcratcly crcatcd in order to represent in its 
various parts spiritual rcalitics. It is notjust that gravitational attraction as the basis of 
the (Ncwtonian) universe is a good illustration of the role of love in the spiritual 
world; rather God ordered the universe in that way in order to image forth lovc. 114 
Again, the gradual progress of Spring as the sun approaches is 'a remarkable type' of 
the coming gradual approach of the kingdom of God, and Edwards spells out the 
various resemblances, which lie c1carly believed were arranged by God to be read off 
in this way, in some dctail. This theory is at its clearest in Miscellanies 362, which 
Edwards indicated would serve as a heading for his 'Types' notebook: I Is 
For indeed the whole outward crcation, which is but the shadows of beings, is 
so made as to represent spiritual things. It might be demonstrated by the 
wonderful agrccmcnt in thousands of things, much of the same kind as is 
between the types of the Old Tcstamcnt and their antitypcs, and by spiritual 
things being so often and ýontinually comparcd with them in the Word of God. 
And it's agrccablc to God's wisdom that it should be so, that the infcrior and 
shadowy parts of his works should be made to rcprcscnt those things that arc 
more real and cxccllcnt, spiritual and divine, to represent the fliings that 
immediately conccm himself and the highest parts of his work. Spiritual 
things arc the crown and glory, the head and soul, the very cnd and alpha and 
omega of all other works: what therefore can be more agreeable to wisdom, 
than that they should be so made as to shadow thcrn forth? 116 
This paragraph is preceded by one showing the sun to be a type of the Trinity, and 
followed by a discussion of Biblical types, and a brief reference to an Augustinian 
image of the Trinity in the human mind. I have quoted at such length because several 
parts of this crucial definition arc relevant to my argument. Firstly, it is clear how 
much the typological system depends on the metaphysics I have discussed in the 
earlier part 'of this chapter - not just the idealism, but also the relational nature of the 
world, arc concepts that underlie Edwards' adoption of this interpretative mcthod. 117 
Secondly, this for the first time in this chapter introduces the tclcological note that is 
central to my thesis: 'spiritual things, ' things that 'immediately concern [God] 
114 ibld p-8 I. 
I Is According to Anderson a reference to this entry was added next to the title - see YEI I p. 7. 
116 YE13 pp. 434-435. 
117 Anderson comments on this relationship In his Introduction to the 'images' manuscript: YE11 
pp. 13-20. 
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himself', arc the purpose, goal orcnd' of the material crcation. 118 Later in the entry 
Edwards will say 'thus God glorifies himself and instructs the minds he has made. ' 
Edwards is able to adopt typology because it is consonant with his prior commitments 
concerning the doctrine of creation, and he chooses to adopt it because it furthers his 
fundamental teleological vision. ' 19 
The contcnt that Edwards rinds in his typcs is also significant: the tradition had sccn 
all the typcs of the Old Tcstarnent as finding tlicir antitype in Christ, but Edwards' 
natural types extend furthcr. 120 Probably the best way to describe the comPlicatcd 
evidence is to say that Edwards saw creation as imaging rcdcniption. 71ic antitypcs, 
although clustered around Christ and His work, also include such things as the 
sanctification of the saints, the temptation and destruction of the reprobate, and thc 
wiles of the devils. All these, howcvcr, may be included under the gcncral heading of 
the work of redemption, broadly considered. That this is an unsurprising result should 
be clear from a restatement: Edwards' great thcmc is the sclf-glorification, by mcans 
of sclf-communication, of God as thc final cnd of all His actions; this scif- 
glorification occurs cspecially in the ctcmal joy - or dcath - of His intclligcnt (Le. 
spiritual, in Edwards' tcnns) crcaturcs; the physical crcation scrvcs this sclf- 
glorification. T'hercforc, the crcatcd ordcr cxists for God to makc known His will 
concerning salvation and pcrdition; this it docs by bcing a mass of typological 
rclationships with thc 'highcr' spiritual rcality. 
Onc final point is rclcvant herc: physical typc and spiritual antitype arc connccted by 
a rclationship cxprcssly thought of by God - that is to say, the conncction is 
III Again, Anderson notes this emphasis: YEI Ipp. 9-1 0. 
119 In addition, Edwards believes that this method of approaching nature Is sanctioned by Biblical use, 
and he lists a number of examples - for instance, marriage as a type of Christ's love for the Church. 
Ilm3ges' 5.9,12.56 (pp. 52,53,54,67). Ilis typological hcrmcneutic. by which he sought to Identify true 
types (ordered by God) from mere fancirul resemblances, was dependent on the assumption that he 
could 'learn the language of types' from these Scriptural examples. See 'Types' notebook, YE11 
p. 152, where Edwards uses the image of a 'language of types' himself, also'Images' 156 (YE11 p. 106) 
where Edwards suggests that Scripture both tells us plainly what are the mysteries that are typified in 
the natural world, and tcaclics us to think typologically by the many examples it gives us. 
120 Although the 'Types of the Messiah' notebook demonstrates that Edwards was committed to 
traditional Christological typology of the Old Testament. YEI/pp. 197-324. 
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metaphysical; types arc really related to their antitypcs. 121 Reading a system like 
Edwards' it would be easy to assume that he is in some sense downplaying the 
importance of creation, but he is not. Creation is genuinely - metaphysically, 
objectively, in Jenson's phrase - bound up with God's final purpose. Jenson again: 
'Reality is a community of minds; and it is an actual community, that is, one engaged 
in communication ... Tbc world of bodies is the betiveen of their communication, the 
perspectival field in which persons can conic togctlicr while each rcmaining an other 
from all the others ... '122 Edwards' typological account of creation cmpliasiscs an 
aspect that is only implicit in the quotation: the world of bodies is also part of what 
cnables God to fulfil His highest purpose of communicating with I [is crcaturcs. 123 
There remains a weakness in the account as I have described it thus far, however: 
communication is a dynamic category, not a static one, as was clear in my discussion 
of God's scif-communication in the previous chapter. In this context, that is to say 
that creation must be dynamic, not static, and that Edwards' system could not work 
without a thcology of history. 
Ilans; Frci, 124 in discussing howýchanging views of the Bible led to the failure of 
traditional typology, links this with changing views of history. Frei offers three 
elements that serve to dcrine 'prccritical rcalistic reading' of Scripture - which all, 
significantly, relate to the nature of history. 125 Firstly, all history-like narrative in 
Scripture was unreflectivcly assumed to describe true historical occurrences 
accurately. Secondly, typological exegesis was used to read a single narrative out of 
the Bible -a historical metanarrativc. Tbirdly, this nictanarrative was assumed to 
embrace the whole world, and so readers were called to fit their own lives, and the 
lives they experienced in their own pcriods in history, into die story. The empiricism 
of Locke and Newton, and with them the Enlightcrinicrit, clearly offered a powerful 
challenge to each of these points: historical science. treating all texts as equal, and 
121 Jenson makes the point wcll: 'C-dwards'typologizing ... Is not an arbitrary game or mere 
hangover 
from older exegetical method; since all things are thoughts in God's mind, their imaging references are 
precisely their objective connections. ' America's Theologian pp. 4849. 
122 ibid p. 32. 
123 And as such is good, as I have already indicated Edwards Insisted (pp. 86-87 above). 
124 See Frei, Hans W. The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study In Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Hermeneutics Yale University Press, London, 1974 pp. 6-8. 
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trusting the mute testimony of artefacts more than that of any text, would determine 
what was historical and what was not; the literary structure of the Scriptural texts 
would be determined by critical analysis, not by a priori theological commitments; 
and if a metanarr4tive was to be permitted, it would be the 'scientifically validated' 
one of the Enlighteners, not something found in ancient texts. Frei speaks of an 
increasing distance between the narrative as read and reality as it was understood, and 
a reversal in the direction of interpretation: no longer was the question how well my 
experience of the world fitted the Biblical narrative; rather, the Biblical narrative was 
judged on its relation to my experience. 126 
Described like this, there is much in Edwards that sounds precritical. This is perhaps 
unsurprising - he lived, after ý all, , at the very start of this movement, when an 
unreflective preacher might have been able to continue in the old ways with some 
success, serenely unaware of the winds of changeý But Edwards was not unreflective; 
Stephen J. Stein, in, his' introduction to the Notes on Scripture, demonstrates that 
Edwards was very aware of the modem critical challenges in his exegesis, and often 
seeking to combat one or another of. them. 127 In part, the conflict was between two 
radically divergent ways of viewing the world - both Enlightened, in the sense of 
taking Newton and Locke seriously, but using the conclusions of Newton and Locke 
very differently. It is important to recognise this because a discussion of the points 
Frei makes from the perspective of Edwards will at times depend on a flat denial, but 
this is not an unreflective denial seeking to hold to the 'medieval' certainties, but a 
denial based on a different way of being Enlightened and modem. An example would 
be Frei's third point, concerning metanarrative: with Edwards' account of creation, as 
described in the earlier part of this chapter, a Christological metanarrative can be 
simply insisted on as not just consonant with, but actually demanded by, an adequate 
description of the being of the world. 128 
125 ibid pp. 2-3. 
126 ibid. pp. 5-6. 
127 YE15 pp. 12-21. See also Miscellanies 851,1172 and 1293, which each show Edwards reflecting 
carefully on his hermeneutic. 
128 This is not to criticise Frei's penetrating analysis, of course, merely to point out that Edwards had 
resources to combat the general trends Frei identifies. 
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This given, Edwards could continue to seek this metanarrative in Scripture, and so to 
read the Bible as an overarching story into which the events of life are to be fitted, as 
Frei describes. That is to say, Edwards could continue, on the basis of his doctrine of 
creation, to offer a theology of history. His practice in this direction can be seen in a 
number of works, the Notes on Scripture, 129 or the various works contained in the 
Apocalyptic Writings, 130 but it shows up most clearly in the History of the Work of 
Redemption. 131 This work, consisting of a series of thirty sermons on the text Isaiah 
51: 8, describes the progress of God's redemption as Edwards reads it in Scripture 
from 'the fall of man to the end of the world'132 and constitutes an overarching and 
breathtakingly ambitious theology of history. 
Before analysing this work, it would be as well to gather some indications of 
Edwards' viewpoint from other texts. Perhaps the clearest proof that he had a 
theology of history is his conviction, already mentioned in the previous chapter, that 
history continues beyond the end of the world, into the lives of the saints in heaven: 
'If the happiness of the creature be considered as it will be, in the whole of the 
creature's eternal duration, with all the infinity of its'progress and infinite increase of 
nearness and union ... '. 133 Progress and increase continue in perfection; 
134 there is 
nothing static about the joys of heaven, any more than there is about God's gift of 
Himself through the created order of the earth. 135 
Miscellanies 547136 discusses the theology of history in relation to the teleological 
theme that I am pursuing. The 'goal of providence' will not be reached until the end 
of the world, insists Edwards, but all created providence is a necessary part of that 
goal. Each snapshot state of the world in history must be of relevance, or 'providence 
would never have ordered. them. The world would never have been in such a state. ' 
The first corollary of this offers a position that emphasises my theme in this thesis: 
129 YE15. 
130 YES, particularly the Notes on the Apocalypse. 
131 YE9. 
132 The Doctrine of the whole discourse; see YE9 p. 116. 
133 From the Dissertation Concerning the Endfor Which God Created the World; YE8 pp. 533-534. 
134 For Edwards, unlike so much Platonist-influenced theology, temporality is not a defect in the 
creature. 
135 Paul Ramsey, the editor of YE8, has collected the various references Edwards makes to heaven as a 
progressive state in his Appendix III: YE8 pp. 706-738. 
105 
this, argues Edwards, proves the survival of created intelligences, as these 
intermediate states of the world exist only in the memory of such intelligences. This 
may seem slightly out of step with the metaphysics that I have described this chapter, 
as an assertion that history has genuine reality because it is eternally perceived and 
enjoyed by God could be made, 137 but Edwards' point is that what God does is done 
so that His glory may be known and loved, and so there must be creatures remember 
history and so to see God's glory therein displayed. 138 Nevertheless, the point stands: 
history has its own ontology, and if Edwards will use the word 'shadow, it is not the 
insubstantial illusion of Plato's cave. The world remains beautiful, but it is the 
sequential beauty of a piece of music (to borrow an image from Jenson139) rather than 
the static beauty of the 'still life'. The community of minds meeting harmoniously in 
dependent material reality is subject to change and movement - movement forward, 
to all eternity. 
Here, once again, Edwards' rigorous Calvinism is of benefit. 140 If it is assumed that 
the fall was a rrýistake, never part of the plan, then the same is likely to be said of 
history. The turning of ages will become, as it did for Origen, 141 an unfortunate 
necessity to get back to the place where it all started. For Edwards, God's first and 
best thought was of change - the crucifixion of Christ being 'as it were the cause of 
all the decrees, the greatest of all decreed events, and that on which all other decreed 
events depend as their main foundation. '142 The end of history is not its beginning; 
indeed, history has no 'end', in the sense of a, static, immutable 'Omega point'. 
136 Townsend pp. 135-136. 
137 Again, it is easier to hold this from Edwards' position than from Berkeley's, as the successive 
states of history could be described in terms of differing relationships between created objects. 
Relationships, it will be remembered, are integral to Edwards' system, but not to that of Berkeley, as 
indeed Edwards states in this Miscellanies entry: '... the various succesive states of the world do in 
conjunction or as connected in a scheme together attain God's great design. ' 
138 '[T]here is nothing remains than can be supposed to be the thing reached or brought forth as the 
great thing aimed at in all that God had for so many ages been doing ... God ... has gained no knowledge ... by all that has happened. There remains no declarative glory of God nor any benefit to 
any other being. ' 
139 op. cit. p. 35. 
140 Jenson makes the point, although his illustration is perhaps unfortunate: 'The division runs 
between those for whom Christ's atoning work is contingent to the sheer fact of sin, and those for 
whom the fact of sin is contingent to God's intent to redeem. Some cannot and some can join the ... 
carol that rejoices in Adam's sin, since otherwise "our Lady" would not have been "heaven's queen". ' 
(op. cit. p. 45) With all due deference to Professor Jenson's knowledge of the subject, I for one would 
be surprised to find Edwards willing to refer to the Blessed Virgin as 'heaven's queen'! 
141 De PrincipUs 1.6.2. 
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Rather, 'the end of history' still features temporal change, with the saints moving into 
closer and closer union with God for all eternity. History, very simply, is the 
necessary condition for the event of the overflow of God's glory, and -as such can 
never come to an end. Given this, it is natural that Edwards should conceive of 
precisely the history of the work of redemption as a fitting subject for a major 
discourse - and a fitting title for'his projected Summa. 143 
A problem raises its head, of course: a theology of history may very well speak of the 
necessity of Old Testament history for the Incarnation - indeed, may even claim that 
such Heilsgeschte is presupposed by the fact of personal conversion. 144 But what of 
the rise of Islam, the Reformation, or the European colonisation of the Americas? 
How are we to theologise concerning these? Three approaches seem possible: one 
may, with Augustine, 145 proffer general theories concerning the nature of human 
history and speculate as to how recent events might relate'to such; one may, with the 
Puritan radicals and fifth monarchists of the English Civil War seek prophecies in 
Scripture that speak about the current day; or, most ambitiously, one could seek a 
hermeneutic with which to interpret history itselL Perhaps the feature that marks 
Edwards most'clearly as an Enlightenment thinker is his confidence, not just in the 
rationality of the world, but in his ability to uncover that rationality; it is no surprise, 
then, to find Edwards adopting all three of these methods. 
I have already discussed the theology of'history that will underline the first. 
Miscellanies entry 547 can'be 'Seen in this light: creation has a teleology, so history 
must conforin to that teleology. This, however, -will not take us very far, and so 
Augustine's tale of two cities does not presume'to explain God's purpose in every 
detail of recorded history. The second road may travel further, and Edwards' copious 
Notes on the . 4pocalypse demonstrate his attempts to walk this way. 
These books, of 
all Edwards' writings, are perhaps the most foreign to the modem reader, but then the 
142 Miscellanies 762, Corol. 2. 
143 Edwards' intention to write a 'body of divinity' under this title is indicated in a letter to the trustees 
of the College of New Jersey concerning the offer of the presidency of the college. For the text see 
YE16 pp. 725-730. 
144 Although Edwards would never have consented to such a de-objectifying of the drama of salvation. 
See my next chapter. 
145 In Civitas Dei. 
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modern reader will not share Edwards' assumption that history is precisely the history 
of redemption, the unfolding action of God in revealing His glory through the 
salvation and eternal joy of His elect creatures. If we find it strange or even amusing 
to read Edwards' attempts to link the 'sixth vial' of Revelation 16: 12 with the 
disruption of the flow of riches from the colonies to Roman Catholic monarchs in his 
own day, 146 then that may be as much to do with our assumptions that God is 
powerless in history - paganism - or even that our salvation is out of, rather than 
through, 'secular' history - gnosticism - as any primitivism on Edwards' part. The 
third route is the most dangerous, if potentially the most fruitful. Edwards' attempts 
in this direction involved a further extension of his typological herineneutic to the 
events of history in order to show that these, too, could show forth Christ and His 
saving work, to God's glory. Indeed, if creation and its history are as Edwards has 
described them, then the events of history must show forth Christ because such events 
are essentially relationships that God thinks of, which is to say their being is 
Christologically grounded. 147 And this is no sub-Hegelian logos-mysticism; Edwards, 
when speaking abopt Christ, is speaking of the One who was crucified under Pontius 
Pilate, not of any organising principle of the cosmos - or, better, he is speaking of the 
One who was crucified. under Pontius Pilate as the organising Person of the 
COSMOS. 148 
I have had cause to comment earlier in this chapter that Edwards will admit no basic 
ontological distinction other than that between creature and Creator; 49 a fl er piece 
of evidence of this commitment will demonstrate just how seriously Edwards takes 
this theme of the work of Jesus Christ as that around which the universe is organised. 
A theology that had not been thoroughly emancipated from Greek or Enlightenment 
146 YE5 pp. 253-284. 
147 'Christ God man is not only Mediatour between God and sinfull men but he acts as a middle 
person between all other persons & all intelligent beings. ' Miscellanies 781. The assertion is 
breathtakingly daring, but entirely in accord with Edwards' system. 
148 This is clear from the History of the Work of Redemption, which focuses on the events of the 
gospel narratives: 'And we are now come to the most remarkable article of time that ever was or ever 
will be. Though it was between thirty and forty years, yet more was done in it than had been done from 
the beginning of the world to that time. We have observed that all [things] that had been done before 
were only preparatory for what was done now, and it may be observed that all that was done before the 
beginning of time in the eternal counsels of God and that eternal transaction there was between the 
persons of the Trinity, chiefly respected this period. ' 
YE9 p. 294. 
149 pp. 90-92 above. 
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views would see the angels, as the inhabitants of heaven, as perfect and unchanging. 
Edwards will not. The elect angels are creatures as we are and so are in need of 
confirmation, and that confirmation comes only through the work of Jesus Christ. 
Briefly, Edwards argues that it was the awareness of the coming humiliation of Christ 
that caused the fallen angels to reject God's plans, as they regarded this as unworthy 
of the Son of God. So, it was appropriate that the test of the elect angels that 
confirmed their obedience was their submission to the man Jesus Christ as their King. 
This they could only do at the ascension, so it was only at the completion of the 
gospel plan that the elect angels were confirmed as elect. 150 It is notjust the material 
creation that finds its history bound up in the life, death, resurrection, ascension and 
return of Jesus Christ; the heavens themselves depend on Him for their being. 
The History of the Work of Redemption, then, describes the history of the world 
through the hermeneutical key of Jesus Christ. All that happens before the 
Incarnation is preparatory for His mission, all that happens after is an outworking of 
what He has done. - Edwards is concerned to demonstrate that at every point in history 
God is applying the salvation found in and through Jesus Christ to men and women. 
In the first section of the work, 151 Edwards discusses the history of the world from the 
Fall to the Incarnation. The proposition here is that this span of time 'is taken up in 
doing those things that were forerunners and earnests also of Christ's coming and 
working out redemption and work preparatory to it. $ 152 Whether God's mighty acts of 
liberation in Old Testament history, 153 or the rise and fall of the ancient empires, 154 or 
the actual redemption of individual Israelites, 155 all history in this period was so 
ordered by God to provide the right conditions for the coming of Christ. But this is 
not the most striking feature of the discourse: Edwards also insists that the salvation 
150 Miscellanies 515 contains substantially this account, but most of the positions are common 
throughout the Miscellanies. Entry 938 in particular makes the same point: 'So it was in Christ God 
man that the angels have found rest. ' 
151 pp. 113-293. 
152 p. 128. 
153 For instance, Edwards describes the exodus as 'the greatest pledge and forerunner of the future 
redemption of Christ' and 'the greatest type of Christ's redemption of any providential event 
whatsoever'. p. 175. 
154 'This period being the last period of the Old Testament and the next to Christ's coming, - seems to 
have been remarkably distinguished from all others in the great revolutions that were among the 
nations of the earth to make way for the kingdom of Christ. ' p. 244. 
155 '... all the souls that were saved before Christ came were only as it [were] the eamests of the future 
harvest. ' p. 129. 
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that is wrought by God in these times is only through Christ - Ile is the one who 
stands in the place of the mediator, and so all God's actions are through Him. This is 
represented as a result of the judgement that followed the Fall: 'Henceforth, this lower 
world with all its concerns was as it were devolved upon the Son of God. For when 
man had sinned, God the Father would have no more to do with man immediately 
He would henceforth have no concern with man but only through a mediator. '156 
A tension with Edwards' metaphysical thought will be apparent. I have argued that 
Edwards sees the act of creation as mediated by Son and Spirit; here, there is the 
(implicit) suggestion that God acted immediately on the original creation. Once 
again, the provisional nature of the text must be taken into account: this is an 
unrevised sermon, which cannot be expected to state every point in the most careful 
manner. The suggestion is no more than implicit, and as it contradicts explicit 
statements made by Edwards in more carefully considered points, 157 we may assume 
that it was a slip of phrasing, that would have been eliminated had Edwards lived to 
revise the -text as he intended. The present point, however, is to notice how 
thoroughly Christocentric Edwards' account of history is: '... when we read in the 
sacred history what God did from time to time towards his church and people, and 
what he said to them, and how he revealed himself to them, we are to understand it 
especially of the second person of the Trinity. '158 Again, in speaking of the exodus, 
Edwards insists 'this redemption was by Jesus Christ', 159 arguing that Christ appeared 
in the burning bush, that Christ was in the pillar of cloud and fire, that Christ 
destroyed the pursuing army in the Red Sea. This whole passage is a remarkable 
example of the Christological hermeneutic which informs Edwards' writing; not only 
is every divine action ascribed specifically to Christ, but the event as a whole is seen 
as a type of Christ's redemption, and many of the details are linked to prophecies and 
details of His life and work. So the burning bush in its details is a type of the 
incarnation and passion of the Redeemer, the Red Sea a type of baptism, and hence of 
salvation through being washed in Christ's blood, and many other images and 
156 p. 13 1. 
157 'All works of God are done by the Spirit, but in all works relating to the world he acts as the Spirit 
of the Son ... So Christ can be called the Author of both the old & new creation..., Miscellanies 958 (unpublished). 
158 ibid. 
159 p. 175. 
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allusions appear in between. 160 History in its grand sweep, and its apparently 
incidental details is ordered by God through Christ to prepare for the greatest act of 
God in the humiliation of His Son. 161 
And this is the second of Edwards' three periods of history. It is, as he says, 
_a 
'very 
unequal division', since this 'second period is so much the greatcst. '162 It is, Edwards 
says, taken up with 'the purchase of redemption. '163 Bracketing the question of the 
appropriateness of the mercantile metaphor, which will be properly considered in the 
next chapter, the central point that Edwards makes is that the gaining of redemption 
began on the morning of incarnation, and was completed on the morning of 
resurrection. Nothing took place before this period, or after it, and the whole of this 
period - the whole of Christ's life - was taken up with the work. 164 Most of the 
discussion of this period in the sermon series is taken up with the nature of 
redemption, a subject that will be dealt with in the next chapter, so I will pass over 
this section without further comment. 
The last, and for my purposes, perhaps the most interesting, of Edwards' divisions 
covers the time from the resurrection to the end of the world. For the majority of this 
period there is no revealed interpretation of history, so Edwards was forced to 
interpret reported history - and the events of his own day165 - using the hermeneutical 
tools that he had developed. His first sermon concerning this period is devoted to 
describing these tools for his listeners. 166 Firstly, he has a general theory of history 
which will shape his account, as this period is 'all taken up in bringing about the great 
160 pp. 175-177. Similar insistences can be found throughout the Miscellanies. Entry 663, for 
instance, (as yet unpublished) accounts for the salvation of the Old Testament saints by asserting that 
'it was the Lord Jesus Christ, the second Person of the Trinity, that was wont to appear & to reveal 
himself to the people of God of old... '. Again, in entry 691 (also unpublished) he says that 'Christ 
himself came up on that day out of the Red Sea with the children of Israel in the cloud and the fire. ' 
(§ 19, p. 15 of Schafer transcript). The Blank Bible on John 1: 18 is also significant: all the theophanies 
throughout the Old Testament are types of the coming Incarnation; Christ delighted to appear as a man 
because He delighted in His coming Incarnation. 
161 In this work (which, it must be remembered, survives only in sermon-manuscript form, and not as 
the statement of Christian doctrine which Edwards had intended to produce) Edwards is vulnerable to 
the charge that he has little place for the Holy Spirit in his account of creation and its history. 
162 p. 127. 
163 p. 295. 
164 ibid. 
165 Although this is more prevalent in the Notes on the Apocalypse. 
166 Sermon 18; pp. 344-356. 
effect or success of Christ's purpose'; 167 secondly, he finds prophecies in Scripture 
relating to this period - those passages which speak of 'the last days', 'the end of the 
world' and similar; 168 and thirdly, within the discussion of Scripture, is an indication 
that history will be read typologically in order to produce his account. There are four 
successive events in the setting up of Christ's kingdom: the destruction of Jerusalem, 
of the Roman empire, of Antichrist (Le. the papacy) and Christ's coming in glory. 'I 
would observe, ' says Edwards, 'that each of the three former of these is a lively image 
and type of the fourth and last... 1169 
Further details of Edwards' arguments in this section need not detain us; assuming 
that we are less convinced than he was that Biblical prophecies of the Antichrist refer 
to the papacy, there is little of interest in the content of his description of history, and 
the ingenuity of the method should already be clear. My analysis of History of the 
Work of Redemption has sought to provide the data to establish that Edwards had a 
theology of history. It should be clear enough that he had theological resources to 
find meaning in historical events, and I indicated earlier that Edwards was concerned 
to find an ontology of history. Indeed, such a theory was necessary for history to 
fulfil its basic teleological purpose in his scheme. One final point is worthy of notice: 
in applying his typological categories to history as well as nature, he has linked the 
ontology of history with epistemology, and so the existence of historical events is 
real, and is a result of their being media for communication. 170 
A summary seems in order. Edwards lived during the period when 'medieval' 
conceptions of the world as morally comprehensible were being displaced by 
'modem' conceptions of the world as mathematically comprehensible. His own 
thought was an attempt to embrace the advances being made by natural science whilst 
holding on to the very robust doctrine of providence he inherited from the Puritan 
tradition. This, I have argued, he achieved by -finding a Trinitarian idealist 
metaphysic that could underpin Newtonian physics at least as well as the rationalisms; 
167 p. 344. 
168 pp. 346-356. 
169 p. 351. 
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of the philosophes. The way was open for him, then, to offer an account of the moral, 
or teleological, meaning of creation. Edwards sought to do this through a 
development of 'the old hermeneutical tool of typology. Combined with his 
metaphysics, this becomes not just an interpretative, but also an ontological, tool to 
describe why and how creation- including history - has meaning, and so to 
demonstrate that creation can fit into the teleological scheme that I described in the 
preýlious chapter. Simply, Edwards offered a way to re-assert, whilst accepting and 
celebrating all the advances made by natural science, that there is no creature so small 
and abject that it does not represent the goodness of God, or indeed all of God's other 
attributes. Creation is the display and communication of God's glory, just as it must 
be for Edwards' account of God's purposes to work. 
Finally, some interim conclusions: this account is certainly coherent in its own terms, 
but is typology really able to bear this amount of weight? The language, after all, 
seems alien to the current generation of theologians, 171 but it could, I suggest, be 
restated in more familiar language. , For Edwards, typology is a category - the 
category, perhaps - of mediated communication. Because of this, in his metaphysical 
system, it is also an ontological principle. But God's self-communication, in 
Edwards' idealist language, is only another way of speaking of the Son. Creation, 
claims Edwards, with, his ontological typology, is a mode of God's self- 
communication through His Son. And, because God's self-communication is finally a 
participative category (as the previous chapter explored), creation is a mode of God's 
self-giving through His Son. Tor the moment, let us assume that all of Edwards' 
typological identifications are wrong - and certainly many of them are fanciful 
enough - still, was he not right to assert the Christological basis of creation, noetically 
and ontically, and to seek to give some content to that? I have mentioned already the 
question of the lack of pneumatology in all this; perhaps the only other point of 
contention would be the assumption that content can be given. The Nein! still rings in 
our ears, after all. 
170 Edwards' vision of the possibilities of mass media was thus not only two centuries earlier than that 
of his fellow Americans such as Bill Gates, but also considerably more audacious! 
171 Although perhaps not so alien as it was to recent generations, thanks to the degree of rehabilitation 
brought about by (amongst others) Frei and Danidlou (opera cit. ). 
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For Edwards' system to work, of course, this content must be given. If God -is not 
glorified by the being'of creation, then it has no reason to be. Edwards at least wants 
his natural theology to be Christian natural theology - of Christ, from Christ, through 
Christ - and even Barth was prepared to accept that there are 'true words which are 
not spoken in the Bible or the Church, but which have to be regarded as true in 
relation to the one Word of God, and therefore heard like this Word, and together with 
it' and indeed that 'Jesus Christ speak[s] through such words. '172 Edwards thought he 
had a way of hearing those words, not a way apart from Jesus Christ, but a way built 
on the one Word he had heard, which he claimed could, if listened to, give the 
charism of interpretation necessary to hear the Word in these words too. If he was 
wrong in this, he was surely not wrong to insist that such words existed, that Jesus 
Christ gave Himself in creation and its history too, and indeed, that creation was 
nothing other than the network of such words, the structure of this divine self-giving. 
Every structure, according to Jacques Derrida, has its 'point of presence', that 
'transcendental signified' which serves to 'orient, balance, -and organize the 
structure. '173 Derrida is no fan of such 'points of presence', but let that pass; the 
question that will perhaps finally determine the value or otherwise of Edwards 
doctrine of creation is this: where is that point of presence? If, as so often in 
'Christian' accounts of history it is an alien theory of history that is used to explain 
how the gospel story relates to the whole, then it must finally be discarded. But I 
have suggested throughout that this is not the case: the centre that gives coherence and 
meaning to the whole is precisely the gospel story. '[A]II that was done ... in the 
eternal counsels of God ... chiefly respected this period, ' says Edwards; 174 'the sin of 
crucifying Christ' is precisely 'that on which all other decreed events depend on as 
their main foundation. '175, Robert Jenson, in a fascinating discussion of Augustine's 
understanding of created time as distentio, suggests that the only route between 
idealism and atheism is to insist that this distentio is the 'drama, the complex energeia 
172 C. D. IV/3.1 p. 114. 
173 See Derrida, Jacques 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' in Lodge, 
David (ed. ) Modern Criticism and Theory: A Readerý Longman, London, 1988 pp. 108-123, & 
particularly pp. 109-110 for the point and quotations. 
174 YE9 p. 294. 
175 Miscellanies 762 corol. 2. 
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that the living God iS. '176 Edwards allows us to specify this distentio in a daring way, 
with a Biblical text. Time - creation, and its history - can be because, and only 
because, the Son of God once cried 'Eloi, Doi lama sabachthani. 177 
The question I have set out to put is borrowed from Luther: does Edwards view God's 
glory through the Cross? In his account of creation the answer is an unambiguous 
'yes'. There are rough edges and questions in the scheme, unsuprisingly, as what 
would have been its main statement was unwritten, but in this area Edwards' account 
is broadly coherent and satisfying. Creation and its history are ontologically 
dependent on, connected to, and revelatory of, the gospel story. Perhaps this should 
not be too surprising; it is a commonplace of Reformed theology that God created in 
order to fulfil His prior purposes in salvation and damnation, and Edwards' account of 
God's self-glorification assumes this position. In this context, an account of creation 
should be built and focused on the gospel, but the majority of the tradition failed to be 
true to itself on this point. Edwards, with the minor questions I have noted, succeeded 
in linking creation to redemption theologically. The next chapter turns to ask how far 
he was able to speak of God's self-glorification in the work of redemption in an 
equally crucicentric way. 
176 'Aspects of a Doctrine of Creation' in Gunton, Colin E. (ed. ) The Doctrine of Creation T. &T. 
Clark, Edinburgh, 1997, pp. 17-28, p. 27. 
177 Would Jesus have been crucified if humanity had not fallen? No doubt Edwards would insist that 
it was inevitable that humanity should fall, and so the question is a meaningless one. But one can 
imagine an answer analogous to that the Fathers gave: distension would have been necessary - 
Jenson's argument is that creation can have no being without it - but one could posit a less vicious 
form of distension, a way for the Son to be incarnate which did not lead to crucif"Nion. The echoes of 
Scotus hardly need pointing out. 
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Chapter 4 
'God Glorified in the Work of RedemPtion' 
Oh wearisome Condition ofHumanily! 
Borne under one Law, to another bound: 
Vainely begot, andyetforbidden vanity, 
Created sicke, commanded to be sound: 
Mhat meaneth Nature by these diverse Lawes? 
Passion and Reason, setle-division cause: 
Is it the mark or Majesly ofPower 
To make offenses that it mayforgive? 
Nature hersetfe, doth her own setfe defloure, 
To hate those errors she her seye doth give... 
In 1731, two years after his grandfather's death and his consequent elevation as 
Stoddard's successor, Edwards was invited to give the Public Lecture in Boston. Perry 
Miller has eloquently explained the reasons for regarding the sermon Edwards preached 
on that occasion as almost a personal manifesto. 2 This was Edwards' opportunity to set 
out his stall publicly: he had succeeded to a significant pulpit, and one regarded with 
suspicion by the Boston elite; he was, moreover, the grandson of 'Pope' Stoddard, who 
had made that Northampton pulpit a power-base to rival those in Boston; there was every 
chance of the lecture being sponsored for publication, and so a lasting statement might be 
made. Edwards, now 28, was presented with the opportunity to set out his principles, to 
take his own stand. The short title, the text and the doctrine of the address all 
demonstrate that the theme of this thesis, God's self-glorification, is central to Edwards' 
concerns in this manifesto: 'God glorified in man's dependence' was the title; I 
Corinthians 1: 2ý-3 1, '... He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord, ' was the text; and the 
I Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke Chorus Sacerdotum 11.1-10, taken from Gardiner, H. (ed. ) The Metaphysical 
Poets Penguin Classics, Penguin, London, 1972 3 pp. 36-37. 
2 Miller, Peny Jonathan Edwards (American Men of Letters Series) William Sloane Associates, n. loc., 
1949, pp. 28-34. 
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doctrine claimed 'God iS'glorified in the work of redemption in this, that there appears in 
it so absolute and universal a dependence of the redeemed on him. "3 
In teaching us to regard this lecture as definitive, however, Miller also set a fashion for 
seeing the second half of the short title as determinative of the content: it is 'man's 
dependence' that Edwards' sought to insist on. 4 But a consideration of the text and 
doctrine surely tells against this, still more so a reading of the lecture. Having sought to 
prove his doctrine, Edwards immediately turns to its use in demonstrating God's wisdom: 
even 'man's emptiness and misery, his low, lost, and ruined state' become a means of 
serving God's glory. '[a]ll is of the Father, all through the Son, and all in the Holy 
Ghost' so the three Persons are *equally glorified in this work, and any theology that 
lessens human dependence in any way - the target is clearly Anninianism - robs God of 
His glory. 5 Edwards is uncompromising - it is indeed the 'mark' and 'Majesty of Power, 
to make offenses that it may forgive. ' The dependence of humanity is a means to an end. 
The end is the glory of God. 
So, in soteriology as well, Edwards saw God's self-glorification as fundamental. This 
chapter will seek to explore this theme and ask how he sees God as being glorified, 
whether here, too, the vision of God's self-glorification is crucicentric. Some structure 
must be proposed for the material; recognising that Edwards' Puritan heritage is at least 
as relevant here as elsewhere, I will seek to order it according to the pattern of the 
'Golden chain', working from God's decrees through the work of Christ to human 
response to God. I will argue-that, in common with the Reformed tradition, Edwards 
offers aýChristologically grounded and crucicentric doctrine of salvation, but separates 
the doctrine of perdition entirely from the person of Christ and the gospel story. -- 
3 The lecture can be found in BT2 pp. 3-7, and the quotations on p. 3. 
4 loc. cit. 
5 The point and quotations are all from the 'Use' section, BT2 pp. 6-7. 
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4.1 The Basis of Redemption: Election and Christology 
Beginning with God's decrees, a question is immediately raised: Gerstner, whose 
account of Edwards' theology is probably the most complete commentary available, cites 
his infralapsarianism as an apparently accepted fact, on the way to making another point; 6 
Jenson, by contrast, has Edwards 'decidedly' in the same group as the supralapsarian 
Calvinists. 7 An exploration of this dispute will provide a convenient way into this theme: 
I have already indicated that my own judgement coincides with Jenson's; this is an 
appropriate point to make clear why. In the tradition that reached Edwards, 
supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism have something of the character of ideal types - 
Beza may be cited as an example of the one, and Turretin of the other, but there are many 
others who stand between these poles. Of particular note is Petrus van Mastricht, not 
only because his attempt to find a mediating position seems to be regarded as the most 
successful, 8 but also because Edwards speaks of Mastricht's Theoretico-practica 
Theologia as better than 'any other Book in the world, excepting the Bible. '9 It is 
inappropriate, -then, to ask if Edwards is 'a supralapsarian' or 'an infralapsarian' as if 
these two positions spanned the range of possibilities. The tradition Edwards inherited 
from the end of the seventeenth century was exploring positions between the two, and 
discovering middle ground, and so it is there we should expect to find him. 
A cluster of Miscellanies entries show that Edwards' attempts to find this mediating 
position. In Miscellanies 70010 the first move is made: 'God in the decree of election is 
justly to be considered as decreeing the creature's eternal happiness, antecedently to any 
foresight of good works, in a sense wherein he does not in reprobation decree the 
creature's eternal misery, antecedently to any foresight of sin. ' There is an asymmetry 
between election and reprobation: God decrees to elect - to allow certain creatures to 
6 Rational Biblical Theology 11.152. 
7 America's Theologian p. 45. 
8 Both Heppe (Reformed Dogmatics p. 162) and Barth (CD. 11/2 pp. 132-133) choose Mastricht's position 
to demonstrate the possibilities for mediation. 
9 Letter to Joseph Bellamy, 15'h Jan. 1746n YE16 p. 217. 
10 Not yet published in YE, but §57 of the Miscellaneous Remarks Concerning the Divine Decrees (BT2 
pp. 540) contains an adequate text. 
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share His glory and happiness - with no other reason than His own love in view, in the 
decree of reprobation God has sinful creatures in view, and so this decree is necessarily 
infralapsarian - 'necessarily', because of positions Edwards explores in the next entry in 
this cluster. Miscellanies 70411 is largely an explicit discussion of the notion of the 
ordering of the decrees. Decrees are, of course, not before or after one another in time, 
but they may be logically, and this in two ways. Firstly, decrees that are means to ends 
can be regarded as consequent upon the decree of the end that is in view; secondly, if one 
decree presupposes another, it may be regarded as dependent on the decree of the thing 
presupposed. So, God's decree to punish sinful creatures is consequent on both the 
decree to glorify Himself - the end which this decree is a means to - and the decree that 
(some) creatures will be sinful - the necessary basis for this decree. Hence, it is 
infralapsarian. Edwards will not, at this point, accept that glorifying His justice is an 
appropriate end for God - He rather glorifies His holiness and majesty by means of His 
justice: Me considering of the glorifying of vindictive justice as a meer [Le. pure, 
simple] end, has led to great misrepresentations, and undue and unhappy expressions 
about the decree of reprobation. Hence the glorifying of God's vindictive justice on such 
particular persons, has been considered 'as altogether prior in the decree to their 
sinfulness; yea, to their very beings... 112 The textual evidence is clear; when he 
explicitly explores the ordering of the decrees, Edwards asserts the decree of reprobation 
to be infralapsarian. 13 
What of election? If Edwards' principles are applied strictly, this should be 
supralapsarian if it has no logical dependence on the decree of the fall. Edwards is 
careful to distinguish two aspects: God's decision that some creatures should share His 
love is dependent only on God's ultimate end, here described as 'glorifying his love and 
communicating his goodness. ' The decree that this should happen through God being 
merciful to undeserving creatures, by contrast, is logically dependent on the fall. The fact 
Not yet published in YE, but §58 of the Miscellaneous Remarks Concerning the Divine Decrees (BT2 
pp. 540-542) contains an adequate text. 
12 ibid 
13 The 'Blank Bible' on Rom. 9: 11-13 ('... Esau I have hated... ') makes the same point, with a reference to 
Turretin, who was of course a noted proponent of the infralapsarian scheme. 
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of election is decreed supra-lapsus; the fonn of election infra-lapsus. The sterility of 
argtunent concerning Edwards' credentials as a supra- or infralapsarian should now be 
clear. 14 
That said, there is an important underlying debate here, which separates Gerstner's 
reconstruction of Edwards' position from Jenson's. For Gerstner, Edwards would not 
think of God as the author of sin, a point he claims Edwards saw the 'vital importance 
, of'. 
Jenson, by contrast, numbers him with those for whom 'the fact of sin is contingent 
to God's intent to redeem. '15 In the context of this thesis, the question becomes: is the 
Fall part of God's self-glorification, or is it only the backdrop against which God carries 
out His purposes? 16 This, it seems, is an either-or question, with a simple assertion of 
ignorance offering the only mediating position. This is the question that underlies talk of 
the lapsarian controversy in both Jenson and Gerstner. 17 
At this point, Gerstner's presentation is simply confused. He shows that, for Edwards, 
evil is necessary to God's schemes and hence part of the decree, 18 and quotes Edwards 
twice as asserting 'all the sins of men are foreordained and ordered by a wise 
14 Gerstner actually quotes - most of the passage I have been expounding as proof of Edwards' 
infralapsarianism (Rational Biblical TheoloSD, 11.152-156 & 162), and even acknowledges that Edwards 
'may seem to be supralapsarian with reference to the decree of election and infralapsarian with reference to 
the decree of reprobation. ' (p. 162) But, Gerstner argues, God's decree is to be generally gracious before 
the fall, and to choose objects of His mercy infra-lapsus. Edwards, however, argues on the basis of his 
metaphysics that God's election is creative ('... the glory of God's love, and the communication of his 
goodness ... give both ... being and happiness' Miscellanies 704), and so specific election precedes 
creation and fall: 'hence the design to communicate and glorify his goodness and love eternally to a certain 
number, is to be considered as prior ... to their being and fall' (my italics). This metaphysical move 
answers Turretin's first criticism of supralapsarianism, that 'a non-entity [i. e. homo creabilis et labilis] 
cannot be the object of predestination' (Inst. Elenc. Theol. IV. 9.9). It also raises a significant question: if 
this is the case, then are not the elect ontologically other than the reprobate? I will return to this question 
later. 
15 Both quotations from loci cit. in nn. 6 and 7 above. 
16 The Iatter position may be found in Turretin, for whom the purpose of creation was I ... the 
communication and (as it were) the spreading out (ekstasis) of the power, wisdom and goodness of the 
Creator... ' - not the justice and mercy of God - '... But after sin had corrupted and disturbed this order 
entirely, God ... instituted the work of redemption for no other end than to display more magnificently ... the same attributes and with them his mercy and justice. ' The Fall was 'only the occasion and end from 
which God began the counsel of salvation'. Inst. Elenc. Theol. IV. 9.22. 
17 Perhaps unhelpfully, as several infrapasarians who held God to have decreed sin can be found in the 
tradition. For example, see Heidegger, quoted in Heppe, p. 146. 
18 op. cit. pp. 148-149. 
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providence', 19 and yet insists that Edwards will not see God as the 'author of sin' - 
without spelling out what might be involved in the last statement which is not asserted by 
the others. This linguistic gymnastics seems to be aimed at insisting that God was just in 
decreeing sin -a point Edwards certainly wants to make (and which I shall discuss in the 
next chapter), but which is not sufficiently made by insisting on the use of words like 
'orderer' instead of 'author'. 20 Nevertheless, the Miscellanies entry Gerstner quotes will 
answer the question well enough: the crucifixion of Christ was a sin, yet this was God's 
first and best thought. Therefore God decrees sin, too, for the promotion of His glory. 
He is the 'author of sin' in any natural sense of that phrase - God thinks of sin, and 
determines that the world shall be with sin and evil, not without. How God can do this 
justly is a subsequent question, and should not be allowed to obscure Edwards' 
uncompromising answer to the first. Sin and evil, too, are part of God's act of self- 
glorification. So there is a sense in which Edwards must be *described as 
uncompromisingly supralapsarian after A., Regardless of the place of the decree of 
reprobation, God's first thought is emphatically that He will redeem, not that He will 
create. 21 
Seven entries after the one Gerstner quotes in this connection, Edwards returns to the 
theme of the election of Christ. In Miscellanies 762 it is an assertion to prove something 
else - God's decreeing of sin; in entry 76922 Edwards explores what it means to talk 
about the election of Christ. God elects His Son to mediatorial office through being 
joined to the man Christ Jesus; God elects this man to mediatorial office through union 
with His Son, and thus God elects the God-man, Jesus Christ the Lord to be the 'head of 
19 Both quotations on p. 150; the phrase is from §12 of the Miscellaneous Observations Concerning the 
Divine Decrees (B72 p. 528), which is a much-reduced version of Miscellanies 762, not yet published in 
any better form. 
20 Edwards shows himself impatient of a similarly standard verbal distinction in an unpublished notebook 
on the doctrines of grace (Beinecke collection Box 15 Folder 1205): 'What God permits, he decrees to 
permit. If it is no blemish to God to permit sin, then it is no blemish to him to [word crossed out] or intend 
to permit it... ' (p. 9 of the notebook; the emphasis is Edwards'). 
21 This could be demonstrated from a multitude of Miscellanies entries, but one example will serve: 'The 
greatest work of God & the end of all other works, and all God's DECREES [are] contained in the Covenant 
of REDEMPTION' (entry 993, unpublished; this is the first sentence of the entry, and the capitalised words 
are those under which Edwards indexed the entry in his table). 
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election and the pattern of all other election. This last phrase is expounded: election of 
other creatures (angels and human beings) is contained in the election of Christ. God 
chooses the elect to be in'ChriSt, 23 and thus they are elected to share the glory to which 
God has elected Christ. One final point: the God who elects is not the abstract majesty 
Barth finds so offensive in the tradition; Edwards will again and again speak of the 
eternal counsels of the Trinity regarding God's purposes in salvation. 24 
Edwards returns to this theme in Miscellanies 1245.25 What, he asks, does it mean to say 
that we are chosen 'in Christ'? It does not mean that we are chosen because our belief in 
Christ is foreseen, nor that, we are chosen because His act of atonement is foreseen. 
Again, it cannot mean that we are elected to be in Christ (this is at least a clarification of 
the position reached in the entry considered in the previous paragraph, if not a 
modification), nor that we were elected alongside Christ. Instead, insists Edwards, we 
need to consider God's basic purposes and to understand the text in their light. God's 
fspecial aim in all was to procure. one created child, one spouse and body of his Son for 
the adequate displays of his unspeakable and transcendent goodness and grace. ' So, 
although individuals are elected, they are elected as the Church ('as one body, one 
spouse, all united in one Head') to receive the benefits of election no other way than in 
Christ. Edwards presses the metaphor of the body to make his point: every atom of a 
particular body was chosen by God to be alive, but only in the body, animated by the 
soul, 'partaking of the vital influence of the Head and vitals of the body'. 
So, God chose certain individuals to make up the elect body, the Church, 'Which is 
vivified by its union with Christ, as His body and His spouse. As these individuals were 
to be human beings, God elected a human being to be the Head of the body and also the 
22 The only currently published version is §48 of the Miscellaneous Observations Concerning the Divine 
Decrees (BT2 pp. 538-539), but this is a heavily edited text. 
23 4... we are elected in Christ, as we are elected in his election' (p. 6 of Schafer's transcript). 
24 For example: Miscellanies 993 (as yet unpublished); the Observations Concerning the Scripture 
Economy of the Trinity (in Helm, ed. Treatise on Grace pp. 77-94), which speaks of the 'mutual free 
agreement, whereby the persons of the Trinity, of their own will, have as it were formed themselves into a 
society, for carrying out the great design ... ' (p. 78); History of Redemption which insists 'The persons of 
the Trinity were as it were confederated in a design and covenant of redemption... ' (YE9 p. 118). 
25 As yet unpublished. 
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Head of creation (see Ephesians 1: 10 which, as Edwards points out, is a part of the same 
discussion as the phrase 'chosen in Him')- This chosen human being is to 'have the most 
transcendent union with the eternal Logos, even so as to be one person. ' So the election 
of Christ is first; the election of His spouse, or body, next, and the election of the 
members of that body only third. Jenson's conclusion seems inescapable: 'Edwards' 
doctrine of election anticipates at most points the justly praised "christological" doctrine 
of election developed by Karl Barth. "26 
Inescapable this may be, but what is not said is also significant: the one point on which 
Edwards does not anticipate Barth is in fashioning the decree of reprobation 
Christologically, as well as that of election. My argument in this chapter, and to some 
extent in the remainder of this thesis, will be that this is finally a very serious omission. 
Finally, I should note that an apparent tension with my basic thesis is visible here: I have 
argued for the priority of God's act of self-glorification in Edwards' thought, and yet here 
the assertion is made that the first and basic decree is the election through crucifixion of 
Jesus Christ. This tension is, however, no more than apparent: I have already argued that 
in his mature thought Edwards sees self-glorification in terms of Christological (and 
pneumatological) participation; God's primal decision to glorify Himself is not in tension 
with the first decree that is Christ, rather they are the same decision viewed from two 
different angles, or described in two different ways. This may be seen explicitly in 
Edwards in Miscellanies 1062, published as the 'Observations Concerning the Scripture 
Oeconomy of the Trinity, and Covenant of Redemption'. 27 Here, Edwards explores how 
the 'covenant of redemption' - the agreement between Father, Son and Holy Spirit that 
redemption should be executed this way rather than another28 - relates to the 'natural 
order of subsistence' of the persons of the Trinity. God's desire to glorify and 
26 America's Theologian p. 106. This anticipation is arguably not such a departure from the tradition as 
Barth (perhaps) and some Barth scholars (certainly) have seen it: Heppe's synopsis, for instance, can claim 
'Of course the person of Christ is the foundation of election. To a certain extent he is the sole object of 
it... ' (Reformed Dogmatics p. 168). 
27 Found in Helm (ed. ) Treatise on Grace pp. 77-98. 
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communicate Himself is basic, here as elsewhere, and this will inevitably be done in a 
manner appropriate to the internal Trinitarian relations. For Edwards, the economic 
Trinity is not so much i. dentical. with the immanent Trinity as coherent, or harmonious: it 
is a relationship of order and beauty, rather thadidentity (always remembering that 
beauty is a key category of ontology). The covenant of redemption is subsequent to this, 
God's inter-trinitarian decision to glorify Himself in this way, not another. Thus, the 
election of Christ to be the mediator of this redemption is subsequent, but it is inevitable 
(because beautiful in the light of the Trinitarian life of God) that Christ should be the one 
elected to be the mediator. 29 A similar argument may be constructed concerning the 
work of the Holy Spirit. 
The object of 'election is Christ. The next stage of the argument, then, must be 
Christology. It has been one of the themes of this study that Edwards is best understood 
as within the Reformed tradition, albeit creatively within it, and I suggest that this is as 
true in Christology as elsewhere. Edwards' doctrine of the person of Christ is built using 
Reformed categories and themes, and any full account must recognise this. Jenson's 
discussion of Edwards' Christology is built on comparisons with the Alexandrian 
tradition and Martin Luther; these are certainly illuminating, but surely the obvious 
comparisons in formal terms are not Luther or Cyril, but John Owen and Edward Irving. 
The genius of Reformed theology from the first has been its insistence on the genuine 
humanity of Jesus Christ. Calvin's disagreement with the Lutherans over the Eucharist, 
for instance, depends finally' on his insistence that Christ's human body must be 
localised, because that is what it is to be human. 30 Radicalised versions of this doctrine 
28 This idea was a commonplace in covenant theology. See Heppe pp. 376-379 for the continental tradition 
and von Rohr, John The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1986 p. 44 for the 
Puritan background. 
29 The point is made regularly in the Miscellanies, but to cite one example: Christ is fit to be the Mediator 
because He is 'the middle person between the Father & the Holy Ghost. ' Miscellanies 772. Edwards once 
(only, I think) makes the same point concerning the Spirit, in Miscellanies 1065. 
30 Inst. IV. 17.30, where ubiquity is described as a 'monstrous notion'. In passing, it is worth noting that 
this does not confine us to a Zwinglian memorialist view; Calvin claims a real feeding on Christ's body and 
blood in the Supper, made possible by our being joined to His heavenly presence by the Spirit (IV. 1 7.3 1. 
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are found in Owen, who insists that the Logos is in union with the man Jesus mediately, 
through the Spirit, 31 and Irving, who agreed with Owen, and further insisted that the 
humanity of Jesus was fallen humanity. 32 Edwards agreed with Owen33 and anticipated 
Irving. A long Miscellanies entry headed 'Incarnation of the Son of God and Union of 
the Two Natures of Christ'34 ends with the assertion 'In Jesus, who dwelt here upon 
earth, there was immediately only these two things: there was the flesh, or the human 
nature; and there was the Spirit of holiness, or the eternal Spirit, by which he was united 
to the Logos. ' This is Owenite Christology. A sermon on Luke 22: 44 asserts 'Christ, 
who is the Lord God omnipotent ... did not take the human nature on him in its first, 
most perfect and vigorous state, but in that feeble and forlorn state which it is in since the 
fall ... '35 and Miscellanies 664 asserts that 'the [the angels] saw him [Christ] in the 
human nature in its mean, defaced, broken, infirm, ruined state, in the form of sinful 
flesh ... 1.36 These latter two quotations contain language that could have been found in 
one of Irving's pronouncements (although perhaps only one of the more temperate! ). 
Why insist on such positions'! Fundamentally, to take with full seriousness the credal 
affirmation 'He was made man'. This is Owen's central point: 'His divine nature was 
not unto him in the place of a soul, nor did immediately operate the things which he 
performed, as some of old vainly imagined. '37 Thus Owen makes all the assert-ions that 
Apollinarian Christology is unable to: Christ grew in understanding, learnt new things, 
34). In passing, it is interesting to note that an Edwardsean metaphysics can cut through this problem: God 
declares and knows the elements to be identical with the body and blood of Christ, and that knowledge 
defines the reality. An interesting account of Edwards' realistic understanding of the Eucharist may be 
found in Danaher, William J. 'By Sensible Signs Represented: Jonathan Edwards' Sermons on the Lord's 
Supper' Pro Ecclesia VII (1998) pp. 261-287. 
31 4 Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit BUI ch. 3&4 (see Works III pp. 159-188); see also Spence, 
Alan 'Christ's Humanity and Ours: John Owen' in Persons Divine and Human ed. Schwoebel C. & 
Gunton, C. E. T. &T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1991 pp. 74-97. 
32 See the 'Sermons on the Incarnation' in Works vol. V pp. 9446, and also McFarlane, Graham 'Strange 
News from Another Star: An Anthropological Insight from Edward Irving' in ibid pp. 98-119. 
33 By the time he came to write Miscellanies 1047, at least, Edwards had read Owen on the Spirit, as in that 
entry he quotes from the text. 
34 Miscellanies 487. YE13 pp. 528-532. 
35 The sermon is printed in BT2 pp. 866-877; the quotation is from p. 866. 
36 Miscellanies 664 §8 (p. 10 of Schafer's transcript). This entry is not yet published in any form. 
37 Owen, op. cit. p. 169. 
125 
and acted in power only through the work of the Holy Spirit. 38 But there are 
soteriological imperatives at work also: 'that which He has not assumed He has not 
healed' insisted Gregory Nazianzen, and (whilst the question did not occur to the Fathers, 
to the best of my knowledge) the derivation from this of Christ's assumption of fallen 
human nature is uncomplicated. There is one further reason, characteristically Puritan in 
its concern with practical theology: if we desire to present Christ as the pattern or 
example of Christian life - if, that is, we wish to speak de imitatione Christ! - then we 
must recognise the true humanity of Christ. This emphasis can certainly be found in 
Owen, in that the whole structure of his Discourse, moving from the work of the Spirit in 
the life of Christ to the work of the Spirit in believers, demonstrates this theme. Irving 
asserts a similar point, in arguing that, since Christ performed all His works of power 
through the Spirit, we should be able to do 'greater things than these' through the same 
Spirit. 39 
All three of these points may be found in Edwards - all are, after all, commonplaces of 
Reformed dogmatics. The denial of the communicatio idiomatum, the assertion of the 
true humanity of Christ (classically in the extra calvinisticum, of which the positions 
outlined above are surely radicalised versions), and so the vision of a genuine possibility 
and expectation of sanctification, form linked parts of Reformed polemic against the 
Lutherans. 40 The sermon on Luke 22: 44, for example, which begins with the assertion 
that Christ's human nature was fallen and weak as ours is, ends with an exhortation to 
38 ibid pp. 169-172, 
39 'The Church with her Endowment of Holiness and Power' in Works vol. V, pp. 449-506. See especially 
pp. 459467. 
40 This works better with the radical denial of the communicatio idomatum taught by Owen and Edwards 
than with the more moderate form that was more often held by continental Reformed theologians. Owen 
and Edwards (along with various others, such as Sibbes or Irving) would insist that Christ took personal 
identity and nothing else from the divine Son, and so had no superhuman abilities at all. Turretin, by 
contrast, argues for a real communication of properties from both natures to the person of Christ, whilst 
resisting what he takes to be the heart of the Lutheran view, that there is an abstract communication 
between the two natures. So Jesus Christ can be properly described as omnipotentý but the human nature of 
Jesus Christ cannot. Inst. Elenc. Theol. X111.8. 
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come before the Father in prayer as He did. This is a standard form of application for 
Edwards, 41 as for all Reformed preachers. 42 
The key Chrisiological question concerns the description of the union of the two natures 
in Christ. Here, Edwards is able to cut through much that is complicating: the discussion 
in the last chapter showed that, for Edwards, created being is in being known and loved 
by God. An obvious corollary, and one Edwards draws in Original Sin, 43 conceins 
personal identity, which 'depends on God's sovereign constitution'. 44 That is, I am 
continuous with my earlier self because God knows me to be so, and for no other reason. 
The argument in Original Sin concerns imputation: the unity of the human race with 
Adam is established on the same ground as my personal identity with myself. If I can be 
held guilty of the sins I committed yesterday, then I can be held guilty of the sin of Adam 
in the same way. 45 When applied to the union of the two natures in Christ, this ontology 
reinforces other positions: 'God hath respect to this man and loveth him as his own Son; 
this man hath communion with the Logos, in the love which the Father hath to him as his 
only begotten Son. Now the love of God is the Holy Ghost. 146 Trinitarian ontology and 
Owenite (i. e. Trinitarian) Christology cohere in Edwards' thought in a remarkable way. 47 
41 Examples abound, but consider the ordination sermon for Job Strong (June 28,1749) 'Christ the 
example of Ministers' (BT2 pp. 960-965), containing phrases like 'this example was set for us in our own 
nature, and so is especially fitted for our imitation' (p. 963). Of particular interest is a notebook (Beinecke 
collection Box 21 Folder 1259) entitled 'Christ's Example' which contains a list of Scriptures showing 
examples of moral virtue in Christ's life. The title makes the intended use clear. 
42 No doubt preachers from other traditions regularly make similar points, but there is a coherence with the 
sort of Reformed dogmatics that Edwards held to which is lacking elsewhere. A preacher who held to the 
communicatio idiomatum, even in its moderate Reformed form, for example, surely could not exhort her 
hearers to do what Jesus did in the same uncomplicated manner, as the question would always arise: was 
this simply a human act, or was this a result of the working of properties I can never hope to obtain? 
43 YE3 pp. 397405. 
44 ibid p. 399. 
45 This point will be more Uly discussed in ch. 5 infra 
46 Miscellanies 487 (YE13 p. 529). 
47 The same point may be found regularly in the Miscellanies. To cite merely two examples, in entry 764b 
(as yet unpublished), the hypostatic union is said to be 'the consequence of God's communicating his Spirit 
without measure to [Christ's] human nature, so as to render it the same person with him that is God'; in 
entry 958 (also unpublished) Edwards asserts that 'All the endowments of both nature and grae which 
Christ had were given him of the Father for all are of the Spirit... '. See also entries 614,713,737,766 and 
1043, amongst others. 
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However, Edwards will not allow the position to be that simple, at least in the 
Miscellanies entry under discussion. A second way in which the two natures are united is 
postulated: 'Tis not just any communion of understanding and will that makes the same 
person, but the communion of understanding is such that there is the same 
consciousness. '48 Locke's influence is felt, and personal identity demands identity of 
consc 
, 
iousneSS, 49 So 'the man Christ Jesus was conscious of the glory and blessedness the 
Logos had in the knowledge and enjoyment of the Father before the world was, as 
remembering of it (John 17: 5). '50 Jenson gives a cautious welcome to this theme: 
'neither the speculative vigour nor the exegetical difficulty ... can be missed ... it may 
well be that on any modem understanding of personhood Jesus' union with the Logos 
must be, as Edwards supposes, "doubtless ... some union of the 
faculties of his soul". '51 
Let me put aside 'modem understandings of personhood', for a moment at least. 
'Speculative vigour' is hardly unusual in Edwards; 'exegetical difficulty' is more so. 
Also unusual, and also not, to be missed, is a theological incoherence. Edwards' 
argument here is an attempt to hold on to the genuine humanity of Christ ('Perhaps there 
is no other way of God's dwelling in a creature but by his Spirit'); and now we are 
presented with a baby who knows what it is to be God. Or with a dying man crying in 
agony 'My God, why have you forsaken me? ' whilst knowing all the while that His 
perichoretic unity with the Father remains undamaged. These may be acceptable (or 
necessary) deductions from an Alexandrian or Lutheran Christology (hence, one 
presumes, Jenson's welcome), but they stand in simple opposition to Reformed theology 
in its radical (Owenite) form. 
I have had cause to insist more than once in this thesis that Edwards' Miscellanies, 
significant as they are, must not be taken as finished or polished statements of his 
theology. They are ideas, drafts, interesting points that he thought merited further 
48 ibid Again, this point recurs in the Miscellanies - entry 738 (unpublished), for example. 
49 For this point in Locke, see Essay 11.27.10 (vol. I pp. 450451 of Fraser's edition). 
50 Miscellanies 487 (YEB p. 529). 
51 op. cit. p. 121 (italics are original; the final quotation is from Miscellanies 487, and the elipsis is 
Jenson's). 
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consideration in the future. There is an incoherence here, based on two different 
conceptions of what constitutes personal identity. From his own metaphysics, Edwards 
was led to Owenite Christology; from Locke's arguments he was led to a Lutheran form. 
He apparently never resolved this. Even in Original Sin, continuity of consciousness is 
still necessary to identity, even if it is subordinated to, and guaranteed by, divine 
decision. Perhaps, as Jenson says, this must be true of 'any modem understanding of 
personhood. ' 
Let me, however, change the emphasis: is the problem not that it is any modern 
understanding of personhood that this must be true oP In particular, a way around this 
may be found in the theological accounts of personhood that have been so important in 
recent years (whether 'postmodem' or 'a-modem'). Outside modernity, outside 
Descartes' incipient solipsism, the assertion that relationality is definitive (or constitutive; 
the debates need not concern us at this point) of personhood allow a robust assertion that 
Edwards' own ontology is enough. I remain myself and not other because God relates to 
me as one. I do not need to know myself to be continuous for that to be true. 52 Outside 
modernity, that is to say, there is no need for the incoherence and the exegetical difficulty 
Edwards introduces; the man Christ Jesus is one with the Logos because the Father 
knows Him to be His Son and loves Him as His Son. 
4.2 The Process of Redemption: Atonement 
This, then, is the Christ who is the object of election. The next stage is to describe 
Edwards' account of what Christ is elected to do - his doctrine of atonement. It is 
something of a surprise here to find how little systematic treatment is offered by 
Edwards; the doctrine is everywhere assumed, certainly, but not often discussed at any 
length; and the two major discussions that are present in the corpus are interesting partly 
52 From the point of view of philosophy, bne may question whether Locke's attempts to evade the question 
of amnesia are wholly successful. More pointedly, I as a pastor have encountered many Christian believers 
who do not know themselves (theologically or existentially) to be 'one with Christ'; yet I persist in my 
belief that God's knowledge of their being is decisive. 
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because they disagree. I will consider each briefly in turn, before offering some 
interpretative remarks. 
The central section of the History of the Work of Redemption53 deals with the time 
between Christ's incarnation and His resurrection (the ascension may have been a better 
choice, but let that pass). The proposition argued for is 'from his incarnation to his 
resurrection, the purchase of redemption was made. '54 This proposition immediately 
highlights the two major points of interest in the discussion: that atonement is the work 
of the years of the incarnation, not just the hours of the passion; and that the controlling 
metaphor is mercantile. 
There are two aims to Christ's work of redemption: satisfaction, or the 'paying of a debt', 
and merit, or the 'purchase' of benefits. 55 These are both carried out throughout Christ's 
life, the one by the suffering and humiliation He underwent, and the other by the 
obedience to the Father He offered. Throughout these sermons, Edwards spells out in 
some detail how the various events and experiences of Christ's life answer to these two 
ends, the purpose clearly being to insist that the details of the life of Christ are Part of the 
gospel story, rather than just the fact of the death of Christ. It is striking in these passages 
just how prevalent the mercantile metaphors are, particularly in regard to the second 
purpose of Christ's work. Merit is almost always spoken of in terms of the 'purchase' of 
a benefit; satisfaction, by contrast, is often described in judicial metaphors, although the 
'payment' of a 'debt' remains a recurring image. 
The second discussion that Edwards left is in the Miscellanies, entries 1352 and 1360.56 
Here, Edwards is concerned to argue that it is 'reasonable and natural' for a 'patron' to 
intercede on behalf of a 'client' and that, as a result of this intercession, the patron's 
53 YE9 pp. 294-343. 
54 ibid. p. 295. 
55 p. 304. 
56 As yet unpublished, but §3 of the Miscellaneous Remarks on Satisfactionfor Sin offers an adequate text: 
parts 1-11 are entry 1352 and parts 12-19 are 1360. This text may be found in B77 pp. 570-573. 
Miscellanies 1070 (also unpublished) shows Edwards moving towards this position, and contains (I think) 
the first reference to 'benefactors' as a metaphor for the atonement. 
130 
'merit' with a, third party may be transferred to (or shared by) the client. Edwards 
attempts to construct a calculus of such personal relationships, emphasising the union of 
patron and client that can be formed by the former considering the latter's interests his (or 
her) own, and the naturalness of the 'friend' regarding the client for the sake of an 
esteemed and loved patron. 57 As we are made one with Christ by His love for us, and by 
our spiritual union with Him, so it is not strange, but most natural for God to apply 
Christ's benefits to us; for, that is, atonement to happen. The metaphor now is one of 
personal relationships, and the emphasis is on the reasonableness of the pr6ceedings. 
This last point is important: the rationality, or beauty, of God's atoning action is central 
to Edwards. Gerstner, in his discussion of Edwards' understanding of the atonement, 
seems to have missed this, and so finds the texts riddled with evidences of a Grotian, 
tmoral government' theory with which he is distinctly uncomfortable. Ile has most 
difficulty with Miscellanies 306: 'According to M 306, if God did not punish sin, 
"nobody could charge God with any wrong. " How could an Anselmian like Edwards say 
that? ... pure governementalism. follows fast: "As God's nature 
inclines him [to] order all 
things beautifully properly and decently, so it was necessary that sin should be punished 
... There is this necessity, besides that which arises from the veracity of 
God". '58 
Edwards is certainly here rejecting the assumption that God has any need to act justly, 
rather than mercifully (an 'Anselmian' position, in Gerstner's terms), but he is not 
embracing the idea that God only chooses to punish sin because there was a need for 
God's law to be seen to be upheld, having once been promulgated ('govermentalism'). 59 
Rather, Edwards is reverting to key categories of beauty and decency to insist that, 
57 As may be expected, precursors of this attempt can be found earlier in the corpus. Miscellanies 604, for 
example, asserts that 'It was a thing infinitely honourable to God that a person of infinite dignity was not 
ashamed to call him his God & to adore & obey him as such... ' (this entry has not yet been published). 
Although those for whom Christ acts are not mentioned here, there is the beginning of an attempt to 
understand what Christ has done using the logic of interpersonal relationships. 
58 Rational Biblical Theology 11.435436; the Miscellanies text Gerstner is quoting can be found in YE13 
p. 3 9 1. 
59 Edwards has no problems with a 'moral government' theory, and indeed invokes such ideas more than 
once, but it is not the most important metaphor for the atonement in his writings. An example, however: 
there is a minor thread in the notebooks concerning God's curse on Adam, 'Thou shalt surely die. In a 
variety of Miscellanies entries around 1050-1100, this threat is offered as the reason that Christ had to die, 
which is indeed pure' goverrimentalism'. 
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although He is not required to act justly, it is appropriate to God's nature so to act, and so 
He inevitably Will. 60 
Two points seem constant: Edwards wants to see the whole life of Jesus as redemptive, 
not just His death, and to insist on the rationality - or appropriateness - of the atonement. 
What is different, and markedly so, is the controlling metaphor used in the , two 
discussions. It would be possible, at this point, to notice the chronological order, breathe 
a sigh of relief, and assert that Edwards put away crass economic language for the far 
richer pictures of personal relationship; after all, mercantile language sounds simply 
unworthy to be used to describe Christ's work to modem ears. I believe, however, that 
there is something to be leamt from giving attention to this disagreement, as I see an 
underlying continuity in the two accounts. 
Edwards' concern in both pieces, I suggest, is to 'argue for the rationality of the 
atonement in personal terms. Perhaps the key point here is that it is not abstract 'Justice' 
or even 'Goodness' that must be satisfied, but that, for Edwards, what goes on in the life; 
death and'resurrection of Christ must make sense as a relational event between Christ, 
His Father, and the elect. Just as legal metaphors are radically depersonalised in the 
movement from feudal to modem society, so Edwards' first, mercantile, metaphor can be 
seen as a picture of personal relationships in a context where money retains its old 
function of smoothing the interpersonal exchanges of goods, knowledge and skill that 
would have happened in any case. So 'purchase, ' 'debt' and similar terms do not 
function as abstract economic metaphors, but as ways of describing the interpersonal 
activities and obligations that would be familiar to the hearers of Edwards' sermon series. 
If, as seems likely given his friendship with John McLeod Campbell, Edward Irving had 
60 The classic aesthetic argument concerning the atonement in the tradition, of course, is Anselm's 
suggestion that the saints are redeemed to make up the perfect number of inhabitants for heaven after the 
fall of the angels (Cur Deus Homo? 1.16-18). 1 am not aware of any evidence that Edwards had read 
Anselm, or even of a survival of this idea in the Reformed tradition, but it is interesting to discover that 
Edwards at one point makes the same argument: the saints will 'fill up the room that was left vacant in 
heaven by their [viz- evil angels] fall... ' Miscellanies 616 (unpublished). In another contexý this sort of 
aesthetics is even offered as the reason for the resurrection: 'For if God appointed his Son to redeem 
mankind from the calamities & miseries that are come upon them by the fall, tis most meet that this 
132 
Edwards partly in mind with his jibe about 'stock-exchange divinity, it may be that he 
was missing the very pertinent point that Edwards used trade language in a society that 
did not have a stock exchange! 
So, I suggest that the mercantile language is an earlier (and, I think, less satisfactory) 
version of the same project that Edwards is about in the Miscellanies texts - the attempt 
to show that a personal/relational rationality underlies the Christian doctrine of 
atonement. 61 This, surely, is also the import of the various uses of, and modifications: to, 
traditional Reformed covenant language in Edwards: 62 that the 'grace' which Christ 
'purchased' from the Father is the indwelling Spirit, rather than some list of 'benefits' is 
no more than an insistence that atonement is personal. 63 
This emphasis appears to have enabled Edwards to appropriate the best insights of the 
Reformed tradition when asking about what benefits are gained by Christ's atoning work. 
Classically a distinction had been drawn between justification and sanctification, and the 
problem faced by any theologian (or preacher) of salvation was to navigate between 
antinomianism,, the ever-present danger facing Puritan theology, and the doctrine of 
salvation by works, which was seen as the chief error of the Church of Rome. Calvin's 
answer to this problem had been to insist that justification and sar! ctification were two 
redemption should be compleat, and that all the evils of the fall should be abolished & delivered from of 
which one is death. ' (Miscellanies 608, as yet unpublished). 
61 This is the attempt in these texts, at least In Edwards' overall conception the argument is turned on its 
head, as has been implicit in earlier chapters and will become explicit before the end of this one. It is not 
so much that the atonement is a rational form of personal relationship; rather that particular forms of 
personal relationship are rational because they resonate or harmonize with the gospel story. 
62 Whether Edwards can properly be called a 'covenant theologian' (or 'federal Calvinist') or not, seems to 
me to be a sterile question, depending more on the definition and delimitation of such terms than on any 
insight into his theology. For a glimpse of the debate, see pp. 13-17 of Paul Helm's 'Introduction' to the 
Treatise on Grace. Miscellanies 1091 is an attempt to find a mediating position 
between different varieties 
of covenant theology, and so might be the best source for a consideration of Edwards' 
doctrine of the 
covenants. 
63 It is true that Edwards' immediate reason for making this move in the Treatise on Grace is to demand 
4 equal glory' for the Spirit with the Father and the Son in the work of redemption -a point I will return to 
later in this chapter - and this should not be minimized, 
but the entire Treatise is devoted to the argument 
that saving grace is not some impersonal 'stufr but the personal Spirit, and so the wider context admits and 
demands the interpretation which I am offering. 
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results of one prior reality, viz. union with ChriSt. 64 Whilst this insight was never wholly 
lost in the tradition, there is a sense in much post-reformation soteriology that judicial 
declaration has replaced personal union as the centre of the scheme, and the 'golden 
chain' of Romans 8: 30 became a standard way of ordering such decrees. The most 
telling example of this, perhaps, is the relationship between justification and adoption: in 
Calvin, and in Edwards, these are parallel benefits; 65 in much of the tradition between, by 
contrast, adoption is a result ofjustification. 66 
Edwards' earlier discussions of the benefits that were won by Christ's atoning acts 
focused on the gift of the Spirit; the later focus is on incorporation into ChriSt. 67 This, 
once again, is not so much a change of mind as a refining of focus: it is incorporation into 
Christ that is the first and most proper work of the Spirit in the believer. Two systematic 
points stand out here: firstly, returning to the vision of Trinitarian overflow that I found 
to be basic to Edwards' concept of God's self-glorification, it is noteworthy that both the 
gift of the Spirit and incorporation into the Son are only possible because of this rich 
vision of the dynamism of God's life. Because God communicates Himself, we can 
speak of union with Him - speak, that is of on the one hand the Spirit indwelling us and 
on the other of our indwelling of Christ. Secondly, the questions about the nature of 
personal identity which I discussed earlier in this chapter are of some help in 
understanding these points: understanding the (admittedly Biblical) language of 
'incorporation' into Christ is not always easy, but in Edwards' scheme it is trivial: God 
regards the believer as one with Christ so, ontologically, the believer is one with Christ. 
64 So, for instance, Calvin's first statement concerning the work of the Spirit: 'he is called the "spirit of 
adoption" because he is the witness to us of the free benevolence of God with which God the Father has 
embraced us in his beloved only-begotten Son to become a Father to us... ' Inst. Ill. 1 .3 
65 Calvin, Inst. 111.11.6: 'Whomever, therefore, God receives into grace, on them he at the same time 
bestows the spirit of adoption, by whose power he remakes them to his own image. ' For the same point in 
Edwards, see for example Miscellanies 1093 (unpublished). 
66 See, for example, Wollebius (see Beardslee, Reformed Dogmatics pp. 157-176) or Turretin 15-17 (see 
especially 16.4-6, where Turretin explicitly states that adoption is a result ofjustification, rather than vice- 
versa). 
67 This shift in focus can perhaps be best seen by reading the Miscellanies in chronological order. 
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Under the metaphysical positions with which Edwards was working, it really is that 
simple. 68 
Atonement is to be understood using a logic that is personal and relational. The results of 
atonement are in terms of personal union between the believer and the tri-personed God. 
Thus far in the -exposition there is no hint that atonement is limited; this is, I think, 
significant. The logic of Edwards' theology in the areas of atonement, Christology and 
even predestination nowhere demands a limited salvation - the last because of the move 
that makes Christ the primary object of predestination. Edwards did, of course, hold to a 
doctrine of limited atonement - there was no other position admissible in New England 
Puritanism - but there is textual evidence that he was uncomfortable with the idea, which 
I shall highlight later. However, the effect of introducing a doctrine of limited atonement 
alongside the positions I have just outlined is striking: the gospel story becomes a 
relational narrative featuring Jesus, the Father, the Spirit and the elect. The rest of 
humanity (and, incidentally, the non-human creation) are excluded from this narrative, 
and so live their lives unconnected with the gospel. Here, then, the problem that I 
indicated in my consideration of Edwards' doctrine of predestination has consequences: 
if Christ is not connected to the reprobate as well as the elect, then the gospel has nothing 
to say about the reprobate. The most unacceptable results of this theology will become 
clear later in this chapter; for now, I will turn to Edwards' arguments for the doctrines of 
grace. 
Edwards' defence of the Calvinist scheme is built on an analysis of human falleness and 
liberty, rather than a doctrine -of predestination. Having analysed God's action in 
atonement, a discussion of these texts will form a necessary excursus before I explore the 
application of atonement in justification, faith, and sanctification. That is, conversion, at 
68 1 am here assuming that Edwards' Lockean insistences on continuity of consciousness being necessary to 
personal identity were a mistake; they certainly complicate this point greatly. 
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least in Edwards' scheme, is probably best understood by examining what it is a turning 
from before looking at what it is a turning to. 69 
Two major texts are significant in this area: FreedoM of the Will and Original Sin. The 
latter will be treated in some detail in the next chapter; for now it will suffice to record 
that Edwards defends traditional positions concerning universal depravity and imputation, 
afthough the latter is defended in a novel way, as has already been indicated. The 
argument in The Freedom of the Will is essentially that the freedom that human beings 
possess, when properly understood, is not inconsistent with our actions being predictable 
or even necessitated - not incompatible, fundamentally, with predestination. T'llis is 
established by means of language analysis: 'the will' is simply 'that by which the mind 
chooses anything', 70 and so an 'act of will' is simply a choice. Given this, Edwards can 
assert that the will is determined by the strongest motive, in the view of the mind. 71 The 
image of a pair of traditional balance scales is not inappropriate here; I have a series of 
inducements to act one way or another, and (what I judge to be) the strongest set of 
inducements inevitably determine my'choice. So, 'the will always is as the greatest 
apparent good iS. 72 'Freedom'. as commonly used, is simply the ability to do what we 
choose, 73 and so something may only be described as free if it possesses the ability to 
choose - if it possesses a will. So the will itself is not free, because it does not possess a 
will of its own; a person, by contrast, may properly be described as free, as one who does 
possess a will. This, briefly stated, is the position for which Edwards is arguing. 
Edwards is aware, of course, that he will not carry the argument that easily, so the second 
part of the work turns to examining the opposing arguments. The basic position in this 
area is not so much that the 'liberty of indifference' claimed by his opponents is wrong as 
that it is nonsensical: '... to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will 
69 This might be seen as a weakness, but I suspect it is merely another example of Edwards' contextual 
theology. His understanding of conversion is decisively influenced by his experience of preaching, where 
this is the natural way round to work. 
70 YEI p. 137. 
71 p. 14 1. 
72 p. 142. 
73 p. 163. 
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itself is not to speak good sense ... 174 Asking whether the will is free or not is equivalent 
to asking if it is purple or not, and discussions based on this starting point are as likely to 
be useful! He asserts that the notion of 'free will' held by 'Arminians, Pelagians and 
others, who oppose- the Calvinists' consists of three assertions: the self-determining 
power of . the will; the indifference of the mind prior to the act of will; and the 
'contingency' of the act of will, meaning that there is nothing that can be said to have 
'caused' it. 75 The first of these assertions is simply incoherent, asserts Edwards; it can 
only mean that the person determines her own will, since the will is (as previously 
established) not an agent that can determine anything. But for a person to determine her 
own will, she must exercise choice, so every act of will is determined by a previous act of 
will. Edwards demonstrates the infinite regress by means of a reductio ad absurdum, 
positing a first act of will in the chain. 76 The assertion of the mind's indifference is again 
not so much wrong as incoherent: we are asked to suppose that, at the very moment of 
choosing one thing over, another, our minds are indifferent as to which of the two we 
should choose. Finally, the uncaused nature of choice (and, indeed, several attempts to 
evade his reasoning on the first two points which Edwards has explored along the way) 
establishes nothing. All that could be inferred if it were granted would be that from time 
to time the will-randomly moves towards some thing or another, with no motive, no 
morality, no rational understanding possibly lying behind the movement, by definition. 77 
At various points in the text, Edwards returns to his analysis of the notion of 'cause'. The 
most important issue here is the division into 'moral' and 'natural' cause. Moral causes 
are internal to the person choosing -a like or dislike; a moral imperative that is held in 
high esteem; a sense of some advantage to be gained by moving one way or the other. 
Natural causes are external -a gun held to my head or a locked prison door. 78 This 
74 p. 163. 
75 pp. 164-165. 
76 p. 172. 
77 p. 179. Were they better-versed in the history of philosophy, this point might give pause to those writers 
who regularly assail the public with arguments that the apparent randomness of certain quantum events 
makes room for 'genuine' human freedom in the scientific universe. 
78 Clearly there are grey areas in this definition, concerning the effect of mental illness and the like. Tlie 
extent that these correspond to important ethical questions concerning 'diminished responsibility' will 
demonstrate the usefulness of Edwards' analysis. 
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distinction is vital for Edwards, and provides an epigrammtic way of stating his position: 
since the will merely weighs up conflicting motives, and comes down on the side of the 
strongest, and freedom is no more than the ability to do what I want, Edwards can insist 
that a free choice is one which is caused only by moral causes, a constrained choice one 
caused, in part at least, by natural causes. 
So much for the argument of The Freedom ofthe Will; what are we to make of it? In this 
book Edwards is working almost entirely philosophically, rather than theologically 
(although the boundaries were less clearly drawn in his day). The strongest evidence for 
this lies in the fact that the first reference to Jesus Christ occurs 175 pages into the text. It 
is, then, perhaps unsurprising that the arguments appear less compelling in a different 
philosophical climate. The method of language analysis, for example, must assume that 
only one language game operates, or at least that one is privileged, or there is no 
'ordinary language' to analyse, and so the analysis of 'ordinary language' is not a 
possible or appropriate activity. After Wittgenstein and Maclntyre, however, it seems 
difficult to make this assumption. What we call 'ordinary language' is a patchwork of 
elements of different language games that have become common. Each square of the 
quilt is itself a partial, and so probably incoherent, subset of a wider game (one might 
think of the elements of psychological or psychoanalytical language that have passed in 
to public usage, for example), and the different squares certainly lack coherence with 
each other. So, even if we could isolate something that we could regard as 'the' common 
language of our society, Edwards' position relies on the assumption that this language 
game will produce meaningful and non-contradictory results when subjected to rigorous 
philosophical analysis. Perhaps Edwards did live in a society where the day-to-day 
discourse was sufficiently unified and philosophically robust to withstand such analysis, 
but to simply assume that this is the case seems rather difficult today. Edwards' mode of 
argument cannot be considered compelling in the (post)modem world. 
So, must the Freedom of the Will be put to one side, a brilliant piece of analysis relying 
on premises that are no longer tenable? I think not. The mode of argument is open to 
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attack, but the work contains resources that suggest a different way of arguing similar 
conclusions, one that is theologically grounded. In Part III Sections I and 279 Edwards is 
addressing the question of whether necessity is incompatible with praise- or 
blameworthiness. He does this by asserting that God is necessarily holy, and yet still 
praiseworthy and that the holiness of Jesus Christ is again both necessary and 
praiseworthy (111.2). In the first of these sections, the argument is that God, of all beings, 
is worthy of praise, and yet He is also necessarily holy - so necessity cannot be -a bar to 
moral worth. It would be equally cogent to argue that God, of all beings, is free, 80 yet 
necessarily holy, and so freedom is not incompatible with necessity. 81 If God's freedom 
consists in the freedom to be who He is, then we cannot claim for ourselves any 'higher' 
freedom. 82 
In the second section, Edwards seeks to establish that it was indeed necessary for Christ 
to be holy, on the basis of the prophecies and promises of God given beforehand that He 
would be, and on the basis of His divine nature. Such arguments are clearly powerful 
from any position which, like Edwards', holds to a strong doctrine of the divine decrees. 
He next insists that Christ's actions are praiseworthy, and offers a similar argument to the 
one sketched above, which invites a similar reconstruction. This reconstruction becomes 
all the more forceful in the light of Barth's fundamental reorientation of anthropology: if 
we define humanity by looking at Christ, then the few pages of exegesis in this section 
offer a theological basis for the whole. Christ was, as Edwards argued, necessarily holy; 
His holiness was praiseworthy; to be praiseworthy it must have been freely entered into; 
thus in Christ we see a freedom that is compatible with necessity. Edwards finds an 
example here, but it is possible to find a definition: we only know what it means to be 
human as we look to Christ, so this freedom, subject to necessity as it is, is definitive of 
true human freedom. 
79 YEI pp. 277-294. 
80 Although Edwards does suggest that some of his opponents are denying this: pp. 277-278 & 203 n. I. 
Later in the text he will assert that 'God himself has the highest possible freedom. ' p. 364. 
81 Edwards comes near to making this argument in his discussion of the necessity of the divine will: 
pp. 375-383. 
82 In Edwards' terms this necessity for God to be holy is of course a moral necessity - inevitable because 
beautiful, in the light of God's triune self. 
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I therefore suggest that, by invoking theological arguments like these, Edwards' 
arguments may be given foundations that are perhaps more lasting than those which he 
offers from the philosophical methods of his day. As a parenthesis, one final criticism 
suggests itself: if the argument suffers from being philosophical, then it is surely no 
surprise that the conclusion does so too. Edwards' definition of freedom is based on the 
meaning of the word in common speech, not what it means in the New Testament. 
There, cXcuOepoq and its cognates are soteriological words; freedom is a category of 
Christian being, not a category of 'natural' human being. It is the freedom to serve God 
as a child of God - to borrow another insight from Barth, to live as children of God is our 
only possible way of living; any other existence must be in some sense inauthentic, 
unreal and impossible. 83 
This position may appear to be radically different from that"of Edwards, but actually 
differs on only one point: the nature of the moral agent. Edwards defines a moral agent 
as a 'being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can 
properly be - denominated good or evil in a moral sense'. 84 In this, a certain autonomy is 
assumed, but theologically (as Edwards well knew) the nature of humanity is 
fundamentally contingent: we are created by and for God, determined to serve God and to 
live as children of God. This, surely, must be relevant to a discussion of human freedom. ' 
If we paraphrase Edwards' position as 'freedom is the freedom to be who you are', the 
point becomes clear: we are, at least in part, that for which we are determined; as such to 
live in any other way than as a child of God is to be something less than free. A 
felicitous expression of this occurs in an unexpected source, when the (now sanctified) 
soul of Gerontius says '-for I feel in me ... a sense of 
freedom, as I were at length 
myself, and ne're had been before'. 85 
83 See especially CA = pp. 349-354. 
84 YEI p. 165. 
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It may be argued that only the elect are determined to live as children of God, but this 
raises again the problem that I am concerned to expose in this chapter: if human ontology 
is (even in part) teleologically defined, and if this is not true of all humanity, then the 
reprobate are ontologically other than the elect and so not truly human. 86 Now, Edwards' 
ontology as I have sketched it in the previous two chapters clearly has a teleological 
component - the end of all being is the End when God is glorified through the ekstasis of 
Son and Spirit to His creatures - so this is a genuine problem. I will return to this theme, 
but first my exposition of Edwards' account of the doctrines of grace needs completion. 
On the basis of his analysis of the nature of freedom, Edwards feels able to deal with the 
five points of traditional Calvinism in little more than one paragraph each. His argument 
in each case is similar: the doctrines are generally accepted to be the most natural way of 
understanding Scripture, but it has been held that they are logically difficult, usually 
because of a corrunitment to an understanding of freedom of the sort Edwards has been 
concerned to debunk, so in each case he may insist on the doctrine by showing how the 
objections to it rely on that particular account of freedom. Thus, the major objection to 
the doctrine of total depravity is that it is inconsistent with free will, but Edwards has 
shown this to be a meaningless term, and there is no inconsistency between total 
depravity and freedom as he has defined it, so that the doctrine may stand, at least until 
further objections are raised. Turning to irresistible grace, so long as this is understood to 
create a moral, rather than a natural, necessity of acting, it is also consistent with human 
freedom as defined by Edwards and so again may remain. 87 Tle same arguments may be 
made in relation to unconditional election and the final perseverance of the saints. 
Turning finally to limited atonement, Edwards' comments are worth quoting at length, as 
they indicate that uneasiness with the doctrine that I commented on earlier: 
85 In the first speech of the soul in'part 11 of the abridged version of the Dream of Gerontius that Elgar 
used for his libretto. 
86 See n. 13 above for the same charge made in a slightly different way. 
87 The same point is made in a different way in Miscellanies 665 (unpublished), where Edwards argues that 
irresistible grace does not imply that the will cannot resist, since grace acts on the will, and so the will just 
will not oppose the workings of grace. The argument in the Freedom of the Will adds only that this is not 
an infringement of the convert's freedom, properly understood. 
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From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense 
may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the whole 
world by his death; yet there must be something particular in the design of his 
death, With respect to such as he intended should actually be saved thereby ... 
God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, 
and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other, most strictly speaking; for 
'tis impossible, that God should prosecute any other design than only such as he 
has: he certainly don't, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a 
design that he has not .. i for 'tis as impossible, in strictness of speech, that God 
should ... 88 
Not only the insistence on a genuinely universal ('the whole world') sense to the work of 
redemption, but also the constant qualifiers concerning strictness of speech, indicate that 
Edwards, whilst certainly wanting to hold to the theological point, is unhappy with the 
mode ýf expression. In Miscellanies 42489 Edwards is working at the same point, and 
suggesting that there is genuinely a universal component to the atonement, that by it all 
people should 'have an opportunity of being saved'. The doctrine of limited atonement is 
both important and difficult for Edwards, because he was (rightly) so impressed with the 
magnitude of the sacrifice of Christ. This must be to accomplish something definite, 
rather than merely establishing a possibility, and a doctrine of limited atonement offers 
this certainty. On the other hand, the same vision of the magnitude of Christ's death 
leads him to struggle with the idea that anything could remain untouched by it. I will 
suggest later that in both cases his theological instinct was sound, and that there may be 
another way through the problem. ' For now, however, I merely observe that Edwards' 
unease is surely related to the ontological questions I have been raising in this chapter: if, 
as I have argued Edwards held, the whole of the being of creation is defined by the gospel 
story, then the being of the reprobate must be so defined, or they become some special 
class separated from not just true humanity - the elect - but God's creation as well. 
88 YEI p. 435. 
89 YE13 p. 478. 
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Edwards was too sharp a thinker to miss this line, and so feels the need to speak of some 
universal component of the atonement. 90 
4.3 The Process of Redemption: Conversion 
The doctrine of atonement is an exploration of the new possibility for human living 
provided by the work of Christ. The most important question, however, at least for a 
preacher and a pastor such as Edwards was for much of his life, is how this new 
possibility may be realised in a particular human life. How, on the basis of all of the 
above, can a particular (elect) person come to enjoy the benefits that are available to 
(elect) human beings through the work of Jesus Christ? Edwards' most complete answer 
came in a key sermon text. 'Justification by Faith Alone'91 is in its published form an 
expansion of one of a series of anti-Arminian sermons that were instrumental in sparking 
off the first revival that Edwards witnessed at Northampton. 
The text for this sermon is Rom. 4: 5 'But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him 
who j ustifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness, and the doctrine asserts 
4we are justified only by faith in Christ, and not by any manner of virtue or goodness of 
our own. ' Christ, Edwards states, has 'purchased' (again! ) justification - that is, both a 
remission of guilt and an imputation of righteousness. Given this, 'there may be certain 
qualifications found in some persons which ... is the thing that 
in the sight of God 
renders it a meet and condecent thing, that they should have an interest in this purchased 
benefit. ' There is no sense of desert here - no human person deserves to be justified by 
God, or can do anything which would merit this, that was the burden of Original Sin, and 
a fixed position in Edwards' thought. 92 However, it is a datum confirmed by Scripture, 
tradition and pastoral experience for Edwards that some people receive God's gift and 
90 One of the notebooks containing source material for Freedom of the Will and Original Sin demonstrates 
the same point: 'Universal Redemption: in some sense Redemption is universal of all mankind all mankind 
now have an opportunity to [respond? the word is unclear] otherwise than they would have had if Christ 
had not died a door of mercy is in some sort now open for them. ' (Beinecke collection Box 15 Folder 
1205, p. 10). 
91 BTI pp. 622-654. 
92 The regular reason given by Edwards for this position is that to assert otherwise would detract from 
God's glory -a further example of the centrality of my theme to his thinking. 
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others do not, and so there must be some reason for this division. Clearly, the reason is 
faith, but Edwards' construction of how faith is a 'condition' is very careful. Justification 
is based on God choosing to treat Christ and each believer as a single moral agent - there 
is an effective moral union. 93 We are justified not because we are united with Christ but 
by being united with Christ: in union Christ's merits are ours, and so there is no need for 
a subsequent decision of the Father to justify those He has chosen to unite with His Son. 
Faith is the instrumental cause, on our part, of this union. 
The danger here, and one that Edwards recognises, is that this can make faith merely 
another 'work' -a way for humanity to save themselves, rather than relying wholly on 
the grace of God. 94 Edwards responds to this in a number of ways. Firstly, the grounds 
on which God makes faith the decisive condition are not moral, but aesthetic - it is not 
that those with faith deserve to be saved (united with Christ), but that it is beautiful in 
God's eyes that they should be. Secondly, faith is the act of union, not a prior act to 
which union/justification are attached as a reward: '... faith is the very act of uniting or 
closing on our pqrt. As when a man offers himself to a woman in marriage, he does not 
give himself to her as a reward - of her receiving him... '. 95 Thirdly, Edwards' 
predestinarianism requires that faith itself is an unmerited gift of God -a requirement 
that merely moves the problem a stage backward. 
'There is, ' asserts Edwards, in the 'doctrine' of another published seffnon, 96 'such a thing 
as a divine light, immediately imparted to the soul by God, of a different nature from any 
that is obtained by natural means. ' Mt. 16: 17 was the text, and the words 'flesh and blood 
93 The discussion of the patron-client relationship in Miscellanies 1352 and 1360 is no more than an 
attempt to uncover the logic of this divine choice. 
94 The question of why or how faith is made the condition for justification is probably the single most 
frequent subject of Miscellanies entries. Edwards' mature answers do not go very far beyond this sermon 
text, but it becomes ever-clearer that he sees union with Christ as the fundamental soteriological category, 
and faith as an appropriate, or beautiful, way for us to be united with the Saviour. See, for example, 
Miscellanies 1042 (unpublished): '... there is a particular beauty in his [God's] so, ordering it that those 
sinners that heartily consent to & with their whole souls comply with Christ as a Mediatour should be 
looked upon & they only as in him or belonging to him. ' 
95 'Justification... ' 11.4.3 (BTI p. 640) See also on this point the 'Appendix' to the 'Observations 
Concerning the Trinity' in Treatise on Grace pp. 95-98. 
96 'A Divine and Supernatural Light' BT2 pp. 12-17. 
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did not reveal this to you, but my Father in heaven' were the focus. All knowledge is 
from God, according to Edwards, but in imparting most knowledge He makes use of 
'flesh and blood' as a 'mediate' or 'second' cause. This knowledge, by contrast, was 
imparted immediately, with no 'intermediate natural causes'. The knowledge is 'a true 
sense of the divine excellency of the things revealed in the word of God, and a conviction 
of the truth and reality of them thence arising'. Faith is a reflex act in response to this 
knowledge: one who sees the beauty of the gospel story cannot but be seized by it and so 
respond in faith. 
So, the prior gift of God is this 'light'. Edwards' construction of this is characteristically 
careful. The light is emphatically not any new notional knowledge; it is an appreciation 
of the beauty and moral majesty of the notional knowledge of the gospel that is already 
present. Edwards' common illustration is of experiencing a taste -I might have been told 
of a liquid that tastes of seaweed and peat smoke, and might even believe that this could 
be a pleasant experience, in the sense of giving intellectual consent to such a proposition, 
but only when I, taste the whiskies of Islay will'I really understand what was meant, and 
be seized by the desire to discover more. 97 This is the 'sense of the heart' to which 
Edwards regularly refers. 
This introduces an important topic that may be called the psychology of conversion, 
which I will return to and examine with the help of Edwards' revival treatises, but the 
main point in this sermon is the one I noted earlier, concerning the role of the Spirit as the 
benefit given to the elect in salvation. The 'light' is 'divine' and so the person of the 
Holy Spirit, acting 'in the mind of the saint as an indwelling vital principle. ' The Spirit 
brings 'knowledge' in the sense that, renewed by the Spirit, a person is able to see the 
beauty of the gospel story that they already knew. The image is perhaps a light coming 
on in a dark room -I might have established that something was there by shadows and 
touch, but that it was a sculpture by Michelangelo had escaped me. But the coming of 
the Spirit does not just give me light to see the beauty, but the conceptual framework to 
97 Edwards' own illustration was of the sweetness of honey, but honey is perhaps a more prosaic foodstuff 
today than when Edwards spoke of itý and so his analogy communicates less well than it did. 
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appreciate, it as well. More than this still, salvation is an ontic change in which a new 
basis ('indwelling vital principle') is given to the life of the person converted. 
So, a person is converted because the Spirit illuminates their mind, or is given to them by 
the Father. We are back in, the realm of the divine decrees, and so no further why? 
questions may be asked. In the beautiful melody that unfolds from God's first thought of 
the death of His Son, it is appropriate that x should hear and respond, that y should hear 
and be hardened, and that z should never hear. But the question recurs: how can the 
hardening of y and the loss of z be beautiful in this system? If the tonic note of the 
melody is really the cross of Christ, then in what sense is it appropriate or harmonious for 
a person to be lost? This, surely, is a discordant note, dissonant with not just the life of 
the church but the universe around. It is all the more dissonant because, as I have tried to 
show, the theme (to continue the musical metaphor) that is the life and loss of the 
reprobate has no relationship to this tonic note, no connection to the cross of Christ. 
Beauty, as I discussed in the previous chapter, is defined by relationship - so this cannot 
be beautiful. Worse than that however: beauty is also a category of ontology, so the 
question is not finally how the hardening of y and the loss of z can be beautiful, but how 
such things can be. God simply should not think like this. 
4.4 The Psychology of Conversion 
The criticism of Edwards that I have been seeking to develop in this chapter is almost 
complete; for the sake of comprehensiveness, I will finish with an account of Edwards' 
understanding of the subjective experience of being converted. Although many of his 
published writings treated this area, including the most popular ones, 98 I hope my 
reconstruction of Edwards' theology has demonstrated that this is more due to historical 
accident than to any particular focus of hisý thought in this area. The fact- remains, 
however, that Edwards devoted himself to puzzling out these problems also, and some 
discussion of his answers is necessary here in order to offer a relatively complete account 
98 We might think not just of the revival treatises (culminating in the Religious Affections, but the earlier 
texts are collected in YE4) but also of Edwards' edition of Brainerd's Diary (M) and of a number of the 
sermons that he published during his lifetime. 
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of his theology. In this section I hope to show that here, too, the central vision of God's 
self-glorification is decisive for what Edwards has to say. 
Edwards' Personal Narrative99 famously records his doubts over his own conversion, 
centering on a worry that, as he had not gone through the steps of the process of 
conversion as mapped out by the Puritan tradition, there was some want or deficiency in 
his experience. There is a sense in which this question lies behind much of his writing in 
defence of revival, where the central question is 'how can a genuine work of the Spirit be 
identified? ' and the answers given include an insistence 'not by a particular order of 
experience. ' 
This concern over identifying true and false religious experience seems foreign, to 
Christians today, but two factors combined to make it extremely relevant to Edwards and 
his contemporaries, The first is theological: a Reformed and Puritan tradition of seeking 
to give assurance through a syllogism that included evidence of one's own conversion 
was bound to result in questions about what evidence was valid. The second reason - 
and perhaps the more powerful one - is sociological. Edwards had a sense of the 
prevalence of 'natural religion' - the attitude of unconverted people who were seeking 
selfish religious gratification, particularly, perhaps, some sort of freedom from the fear of 
hell. Now, the person who is in search of such selfish religious pleasure today will 
probably find it in whichever version of new religious practice is currently and locally 
fashionable. In Edwards' day such a person would have appeared diligent in Christian 
practice. Thus he faced the need to address d question that is unlikely to trouble pastors 
greatly in our own time. 
The series of treatises in defence of the religious experiences of those who were affected 
by the revivals that Edwards produced began with a simple account of events in the first, 
localised, awakening of 1734-1735. A Faithful Narrative originated as a letter to a 
friend, but was gradually worked up into a more polished description of Edwards' first 
99 YE16 pp. 790-804. 
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experience as a pastor of revival. 100 It is perhaps worth noting that local revivals were 
not novel; Stoddard had seen five such during his ministry, 101 and Edwards himself had 
been moved (although not to conversion, in his own estimation) by two similar events 
which had occurred in his father's church. 102 The Great Awakening, by contrast, was 
something new: a work of the Spirit so geographically widespread, and so temporally 
sustained was indeed remarkable - and, according to some, dangerous. Thus there was a 
need for analysis and defence of revivalist. c preaching, and of the reality of revival 
experience. 
The Distinguishing Marks represents Edwards' first attempt to provide such analysis and 
defence. 103 This text is a sermon on the need to 'try the spirits' in I John 4: 1. In it 
Edwards introduced an idea that was to remain central throughout his involvement in the 
controversy: that of a 'negative sign'. There were positive signs, signs that would 
demonstrate by their presence that the Spirit was genuinely at work in this or that 
situation. But what Edwards regarded as negative signs were to become more 
controversially important, if of less lasting theological significance. These were 
epiphenomena; happenings which proved nothing either way regarding the presence or 
absence of a true work of the Spirit. Yes, some might cry out in fear as they listened to a 
sermon on hell, and later feel an overwhelming sense of relief at the mention of Jesus' 
name, but such proved nothing. A true work of the Spirit may well be accompanied by 
heightened emotion, and so cryings out could not be dismissed as hysteria that precluded 
the Spirit's presence. Such emotions could equally well be merely the natural responses 
of an unconverted sinner who falsely believes that she has hope, however. 
As the controversy over the revivals went on, Edwards found himself fighting on two 
fronts. Not only did he need to oppose those who condemned the revivals out of hand, 
led by Chauncy, but he also had need to oppose those whose enthusiastical tendencies 
100 See C. C. Goen's 'Introduction' to YE4 pp. 3246 for the (somewhat convoluted! ) history; YE4 pp. 99- 
109 for the original letter, and pp. 144-211 for a definitive text of the final published version. 
101 Edwards claims continuity with this heritage in the Faithful Narrative. YE4 p. 190. 
102 Seethe Personal Narrative in YE. 16 p. 790. 
103 For the occasion, see Goen in YE4 pp. 52-56, & pp. 226-288 for the text. 
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were giving revival a bad name and leading to the work being damaged, in Edwards' eyes 
(Davenport is the key name here). 104 One can imagine the woman of the paragraph above 
crying out, with Davenport saying 'she's saved, Chauncy saying 'she's mad' and 
Edwards saying 'this proves'nothing' with some degree of exasperation!, . 
If these things prove nothing, what does? Edwards' analysis is complex, particularly so 
in its mature form in the Religious Affections. 105 'True religion, ' according to the 
doctrine of that work, 'in great part, consists in holy affections. '106 That is, in willing, 
and especially in loving. Edwards offers twelve positive signs by which holy affections 
may be identified, describing their source, their nature and their results. 107 Truly gracious 
affections come from the indwelling Spirit of God and the change of nature that 
accompanies that indwelling, consist of an appreciation of the beauty of God, and of 
'divine things', and a disinterested love for God, and result in a humble, Christ-like, 
beautiful spirit that shows itself in Christian living., 
The details of the individual signs have been much-studied, and a repetition of this 
material is not necessary here. 108 A link has been regularly made with a key concept in 
Edwards' psychology of conversion, the 'sense of the heart'., This term has been much- 
discussed, 109 as it is perhaps the most important idea that Edwards developed in response 
to Locke. In essence, it is knowledge that is emotionally affecting, or an act of will that 
coincides with held notions: the point at which the old faculty psychology is finally seen 
104 For a summary of the history-, see again Goen in YE4 pp. 51-52. For a fuller account, Joseph Tracey's 
The Great Awakening Banner of Truth, Edinburgh, 1976, dates from the last century but is probably still as 
good a source of historical data as any. See pp. 230-255 for Davenport. 
105 YE2. 
106 YE2 p. 95. 
107 YE2 pp. 191-461. 
108 John E. Smith's 'Introduction' to YE2 is a good summary, and a useful pointer towards the wider 
literature. 
109 A selection: Erdt, Terrance Jonathan Edwards: Art and the Sense of the Heart University of 
Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1980 makes repeated reference to the topic (unsurprisingly, given the 
subtitle), as does Simonson, H. P. Jonathan Edwards: Theologian of the Heart Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 
1974. Briefer discussions may be found in: Morimoto, Anri Jonathan Edwards and the Catholic Vision of 
Salvation, Penn. State U. P. University Park, 1995 (pp. 22-23); Cherry, Conrad The TheoloSy ofJonathan 
Edwards: A Reappraisal Doubleday, Garden City, 1966 (pp. 19-20); and Jenson, op. cit. pp. 70-7 1. 
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to be inadequate, because a person's whole self, both mind and will, is caught up in the 
experience of conversion. 
However, the interest which has been focused on the psychological aspects of Edwards' 
account of Christian conversion has sometimes obscured the more directly theological 
aspects. The one point in his discussions of soteriology where Edwards admits to being 
innovative concerns the way in which salvation is applied: 'If we suppose no inore than 
used to be supposed about the Holy Ghost, the honour of the Holy Ghost in the work of 
redemption is not equal in any sense to the Father and the Son's; nor is there an equal part 
of the glory of this work belonging to Him. '110 The old theology that had held that the 
Spirit merely applied the gifts of salvation that the Son had 'purchased' from the Father 
would not do; rather, the Spirit must Himself be seen as what is purchased. The Spirit 
&acts in the mind of a saint as an indwelling vital principle ... [He] exerts and 
communicates himself there in his own. proper nature ... The 
Holy Spirit operates in the 
minds of the godly, by uniting himself to them and living in them, exerting his own 
nature in the exercise of their faculties. " II 
At this point Edwards has succeeded in describing the conversion of the saints in terms of 
the Trinitarian relationships. An (unpublished) Miscellanies entry makes this point in 
remarkably vigorous language: 
It was not fit that he [the mediator] should be either God the Father nor a fallen 
man because he was to be Mediatour between the Father & fallen man. Upon the 
same account tis not fit that he should be either the Father or the Spirit for he is to 
be Mediatour between the Father & the Spirit. In being Mediatour between the 
Father & the saints he is Mediatour between the Father & the Spirit. The saints as 
saints act only by the Spirit ... There is a need of a mediatour 
between God and 
the spirit as the Spirit is a principle of action in a fallen creature ... 1112 
110 Treatise on Grace (ed. Helm) pp. 68-69; see 'An Essay on the Trinity' in the same volume, pp. 123-124, 
for the same point in another place. 
III 'A Divine and Supernatural Light' 1.1 (B77 p. 13). 
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This indwelling of the Spirit naturally leads to sanctification. Here, Edwards remains 
with the mainstream Reformed tradition, insisting that sanctification is to be expected, 
but regarding it as a long-term and partial reality. If Christian practice is the chief 
positive sign through'which genuinely gracious affections can be identified, still '[t]rue 
saints may be guilty of some kinds and degrees of backsliding, may be foiled by 
particular temptations, and fall into sin, yea, great sins. '113 But, Edwards insists, a 
perseverance and growth in holy living will be the mark of all true saints, until the end of 
their lives. 
A part of my argument in this thesis is that God's self-glorification is a key concept for 
Edwards, and that it should be understood in Trinitarian terms. In glorifying Himself in 
the work of redemption, there must be equal glory for Father, Son and Spirit, insists 
Edwards, and his account of conversion and its outworking is bent towards giving 
appropriate weight, and hence glory, to the work of the Spirit. God mediates salvation by 
His Son and Spirit, and so draws us into relationship with Himself. The language of the 
Two Dissertations is appropriate here - through His Son and Spirit the Father knows and 
loves us, and so sýlvation consists in our pneumatic response, in Christ, to the Father's 
ekstasis - our entry into ever deeper relationship until 'the creature must 
be looked upon 
as united to God in an infinite strictness. 'I 14 
4.5 Conclusion and Prospect 
In the previous chapter I argued that, for Edwards, the being and history of creation were 
defined by the gospel story. I uncovered, using Frei's categories, a sustained attempt to 
read the world into the text, and this chapter, in part at least, has been about expounding 
the theological narrative into which the world is read. The narrative is a Trinitarian one: 
'... the persons of the Trinity, of their own will, have as it were formed themselves into a 
112 Miscellanies 614 (unpublished). 
113 YE2 p. 390. 
114 YE8 p. 534. 
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society, for carrying on the great design of glorifying -the deity and communicating its 
fulness... 'I 15 The language here invites words like 'daring' or 'unguarded'. As ever, it is 
important to remember that this is not material prepared for publication, and so perhaps 
not so carefully phrased as it might have been if reworked. The image,, however, is a 
powerful one - the narrative into which the world is to be read is a story of dynamic 
inter-Trinitarian relationship. Hence the point I made in passing earlier: 116 it is not that 
the atonement is rational in personal terms - rather, the atonement, being the centre of the 
personal inter-Trinitarian relationships that make up the narrative that defines the being 
and rationality of the world, is definitive of all personal rationality. Paul makes a very 
similar point in Ephesians, of course, in connection with marriage - the wife-husband 
relationship only makes sense because there is a rationality derived from Christ's love for 
the Church. 117 
The atonement is the central event of this narrative; the phrase I have repeatedly quoted 
concerning the crucifixion as the first and foundational decree of God makes this point, 
as does the supralapsarian form of Edwards' theology., Creation, history, and all other 
divine actions (which is to say all else that is) can be regarded as the necessary backdrop 
for God to glorify Himself through the death of His Son, and the outpouring of His Spirit. 
This was, simply, His first and best thought, to which all else is subsequent. 
In spelling this out I have indicated my admiration for the basic vision of Edwards' 
Christology and my concerns about the confusion introduced by Lockean categories here, 
and also indicated the ways in which Edwards sought to be more rigorously 
pneurnatological, and hence trinitarian, than the tradition he had inherited. This much is 
to be celebrated in Edwards' account, but I have also highlighted one key problem: I 
have already quoted Jenson's assertion that 'Edwards' doctrine of election anticipates at 
most points the justly praised "christological" doctrine of election developed by Karl 
115 Miscellanies 1062, published as 'Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy of the Trinity 
in Helm (ed. ) Treatise on Grace pp. 77-94; p. 78. 
116 n. 61 supra. CHECK THIS 
117 Eph. 5: 21-33. 
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Barth, 'I 18 and noted that what is left open here is the question of reprobation. In the 
previous chapter I argued that, for Edwards, created being was mediated Christologically 
and pneurnatologically; in this one the argument has been that the same is true of election 
and the salvation that is dependent upon it. If this is the case then it is not just that the 
determination of the reprobate is other than that of the elect, but that their being is - they 
are, and there is no other way of saying it, less human (or at least 'differently human') 
than the elect. The 'seed of election', of which Calvin was so concerned to avoid any 
suggestion, has here returned, and not as a seed, but as the largest of the trees of the 
field. 119 
It is instructive to consider how this problem arises, because it is a direct result of the 
advances I described in the last chapter. In developing a Trinitarian theology of creation, 
Edwards exposed the flaws in a Reformed tradition that had always seen the reprobate as 
Christless and Spiritless. It is noticeable in Calvin's account of predestination that, 
whereas the name of Christ is linked in a number of ways with the elect, 120 the rejected 
li, ýe out their determination with no reference to Christ. 121 As Reformed orthodoxy 
developed, this feature became fixed: Beza's Tabula praedestinationis, and Perkin's 
Golden Chaine (which is based closely upon it) firmly in their diagrammatic form place 
Christ with the elect on one side and leave the reprobate totally unconnected to Christ on 
the other. 122 The most striking illustration of this tendency is perhaps from a modem 
118 America's Theologian p. 106. 
119 Inst. 111.24.10. 
120 Reid's article helpfully considers these. Reid, J. K. S. 'The Office of Christ in Predestination' Scottish 
Journal of TheoloV I (1948) pp. 5-19 and 166-183. 
121 This can be seen very strikingly in Inst. 111.24, where sections I -I I describe the fulfilment of the 
determination of the elect, and refer regularly and in many ways to Christ, and sections 12-17 describe 
God's dealings with the reprobate. In these latter pages there are a number of references to Scripture 
introduced with words like 'Christ Himself said, ' and one temporal reference ('before Christ's advent'), but 
Christ is mentioned only once in any theological sense, when the reprobate are described as 'strangers to 
Christ's body'. Given that Calvin introduces election as a means of offering assurance to believers, the 
problem in his doctrine may be simply that he is not interested in reprobation. This defence certainly could 
not be made for much of the following tradition. 
122 Beza, Theodore 'Summa Totius Christianismi... ' in Tractationum Theologicarum (Secunda Editio) 
Eustathii Vignon, Anchora, 1576 pp. 170-205. The table is on p. 170 (Notice partuicularly the first two sets 
of parallel boxes: firstly, 'ELIGERE in CMUSTO feruandos' is opposite 'REIICERE & propter suam, ipsorum 
voluntariam culpam xtemis pcenis addicere'; then 'AMOR gratuitus Dei erga corruptos quidem in seipsis, 
sed in CHRITO (sic) gratis destinatos, electioni & saluti' is Opposite 'ODIUM Dei iustum erga corruptis in 
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commentator: Richard A. Muller's Christ and the Decree, conceived as a defence against 
the charge that Reformed orthodoxy separateý Christ and the doctrine of predestination, 
regularly demonstrates how Christ was connected with election. The shadow side of the 
decree proceeds with no influence from the Son and no work of the Spirit. 123 
If one can be human without reference to Christ - if, that is, for example, human being is 
defined in relationship to Adam, not to Jesus - then this tradition may stand. The 
Creator, it is true, is properly named as Father, Son and Spirit, but an infralapsarian, at 
least, may speak about the Logos asarkos and suggest that the Incarnation was an 
afterthought. But I have suggested in the previous chapter that Edwards shows up the 
weaknesses in this tradition. God is known only in the gospel story, and so creaturely 
being, and hence human being, can only be known in the gospel. If this is the case, then 
to speak of a Christless, Spiritless existence for the reprobate is to deny them any 
humanity. 
Edwards account of salvation, I have argued, is rich and suggestive; it is his account of 
perdition that creates a serious problem. In the next chapter, by focusing on Edwards' 
understanding of hell, I will investigate his account of reprobation and show how this 
problem manifests itself there, before moving in the final chapter to attempt a synthesis 
of Edwards' account of God's self-glorification and to suggest some ways by which this 
central problem may perhaps be lessened or avoided. 
seipsis, ex peccati per ADAMUM propagatione'. The point could hardly be clearer). Perkins, William 'A 
Golden Chaine... ' in Works vol. I Cambridge 1612, pp. 9-114. 
123 Muller, R. A. Christ and the Decree: Christolov and Predestination in Reformed Theolov from 
Calvin to Perkins Baker, Grand Rapids, 1988 2. See, for example, p. 95 for the point concerning Beza, p. 171 
for Perkins (where Adam fulfils a role for the reprobate equivalent to Christ's for the elect! ), and pp. 171- 
173 for a series of assertions that this move characterises the whole period. 
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Chapter 5 
God's Self-Glorification in the Damnation of Sinners 
Through me you enter the woeful city. 
Through me you enter eternal grief, 
Through me you enter among the lost. 
Justice moved my high maker: 
The Divine Power made me, 
The Supreme Wisdom, and the Primal Love. 
Before me nothing was created 
Ifnot eternal, and eternal I endure. 
Abandon every hope, you who enter. 
Dante, 11.1-9 of Canto III of the Infemo (Ir. Singleton) 
That God is glorified in His gracious salvific action, as the previous chapter was 
devoted to arguing, is hardly a controversial point. The same, however, emphatically 
may not be said of the converse, at least in the present theological climate: the idea 
that God may glorify Himself in the rejection and punishment of impenitent men and 
women, that, if it must happen, this can be anything other than a cause of the most 
grievous divine sorrow, is rejected as a particularly gruesome and old-fashioned 
Calvinistic excess that we are most grateful to be rid of. ' 
Perhaps - certainly the point may be found in Calvin. 2 But Jonathan Edwards, 
although other things as well, was nothing if not an old-fashioned Calvinist. The 
recent revival of interest in Edwards has sought to play down the note of 'hellfire' in 
his preaching (particularly), arguing that American literature anthologists perpetrated 
a major crime against his memory in ensuring that he was known only through 
'Sinners in the hands of an Angry God'. 3 This is, of course, true: there is far more to 
Edwards' thought than is hinted at in this sermon, even if it does offer a particularly 
I This emphasis can be found even in a broadly sympathetic treatment such as John Colwell's 1992 
Drew Lecture (published as Colwell, John E. 'The Glory of God's Justice and the Glory of God's 
Grace: Contemporary Reflections on the Doctrine of Hell in the Teaching of Jonathan Edwards' 
Evangelical Quarterly 67/4 (1995) pp. 291-308). 
2 Inst. 111.24.14. 
3 See for example: Cherry, Conrad, The Theology ofJonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal Doubleday, 
Garden City, 1966 p. 58; Jenson, Robert W. America's Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan 
Edwards Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 101. Many other examples are readily available. 
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potent example of his rhetoric. But if not a crime, it would certainly be a distortion of 
his memory if this note were eradicated from it. At best, we would lose an important 
reminder that Edwards was, whatever else he was, a preacher in the Puritan tradition; 
at worst we might lose an important, if unpleasant, clue to interpreting his theology. 
One assumes that medical professionals do not enjoy all the examinations they are 
asked to perform; that there would be less medical knowledge available to us if they 
shrank from such tasks, however, is obvious. In this chapter I shall attempt a general 
survey of Edwards' doctrine of hell before showing how this relates to the wider 
theme of this thesis. 
Comparing the reaction to Edwards' writing on hell with that to Dante's Inferno, 
quoted above, makes an important initial point: there is significantly less comfort 
with ideas in Edwards than with very similar ideas in Dante. Tbis, presumably, can 
only be because of an implicit assumption that Edwards, being more 'modem', is 
culpable for invoking such ideas in a way that Dante is not. A medieval author is 
permitted to be 'obsessed' with the pains of hell; 4 a philosopher conversant with 
Locke, living on the cusp of the great Enlightenment social experiment that was the 
founding of the American state, is not. The fashion in early American studies for 
comparisons of Edwards with Benjamin Franklin5 is an indication of this: if Franklin 
can be such a thoroughly modem 'Yankee', why is Edwards, in the same age, stuck 
with trying to re-write the old 'Puritan' script? 
As the modernist consensus collapses, and Enlightenment values are more and more 
rejected, we may assume that at least the assumption of culpability on Edwards' part 
in many of these studies will quietly pass away. Indeed, one of the (many) merits of 
Robert Jenson's appreciation of Edwards is the recognition that his particular re- 
casting of the first colonial American social experiment, the Puritan 'city on a hill', 
has much to say to a culture that preferred to listen to Franklin's new vision and is 
4 The charge of 'obsession' is as unfair to Dante as it is to Edwards, of course, but the relative current 
popularity of the Inferno compared to the other two parts of the Comedy makes the comparison an apt 
one - particularly as the Purgatorio and the Paradiso are regarded as 'difficult' because their content is 
more philosophical than that of the more popular work. Comparisons with Edwards hardly need 
spelling out! 
5 See my discussion of this point in chapter 1. 
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still living with the consequences of that. 6 The point that prompted these reflections, 
however, is still to be answered: how can Edwards, living in an age which is at least 
beginning to be Enlightened, speak as he does about the doctrine of hell? 
Before levelling accusations that Edwards was obsessed with hellfire or similar, it 
seems only reasonable to investigate the extent to which he differed from the 
community and tradition of which he was a part. His pictures, although shocking, 
would not be out of place in the high Puritanism of the mid-seventeenth century 
American colonies, but they would be in the young, forward-looking, and Enlightened 
nation of 1800. We may usefully ask where the break came: if we press the motif 
noted above, whilst removing notions of blame, the question becomes is Edwards 
anachronistic, or Franklin prophetic? Or do they perhaps between them show the 
tensions of a nation 'between the times', providing an all-American mythology for 
our own 'postmodem' culture? I will begin this chapter by, albeit very briefly, 
seeking to identify Edwards' context on this point. 
5.1 Visions of Hell in the Early Eighteenth Century 
Edwards' heritage, at least, was Puritan. More than that: until such figures as 
Franklin found an alternative mythology7 in Enlightenment philosophy, the only 
heritage available to colonial America was Puritan. It is there, then, that I will begin 
my sketch. My intention is to trace both the substance and the presentation of belief 
in hell in the Puritan period, and how this developed in the decades afterwards, in 
order to provide a background to Edwards' own theology and rhetoric. 8 
Carl Trueman has written a useful, if brief, article on heaven and hell in Puritan 
thinking in the Epworth Review. 9 He begins by commenting on the brevity of the 
6 Jenson, op. cit. Jenson's initial statement of his purpose makes the point: 'Edwards knew what to 
make of the great eighteenth-century Enlightenmentý and America and its church are the nation and the 
church the Enlightem-nent made. ' p. 3. 
7 Using 'mythology' in the sense of 'foundational story, not with any assumptions about truth value 
attached. My own convictions about the Enlightenment paradigm will no doubt be clear to the reader, 
but this point, at least, stands whether or not they are accepted. 
8 The concern with presentation ('rhetoric') alongside substance in the earlier parts of this chapter is 
based on the assumption thatý with such an emotive subject as eternal human suffering, the language 
chosen to present a given idea can be just as important - and damaging - as the idea itself. 
9 Trueman, Carl R. 'Heaven and Hell: 12 In Puritan Theology' Epworth Review 2213 (Sept. 1995) 
pp. 75-85. 
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presentation of heaven and hell in the Westminster Confession, 10 itself significant: 
there was presumably sufficient doctrinal agreement in the mid-seventeenth century 
for there to be no need to define truth and combat error in the documents of the 
Assembly, jn analysing this doctrinal consensus, Trueman first explores the 
significant borrowings Puritan writers made from the medieval heritage, and identifies 
two points: the adoption of Aristotelian categories and logic, " and wholesale 
borrowings from scholastic theology - this latter including, for example, the poena 
sensus - poena damni distinction. 12 
There is, according to Trueman, an asymmetry in the doctrine of the last things in 
Puritanism. Heaven is coloured by a Christological focus; hell is, in essence, absence 
from God. Because of this, to speak of heaven is to be about theology proper in a way 
that to speak of hell is not. The language of physical suffering was rccogniscd as 
inadequate of hell by the Puritans, but still used with some freedoM. 13 Puritan writers 
assert both that heaven is visible from hell, and the pains of the damned are thereby 
increased, zind that hell is visible from heaven, with a corresponding increase of the 
joys of the saved. 14 Finally, with Edwards quoted as an example, Trueman speaks of 
'a basic Puritan pastoral preoccupation with indifference towards hell ... "s 
In order to amplify this basic picture slightly, particularly to demonstrate some 
features of the rhetoric to which Edwards was heir, I want to examine two Puritan 
writings on hell briefly. I have deliberately chosen authors who have reputation of 
being among the more gentle breed of Puritan, in order to make more forcefully the 
10 The only references are in 32: 1, which teaches '... the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where 
they remain in torment and utter darkness, reserved for [the last judgement]'; 32: 3, which states that, at 
the final judgement, Me bodies of the unjust shall, by the power of Christ, be raised to dishonour ... I 
and 33: 2, which asserts that part of the reason for the judgement is the display of '[the glory oQ his 
justice in the damnation of the reprobate who are wicked and disobedient, ' and goes on to insist that 
'the wicked ... shall be cast into eternal torments, and be punished with everlasting destruction from L%e presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power. ' Notable here is the total lack of controversy 
in comparison with much of the Confession: no opposing positions are named and rejected. 
11 'it is tempting to describe The Saint's Everlasting Rest as the greatest application of Aristotelian 
physics to the service of Christian piety in the history of the church. ' ibid. p. 76 As Trueman notes, this 
is unsurprising, in that Reformed thinking was resistant to Cartesianism and, prior to Edwards' 
appropriation of Newton and Locke, few other philosophical schemes were available for service. 
12 ibid p. 77. 
13 ibid. p. 80; some examples of my own will be found below. 
14 ibid. pp. 79-80. 
IS ibid. p. 8 1. 
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point that such rhetoric was commonplace. The writings are Richard Baxter's The 
Saint's Everlasting Restl 6 and John Bunyan's The Resurrection ofthe Dead. 17 
Baxter's Saint's Rest should need no recommendation; occupying a similar pre- 
eminence amongst Puritan devotional literature as its author's Reformed Pastor and 
Christian Directory do in the field of pastoral theology, it is one of the gems of the 
religious writing of the period. It is perhaps a matter of some surprise, then, to find 
within this work, a series of chapters describing in some detail the sufferings of those 
who are found at the last not to be saints. More so, perhaps, when it is realiscd that 
these chapters occupy a position of significance: the first of the 'uses' found for the 
doctrine of rest is 'Showing the unconceivable (sic) misery of the ungodly in their loss 
of this Rest. '18 Baxter here follows a common Puritan practice of including an 'alarm 
to the unconverted'19 in his text; my intention is to focus attention on the contents of 
that 'alarm'. 
Baxter is, very simply, seeking to scare his readers into heaven: 'I am a messenger of 
the saddest tidings to thee, that ever yet thy ears did hear ... This sentence I am 
commanded to pass on thee, from the word: take it as thou wilt, and escape it if thou 
canst. 120 To this end, he offers three sections, demonstrating the greatness of the loss 
of heaven, those things that aggravate this loss, and the positive torments that are 
added to that JOSS. 21 The damned lose God, their own possibility of a glorified 
existence, all the benefits of God, and the company of the saints and angelS. 22 This 
loss is aggravated by the increased ability to understand their condition which they 
will then know; by the strengthening of their consciences; by the increased ability to 
feel; and by the clarity of their memories - particularly of the opportunities to escape 
16 Baxter's Works are published in 23 vols., with a Life and appreciation by William Orme; the Saint's 
Rest may be found in vol. 22: Baxter, Richard Works: vol. 22 James Duncan, London, 1830. 
17 A recent scholarly edition of Bunyan's Miscellaneous Works has been used: Bunyan, John 
Christian Behaviour, The Holy City; The Resurrection of the Dead: Miscellaneous Works vol. 3 (ed. 
J. Sears McGee) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987. 
18 op. cit. p. 36 1; this use is discussed in the Third Pail, ch. 1-4. 
19 The phrase is the title of a book by John Alleine; the concept will be recognised by anyone familiar 
with Puritan literature. 
20 ibid. pp. 361-362. 
21 In passing, it is notable here that the poena sensus - poena damni distinction underlies Baxter's 
thought, without explicit invocation. 
22 ibid pp. 365-371. 
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the torment they spurned. 23 Then follows a list of the pleasant things of this world, 
which will be lostj just as surely as the delights of heaven, 24 before finally Baxter 
turns to the positive torments that the damned experience. The greatness of these are 
demonstrated by the fact that God is the Author of them, by the seriousness with 
which He takes the work of glorifying His justice, by the 'delight' He will take in 
punishing the wicked, by the identity of their tormentors, viz. Satan and themselves, 
by the way these torments will affect every part of soul and body continuously, by the 
lack of any hope of an end, and by their eternity. 25 
This summary will have given some flavour of these sections, but to truly convey a 
taste of the rhetoric I must quote at some length: 
Is it not a terrible thing to a wretched soul, when it shall lie roaring perpetually 
in the flames of hell, and the God of mercy himself shall laugh at them; when 
they shall cry out for mercy, yea, for one drop of water, and God shall mock 
them instead of relieving them; when none in heaven or earth can help them 
but God, and he shall rejoice over them in their calamity? 26 
How God will stand over them with the rod in his hand, (not the rod of 
fatherly chastisement, but that iron rod wherewith he bruises the rebellious, ) 
and lay it on for all their neglects of Christ and his grace. Oh, that men would 
foresee this, and not put themselves under the hammer of revenging fury ... 27 
So also, when the time comes that he will purposefully manifest his justice, it 
shall appear to be indeed the justice of God. The everlasting flames of hell 
will not be thought too hot for the rebellious; and when they have there burnt 
through millions of ages, he will not repent him of the evil which is befallen 
them. Oh! wo (sic) to the soul that is thus set up for a butt, for the wrath of the 
Almighty to shoot at; and for a bush, that must bum in the flames of his 
jealousy and never be consumed. 28 
These sections occupy a significant proportion of the teXt, 29 and these examples could 
be multiplied, but the point should now be made: Trueman could as well have picked 
Baxter as Edwards as an example of his 'basic pastoral preoccupation' with a neglect 
23 ibid pp. 371-395. 
24 ibid pp. 395415. 
25 ibid pp. 415425. 
26 ibid. p. 419. 
27 ibid. p. 418. 
28 ibid. pp. 417418. 
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of the seriousness of the threat of damnation. More briefly, let me add a third name to 
this list, which should serve to establish that such imagery was common currency 
amongst Puritan divines. 
John Bunyan is perhaps the greatest of the Puritan authors, judged on purely literary 
terms; Pilgrim's Progress is in the very first rank of English literature both in terms 
of popularity and influence and, whilst none of his other work approaches this, such 
texts as Grace Abounding are still read, and deservedly so. For my purposes here, I 
will turn to a very brief treatise, making no comment on its theological merit or 
oth&rwise, in order to demonstrate that Bunyan, too, shared in the common Puritan 
rhetoric of damnation. In this work30 Bunyan discusses at great length in narrative 
form the final judgement, with various 'books' being opened, and heaven and hell 
visible to all humanity before the bar. With considerable literary skill, he paints the 
desperation of those under judgement to be let into paradise and even across the 
centuries the writing is capable of conjuring feelings of urgency and suspense. My 
concern, however, is with the description of hell that Bunyan builds. Once again, the 
simplest way to communicate the flavour is to resort to quotation: 
... they will most 
f=ously behold the pit, the bottomless pit, the fire, the 
Brimstone, and the flaming bcds that Justice hath prepared for them of old ... 
Fire is that which of all things is the most insufferable, and insupportable. 
Wherefore, by fire, is shewed the grievous state of the ungodly, after 
Judgement. Who can eat fire, drink fire, and ly down in the midst of flames 
of fire? yet this must the wicked do. Again, not onely fire, but cvcrIasting fire 
31 
The Holy shall be in everlasting Light: But the Sinner in everlasting Darkness. 
Without light, I say, yet in Fire ever burning, yet not consumed, always afraid 
of death and hell, vehemently desiring to be annihilated to nothing. 
Continually fearing to stay long in Hell, and yet certainly sure they shall never 
come out of it. Ever desiring the Saints happiness (sic), and yet alwayes 
envying their felicity. They would have it, because it is easie and 
Comfortable; yet cannot abide to think of it, because they have lost it for ever. 
Ever loaden with the delight of sin: and yet that is the greatest torture, alwayes 
29 72 pages out of 514 in the edition used. 
30 op-cit. pp. 197-292. 
31 ibid. pp. 286-287. 
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desiring to put it out of their Mind, and yet assuredly know (sic) they must for 
ever abide. the guilt and torment thereof. 32 
These passages are not pleasant; their authors never intended them to be pleasant and, 
in an age less used to such descriptions, they border on the horrifiC. 33 They have been 
included for a reason, however: there is a widespread assumption that Edwards is in 
some sense culpable for the doctrine of hell he espouses, and preaches. In assessing 
the validity of that charge, the tradition of rhetoric that he inherited must be taken 
with full seriousness. 
Two monographs offer helpful discussions of the movements that occurred between 
the writing of such passages and Edwards' prime: Walker's The Decline of Hell and 
Almond's Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment England. 34 Both survey the period 
around 1700, as mainstream Puritan and other, stranger, conceptions from the 
Commonwealth radicals gave way to an increasingly universalistic picturc. 
Following these authors, and Camporesi in The Fear of He11135 I will identify several 
common features of the background to Edward's own thought on this subject: 
Firstly, Walker and Almond both make a link between the doctrine of hell and 
changing notions of punishment: 'For Baxter, as for his contemporaries, the purpose 
of punishment of those convicted of crime was retributive, and the conscious 
infliction of physical suffering in a public context was central. 136 This point is worthy 
of some attention: whilst retributive punishment, as described in the quotation, was 
regarded as ethically acceptable, there was little to oppose the inherited notion of hell. 
The concept of 'desert' was widely held, and this legitimated eternal punishment 
32 ibid. p. 290. 
33 Although one might cogently argue that for modem society to object to such descriptive language 
in print or pulpit whilst supporting the right of film directors to produce some of the sicker fantasies 
that have emanated from Hollywood in recent years is hypocrisy on a quite breathtaking scale. 
34 Walker, D. P. The Decline ofHell: Seventeenth Century Discussions ofEternal Torment, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, 1964; Almond, Philip C. Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment England C. U. P., 
Cambridge, 1994. 
35 Camporesi, Piero The Fear of Hell., Images of Damnation and Salvation in Early Afodern Europe 
(tr. Lucinda Byatt) E. T. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990. 
36 Almond, ibid p. 84. 
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(once some argument concerning the infinite guilt of sin was constructed, and such 
arguments were commonplace37). Equally, whilst the visibility of punishment was 
considered important, the 'vision across the chasm, ' so repugnant to twentieth century 
sensibilities, was almost demanded for God's action to be just - and with this concept 
in place, the fact of the eternal bliss of the saints could demand the eternity of the 
torments of hell - God's justice would not be perfect, and hence their enjoyment of 
God not perfect, if they could not see justice being done on the impenitent. 
As ideas of punishment became more focused on restoration and deterrence, so ideas 
of hell inherited from the Middle Ages became less in tune with the temper of the 
times. Thus, the idea of vision across the chasm from both sides gradually 
disappeared after 1700. Significantly, however, this was not the result of sustained 
criticism - the concept vanished quietly because, apparently, it was simply no longer 
part of the way people thought. There was now no need for punishment to be seen for 
it to be effective (obviously deterrence must be seen, but it must be seen in this life: 
the saints need no convincing to remain holy38). Almond offers a further datum: the 
hordes of demons, and their ruler Satan, which formed part of the standard description 
of hell prior to 1700, rapidly disappeared in the new century. Either God was seen as 
directly punishing those in hell, or universalism was embraced. 
The connection between understandings of hell and legal theories of justice is a 
natural one in a Western tradition which has usually understood the Atonement in 
forensic termS. 39 If this is followed, then once retributive theories ofjusticc have been 
discounted, there can be little support for the doctrine of hell, in its traditional form of 
eternal conscious torment with no hope of an end. Such an understanding does not 
'restore' the 'harm' done to God by sin; traditional doctrines of impassibility make 
any such language meaningless, and so restorative theories of justice offer little 
37 See below for a discussion of the standard argument as Edwards constructs it. 
38 Walker actually notes one writer who uses the need for the saints to be eternally deterred from 
sinning as an argument for the eternity and visibility of hell, but this was hardly a common position. 
op. cit. P. 10 1. 
39 On the connection between atonement theories and the ethics of judgement see Gorringe, Timothy 
G. God's Just Vengence: Crime, Violence and the Rhetoric ofSalvation Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996 and Moberly, Walter The Ethics ofPunishment Faber and Faber, London, 1968. 
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help. 40 If such ideas of justice are to be used, then some scheme such as that of 
Anselm, which proposes a need for a debt to be paid in order for propriety to be 
satisfied must be invoked, and it is difficult to see how this differs, except in the 
language used, from straightforward retribution. 41 As already noted in passing, for 
hell to have any deterrent effect it must be visible in this life, not the next, and so any 
such effect ceases to be relevant at the es'chaton. Whilst it may - be argued that the 
pains of hell must continue into eternity for the deterrent threat to be honest, such 
sophistry hardly seems reason enough for God to do such a terrible thing, if His 
character is anything close to what has been commonly assumed in the Christian 
tradition. Reformative theories of justice, of course, lead one to the final 
universalisms of Origen and Hick, 42 not to any support for the traditional doctrine of 
hell. In my examination of Edwards' doctrine, I will return to this question of the 
relationship between doctrines of hell and understandings ofjustice. 
Secondly, the 'static' nature of hell is highlighted, by these authors: there is a 
complete 'moral freezing' at death, such that there can be no further guilt incurred, 
but also no hope of repentance. This view can be found in Aquinas. 43 Walker44 links 
this to the deterrent value of the idea of hell, 45 a theme which he regards as 
important. 46 Such a moral freezing removes an obvious defence of the existence of 
hell - that the impenitent continue to sin, and so remain in punishment. 47 
Thirdly, Walker traces the systematic connection between the doctrine of hell and 
other doctrines, particularly the atonement. 48 If Christ, as truly God, suffered and 
40 The widespread desire amongst recent theologians to re-cast (or remove) the doctrine or 
impassibility hardly alters this point: whilst some wish to speak of God suffering as a result of our sin, 
and it is easy to see how this could be used as an argument in favour of traditional doctrines of hell, 
there would seem to be little desire to make this a reason (excuse? ) to re-introduce such doctrines. 
41 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo? Book I ch. 12-23. 
42 Hick's understanding is not necessarily universalist, in that he preserves a place for indeterminate 
human freedom - see my discussion towards the end of this chapter. 
43 S. T Mae q. 13 art. 4. 
44 op. cil. p. 23. 
45 That hell has a deterrent value is undisputed throughout the period; the object of the discussion of 
justice above was to indicate that if hell has no more than a deterrent value, it becomes difficult to 
defend its existence. 
46 Various authors are quoted to the effect that, if the doctrine of hell is questioned, crime will 
necessarily increase - see pp. 14, and passim. 
47 According to Walker, Leibniz, amongst others, actually offered this defence. ibid pp. 24-25. 
48 ibid pp. 26-29. 
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died for our redemption, then, within a retributive scheme, sin must be infinitely 
culpable: the moral calculus here is a reversal of Anselm's in Cur deus homo?: he 
argued that, since sin must be infinite, only God could atone; 49 now the argument is 
that since God has atoned, sin must be infinite. 50 Walker makes the point that this 
made it very'easy for Socinians and Arians to reject the orthodox doctrine of hell, 
although others may wish to place more stress on a common cause for the rejection of 
various orthodox doctrines than on a theological consequent like this. Walker offers a 
fourth section, concerned with what I have called the 'vision across the chasm. ' In 
discussing this under the question of retributive justice, I hope I have indicated 
theological linkages which may not be wholly evident in Walker's account. 
In summary, then, the Puritan tradition which Edwards inherited stood in broad 
continuity with the medieval tradition both in doctrine and rhetoric concerning hell. I 
have highlighted the connection with theories of justice that led to common views of 
hell changing during the early decades of Edwards' life, and the 'vision across the 
chasm', the decline of which demonstrates this shift well. In addition, I have 
followed Walker in noting other aspects of the received doctrine which were being 
challenged in Edwards' day. 
5.2 Edwards'Doctrine and Rhetoric of Hell 
With this background in place, it is now appropriate to examine Edwards' own 
understanding, and presentation, of hell. When Edwards' sermons on the subject are 
read alongside the descriptions quoted earlier, what is striking is actually his reticence 
in graphic descriptions of hell. 51 His preaching ministry was carried out less than a 
century after the origin of these illustrations, and so one is forced to conclude that, in 
his rhetoric, Edwards was no more than in step with his times. fie certainly can - and 
49 CDA book 11 ch. 6. 
50 One thinks of Barth's argument that we only understand what sin means by seeing Jesus accepting 
its consequences on the cross. 
51 The crude anthropomorphism of God's infliction of torments seen in Baxter, for instance, could not 
be paralleled within Edwards' corpus. The reader of Edwards' Miscellanies cannot fail to be struck by 
the sense that his abiding interest is in the joys of heaven, not the pains of hell, and he is far more 
graphic in describing the former, even with much less Scriptural material on which to build. 
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regularly does - use language to shock and grab the attention of his congregation, but 
usually it is not the pains of hell itself he stresses, but their immanence, their 
unavoidability, their eternity, and the sovereignty of God. 52 
It is worthy of note, even if only in passing, that in choosing to preach in such ways 
Edwards was not out on a limb; his own criticisms of revivalist excesses suggests that 
many were so affected by their experiences of the revival that they preached in ways 
even Edwards found wholly unacceptable. 53 Further, Edwards' practice here differed 
little from that of Wesley or Whitefield. 54 
Turning to doctrine, rather than presentation, if we search Edwards for visions of 
demons and Satan, we again find that he was in step with his times. His vision of hcll 
is between God and the damned, perhaps all the more shocking for today's Christian 
reader because of that, 55 but there is little or no room for great armies of demons with 
twisted faces tormenting the damned, as there had been in the Puritans of the previous 
centuries. Certainly Edwards believed in the devil and the fallen angels; his 
52 It has been regularly remarked, but serves as an ideal example here: the images of 'Sinners in the 
Hands of an Angry God' terrify by stressing instability - the mere pleasure of an angry Deity keeping 
the spider out of the flames - not by stressing the pains of hell. This makes the doctrine of God an even 
sharper question of course, and one I shall return to. For other examples of the point, see my analysis 
of the various published 'hellfire' sermons below. 
53 James Davenport is the name almost always mentioned in this connection, although it is unclear 
whether he was the most culpable, or just the most notorious, culprit. Reading the history, I am left 
with a uncomfortable feeling that he is blamed most because he detailed his own failures in a retraction. 
One could hope that Christian theologians rehearsing this history would have been more conscious of 
the impropriety of heaping guilt upon a person precisely because they have repented. For brief 
accounts of the history of this part of the controversy over the revivals, see YE2 pp. 2-8; YE4 pp. 51-52; 
60-6 1; for Edwards' explicit statements that he feels some have been emphasising the terrors of hell too 
much, see YE4 pp. 246-248. For Davenport's retraction, see Confessions and Retractions in The Great 
Awakening: Documents Illustrating the Crisis and its Consequences ed. I leimart, Alan and Miller, 
Perry, Bobbs-Merill, Indianapolis, 1967 pp. 257-262. The editors describe Davenport as 'a convenient 
target' - p. 257. 
54 This point may be demonstrated by reference to James Downey's study The Eighteenth Century 
Pulpit: A Study of the Sermons of Butler, Berkeley, Secker, Sterne, fVhitefseld and Wesley Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1969. Downey says of Whitefield's predilection for such preaching: 'It is 
little wonder thatý projecting such graphic descriptions of hell, he sent many away from his services 
distraught with fear. But Whiterield made no apology for this. fie believed that it was "betterto have 
some soul-trouble here, than to be sent to hell by Jesus Christ hereafter". ' (p. 162). According to 
Wesley, Downey suggests, '[c]ongregations must never be allowed to forget the ineluctable fate of the 
impenitent' (p. 192). Downey quotes at length from both preachers, and a glance at the relevant 
passages will offer considerable support for the point. 
55 If only in that such immediacy may imply some uncomfortable things about God. 
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(Reformed) orthodoxy was, here as elsewhere, impeccable; 56 it is Simply that he was 
not especially interested in them, and saw little use for pictures painted involving 
them. 57 
It is when we turn to what I have termed the 'vision across the chasm', to the saints 
rejoicing over the sight of sinners being punished and sinners suffering more from 
seeing saints in glory, that Edwards' doctrine appears, famously, out of step. An 
entire sermon, 'The End of the Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous, '59 is devoted 
to defending this point, and it regularly appears in other texts. 59 This sermon, on 
Rev. 18: 20, begins by asserting 'When the saints in glory shall see the wrath of God 
executed on ungodly men, it will be no occasion of grief to them, but of rcjoicing. '60 
Scripture, according to Edwards, plainly teaches that heaven and hell are each visible 
from the other. Further, when the righteous see the sufferings of hell q`hey will not be 
sorry for the damned, it will cause no uneasiness or dissatisfaction to them; but on the 
contrary, when they have this sight, it will excite them to joyful praises. 61 
This is so out of tune with our own times that it is in danger of exciting simple 
revulsion. As I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, this should not be 
allowed to prevent us tracing Edwards' logic on this point. It is a part of his theology, 
and one I intend to show to be important in understanding his vision of glory, and the 
flaws therein. Edwards offers several arguments for his contention that the saints will 
praise God at the sight of the damned. Firstly, and negatively, it is not because of any 
ill disposition in the saints. They have no love and no pity for the damned, because 
they love only what God loves and God does not love the damned. Secondly and 
positively, God glorifies Himself - his justice, power and majesty - in the punishment 
of sinners, and the saints will rejoice in any display of His glory, so they will rejoice 
at the sight of the sufferings of hell. Thirdly, in seeing what they have been saved 
S6 For references, seethe Miscellanies entries listed in Edwards' table: YE13 p. 130 (undcrdcvils) and 
p. 145 (under Satan). 
57 A brief passage such as the one in the scrmon entitled 'The End of the Wicked Contemplated by the 
Righteous' (BT2 pp. 207-212) referring to the lack of any pity in the devils that torment the damned, 
(see IV. 1.3, p. 21 1) only proves the point: it is simply not characteristic of Edwards' preaching. 
58 B72 pp. 207-212. 
S9 See, for instance, 'Wicked Men Useful in their Destruction Only' BT2 p. 127. - 60 op. cit. Sec. 1. 
61 ibid Sec. 1 Prop. 11. 
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from, the saints have a greater sense of their own happiness and a greater sense of 
God's love and grace; both gratitude for salvation, and this further glorification of God 
as the depths of His love are seen, excite them to worship. Edwards is aware of the 
objection that any modem reader would raise, although not perhaps of the emotional 
force with which it would be raised, and he answers the point that this appears to be a 
less than perfect action on the part of the saints in several ways. An examination of 
these shows that they essentially reduce to his fourth argument: that the exercise of a 
virtuous disposition is different in different circumstances. So the saints are called to 
love sinners now because they do not know whether a particular person may be 
amongst the elect and hence later converted; then they will know, and so may respond 
with simple hatred for those whom God hates. 62 Again, in the suffering of the 
reprobate the saints see God's glory, and they are more aware of His love for them, 
and so it is appropriate for them to rejoice at the sight, but this is not the case with 
human suffering seen in this life, which appropriately generates pity and compassion 
in a virtuous person. - The difference, according to Edwards, is in the nature of the 
suffering, not in the virtue of the person who sees it. 63 
So, my examination thus far suggests that Edwards was broadly in tune with his 
times, if perhaps a little on the old-fashioned side (understandable in someone from 
the frontier) in both his rhetoric of damnation and in most areas of his doctrine. The 
single glaring exception is the 'vision across the chasm' and the use he makes of that. 
As with his commitment to Calvinist expressions, Edwards can be seen here to be 
firmly holding to a doctrine thavis rapidly being discarded all around, presumably 
because it forms an important plank in his theological scheme. My purpose in the 
next part of the chapter, then, will be to use this anomaly as a way in to explore the 
62 This would seem to presuppose a limited atonement, at least with Edwards' Calvinist 
presuppositions; Edwards' views on this issue will be considered later in the chapter. 
63 The strongest argument that Edwards advances in favour of these ideas is actually found in the 0 Miscellanies. In entry 1356, Edwards constructs a series of arguments against the Idea that hell is 
reformative, rather than punitive, in the course of which he asserts: 'There is nothing in the accounts of 
the day of judgement [in Scripture] that looks as tho the saints had any love or pity for the wicked, on 
ac of the terrible long-continued torments which they must suffer. Nor indeed will the accounts that are 
given admit of supposing any such thing. We have an account of their judging them & being with 
Christ in condemning them, concurring in the sentence ... but no account of their praying for them, nor 
of their exhorting them to consider and repent... ' (p. 12 of Schafer's transcript). These observations arc 
significant, and must be taken seriously by any theology that is committed to the authority of Scripture. 
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doctrinal concerns that lie behind Edwards' understanding of damnation. This will 
take up the next two sections, the first being an examination of the writings (mainly 
sermons) that treat directly of hell, and the second an examination of an area of 
theology which will form an important part of the background to this question in 
Edwards' own thought, 
5.3 The Use of Hell in Promoting God's Glory 
The key texts for an examination of Edwards' doctrine of hell come from the 
published sermons: 'The End of the Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous', 64 'The 
Wicked Useful in their Destruction Only', 65 'Wrath upon the Wicked to the 
Uttermost', 66 The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners', 67 and, famously, 
'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God'. 69 
This is an unpleasant selection of titles, but notice what it means: there is almost 
nothing in Edwards' major published works which touches on the doctrine of hell -a 
brief comment in the section of True Virtue concerning conscienCC; 69 a few pages 
towards the end of History of Redemption; 70 but, overall, very little. The comparison 
with Baxter's Saints' Rest, to which I have already referred, is instructive: nearly a 
sixth part of this work is devoted to discussing hell. This cannot be put down to 
subject matter: Original Sin, True Virtue, and any or all of the Revival Treatises 
could have included an 'alarm to the unconverted' without raising any surprise 
amongst those used to Puritan literature. A relatively small collection of scrmons7I 
and a number of Miscellanies entrieS72 are the entirety of Edwards' output in this area 
and, whilst their contents should not be minimized, nor should they be over- 
emphasised simply because of their sensational nature. 
64 Op. Cit. 
65 BT2 pp. 125-129 (dated July 1744). 
66 B77pp. 122-125 (dated May 1735). 
67 BTI pp. 668-679 (The fourth of the 'Five Discourses* which Edwards published as his anti. 
Arminian series which, he claims, were a catalyst for the first revival he saw at Northampton, in 1734) 
68 B72 pp. 7-12 (Preached at Enfield on 8th July 174 1. and at Northampton a few months earlier). 
69 YE8 pp. 597-599. 
70 YE9 pp. 505-506,512. 
71 In addition to those listed, only one of the semons thus far published is devoted to hell: Illie 
Torments of Hell are Exceeding Great' in YE14 pp. 301-33 1. 
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I will treat these sermons in a theological, rather than chronological, order, beginning 
with 'Wrath upon the Wicked'. The doctrine of this sermon states: 'When those that 
continue in sin shall have filled up the measure of their sin, then wrath will come 
upon them to the uttermost. ' - the points stressed being that there is a limit permitted 
to the sin of any wicked person, and that when that limit is filled, God's wrath will 
fall without any restraint. The use of this is to encourage those still unconverted to 
seek salvation. Wrath will come without restraint, without mercy, without limit and 
without end, because 'sin is an infinite evil. 173 This sermon is a simple threat; there is 
little other than standard Puritan ideas contained therein, although the rhetoric focuses 
on the immediate action of God in punishing those in hell - an emphasis entirely in 
accord with Edwards' regular stress on God's immediacy. This focus is emphasised 
when the most famous of Edwards' imprecatory sermons is'considered; as already 
notcd, 74 the stress in 'Sinners... ' is not so much on the pains of hell as on their 
immediacy and the instability of the unconverted sinner - again and again, the image 
is of the hand of God, the God the listeners are told they have provoked to anger and 
hatred, being the only thing that keeps them out of the fire. This is unsurprising when 
the doctrine of the sermon is considered: 'There is nothing that keeps wicked men at 
any one moment out of hell, but the mere pleasure of God. ' Immediacy and 
instability are the hall marks. 
Wilson Kimnach, in his long and significant introduction to the various volumes of. 
Edwards' sermons in the Yale Edition, has traced the genre of this scrmon to 'hands' 
sermons, preached to criminals condemned to execution and often later published. 75 
The rhetorical trick Edwards used is to take the language of these sermons, delivered 
to those on the point of certain death, and to apply it to his listeners in Enfield to 
stress the instability of their position. Edwards' vision of immediacy reached a 
terrifying crescendo here: everything is stripped away, God and die sinner are the 
72 Edwards' Table, which is exhaustive, lists 70 of the 1400+ entries as having some reference to hell, 
or about 5% - almost exactly the same number as refer to heaven. See YE13 pp. 134-136. There 
is little 
in these entries that is not present in the sermons that I am considering. 
73 B77 p. 123. 
74 n. 52 supra. 
75 YElOpp. 167-179. 
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only two beings in view, and God is characterised as being primarily powerful and 
angry. 
These two sermons point to the first aspect of Edwards' understanding of hell that I 
want to draw out: the note of immediacy. Edwards' vision of the immediacy of 
God's relations with men and women has been a mentioned before in this study, but 
this is the point where he might have been expected to finally draw back from it. 
After all, according to Trueman, the basic description of hell in the Puritan tradition 
was the poena damni, the absence of God. For Edwards, this is not the case: hell is 
the presence of God, but of God in His anger and wrath. What hell is not, however, 
and the texts will be searched in vain for any counter-evidcnce, is the presence of the 
Trinitiarian God. God's close relationship with His creation, is Trinitarian - most 
obviously in the divine self-giving to the world, which is the sending of Son and 
Spirit. In redemption, it is the closeness of the saints' relationship to Christ, and the 
presence of the indwelling Spirit which demonstrate the closeness of God. Here, in 
hell, it appears that a different God is present. I will return to this theme. 
Bracketing this Trinitarian question, Edwards' position (insisting that hell is the 
presence, rather than the absence, of God) has a certain strength theologically, in that 
he takes with full seriousness the contingent nature of human creatureliness. There is 
always a certain suspicion in accounts which stress the absence of God that what is at 
work is a borrowed Greek view of the necessary immortality of the soul, and so a 
concept of hell as the soul living out its life apart from God. 76 Edwards' conviction 
that continued existence of any sort must be solely by the active will of God is surely 
truer to the Biblical texts, but raises an acute problem: why, if this is the case, are the 
damned resurrected at all? 
It may be that the truth of this position can be established by exegesis, at least for 
anyone with a 'high' view of Scripture77 - and certainly this would be the case for 
76 Perhaps Odysseus' experiences in the Underworld come to mind, as he praises the shade of 
Achilles for the high regard in which he is held in the realm of the dead. Achilles' response is to insist 
that to be a slave but alive would be better than his current state. Odyssey Book 11. 
77 
... if a specific sense be attached to words, never-ending misery is enunciated in the Bible. On the 
presumption that one doctrine is taught, it is the eternity of hell torments. ' The claim is of course 
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Edwards. This is not, however, the challenge: when Edwards adopts the realist 
understanding of virtue of which True Virtue is an exposition, and particularly when 
he does so in full knowledge of Locke's attempt to make justice and similar self- 
defining concepts, the pressing question must be how Edwards can consider such a 
position theologically possible. When Bruce Davidson wrote an article entitled 
'Reasonable Damnation: How Jonathan Edwards argued for the rationality of hell' he 
was asking the right question. 78 
I will address this question by examining the remainder of the sermons listed at the 
beginning of this section, 79 starting with 'The Justice of God in the Damnation of 
Sinners'. This sermon, preached on Romans 3: 19 'That every mouth may be 
stopped, ' is a defence of the doctrine of hell on precisely this point: how can it be 
just? Edwards answers on the basis of two data: human sinfulness and God's 
sovereignty. On the first, he adopts a traditional defence, in arguing for the infinite 
guilt of sin. This can only be appropriately dealt with by either suffering of infinite 
worth - as in the self-offering of Christ on the cross - or suffering of infinite duration - 
as in the eternal punishment of the wicked. Edwards' construction of the argument is 
typically careful, and must have been shattering to hear preached. Punishment, he 
asserts must be proportional to the crime punished, this is simple (retributive) justice. 
The heinousness of a crime is, in turn, proportional to the strength of the obligation 
offended against. Obligations to love, honour or obey are proportionate to the degree 
of loveliness, 'honourableness' or authority in the person in question - this is the 
definition of these words. But God is infinitely lovely, etc., and so, tracing the chain 
back, any offence against God is deserving of infinite punishment. Therefore, 'the 
eternity of the punishment of ungodly men renders it infinite: and renders it no more 
than infinite' - so punishment is proportionate. 
vastly over-stated, but makes the point. The quotation is in Shedd, W. G. T. The Doctrine of Endless 
Punishment Banner of Truth Trust, Edinburgh, 1986 p. 118. 
78 Although I find the answers he gives lacking in penetration. The article is: Davidson, Bruce W. 
'Reasonable Damnation: How Jonathan Edwards argued for the rationality of hell' Journal of the 
Evangelical Theology Society 3 8/1 (March 1995) pp. 47-56. 
79 An early attempt at a defence can be seen in 'All God's Methods are Most Reasonable' (YE14 
pp. 165-197). particularly sections 1,11 and V. The arguments in the sermons that I analyse in the main 
text cover the points made here more carefully, so I will not include an analysis of this sermon. 
172 
There is a more careful construction of this in Miscellanies 713,80 where Edwards 
(presumably independently) reaches the same conclusion as Aquinass' in arguing that 
all sins are infinite in one direction but not in another. Edwards invokes the image of 
cylinders of infinite length, which may still differ greatly in diameter and yet all be 
infinite., In ýthe same way, considered as offence against God, all sin is infinitely 
culpable, but considered in other ways sins may be much greater or less than each 
other. 82 Aquinas follows this by insisting that punishment is infinite in its duration 
but finite (and varying) in its intensity - not a point Edwards makes as far as I am 
aware, but one from which he is only one step away. 
Considering the question from the stand-point of God's ma esty, Edwards is 
concerned to make three points: that God is under no obligation to prevent us from 
sinning; that it is just for God to impose the federal scheme; and that God may choose 
to redeem or not as He pleases, when fallen humanity is in view. The first of these is 
defended on the grounds that it would be unreasonable to insist that God makes us in 
such a way that it is impossible for us to sin, and so we cannot blame Him when we 
do. Further, God may permit sinjustly, even if He knows it is certain we will fall into 
sin - or if He so orders the creation that it is inevitable that we should fall into sin. 83 
The second of Edwards' contentions is that there is no reason why God should choose 
to treat us as individuals, rather than as a federal whole under Adam, 94 as the latter is 
no more inherently dangerous to us than the former. Once again, there is apparently a 
certain doublethink present here, as this can only be the case if Adam's sin is not 
foreknown and foreordained. Lastly, he argues that with fallen humanity in view, 
God mayjustly choose who to redeem and who not to, since all are guilty. 
80 As yet unpublished, but cited in this connection in YE3 pAl n. 1. 
81 STSupp. q. 99art. Iresponsio. 
82 Edwards' precise words - 'it may be doubled & trebled yea & made a thousand fold more by the 
increase of other dimensions' (Miscellanies 713) - lack mathematical rigour, in that the volume of a 
cylinder of infinite length and any finite diameter is the same. One could seek increases by invoking 
Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers (unknown in Edwards' day, of course) - whereby the volume of 
a cylinder of infinite diameter would be a larger infinity than the first (an alcph- I set as opposed to an 
aleph-null set), but Edwards' point is made by his illustration, whatever the mathematical niceticsi 
83 In this final step, the defence of his predestinarian scheme, Edwards may appear vulnerable. I will 
return to this question in the next section. 
94 The federal scheme, unsurprisingly given its cultural milieu, does not mention Eve in this 
connection. It is not clear to me that the inclusion of Eve would alter the theological scheme in any 
significant way, however. 
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These points, taken together, are unsatisfactory. Each on its own may indeed work. it 
is, however, integral to Edwards' theological scheme that such decisions do not come 
on their own. It is not that God creates homo labilis and is then 'surprised' and forced 
to take a new decision when we fall; it is not even that God creates homo labilis in full 
knowledge that we will fall; as I have tried to show, Edwards' understanding of 
creation is such that history is all immediately present to the mind of God - with this 
understanding of the relationship between eternity and time, Edwards is asking us to 
believe that God creates not just homo lapsus but the niassa damnata. Thearguments 
he deploys will not defend against the charge of injustice levelled here. 85 Once again, 
this difficulty is related to Edwards' predestinarianism, and I will return to it in the 
next section. 
The two remaining sermons address a slightly different question: the usefulness of 
hell. This will not stand as a defence on its own, of course: hell may not finally be 
accepted because it is useful, although unjust. It is, however, a second strand to 
Edwards' attempts to justify the existence of hell, and a further guide to his 
understanding of hell. I will begin with his sermon on Ezekiel 15: 24, 'Ile Wicked 
Useful in their Destruction Only. ' 
Edwards, with a certain horrific logic, presses the image in the text of a barren tree 
being useful only for fuel to assert that those who do not 'bring forth fruit to God' are 
useful only when burning in hell. The 'end of their being' is to glorify God; if this 
cannot be obtained by living for Him, then in eternal death they can bring glory to 
God: God's ma esty is glorified in that the greatness of it is seen by the awfulness of 
offending against it; God's justice is glorified in that fie does not shrink from 
delivering the damned to what they deserve; and God's love and mercy are glorified 
in that the saints are given a sense - and a sight - of what they have been freed from by 
the mere grace of God. 86 
85 To be fair to Edwards at this point, we cannot expect the theological rigour of his later treatises 
within the confines of a sermon. My purpose here is not to dismiss the arguments of the sermon, but to 
indicate that they are inadequate to answer the general question, however valid in context. 
86 Underlying these conceptions is an important point: Edwards, in common with the majority of the 
Christian tradition, cannot conceive that human beings will ever be able to see God directly (this 
perhaps goes back to an ontological point I made in the third chapter of this thesis, in that it is not being 
embodied or being sinful that separates us most fundamentally from God, it is being created), and so 
we may only ever hope to see God in His works. I lence, in Miscellanies 811 (unpublished), Edwards 
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Edwards focuses on God's glorifying of Himself in the punishment of the reprobate, 
which is made an occasion for worship and thanksgiving when seen by the saints. So, 
in the final - sermon that I will consider, 'The End of the Wicked... ', which I have 
already discussed at some length, Edwards assertsthat, whilst God glorifies Himself 
in everything He does, He does so principally in the eternal fate of His intelligent 
creatures - whether to life or death. In the eternal death of the wicked, He glorifies 
His own justice, His power and majesty, and His grace and love, in the ways 
described above. The use of hell is that God is glorified through it, by the display of 
His perfections. Assuming it is just for God to send people to hell, this point must be 
considered valid. 87 Once again, however, the same question recurs: in his basic 
account of God's self-glorification, in creation and in redemption, God's glory is 
defined by Trinitarian concepts and the gospel narrative. These are only conspicuous 
by their absence in the writings on hell. 
Again, leaving a full consideration'of this point until the end of the chapter, on 
Edwards' own terms the question remaining is one of justice, and the sharpness of it, 
as I have indicated, depends on his predestinarianism. 88 In order to explore this 
question more fully, then, I will need in the next section to devote space to the last of 
Edwards' major works to be considered in this thesis, and to explore Edwards' 
doctrine of reprobation. 
5.4 Edwards' Calvinism in Original Sin 
If the doctrine of hell Edwards adopts is to be treated with full seriousness, both doing 
justice to the uses he makes of it and highlighting possible weaknesses within it, it 
must be viewed in connection with his predestinarianism. Certainly, if an 'Anninian, 
argues that the saints can see what is done on earth, and there they see God's perfections, and so are led 
to worship. Again, in Miscellanies 1137 (published only in the 1830 Dwight edition), '[t]he beatifical 
vision of God in heaven consists mostly in beholding the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ either 
in his work or in his person as appearing in the glorified human nature'. For the wider point see: 
Placher, William The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern ThinkingAbout God Went Wrong 
Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville, 1996. 
87 Although I will raise some objections to it in section 5.5 below. 
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understanding of freedom and salvation is once admitted, it is easier to defend eternal, 
conscious torment - indeed, the defences already explored could be, considered 
sufficient from such a starting point. Edwards, however, does not start from here. I 
looked at the first part of his projected defence of his variety of Calvinism in The 
Freedoni of the Will in the previous chapter; I will now introduce the theme in this 
chapter with a reading of the second, Original Sin. 89 
Edwards finished this work in 1757, intending it, as he tells us, not just as a reply to 
Turribill and Taylor, but as a 'general defense of that great important doctrine. '90 
Turribill and, particularly Taylor, seem never to have been far from his mind, 
however. In John Taylor of Norwich, Edwards seems to have found an opponent 
worthy of his foil; unlike the various works addressed in Freedom of the Will, 
Taylor's The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin, Proposed to Free and Candid 
Examination was written by a scholar of no mean ability, who was skilled in both 
Biblical languages and contemporary philosophy and theology. 91 The book itself had 
apparently rapidly gained a reputation of being unanswerable, despite valiant attempts 
by, among others, -Isaac Watts. 92 The nature of what Edwards called 'Arminianism' 
in New England has already been noted, and a moment's thought will show how 
amenable such a mood would be to an apparently reasonable and learned attack on 
one of the most offensive of the 'old Calvinist' doctrines. 93 
Edwards' reply is divided into four parts, with the first three designed to demonstrate 
the truth of the doctrine and the last designed to answer objections raised against it. 
88 Miscellanies 779, for instance, contains a long defence of the appropriateness of God's punishing of 
sin, which works on its own terms, but (again) ignores the way in which the arguments must be 
adjusted if it is held that God ordained the sin in the first place. 
89 YE3; key secondary texts relating to this work include Clyde A. Holbrook's Editor's Introduction 
(YE3 pp. I- 10 1); Storms, C. Samuel Tragedy in Eden: Original Sin in the Theology of Jonathan 
Edwards University Press of America, London, 1985; and pp. 141-153 of Jenson's America's 
Theologian. In addition, Haroutunian's Piety vs Moralism will be found to reflect this controversy on 
almost every page, although it is only rarely in the foreground. 
90 ibid. p. 102; italics original. 
91 For a brief biography of Taylor, see YE3 pp. 68-70. His Scripture Doctrine was published either 
1738 or 1740 - see YE3 p. 2 n. 5. 
92 See YE3 p. 3, where both this reputation and the various responses are discussed. 
93 Jenson states 'The rising bourgeoisie found the notion of original sin the single greatest religious 
offence to its ideology and aspirations. ' (op. cit. p. 144) This may be overstated - certainly the doctrine 
of predestination would be a close challenger - but the basic point, that this linked nexus of 
predestinarian doctrines was inimical to the rising American mood, holds. 
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The first two parts, roughly equal in length, discuss evidence for original sin in 'facts 
and events' and Scripture, respectively; the third, much shorter, part offers a 
theological argument based on the doctrine of redemption. The work as a whole 
suffers in comparison with its companion volume, The Freedom ofthe Will - but then, 
most books would. One might -describe Original Sin as competent rather than 
brilliant; its one original contribution, the doctrine of imputation put forward, has 
been considered as misconceived by most commentators. 94 Other than this point, the 
book is little more than a solid re-statement, mainly built on Biblical exegesis, of the 
mainstream Christian position. Edwards displays his usual clarity, and his usual 
cumbersomeness, in his restatement, and does a solid job of defending against the 
particular attack he was facing. 
Edwards' preparation of the ground is characteristically careful: 'original sin' in 
theological use refers only to human depravity, whereas in lay use it refers to the 
(linked) doctrines of depravity and imputation; 95 depravity means a particular 
disposition of the heart, which may be discerned by observing what is common to the 
same event in a wide variety of circumstances. 96 In the particular case in question, we 
must be careful to look at the reaction of humanity apart from the effect of divine 
grace. 97 Equally, we must not make arguments about the relative preponderance of 
good and bad: depravity implies that we are always liable to sin, not that we are liable 
to sin always. 98 Again, arguing that we are good naturally, but just corrupted by this 
world is irrelevant: this world is our proper place; if we are corrupt in our proper place 
then we are corrupt. 99 On the basis of these foundations, Edwards' seeks to 
demonstrate the universality of human sin. The texts cited are the usual ones, as are 
most of the arguments; two of the latter, however, are worthy of further comment. 
94 Any survey of the literature will demonstrate this - including, most conveniently, Holbrook's in his 
Introduction. See YE3 pp. 97-101. My own estimation will follow the minority line - see later. 
95 YE3 p. 107. 
96 ibid. pp. 107-109. 
97 ibid. p. I ()q. 
98 ibid. pp. 120-127. 
99 ibid. pp. 125-127. 
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The first is a cluster of arguments in the second chapter, which is entitled 'Universal 
Mortality Proves Original Sin. '100 Edwards is here addressing Taylor's point that 
death is a great benefit to humanity, given by God for many good purposes. 101 For 
Edwards, death is 'a calamity above all others terrible. '102 Behind this argument is the 
Panglossian nature of the Enlightenment thought of which Taylor is such an able 
representative. Whatever is, is good; death is; so death must be good. Taylor tries 
hard to defend this position, arguing that death teaches and trains us, and so is to be 
welcomed as a good gift of God. Edwards responds with almost angry derision - 
death is a tragedy; Christ meets death as an enemy; 103 it is the ultimate sign that there 
is something fundamentally wrong with the world. 
Secondly, Edwards constructs arguments for the ubiquity of sin from the dullness of 
religion in the world. 104 Once again, this highlights a fundamental divergence 
between Edwards and the coming Enlightenment. The moral calculus of True Virtue, 
which insists that an action's value can be judged only in relation to God, and that 
heroic deeds in another context are finally sinful, is beyond Taylor. Edwards' point is 
one I have had cause to mention before now: that which appears good and harmonious 
viewed against part of reality may-yet be seen to be disharmonious with the whole, 
and hence wrong. A theme, however attractive in itself, will grate if it occurs in a 
piece of music in a different key. 
When Edwards feels he has established the doctrine, by arguments and citations, he 
turns in Part 4105 to discuss various objections that are raised. Much of the genuinely 
interesting material in the book is here. Two areas stand out: the suggestion that this 
doctrine makes God the author of sin (which speaks directly to the questions about the 
justice of hell which prompted this examination), and the doctrine of imputation 
advanced. I will consider these in reverse order: 
100 ibid. p. 206. 
101 Perhaps Holbrook's statement of Taylor's position will make the point best: 'it is God's love, his 
fatherly concern for his children's welfare, his grace, that has brought about death. ' YE3p. 32. 
102 ibid. p. 206. 
103 ibid p. 212. 
104 ibid. pp. 147-157. 
105 ibid pp. 373433. 
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The doctrine of imputation has provided difficulties throughout the history of the 
A ugustinian tradition of theology. The fact of imputation - that we are guilty by 
virtue of Adam's sin and holy by virtue of Christ's obedience - is easily derived from 
a fairly natural reading of Paul's argument in the early chapters of Romans; problems 
arise when attempts are made to account for this fact theologically. Augustine's own 
version was developed, like so much of his theology, 106 in the heat of controversy - 
the Pelagian disputes, in this case. The student of Edwards Icarns to appreciate the 
particular difficulties that doing theology controversially brings, and it is a measure of 
Augustine's greatness that he was able to produce creative and powerful work in the 
heat of argument so regularly. On the doctrine of imputation, however, he is almost 
universally regarded as having made a false move. 
Augustine argued, simply, that the essence of sin is concupiscence - inordinate desire. 
Sin is inherited, from Adam and Eve down, because concupiscence is always a part of 
reproduction as sexual intercourse cannot take place without desire. On an abstract 
level, this is very neat: it makes sense of troublesome passages concerning sinning in 
Adam, and the status of the virgin birth is immediately established as the reason for 
Christ's sinlessness. It is the practical and pastoral consequences concerning the 
denigration of God's good gift of sexuality, and hence, embodiment which are 
disastrous; theologically, this ties up with a commonly perceived failure in 
Augustine's theological scheme to take on board the goodness of creation. 107 
There is no need here to explore further attempts to formulate the doctrine. 108 Within 
the Reformed tradition, Edwards would have found a confused legacy, which sought 
to move away from Augustine's position without really knowing what, other than the 
106 Of the major works, only de Trinitate is wholly the product of reflection at leisure. 
107 For Augustine's position, see the various anti-Pelagian writings (conveniently collected in NPNF 
I st series vol. V), but especially 'On Marriage and Concupiscence' (ibid. pp. 260-308). 
108 A long, although not necessarily unbiased, discussion will be found in F. P_ Tennant's flulsean 
Lectures, published as The Origin and Propagation of Sin, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
1902, pp. 1-112. See also Norman Powell Williams' Bampton Lectures: The Ideas of the Fall and 
Original Sin: A Historical and Critical Study Longmans, Green & co., London, 1929. 
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barc fact of imputation, to put in its placc. 109 Given this, it is hardly surprising that 
Edwards should make an original contribution when he comes to this point. 
Edwards advances his theory of imputation in the third chapter of part four of 
Original Sin, 110 devoted to dealing with the charge that imputation is unjust. 
Characteristically, the treatment begins with a careful statement of what imputation is. 
God's covenant with Adam was such that, in every step of His dealings with him, Ile 
treated his posterity as one with him. ' 11 The essence of Adam's first sin was in his 
disposition, not in his act, which was merely the outward manifestation of the inward 
disposition: 'His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficientfor, and entirely 
amounting io, all that appeared in the act he committed. " 12 Part of the punishment 
for this sin was God-forsakeness, resulting in depravity of nature as a fixed principle 
in Adam, and in all who follow. 113 
Taylor had insisted that it was unreasonable and unjust to consider Adam and his 
posterity, manifestly different individuals, as one. Once again, a standard 
Enlightenment note is being sounded here: the desire to define my freedom against 
the community, rather thanfor and by the community - in this case, the community of 
the whole human race. 114 The precise objections are twofold -that this damages those 
of us who are descended from Adam, and that it is simply fictional, and so improper, 
to do this. Edwards simply dismisses the first objection - it was much fairer to 
humanity to do things this way round, as Adam had far more reason, and so was far 
more likely, to obey than any who follow. Enlightened pleas of self-sufficiency are 
met with the contempt they deserve: '... no man's vain opinion of himself, as more fit 
to be trusted than others, alters the true nature and tendency of things, as they 
demonstrably are in themselves. " 15 
109 Heppe's regular desire to impose order and unanimity on the tradition only makes his witness to 
confusion on this point more powerful: fleppe, Heinrich, Reformed Dogniatics (e. t. G. T. Thomson, 
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1950) pp. 341-348. 
110 YE3pp. 389412. 
III ibid p. 389. 
112 ibid p. 390. 
113 ibid pp. 390-391. 
114 On this point, see Jenson, op. cit. pp. 154-168; Gunton, Colin E. 'God, Grace and Freedom' in 
Gunton, Colin E. (ed. ) God and Freedom: Essays in Historical and Systematic Theolov T. &T. Clark, 
Edinburgh, 1995 pp. 1 19-133. 
Its YE3p. 396. 
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The second objection, that this oneness between Adam and his descendants is 
fictional, is where Edwards' hovel views are put forward. These depend on an 
analysis of what is meant by identity: 'the seeming force of the objection arises from 
ignorance or inconsideration of the degree, in which created identity or oneness with 
past existence in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the 
Supreme Author and Disposer of the universe. '116 Only God has 'absolutely 
independent identity'; ' 17 all other identity is dependent on God's pleasure. A tree, for 
example, is 'so exceeding diverse, many thousand times bigger, and of a very 
different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same' as the shoot from which it 
grew, but God has 'in a constant succession communicated to it many of the same 
qualities, and most important properties, as if it were one. '118 Locke saw personal 
identity as identity of consciousness; ' 19 Edwards wants to say that it is more than this, 
but he accepts that this is essential, and insists that it 'depends wholly on a divine 
establishment. '120 
Edwards offers a proof for this, at first sight surprising, contention: the existence of a 
body in a given moment is not necessary, so must be dependent on some cause. That 
cause is usually thought to be its existence in the previous moment, but this cannot be 
the case. Firstly, many previous existences are entirely passive -a stone, for example, 
cannot be considered as exerting itself to cause its continuation. Secondly, the 
previous existence is, by supposition, no longer existing at the moment of present 
existence, and nothing can cause an effect in a place, or a time, where it is not present. 
The past moment is gone, and can have no more effect on the present than a moment 
of existence twenty years ago. So momentary existence must be the immediate action 
of God. 121 
These arguments do not work, of course. Ingenious as the second line is, Edwards 
had allowed as far back as Of Atoms that the condition of being adjacent was 
116 ihid p. 397. - 117 ibid. p. 400. 
118 ibid. pp. 397-398. 
11"' Essay Concerning Human Understanding 2.27.11 (pp. 448449 of the Fraser edition). 
120 YE3 P-398. 
121 ibid pp. 400-401. 
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sufficient for cause to apply spatially; 122 if the temporal analogy may not be made, he 
needs to demonstrate why. The first argument is simple question-begging: he wishes 
to argue that something cannot be the cause of its own continuation, on the basis of an 
assertion that it cannot be the cause of its own continuation. Apparently, Edwards 
recognises this, since his next move is to allow 'that the established course of nature is 
sufficient to continue existence, where existence is once given. ' 123 This prompts him 
to expose his underlying argument: on the basis of his understanding of the nature of 
created reality, 'the established course of nature' is nothing other than God's agency. 
So we have a statement of his standard theme in reference to creation: 'God's 
preserving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation, or to 
his creating those things out of nothing at each moment. 9 124 
I have already discussed the validity of this understanding of creation, 125 but with it, 
Edwards' doctrine of imputation follows naturally. If all created identity is arbitrary 
divine constitution, then to object that God cannot establish such-and-such an identity 
because to do so would be arbitrary, as Taylor is trying to, is to pursue a signally 
fruitless line. Jenson sees much of the breakdown of communal identity in the 
Enlightened nation of the United States as due to precisely this flaw: identity can only 
be imposed by arbitrary divine decision; 'to attempt to live without recourse to the 
divine, the grand Enlightenment experiment, is inevitably to attempt to live without 
identity, even, in the last analysis of Sartre, identity with myself. 126 
Turning to Edwards' response to the accusation that his doctrine makes God the 
author of sin, the reply is far less satisfactory. He makes a distinction between the 
idea of sin as something added to human nature, and the witholding of certain divine 
influences without which human nature will inevitably fall into sin. 127 As already 
noted, part of the punishment for Adam's transgression is God-forsakeness, so all who 
follow Adam are solely under the influence of natural and inferior principles, and so 
122 See chapter 3 above. 
123 YE3 p. 401 
124 ibid. p. 401 
125 Again, see chapter 3. 
126 Jenson, op. cit. pp. 150-15 1. 
127 YE3 pp. 3 80-3 8 1. 
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become wholly corrupt, as Adam did. 128 Thus a distinction between God creating sin 
and permitting sin is introduced, but the force of Edwards' argument depends on a 
further invocation of his understanding of providence as continuing creation, and a 
simple lu quoque argument: if Edwards' position makes God the author of sin because 
human beings are created in sin, then so does Taylor's, because human beings are 
permitted to continue in sin. 129 This is Edwards' first response to the same issue when 
he turns to it in Freedom of the Will: 130 once again, the tu quoque argument is to the 
fore. 
In order to be as fair as possible to Edwards at this point, we must recognise that he 
assumes that there is no position which does not make God the 'author of sin' in some 
sense - God created all things, and so, finally, all things come from HiM. 131 Edwards' 
point in his tu quoque is that this is no more the case for a 'Calvinist' than for an 
'Anninian'. This given, his point must be accepted, although we might have wished 
he had displayed more concern about the issue. 
So much for Original Sin. At this juncture some recapitulation may be helpful. For 
Edwards, hell is useful, in that it glorifies God - in that His justice and majesty are 
displayed, and in seeing hell the saints are given a greater sense of His love and 
mcrcy. In all this, the argument is only valid if, in justice, every human being 
deserves hell. God is not being just, and is acting meanly, not majestically, if the 
damned do not deserve what is visited upon them, and there is no mercy, at least, 
displayed to the saints, if they are receiving no less than they deserve. So Edwards' 
understanding of God's self-glorification at this point, and his defence of hell, both 
turn on the question ofjustice. 
128 ihid p. 383. Once again, Edwards is reminiscent of Aquinas in his understanding of depravity. 
This is all the more striking since Calvin, at the start of the Reformed tradition, had offered a different, 
and arguably better, understanding, of every human faculty being ruined, rather than a divine faculty 
being taken away and the rest left untouched. See Inst. Il. 1.8-11; S. T la Hae q. 85. 
129 ibid. pp. 386-388. 
130 YEI pp. 397-399. 
131 '... it is impossible in the nature of things to be otherwise... ' ibid pp. 399400. This point 
depends, of course, on the supposition that Edwards' contention that views of the will as self. 
determining are incoherent is accepted. 
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Edwards sees justice in terms of retribution. Any sin, he argues, incurs infinite guilt, 
because it is committed against God, who is infinitely worthy. So any sin deserves 
infinite punishment. On the basis of the doctrine of imputation outlined in Original 
Sin, I have followed Edwards' argument that it is just for God to establish the federal 
scheme, whereby we are all guilty of Adam's sin. Were Edwards to adopt an 
'Arminian' scheme, his point would now be proved. 132 For reasons that, as I have 
indicated in the previous chapter, I find compelling, he does not. The question that 
remains, then, is whether it can be just for God to create human beings for no purpose 
other than to glorify Himself by damning them, as, according to Edwards, Ile does. 
The responses I have found in Edwards reduce to a bracketing of the problem of 
theodicy. He argues that his opponents have as much trouble with this issue as he 
does; on the basis of this, he asserts that there is no theological scheme which can 
offer a better answer, and so takes refuge in the classical 'who are you, 0 man, to 
answer back to GodT line. This, however, will not do. In federal theology, with a 
broadly nominalist understanding of God's goodness, this approach was available; 
even for Calvin, who seems to be more realist in his thinking, an invocation of the 
doctrine of accommodation made this a possible (if not a useful '33) line; for Edwards, 
however, with an understanding of virtue that is not just realist but Lockean, so that 
what is just must be self-evidently so (at least to the saints) such an approach simply 
could not be acceptable. 134 Edwards must have believed, on his own premises, that 
132 This points to an interesting historical point: the connection, at various times in theological 
history, between predestinarianism and universalism. The example closest to my concerns is Morris, 
K. R. 'The Puritan Roots of American Universalism' Scottish Journal of Theology 44 (199 1) pp. 457. 
487 - see especially pp. 457-458. 
133 To the extent that Calvin's attempts to give assurance to believers through the doctrine of election 
founder on the hidden decree, as Barth, amongst others, suggest (C. D. W2 pp. 334-339), this move is 
the problem. 
134 This point is perhaps best demonstrated by comparisons with what has gone before: 'beauty, is 
self-defining, according to True Virtue; the 'new simple idea' of God given in salvation 'naturally 
shines' -justice, then, must also be visibly just, at least to the regenerate mind. At one point in the 
Miscellanies Edwards seems to accept this argument, but suggest that there may well be things in the 
world that, although they make sense, we will not be able to understand until their meaning is revealed 
to us in heaven. This, he suggests, is in fact quite likely, as it will give us a greater sense of God, s 
perfections, and so lead to God being glorified all the more. Miscellanies 654 (unpublished). 
184 
the transparent justice of his position was demonstrable, even if he did not have a 
demonstration. A comfortable refuge in mystery was simply not an option. 135 
5.5 Concluding Reflections 
For Edwards hell, like every other area of the great drama of God's actions in creation 
and redemption, was bent towards the increase of God's glory. For it to achieve this 
purpose, he needed to demonstrate that it was entirely in accord with divine justice. 
My contention thus far has been that, finally, he failed to do that. This final section is 
an attempt to explore other discussions concerning the nature and use of hell in order 
both to see how Edwards' thought may be appropriated, and to discover possible lines 
for recasting Edwards' doctrine in a stronger form. 
Firstly, I wish to return to the incoherence that I have suggested is present in 
Edwards' position: even bracketing the question of theodicy, his arguments 
concerning the usefulness of hell prompt a question. If we accept that God's 
perfections are most glorious in their exercise, and that justice is a perfection of God 
that is appropriately glorified, and that God's justice is best displayed in the awfulness 
of His judgement on sin, then some doctrine of hell does seem to follow. Equally, if 
the saints' sense of God's mercy and grace is stronger through seeing what they have 
been saved from, then again, hell would seem to be necessary. But the question 
presents itself: how many people must be in hell for God to be glorified? There is, of 
course, an obvious answer: one. And the Creed will tell us who that One is: 'Ile 
descended into hell... ', 
Edwards was a Reformed theologian, so I will invoke a Reformed understanding of 
the descensus. Calvin, in the InStitUteS, 136 identifies Christ's descent into hell with 
His experiencing the pain of separation from the Father on account of sin on the cross. 
135 A point made by Walker about the attempted fideist defence of the doctrine of hell in general is 
relevant here: whilst the appeal *to intellectual mystery may be fairly made in theological discussion 
(Walker offers the example of the doctrine of the Trinity), it is illegitimate to draw an analogy to 
ethical mystery - as with the doctrine of hell. Walker, op. cit. pp. 28-29. 
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Whether we wish to adopt some further conception of the harrowing of hell or not, 
that Jesus Christ endured both the poena sensus and the poena damni on the cross 
seems beyond doubt. If it is really necessary for the saints in heaven to have a sight 
of what they have been saved from, if they really need some visual reminder of the 
strength of God's hatred of sin, then both are there for them: the Lamb bearing the 
marks of slaughter is seated on the throne; the 'wounds yet visible above' are indeed 
'in beauty glorified. '137 If God's justice must be displayed to be glorified, if His 
mercy may not be fully glorified without a sight of the terribleness of His anger, then 
the cross, not hell, must be where these things come to pass. 138 
This raises the point I have mentioned in passing several times in the discussion in 
this chapter in an acute form: In chapter 2 of this thesis I argued that Edwards' 
account of God's self-glorification was Trinitarian, and indeed, that it would not work 
were it not so. In chapter 3,1 sought to demonstrate that, for Edwards, creation 
glorifies God again in a Trinitarian manner, and by imaging forth the gospel story, 
and the same is true of redemption in chapter 4. Now, in his doctrine of hell, the same 
language is being employed - hell, too, is a locus for God's self-glori fi cation - but the 
language must mean something different. The trinitiarian vision of God, and the 
overarching metanarrative of the gospel story, seemingly have no part to play here. 
This is the point where I believe that Edwards finally falls foul of Luther's outspoken 
challenge - here, in the depths of hell, God's glory is not seen through suffering and 
the cross. , 
I will return to this, my major theme, for the concluding comments of this chapter, but 
a further point may usefully be made before that: a comparison of Edwards' doctrine 
with current writing on hell is instructive. A survey of recent works reveals that this 
debate has preoccupied philosophical theologians far more than excgetes or 
136 Inst. 11.16.8-12. 
137 Edwards does in fact link the sufferings of the Christ with the sufferings of the damned in 
Miscellanies 516, but without drawing any theological conclusions. 
138 The cross as God's fundamental act of self-glorification is, of course, a prominent theme in John's 
Gospel. I shall have more to say about this in my critique of Edwards' overall understanding of glory 
in the final chapter. 
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systematicians. 139 Some contributions are easily dismissed - for instance, Marilyn 
McCord Adams, whose rejection of the rationality of belief in hell depends on a series 
of analogies along the lines of 'if I were to do x, we would surely find it unacceptable 
if I were to be punished by y. 1 140 All such a procedure proves, of course, is that the 
doctrine of hell is out of step with the general opinions of twentieth century Western 
liberal intellectuals, which is hardly a startling result. More serious arguments are 
offered by writers such as Wallis and Kvanvig, 141 who at least begin with data of 
revelation, in particular the claim that 'God is loving' or 'God is good'. 142 On the 
basis of an analysis of what is entailed in making these claims, usually suggesting that 
'God' at least implies omnipotence and 'loving' and least implies 'desires the 
happiness of every conscious creature, ' they arrive at ma variety of modified 
doctrines of hell, ranging from John Hick's rejection of any concept of hell, 143 to 
attempts to defend a fairly traditional understanding by invoking libertarian ideas of 
free Will. 144 
When these works are set alongside Edwards' defence of God's self-glorification by 
condemning certain creatures to hell, a number of points stand out. Firstly, my 
examination of Edwards' idea of God's self-glorification in general has demonstrated 
a concern for God's aseity, expressed in terms of all God's 'needs' finding perfect 
fulfilment in His life ad intra as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Ideas of aseitY and, 
much more significantly, of the Trinity, find little place in the recent philosophical- 
theological literature on hell. There is an assumption that if God is loving, that must 
mean He is loving towards us, an assumption that depends on interpreting 'God' 
139 See, for instance, Wallis, Jerry L. Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Library of Religious Philosophy 
vol. 9) University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1992; Kvanvig, Jonathan L. The Problem ofliell 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993; Talbot, Thomas 'The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment' 
Faith and Philosophy 7.1 (Jan. 1990) pp. 1942. 
140 Adams, Marilyn McCord 'Hell and the God of Justice' Religious Studies 11 (1975) pp. 433447. 
141 opera cit. 
142 These two are often regarded as synonyms; see Wallis, pp. 83-84 for an example. 
143 Hick, John Evil and the God ofLove Macmillan, London, 1985 pp. 341-345. flick's point has been 
effectively rebutted by Plantinga, using a 'free-will' defence, See Plantinga, Alvin God, Freedom and 
Evil George Allen & Unwin, London, 1975 pp. 29-64. Actually, Hick shrinks from fWl-blown 
universalism, because he believes that attributing freedom of indifference to human creatures, as he is 
committed to doing, holds out the possibility that some will continually reject God's proffered 
salvation (p. 343). An epigrammatic illustration of two fundamentally different approaches to theology 
offers itself here: Barth will not contemplate a universalist position, because he is afraid of 
compromising God's freedom; Hick, wanting to embrace universalism, ultimately has to refuse to'do 
so in order to protect the freedom of human beings. 
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monadically, and necessitates making* the perfection of His existence dependent on 
His creatures. The latter point, and a departure from aseity, may be an acceptable 
modification to the Christian doctrine of God, but it appears that it is only required if 
the doctrine of the Trinity is denied, which is no modification but a simple departure 
from Christian theology. 
Edwards' struggle with goodness as an attribute of God is significant here: his early 
Miscellanies entries suggested that goodness, of all God's attributes, needed to find 
exercise to be perfect., As his thought moved on, it is clear that he realised that this 
was a threat to God's aseity, and found in the doctrine of the Trinity a way to speak of 
every attribute of God finding perfect exercise without any need for the creation. So, 
we read in the Miscellanies: 
The dcists, unitarians and Socinians who deny the doctrine of the Trinity 
cannot explain how God is essentially good and just antecedently to and 
independent of the creation of finite [supply 'beings] for God cannot be 
cmanently [sic] good and just when there is no object of his beneficence and 
equity. If then to be essentially eternally & necessarily good and just he must 
be so in himself he must therefore find an infinite object within himself to 
whom he displays all his essential love beneficence and equity-145 
Now, this defence is not by any means complete; an obvious argument may be made, 
for example, that, having chosen to create, God's goodness implies that lie will be 
good to His creation. This is certainly the case, but an important move has been 
made, in that this is now a second order principle, not something bound up with God's 
ability to be Himself -- there is, in a sense, more room. God's love is perfectly 
exercised ad intra; God will be loving ad extra, because that is His nature, but His 
hene esse, or even esse, is no longer bound up with His lovingkindness to His 
creation. 
What comes out most clearly from this comparison, however, is how much depends 
on which words are privileged; Edwards (and more recent'scholars who explicitly 
follow him) privilege words such as 'mercy' and 'grace', and insist that there can be 
144 Wallis, op. Cit. 
145 Miscellanies 1253, p. 5 of Schafer's transcript. Although the text is not entirely clear, this appears 
to be a quotation that Edwards recorded from Ramsay's Philosophical Principles of Religion. My 





or dependence upon such attributes - 'the quality of mercy is not 
strained, ' to quote Shakespeare. 146 Modem writers, with perhaps more immediate 
Biblical warrant, use words like 'love' and 'goodness', and insist that there can be no 
exceptions to the exercise of such attributes. 147 A way through this apparent impasse 
is offered by Aquinas' insistence on the simplicity of God. 148 Once this idea is taken 
seriously, the game of playing off one attribute of God against another is no longer a 
possibility. 149 Rather, we have to find a way of taking every perfection seriously in 
everything we say -a position that, of course, presents a challenge to both the modem 
discussions and to Edwards and his followers. The former stress God's love and fail 
to account for God's freedom; the latter (arguably) fail to take sufficient notice of the 
love and goodness of God in seeking to preserve an account of His freedom in their 
doctrines of grace. It is indeed 'the quality of mercy not to be strained, ' but it is Allah 
who is called merciful; the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is unambiguously 
identified with love. 150 
This points towards a deeper theological reason to be unhappy with Edwards' whole 
concept of God's self-glorification in the damnation of sinners, a reason that John 
Colwell focuses on in his Drew Lecture. 151 On the basis of the gospel story we 
simply cannot accept that God glorifies Himself in two equal and opposite ways, in 
the display of His justice and the display of His grace. In speaking of the Father of 
Jesus Christ, we cannot speak of God's freedom without immediately also speaking of 
His love. Nor, contrary to the modem discussions of hell, can we speak of His love 
without immediately speaking of His freedom. This is language that calls to mind 
146 The Merchant of Venice Act IV Scene 1; Portia makes this observation after stating 'Then must 
the Jew be merciftil', eliciting the response 'On what compulsion must I? tell me that' from Shylock. 
For the point in Edwards, see for instance, 'Eternity of Hell Torments' B72 p. 83; 'All God's Method's 
are Most Reasonable' YE14 p. 172. See also Davidson, art. cit. 
147 Walker, Kvanvig opera cit. - 148 In fhctý although this idea is associated with Aquinas, he found it in Augustine's De Trinitate. See 
S-T la Q3 art. 7 and De Trin. VI. 6-7, where simplicity is used to demonstrate that the difference 
between the Persons is not accidental but relational. 
149 Perhaps an example would be helpful at this point: there is a hymn that speaks of the cross as the 
'trysting place where heaven's love and heaven's justice meet. ' Whatever the merits of this as 
religious poetry, theologically it is ruled out by this point: 'heaven's love' and 'heaven's justice' can 
never be separated, and so cannot be thought of as meeting. 
150 The obvious references are I John 4 and I Corinthians 13, but I would also seek to argue that this 
point is required by the gospel narrative - if God is as He is in Jesus Christ, then 'love' must be an 
appropriate word to describe His perfection. 
151 art-cit. pp. 303-305. 
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Karl Barth's basic statement about the reality of God in volume 11 of the Church 
Dogmatics, 'the One who loves in freedom. '152 
To speak only of 'grace', 'mercy' and 'freedom', as Edwards does, leads inevitably to 
the double decree and the vision of God creating some people only to torture them in 
for all eternity unimaginable ways - although Edwards stood in a tradition that tried 
hard to help our imaginations at this point! To speak only of 'love' and 'goodness' 
leads to a variety of approaches ranging from Origenist universalism, through flick's 
near-universalism, to broadly Weslyan Arminianism. So it will not do to speak in 
either of these ways. We must acknowledge that God is God, against to the latter, and 
that God is love, against the former, and so, as Barth does, deny universalism, but so 
affirm the grace and mercy of God that we are constantly drawn in that direction. 153 
Only by doing this can we do justice to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. 
A summary seems in order. I began by seeking to place Edwards within his tradition, 
and so to highlight the 'vision across the chasm', the one feature of his doctrine of 
hell that was genuinely out of step with contemporary thought. On the basis of this, I 
sought to expose Edwards' underlying concerns in his discussions of hell, showing 
once again that the promotion of God's glory was central. In discussing how Edwards 
saw God being glorified here, I underlined the justice of hell as the primary concern 
and argued that, from Edwards' own position, this was finally indefensible. My 
discussion has once again, from two different angles, sought to show that this failure 
is a result of a prior failure to let the gospel 'story inform his position sufficiently. 
A quotation from Dante stood at the head of this chapter: it was not obvious to me, 
and I suspect will not be to others, but the commentators assure us that the f=ous 
legend that stands over the portal of hell in the poet's vision borrows standard 
Trinitarian language - the 'Divine Power' is the Father, the 'Supreme Wisdom' the 
Son, and the 'Primal Love' the Spirit. More than that, the next line ('before me 
152 Title of §28 (11/1 p. 257) and expounded throughout the rest of II/I and 11,12. 
153 It is bizarre that there is still a debate about whether Barth was a univcrsalistý given his repcatcd 
denials of the position. The question of how he thought he was able to avoid universalism is far more 
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nothing wqs created if not eternal') surely consciously echoes the Christological 
claims of Wisdom in Proverbs ch. 8. I commented that there seemed to be less 
discomfort generally with ideas in Dante than with very similar ones in Edwards; 
whilst I am sure that this is for a bad reason -a patronising attitude towards the 
medievals - there could be a good reason for the same point of view: the poet, unlike 
the preacher, when it came to painting the flames of hell, at least, would not speak of 
a God who was not Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
This chapter has been my most critical of Edwards. Here I have indicated the point 
where I believe that his theology breaks down in a major way - his own best instincts 
of God's Trinitarian, gospel-shaped, self-glorification fail him. Finally, Luther's 
charge will stick. I will explore the possible reasons for this failure in the next, and 
final, chapter, as I seek to pull together my examinations and criticisms of Edwards' 
vision of God's self-glorification in different areas in order to construct a coherent 
whole, and some indication of the chief sirengths and weaknesses of Edwards' 
theology. 
interesting. To my mind the best contribution is Colwell, I. E. Actuality and Provisionality: Eternity 
and Election in the Theology ofKarl Barth Rutherford House, Edinburgh, 1989 
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Chapter 6 
Soli Deo Gloria! 
But ... it does not suffice that the principle of Soli Deo Gloria be formally commemorated at the beginning and at the end as in most 
standard theologies, to be wholly forgotten in the interim. Such 
theolo, gy does indeed conventionally affirm that God could create the 
world only for his own glorification; but this statement can be 
understood without scandal only if, in the course of the total 
theological development of God's saving action, one is enlightened as 
to what this glorification actually consists of I 
'He deserves to be called a theologian, ' said Martin Luther, 'who comprehends the 
visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross. ' von 
Balthasar's word 'scandal' is less pointed and so perhaps fairer than Luther's 
uncompromising conditio, but the point is the same. I have tried to argue in this 
thesis that Edwards is more faithful to this charge than the tradition around him in 
every area except one. This final chapter is an attempt to pull the threads together, 
and to suggest some theological results of my examination of Edwards. Firstly, a 
summary seems in order: 
6.1 Summary of the Foregoing Argument 
God created the world for the promotion of His own glory. That much is common to 
the tradition. What is somewhat less common, in the Reformed tradition at least, is 
any sustained discussion of what it might mean to say this. Edwards offers detailed 
analysis of the question, which I explored at length in chapter 2.1 argued that God's 
act of self-glorification for Edwards was described using Trinitarian grammar, and so 
was an act of divine ekstasis, of the sending of the Son and Spirit by the Father. This 
ekstasis is directed towards a sharing or enlargement of the triune life, as the Church, 
finding its being in the Son and filled with the Spirit, shares God's own life and joys. 
A comparison with van Mastricht sought to make the point that the strong doctrines of 
I Hans Ur Von Balthasar, The Glory ofthe Lord. - A Theological Aesthetics, Vol VI: The Old Covenant 
p. 26 
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imrnanencý and theosis present in Edwards' account were a direct result of the 
Trinitarian nature of that account. 
However, the question that'l have continually asked of Edwards was already pressing 
here. A comparison of Edwards with Barth found many similarities, which I 
suggested was difficult, given the very different theological climate of (say) 'Sinners 
in the Hands of an angry God' and (say) 'The Obedience of the Son of God' in CD. 
IV/1.2 It was at this point that I first suggested that the reason for this was a possible 
failure of Edwards' account to be adequately crucicentric. 
In chapter 3, this divine act of self-glorification was explored with reference to the 
created order and its history. An analysis of Edwards' metaphysics in the light of the 
central philosophical questions of the early modem era, and an account of his doctrine 
of history led me to suggest that Edwards' theology of creation was a largely 
successful attempt to hold to Trinitarian doctrine in the face of the philosophical 
ambiguities of modernity. In particular, I argued for three points: Firstly that Edwards 
needed to find an intellectually satisfying 'theistic Newtonianism' if he wished to 
apply a teleology of the created order, and that in what has been referred to as his 
idealism he succeeded in this; secondly that Edwards' metaphysics was much more 
robust than Bishop Berkeley's apparently very similar system - this again due to 
Edwards' thoroughgoing Trinitarianism; and thirdly that Edwards' typological 
scheme, freely extended to nature and history, was the content he gave to this 
teleology - that nature and history were simply the network of the self-rcvealing and 
self-giving of God, and could be interpreted as such through the gospel story. 
Chapter 4 moved to the realm of soteriology, and an attempt to retell the gospel story 
which interprets nature and history. Once again, the gift of salvation was seen to be 
mediated by the Son and the Spirit, and so the gospel story is (for Edwards) a 
narrative of dynamic inter-Trinitarian relationships. It seemed that here, also, any 
accusation that Edwards was not appropriately crucicentric would be shown to be 
false, as he speaks of the cross as God's first and best thought. It was precisely at this 
point, however, when the first discordant note was heard, as the perdition of the 
§59 of the Dogmatics IV/1 pp. 157-357. 
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damned seemed to lack any Trinitarian logic. I suggested that, given the logic 
uncovered in the previous chapters, this left the non-elect in the perilous position of 
lacking true humanity, or indeed true being - and one would have thought that their 
position was quite perilous enough in the old Calvinist logic without heaping this on 
them! I ended the chapter by suggesting that this flaw was not unique to Edwards but 
common to the Reformed tradition. 
Having suggested that the doctrine of Perdition was the locus for the flaw in Edwards' 
theology, I explored this in chapter five, where Edwards' doctrine of hell was 
subjected to a detailed scrutiny. A comparison of Edwards' writings on hell with the 
immediate tradition demonstrated that certain features were distinctive, and these all 
pointed towards the (unsurprising) conclusion that Edwards' doctrine of hell was 
controlled by the use of hell in promoting God's glory. I argued, however, that the 
specific ways in which Edwards claimed hell promoted God's glory finally rely on 
unsustainable positions concerning, particularly, the nature and visibility of divine 
justice. I ended this chapter by suggesting, using comparisons with Barth and the 
more recent philosophical tradition, that the failure here was precisely that Edwards' 
doctrine of perdition was neither Trinitarian in form nor crucicentric. 
So, the thesis I proposed was that Edwards' account of God's self glorification finally 
failed because it was not sufficiently grounded in the gospel story - particularly the 
passion narratives. In my account of Edwards' theology I hope I have demonstrated 
this, and indeed refined it to pinpoint the locus of the failure in the doctrine of 
perdition. 
This, then, is my thesis. The remainder of this chapter will be an attempt to assess the 
significance - or otherwise - of this thesis for the study of 
Edwards but, more 
significantly, as this is an exercise in systematic theology, for the theological task as a 
whole. 
6.2 The Cross as the Locus of God's Self-Glorification 
The first question to be asked, however, is the most basic: Edwards gives a 
theological account of God's glorification; in exploring that account, I have thus far 
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asked about its internal and theological coherence without relating it particularly to 
the Scriptures. This first section of evaluation is an attempt to do that, to ask if 
Edwards' account is not just coherent but right, when measured by the canon of 
Scripture. I suggest that it is: in the gospel stories, it is not the works of power which 
primarily declare God's glory, although this is a feature. It is not even the 
resurrection and ascension that do this. Rather, it is the condescension, suffering and 
death of Jesus. This is the force behind Luther's bold assertions. 
This is true in all four gospels, although in different ways. Amongst the synoptics, 
Luke's account of the birth of Jesus has the angels declaring the gloria in excelsis - 
but declaring it to shepherds, not kings, and declaring it to announce an act of divine 
self-limitation. The words and works of Jesus lead those around to marvel and so to 
glorify God throughout the first three gospelS, 3 but the crowds are precisely those who 
desire to 'look upon the visible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible 
in those things which have actually happened, and so to 'call good evil and evil 
good', to quote Luther once more. The crowds, that is, are those who seek a Messiah 
after the patterns that Jesus rejected when tempted by Satan. The theme is 
particularly interesting in Luke's gospel, with its pictures of the way the Gentiles are 
more open to God's plan than God's people of old. It is the centurion who glorifies 
God when he sees Jesus die, not the people who 'were entrusted with the oracles of 
God' (Romans 3: 2). 
It is the fourth gospel, however, with its rich usage of the language of glory in 
connection with the cross, that makes the point most emphatically. Apart from the 
comment that Jesus 'had not-yet been glorified' in chapter 7, the linked concepts of 
Jesus' glorification, and the glorification of the Father in Jesus, that form such a 
strong motif throughout the latter part of the gospel begin in chapter II- Lazarus, 
illness is to be the occasion for God's glory to be revealed and for Jesus to be 
glorified. As a work of power, this may seem to disprove my point, but this miracle 
leads directly to the plot to kill Jesus, and so is precisely the occasion for God's glory 
to be revealed in the way I have suggested. As the narrative moves on repeated 
3 For example, the healing of the paralytic in Mt. 9: 1-8, parallels Mk. 2: 1-12 and Lk. 5: 17-26, results in 
all three gospels in the crowds giving glory to God. 
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references to Jesus' death as God's act of triune self-glorification are part of the 
literary dynamic that pushes towards the cry of Tetelestai that is the moment of 
climax in the gospel. * In 12: 23-24 'the hour has come for the Son of Man to be 
glorified, ' an assertion immediately followed by the image of a grain of wheat dying 
in order to be fruitful; 'Father, glorify your name! ' is the prayer of obedience that 
Jesus offers when He will not pray 'Father, save me from this hour' in the Johannine 
parallel to the events of Gethsemene. Judas' decision to betray his master is followed 
by another description of the reflex glorification of Father and Son in the event of the 
cross in 13: 31-32 - and so on through the farewell discourses, until the great priestly 
prayer of Jesus in chapter 17 begins with assertions and petitions about the glory that 
the Son -gives to the Father and the glory that the Father will give to the Son at 
Calvary. Strikingly, in the chapters that describe the resurrection appearances of 
Jesus, there is only one further reference to God's glory, in 21: 19, and concerning the 
way that the apostle Peter would glorify God in his own death. The link between the 
display of God's glory and the cross is evident. 
Space precludes the extension of this argument into areas of Scripture other than the 
gospels, but the point could, I think, be'carried there also: In the Old Testament, 
kabod and its derivatives refer (when applied to God) always to an act of self- 
manifestation, of revelation of God's character. In particular, the presence of God in 
the tabernacle and then the temple is the presence of God's glory. 4 and the later 
chapters of Isaiah link the glory of God with His salvific action. 5 These two themes, 
and the general theme of God's presence or self-revelation, could form the basis of an 
argument that the crucifixion is the culmination of the language of glory in the Old 
Testarnent. 6 Equally, -in the New Testament, whilst the language of glory is more 
eschatological, describing the honour that will be given to God when what Ile has 
done is finally understood, what God has done is centred on the death and resurrection 
of Jesus. 
4 Ex. 40: 34ff.; I Ki. 8: 1 1. 
5 For example, Is. 40: 3ff.; 43: 7. 
6 One might also refer to the reference to Jesus' glory in the Johannine Prologue, where the language 
gathers up many of these Old Testament motifs - the tabernacle, the Exodus, later, the temple - and 
points forwards towards the new locus of glorification that the cross wil I be. 
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If all this is correct, what does it mean for a theological account of God's self- 
glorification? Here I return to Edwards' analysis, as I described it in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. God's glory is- the display and communication of His perfcctions, which are 
known and loved by His creatures. It is clear that Edwards believed that God is 
known primarily through the gospel story, and thus particularly through the 
humiliation and death of Jesus Christ, so the Cross is indeed the primary locus for the 
display of God's perfections, and hence our knowledge of them. Christian worship is 
the central expression of creation's love for the Creator - worship that finds its 
beginnings in baptism in the Spirit and into Christ's death, and which finds its 
consummation in the invitation 'Take, eat - this is my body, broken for you'. by the 
power of the Spirit. So, again, our love for God's perfections is Cross-ccntrcd. 
Finally, the communication of God's perfections: Edwards interpreted this by using 
categories of participation, of indwelling the Son and being indwclt by the Spirit. 
Without extensive discussion of Biblical texts, it is clear that these are at least major 
Pauline pictures of salvation, and the argument might be made that they are the 
central categories. Soteriology, of course, is a doctrine centrcd on the gospel. It 
seems appropriate, then, to claim that, if Edwards' definitions of God's self- 
glorification are adequate to the task he puts them to, of describing God's purposes 
for the world, then he was right to insist that these purposes are Gospel-ccntred, and 
wrong at the point where he fell away from his own best insight, and spoke of God 
being glorified in abstraction from the gospel story. 
All of which, however, is still not enough, and a final question needs to be asked: is 
Edwards correct to identify God's purposes in the world with self-glorification, as he 
describes it? The question here is one of substance, not terminology: I have indicated 
that the language of 'glory' was common in this connection, but also that the content 
that Edwards gives to this language was original, and so it would be possible to 
conclude that the language was appropriately used, but that Edwards filled it out in an 
inadequate way. Equally, it would be possible to conclude that Edwards' account of 
God's purposes in creating the world is of great value, but that the traditional 
language of glory is inadequate to it. 
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I have already, in my initial exposition of Edwards' discussion, addressed some of the 
more obvious questions that could be raised: 7 the suspicion of Neoplatonist 
emanationism can easily be laid to rest; equally, Edwards has a ready defence to the 
charge that his account is unworthy of God in that it makes Him appear selfish; the 
account is coherent on its own terms, and appears to be solidly based in Scripture. 
The point has now come when this issue needs to be explored more systematically; in 
what follows, my agreement with, and borrowings from, Edwards' own discussions 
will be clear. 
The first point is one of possibility: can we know God's basic purposes? It might 
seem that a pious and humble confession of ignorance is appropriate here but, as the 
Reformed tradition never tired of reminding us in discussing predestination, whatever 
God has revealed of Himself to us is for our own good, and we do ourselves 
disservice and God dishonour if we fail to confess what He has revealed, just as much 
as if we pretend to know that which He has not. More than this, however, there are 
three pressing systematic -reasons for insisting that we can know. Firstly, simple 
ignorance concerning God's first purposes is likely to lead to the worst forms of 
nominalism - whilst we know, believe in and love the God who saves us, there will be 
a God behind this God about whom we know nothing, a prior purpose in God that lies 
hidden and makes everything we do know second-order, and so untrustworthy. 
Secondly, this postulate is likely to lead to a sectarian theology, in that theology is 
able to deal adequately with the Church, but not with the world - professing ignorance 
of its being and purpose. 9 Thirdly, and most tellingly, whether we construct it more 
philosophically in terms of God's simplicity, or in a more narrative-based manner in 
terms of faithfulness' and singlemindedness, if we claim to know any of God's 
ultimate purposes, we must assume some knowledge of them all. God does not intend 
one thing when He creates and quite a different thing when Ile redeems; His purposes 
are at least coherent and arguably identical. Edwards' arguments, therefore, about 
God's having one chief end in creating the world, are sound. 
7 See chapter 2, above, particularly the end of section 2.3. 
81 suspect that this error could be charged to at least some of the various Anabaptists and Spiritualists 
who formed what has become known as the 'Radical Reformation'. 
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So, God's purpose in creating should be knowable and should be unified - and unified 
with His purposes in redeeming as well. What is this purpose? Here, Edwards' 
arguments may be accepted almost without qualification; his examination of Biblical 
texts is thorough and convincing and, whilst he does not always keep the wider sweep 
of the Scriptural narrative in the foreground, the conclusions he comes to, that God's 
purpose is that He should be known, loved and experienced through the giving of His 
Son and Spirit, coheres very well with the central thrust of the gospel. 
What are we to make of this? Firstly, Edwards was right in linking the revelation and 
overflow of God's glory so thoroughly to the gospel story. It is not just that God is 
active in the world in making His character known, a character that is so 
overwhelmingly beautifal that all who see and understand will necessarily be drawn 
to praise and glorify Him; it is that God makes His character known only and 
precisely through His self-giving in the gospel - fundamentally, through the death and 
resurrection of Jesus. Secondly, Edwards' failure to carry this through with relation 
to the doctrine of perdition was notjust a failure of logic or coherence in his particular 
system, but a failure of theology - it lacks coherence, not just with the rest of 
Edwards' thought, but also with the Biblical texts. Any theology that claims to be 
Biblical must, amongst many other conditions, refuse to speak of God's self- 
glorification apart from the cross and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. I will 
return to this point, and suggest corrections to Edwards' fundamental scheme, later in 
this conclusion. Before that, however, I will explore the relevance of my thesis for 
the study of Edwards. 
6.3 The Interpretation of Edwards' Theology 
If the thesis I have argued is to be of any great use in furthering the understanding of 
Edwards, a second thesis must be maintained: that the concept of God's self- 
glorification is at least not peripheral to Edwards' theology as a whole. The survey of 
Edwards' Miscellanies in chapter 2 should be sufficient to demonstrate that the 
question of the purpose of creation was a recurrent one for Edwards; throughout the 
remainder of the thesis other evidence for the centrality of the theme has been 
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uncovered and highlighted, usually in footnotes. 9 Perry Miller's claim that True 
Virtue and The End of Creation ar6 the only works in the Edwards corpus that are not 
in some way or other occasioned by controversylO could also be cited as evidence for 
this contention. 11 
It would be audacious in the extreme to claim that the concept of -divine self- 
glorification was the central theme of Edwards' theology, and such a claim would 
require an analysis of a number of other themes that scholars have identified as 
important to Edwards to demonstrate their peripheral nature. I will, however, address 
the question of the central categories of Edwards' thought in a more modest way. 
Generally, no doubt because of the popularity of the revival writings, Edwards has 
been analysed in terms of human response to God. So, for example, Conrad Cherry 
centred his discussion on faith, several commentators have found the question of the 
nature of 'the sense of the heart' to be determinative, and Anri Morimoto looked at 
salvation. 12 The chief contribution, in my estimation, of a more recent work, 
McClymond's Encounters with God, 13 lies in the recognition that Edwards' thought 
was God-centred. This was not missed by earlier commentators (Holbrook's 
description of 'theological objectivism' springs to mind14) but has never perhaps been 
9 Chapter 3 indicated that Edwards' natural typology depended on a prior commitment to teleology - 
see pp. 105-107. Chapter 4 found Edwards defending Calvinism, on the basis that to do otherwise 
would be to detract from God's glory (see the introductory remarks, and n. 92), and discussed how 
apparently conflicting statements indicating on the one hand that the gospel story is foundational, and 
on the other that God's self-glorification is, could be reconciled (see my final comments on 
predestination, pp. 129-130). Chapter 5 demonstrated that the chief use of hell, in Edwards' mind, was 
that it promotes God's glory - see section 5.3, pp. 180-18 1. 
10 'The Nature of True Virtue is Edwards' only purely non-polemical work... ' (p. 285). See also p. 5 1. 
Miller finds evidence of some controversial intent in The End of Creation, hence the quotation, but 
recognises both the linked nature of the 71wo Dissertations and True Virtue's dependence on The End of 
Creation. Hence, The End of Creation is not occasioned by controversy (as, for instance, the revival 
treatises, the defences of Calvinism and the ecclesiological works are), although it contains 
controversial material. 
11 Similarly, the reader of Edwards' Miscellanies will observe how many of the regular themes therein 
are controversial. Obvious examples would include perseverance, justification sole fide, or the long 
sections devoted to apologetics on the latter third of the collection. The regular entries on the question 
of the 'End of Creation' are not unique in dealing with a subject Edwards turned to out of interest 
rather than necessity, but I suspect an argument could be made that, of the non-controversial subjects, 
this is at least amongst those to which Edwards turned most frequently. 
12 Morimoto, A. Jonathan Edwards and the Catholic Vision of Salvation, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, University Park, 1995 
13 McClymond, M. J. Encounters with God An Approach to the TheoloV ofJonathan Edwards Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998. See particularly pp. 4,28-30. 
14 Holbrook, Clyde A. The Ethics of Jonathan Edwards: Morality and Aesthetics University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1973 pp. 2-7. 
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given the prominence it deserves. In stressing a reflexive act of God as a significant 
theme in Edwards' thought, my study lends weight to the idea that one gets closer to 
the centre of that system by'focusing on God in Himself, rather than on human 
relationships to God. 
However, my study also moves this claim forward: it is not the bare fact of God, but 
the dynamic life of God, that is so central to Edwards. Hence my repeated stress on 
the Trinity: the being and history of the world is a generous overflowing of the being 
and life of the Triune God, that finds its meaning in the eschatological enlargement of 
that life. Such a vision would be either meaningless or pantheistic without a robust 
and active doctrine of the Trinity. McClymond indicated that Edwards' theocentric 
metaphysics in The Mind was a 'turning of the tables on Enlightenment 
anthropocentrism', 15 which is certainly true, but I have sought to take this further in 
my third chapter, arguing that Edwards offered a Trinitarian response to the assumed 
metaphysics of the Enlightenment which allowed a continued robust theism in the 
face of materialistic mechanism or deism - this argument sustained in part at least by a 
comparison with Berkeley. ,- 
This also points towards a second area where I believe my work adds something to 
the study of Edwards' thought. - I indicated in my initial survey of recent Edwardsean 
scholarship that a recurrent theme has been 'Edwards and American culture', a theme 
that has usually depended on an identification of America as the Enlightenment 
nation, and an estimate of Edwards' Enlightenment credentials. Jenson has argued 
the thesis that Edwards offers a theological critique of the Enlightenment, 16 and hence 
a theological critique that has special relevance to America; the third chapter of my 
own study adds weight to the first part of this thesis and, perhaps, by separating the 
criticism of the Enlightenment from the criticism of America, goes further towards 
identifying Edwards' theology as a critical resource available for theologians of all 
nationalities. 
15 op. cit. p. 29. 
16 op. cit. passim, but see especially pp. 3-12 & 194-196. 
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The strand of scholarship that I described as 'Edwards and postmodemity' in my 
initial chapter. is of particular interest here: 17 this suggests that Edwards offers a 
critique, not just of the American form, and appropriation of modernity, but of 
modernity itself. Despite occasional suggestions that one of the defining features of 
Enlightened/modem thought is a disavowal of metaphysics, I sought to show in the 
first part of chapter 3 that much of what is called 'the Enlightenment' is precisely a 
metaphysics - in, Aristotle's terms, that which comes after physics (in this case 
Newton's physics) and seeks to describe the basis upon which that physics works. 
Edwards offered a different metaphysics for the same physics -a different set of 
ontological and epistemological claims that could justify the same science. To this 
extent, his criticism of Enlightenment is not just a criticism of the then-nascent 
American social experiment Jenson's point - but a wider criticism of a whole 
worldview. 
The term 'postmodemity' has been widely derided; it seems to me to have a certain 
strength. The recently-offered criticisms of modernity are immensely powerful, and 
theology, (which of all academic disciplines should not find its security in the 
dominant ideas of the present age) should be able to recognise and perhaps even 
welcome that. However, what has not yet been offered is any viable alternative 
rationality, and in this sense the present condition is precisely 'post-modem' - after 
one thing, but not yet wcddcd to anything else. 
The currently-popular response of embracing some form of relativism or 
fragmentation is, of course, intellectually naive: computers and (unfortunately) 
nuclear weapons still work, 18 and books still teach, and the challenge faced by 
philosophers is to explain the. rationalities that underlie such events, not to try to 
pretend that such events are illusions. Edwards offers an alternative rationality, one 
that may be more robust than modernity proved to be. And - my point - this is a 
rationality for all peoples, not just for his fellow Americans. 
17 Chapter 1, section 1.2. 
18 At least until the millennium bug strikes! 
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Thirdly, I have both assumed and argued throughout that Edwards is best understood 
as a theologian within the Reformed tradition, and here I deliberately say 'Reformed' 
rather than 'Puritan'. 'The latter term is notoriously hard to define, but Edwards' more 
philosophical and systernatising interests make his theology more reminiscent of the 
-continental orthodox tradition than of the English Puritan, if such a division may be 
made. 19 I shall be arguing the importance of this recognition for Reformed theology 
later in this chapter, but for now the focus is on the study of Edwards. To study 
Edwards without reference to Locke has long been unacceptable; even the best and 
most explicitly theological studies of Edwards, however, have little or no mention of 
Frangois Turretin and Petrus van Mastricht. 20 
Indications of the value of a consideration of'such thinkers can be found within this 
study. A comparison of Edwards with van Mastricht not only demonstrated the 
source for much of his thinking on the subject of divine glory, but also enabled the 
original features to be seen, which resulted in the thoroughly Trinitarian nature of 
Edwards' account being uncovered. Turretin has been used throughout to provide 
background, but was used particularly to give an awareness of the immediate 
background for the consideration of the form of Edwards' predestinarianism in 
chapter 4.21 The importance of such continental Reformed theologians for Edwards' 
mature thought, however, is best indicated by the closing pages of his Catalogue, the 
notebook where he kept records of books for which he was seeking. Pages 4042 
19 It could, I suspect, be argu6d that the reason for this is sociological: English Puritanism was a 
nonconformist movement, existing in opposition to (or a best uneasily within) the state church. This 
not only affected theological self-awareness, but also limited academic opportunities, and demanded 
that effort be put into the task of surviving. The evidence of this can be seen in the overwhelmingly 
practical and polemical bias of Puritan writings. This thesis would best be argued by an examination of 
those English Puritans who bear most comparison to Edwards stylistically - for example, John Owen - 
suggesting that they lived a proportion of their adult life under the Commonwealth, during which these 
conditions were removed. This might also explain the different nature of Scottish Reformed theology 
of the day, with which Edwards clearly felt affinities. 
20 Turretin is easier to study: an English translation has recently appeared (see Bibliography for 
details), and there were editions of his works produced into the last century. van Mastricht can only be 
found in folios bearing the marks of three centuries of use - or, more likely, neglect. Amy Plantinga 
Pauw makes this point in her Ph. D. Dissertation, 'The Supreme Harmony 6fAll. Jonathan Edwards 
and the Trinity. 
21 1 have had no cause to mention him, but J. F. Stapfer could be added to this list. The Miscellanies 
entries numbered in the early 1300s contain numerous long quotations from Stapfer's 
Inst. Theol. Polem. that show Edwards' reliance on this text in attempting to construct his proposed 
apologetics. (Johann Friedrich Stapfer (1708-1775) published his Institutiones Theologice Polemica 
universm ordine scientifico disposita, in five volumes between 1743 and 1747. It went through at least 
four editions in the next few years). 
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contain ý lists of continental Reformed works, mostly recommended in Stapfer or 
Pfaffus, 22 indicating that Edwards' reading was turning more and more in this 
direction as he sought to gather material for his proposed works. 
Fourthly, I have had reason to mention the provisional nature of some of Edwards' 
writings, particularly the 'Miscellanies on several occasions in the course of my 
exposition. 23 There has been a widespread appreciation of the theological interest and 
value of Edwards' notebooks, which can only grow with their publication, but their 
character as notebooks has sometimes been forgotten. A quotation from a 
Miscellanies entry is not sufficient to prove any point other than the trivial one that 
Edwards was thinking about such-and-such an idea at a particular time. 24 In 
particular, many of the entries are contradicted by later discussions. My long series of 
expositions in chapter 2 of this thesis should serve to illustrate this point, by showing 
how a question was played with, how various answers were tried, explored, refined 
and discarded until Edwards was ready to state a position in the published End of 
Creation. 
A similar point may be made with respect to the sermons, a point I indicated in the 
course of my discussion of the imprecatory sermons in chapter 5.25 %ilst these arc 
more careful and more polished, being set before the congregation week by week, 
with the exception of those texts Edwards published himself during his lifetime, we 
cannot assume that a particular sermon gives a whole, or even what Edwards would 
regard as a satisfactory, treatment of a subject. As anyone who has sustained a 
preaching ministry for even a few months will know, the weekly deadlines mean that 
sermons do not always receive the preacher's best, or most considered, thoughts. 
22 For Stapfer see n. 21 above. Waffus' is mentioned only as the author of a 'Body of Divinity'; I 
assume Christoph M. Pfaff is meant, a prolific Lutheran author of the early eighteenth century who 
(amongst other works) wrote a number of books seeking to unite the Reformed and Lutheran churches. 
If this is the case, I have not been able to discover a text which might be described as a 'Body of 
Divinity', however. 
23 The long discussion in chapter 2 (section 2.2, pp. 44-52) is the primary evidence in my thesis of this 
point, but see also my comments on Christology in chapter 4, pp. 134-135. 
24 One illustration: Miscellanies 595 (unpublished) ends with the comment '(these things about 
baptism doubtfull)'. This appears to be a later addition to the text, but does demonstrate that Edwards 
simply changed his mind on occasion about things that he had written in his notebooks. 
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Edwards' is a vast corpus, but respect must be paid to the different types of writing 
within it, or we risk taking an idea that he merely toyed with for a few days before 
rejecting as a settle d position. An example of this sort of fault can be found even in 
the best study: Jenson, in discussing Christology, makes much of a very radical form 
of the communicatio idiomatum that he finds in Edwards' texts. This conclusion is 
reached by referring to a series of texts - almost every one of which could be 
contradicted by a similar text from Edwards' notebooks. 26 
Fifthly, and finally within this section, I believe my thesis illuminates the 
contradiction that is often found by students of Edwards' theology. Most theologians 
who have studied Edwards would broadly agree - as would I- with the following 
opinions of Douglas Elwood: 
... as the foundation of goodness in God, Edwards ... stressed absolute beauty 
... God is sovereign because he is good, not good because he is sovereign ... God is not so much power-itself as he is love-itself. In creating a world he is 
moved not by a lust for power but by the power of love. 27 
But Edwards could, and did, preach passages such as the following: 
The bow of God's wrath is bent, and the arrow made ready on the string, and 
justice bends the arrow at your heart, and strains the bow, and it is nothing but 
the mere pleasure of God, and that of an angry God, without any promise or 
obligation at all, that keeps the arrow one moment from being made drunk 
with your blood ... 29 
25 1 also made this point a number of times in discussing the History ofthe Work ofRedemption in the 
latter part of chapter 3. 
26 Jenson, op. cit. pp. 1 15-118. Jenson quotes Edwards as speaking of 'the man' Christ Jesus creating 
and upholding the world, points which are directly contradicted by some remarks Edwards makes in 
response to Isaac Watts' Christology in Miscellanies 1174 (not yet published, but the Miscellaneous 
Observations Concerning the Deity ofChrist §§58-62 (BT2 pp. 509-510) offer an adequate text). Inthe 
face of two competing sets of claims, it is difficult to make any assessment of the validity or otherwise 
of Jenson's position: Edwards may have held to the earlier positions that Jenson quotes, and the later 
comments in response to Watts may be a false move. Certainly, however, no assertion concerning 
Edwards' position on these points can be made with any confidence in the face of the competing 
evidence. It will be clear to the reader of chapter 4 of this thesis that my own Reformed 
presuppositions make me ill-disposed to take Jenson's point, howeverl Edwards recorded his intention 
to obtain 'A Dissertation on the Logos which Dr Watts mentions as a book that he himself was the 
author of in his Glory of Christ God-man p. 70 &8 L' in his Catalogue (p. 25); the lack of markings 
around this entry suggest that he never managed to procure the book. 
27 Elwood, Douglas J. The Philosophical Theology ofJonathan Edwards Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1960 p. 30. 
28 'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God', 'Application' (B72 p. 9) 
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Perry Miller tried to rehabilitate Edwards by bracketing his theology in toto; the more 
recent fashion has been to bracket the imprecatory sermons, 29 to claim that these are 
not a major part of the corpus (true), not representative of much of it (also true) and so 
can be safely ignored (which of course does not follOW). 30 Any complete account of 
Edwards' theology should illuminate and identify the disjunction that is clearly 
present here. 31 This would perhaps be another fair criticism of Jenson's study: he 
notes that there is nothing unusual about Edwards' assertions of God's absolute 
sovereignty - rather, it is Edwards' understanding of the God who is sovereign that is 
determinative. 32 This is certainly true, but once we have understood who the God 
who is sovereign is, that should drive us back to ask why there is nothing unusual 
about Edwards' assertions of God's sovereignty. If, as Jenson suggests later in the 
chapter, Edwards' account of predestination bears comparison with Barth'S33 -a 
comparison I have already indicated my agreement with - why is it simply impossible 
to imagine Barth preaching some of Edwards' sermons? 
29 Norman Fiering remarks on 'the eff6rts of some modem interpreters to make the doctrine of hell 
merely a footnote to Edwards's other speculations' Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British 
Context University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981 p. 200. 
30 1 am not sure I have ever seen this argument made explicitly, but the first two points are regularly 
made and then, with no further reason offered, these sermons are ignored. It is difficult to see what 
other reasoning may be operative. This tendency has become so marked that the author of one recent 
study on Edwards' doctrine of salvation argued that his logic allowed for a 'wider hope' without 
feeling any need to refer to the imprecatory texts. (Morimoto, op. cit. pp. 62-68) As it happens, I agree 
with the point - but it surely cannot be made without a detailed discussion of texts that point so strongly 
in the opposite direction. 
31 Robert Lowell's poem, 'Jonathan Edwards in Western Massachusetts', illustrates that this is notjust 
a problem perceived by the theological community. To extract some stanzas: 
Poor country Berkeley at Yale, 
you saw the world was soul, 
the soul of God! Ile soul 
of Sarah Pierrepontl 
: &en God's love shone in sun, moon and stars, 
on earth, in the waters, 
in the air, in the loose winds, 
which used to greatly fix your mind. 
Vou 
gave 
her Pompey, a Negro slave, 
and eleven children. 
Yet people were spiders... 
(rrorn For the Union Dead, Faber and Faber, London, 1966 pp. 4044. ) 
32 op. cit. pp. 10 1- 102. 
33 ibid p. 106. 
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Jenson identifies what he sees as the flaw in Edwards' theology: the lack of 
ontological weight given to the word in all its forms. This, however, sheds no light on 
the recurrent problem of the imprecatory sen-nons, and so is ultimately unsatisfactory 
as a complete criticism, however useful it is in a variety of other areas. I have 
repeatedly referred to the 'flaw' in Edwards' theology; in crystallographic terms, a 
'flaw' is a fault where well-arranged structures on either side fail to meet. On the one 
hand, Edwards holds to a Reformed and Puritan doctrine of perdition that makes 
sense on its own terms; on the other he reformulates doctrines of God and creation in 
the face of the growing Enlightenment challenge. But the two will not hold together - 
and my analysis in the previous chapter of his attempts 'to justify God's ways to man' 
in this area suggest strongly that he was aware that this join would not hold. 
My thesis, I suggest, illuminates the nature of this flaw; it does not explain its origin. 
To explore this further, I will turn to an examination of Edwards' place in theological 
history, and what the foregoing may add to that. 
6.4 The History of Reformed Theology 
Space precludes the inclusion of an argument against the idea of the doctrine of 
predestination as the defining point of Reformed theology, but it is an idea that I am 
unhappy with.. A less sweeping and, I think, more defensible suggestion is that one of 
the distinctive features of Reformed theologies is a particular, and broadly similar, 
view of predestination. Whilst I cannot argue this point fully in the present context, 
some pointers as to the direction the argument might move in can be given: 
When Loraine Boettner wrote on the doctrine of the divine decrees in the early part of 
this century, he felt able to title his treatment The Reformed Doctrine of 
Predestination. 34 Barth responded sharply to this study, 35 but he responded because 
he felt that the Reformed doctrine was inadequate, 36 not because of any quarrel with 
the idea of presenting several centuries of Reformed thinking on this subject in such a 
monolithic way. More recent historical study has, of course, muddied the waters 
34 Presbyterian and Refonned, n. loc., 1968. 
35 C. D. IL/2 p. 36-38; 46-47. 
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somewhat. Two ongoing discussions in particular stand out: the recognition that 
federal Calvinism was something different from the thought of Calvin himself; 37 and 
a series of arguments concerning the nature of faith and the relationship between 
Christ and the decree that have usually been treated by the same authors, sometimes 
in a fairly heated manner, and can be summed up by the sobriquet the 'Calvin against 
the Calvinists' debate. 38 However, these do, not prevent a distinctive, and still 
remarkably coherent, Reformed tradition stretching from Calvin through Dort to 
Warfield and Barth. I suggest that two features define this tradition: the attempt to 
use the doctrine of predestination to give assurance, and the shape given to 
expositions of the doctrine. 
The latter point is an observation relating to the Remonstrance and the Synod of Dort. 
In virtually all Reformed theology, the doctrine of predestination is expounded in 
terms of the five points - whether the writer is defending them, attacking them or 
seeking to make modifications, still the questions asked by the Remonstrants define 
the shape in which the doctrine is expounded. 39 
36 '... it cannot be our present task simply to take one of the classical forms of the traditional doctrine 
and to present it as integrally as possible - as, in the case of the Calvinistic form, Loraine Boettner has 
recently attempted to do ... 
'ibid. p. 13. 
37 The arguments as to whether federalism is merely a systernatisation of ideas already present or latent 
in Calvin, or whether it is something new (perhaps learnt from Bullinger) that changes the system 
decisively, need not be addressed here. For various contributions see Baker, J. Wayne Heinrich 
Bullinger and the Covenant: The Other Reformed Tradition Ohio University Press, Athens, 1980; 
Moller, 'Jens G. 'The Beginnings of Puritan Covenant Theology' Journal of Ecclesiastical History 14 
(1963) pp. 46-67; Rolston, Holmes 'Responsible Man in Reformed Theology: Calvin vesus the 
Westminster Confession' Scottish Journal of Theology 23 (197) pp. 129-156; McCoy. Charles S. 
'Johannes Cocceius: Federal Theologian' Scottish Journal of Theology 16 (1963) pp. 352-370; Stoever, 
W. K. B., 'A Faire and Easie Way to Heaven. Covenant Theology and Antinomianism in Early 
Massachusetts Weslyan University Press, Middletown, 1978; Strehle, Stephen Calvinism, Federalism 
and Scholasticism: A study of the Reformed Doctrine of Covenant Peter Lang, Bern, 1988; von Rohr, 
John The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought The Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1986; Weir, David A., 
The Origins of the Federal Theology in Sixteenth Century Reformation Thought Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1990. 
38 Notable contributions are: Hall, Basil 'Calvin against the Calvinists' in John Calvin: A Collection of 
Distinguished Essays (ed. Duffield, G. ) Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1966 pp. 19-37; 1 [elm, Paul Calvin 
and the Calvinists Banner of Truth, Edinburgh, 1982; Kendall, R. T. Calvin and English Calvinism to 
1649 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978; Muller, Richard A. Christ and the Decree: Christology 
and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins Baker, Grand Rapids, 1986; 
Torrance, James B. 'Covenant or Contract? A Study of the Theological Background of Worship in 
Seventeenth Century Scotland' Scottish Journal of Theology 23 (1970) pp. 51-76. 
39 Evidence for this contention can be found in the works cited above, but consider also the standard 
lines of debate amongst Reformed theologians. Supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism are alike 
positions which accept the five points; even Amyraldianism was discussed in these terms: 
I ... unquestionably the predominant design of [the Saumur theologians) was to restore what 
[they] 
firmly believed to be the teaching of Scripture, Calvin and the Dort Canons concerning the matter of 
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The former point relates to the most innovative of Calvin's contributions: there is 
nothing particularly original about his doctrine of predestination, but the use he gives 
it, of replacing sacramental theology as the grounds for Christian hope, is certainly 
original. In the medieval church the combination of efficacious sacraments and a 
doctrine of purgatory meant that theological reassurance was available for anyone 
disposed to question their -salvation, or troubled by fears of hell. The Reformation 
removed the 'safety net' of purgatory - but in its Lutheran form at least retained the 
efficacy of the sacraments and (particularly) the proclamation of the Word. The 
Zwinglian version of Reformed theology, however, did away with this also, leaving 
no answer the terrible question 'but how canJ know I am savedT for religiously 
serious people. The Anabaptist response - assurance comes from my consciousness 
of having done the right things - was, of course, no assurance at all, and in any case 
rank- Pelagianism; Calvin's alternative was to locate assurance in the promise of God, 
specifically election. 40 
It is clear from Calvin's treatment that this is his purpose. Within the first paragraph 
on election in the 1559 Institutes, Calvin insists that '[w]e shall never be clearly 
persuaded, as we ought to be, that our salvation flows from the wellspring of God's 
free mercy until we come to know his eternal election... 1.41 As the account moves on 
we read that 'Satan has no more grievous or dangerous temptation to dishearten 
believers than when he unsettles them with doubt about their election. ' And again: 
'... the mind could not be infected with a more pestilential error than that which 
predestination. ' Armstrong, Brian G. Calvinism and the, 4myraut Heresy. Protestant Scholasticism and 
Humanism in Seventeenth Century France University of Wisconsin Press, London, 1969, p. 142. 
Again, 'Amyraut himself often asserted that his position was the same as that of Dort. ' Thomas, G. 
Michael The Fx1ent of the 41onement., 4 Dilemma for Reformed Theology from Calvin to the 
Concensus (1536-1675) Paternoster, Carlisle, 1997. 
40 Given Calvin's doctrine of the sacraments - the faithful fulfilment of God's promise by Ilis Spirit - 
a new, and more satisfying, version of sacramental assurance was theologically available to him. 
Whilst his introductory statements concerning the Lord's Supper suggest that this was at least in his 
mind (Inst. IV. 17.1), he offers alternative loci for assurance (particularly election), and does not 
particularly stress this one. In response to Lutheran polemic, later Reformed theologians tended to 
adopt a Zwinglian view of sacrament where this possibility was not open, and so assurance remained 
linked to election. 
41 Inst. 111.2 1.1. 
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overwhelms and unsettles the conscience from its peace and tranquility towards 
God. 142 
However, when Calvin introduces the idea of temporary faith in his discussion of 
reprobation, this purpose fails. 43 Those with 'temporary faith', according to Calvin, 
may have 'signs of a call that are similar to those of the elect' but lack 'the sure 
ýestablishment of election. 144 In this case, however, the question is surely still open: 
how can worried believers know whether what they experience is- a 'sure 
establishment' or merely 'signs ... that are similar'? I will return to this question. 
The tradition that followed Calvin was thus faced with an important pastoral question. 
Whatever may be thought of the central thesis of R. T. Kendall's Calvin and English 
Calvinism, his evidence surely demonstrates his contention that 'the fundamental 
concern in the theology of Perkins and his followers centres on the question, How can 
one know he is elect and not reprobate? 145 The Puritan tradition was perhaps more 
devoted to explicitly practical theology than continental Reformed theology, but the 
point may also be found there: 46 'The uses of this doctrine are many and outstanding 
in the Church of Christ. But these uses reach their full effectiveness, only when the 
elect are made surer of their election. '47 Turretin also insists on absolute assurance of 
predestination. 48 
42 Both from Inst. I11.24.4. 
43 Inst. 111.24.7-9. 
44 Both 111.24.7. 
45 op. cit. p. 1. 
46 On this see Wallace, Dewey D. Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant TheoloSy 
1525-1695, University of North Carolina Studies in Religion, University of North Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill, 1982. Wallace identifies a 'Reformed tradition' of predestinarian teaching from the 
earliest days of the Reformation, and highlights the desire to givecomfort and assurance'as one of the 
distinctives of this tradition. As he traces through the Anglophone developing tradition, he indicates 
that this distinctive grows in importance - see, for example, his suggestion that Elizabethan alterations 
in the Articles of Religion were prompted by 'the growing Reformed use of predestination for 
providing assurance! (pp. 31-32). Again, Becke, Joel R., Assurance of Faith: Calvin, English 
Puritanism, andthe Dutch Second Reformation, American University Studies Series VII: Theology and 
Religion Vol. 89, Peter Lang, New York, 1991 begins with the assertion 'one of the great struggles of 
the theologian and pastor of the post-Re formation churches lay within the area of personal assurance of 
faith ... 1 47 Leiden Synopsis XXIV, 4142, quoted by Ileppe p. 178. 
48 Inst. Elenc. Theol. IV. 13 - see the statement of the question, and particularly §§13,22 and 27 - this latter asserting 'this certainty is necessary... '. 
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Finally, one may comment that the great concern in Barth's presentation of the 
doctrine of election is that it should be gospel. Not only is this clear from Barth's first 
comments on election, as he discusses the orientation of the doctrine, it is also 
abundantly clear from the discussion of rejection, which Barth defines as an attempt 
by a human person to live as if he or she were not the elect God, in the face of God's 
decision that he or she is elected. The sense that assurance lies here is very clear in 
Barth's exposition. 49 
Thus there are continuities of purpose and of contour throughout the history of 
Reformed Orthodoxy, if not a precise continuity of theological content. To some 
extent, these continuities precede the period usually considered as 'Orthodoxy' - in 
Calvin, for instance - and also extend beyond it - in Warfield's defence of the five 
points, 50 or Barth's use of election to give assurance to the believer. With this (very 
sketchy! ) background in place, it is time to return to Edwards. 
There is, I have argued, a broadly coherent tradition of Reformed theology in the area 
of predestination. There is also, it seems, now a broad agreement that this tradition 
does not work. Criticisms are rife within the tradition, whether the complaints come 
from the Remonstrants, Amyraut, Eighteenth century evangelicals or Nineteenth 
century liberals. But the welcome given to Barth's recasting of the doctrine suggests 
that these isolated attacks have been replaced by a near-universal rejection of this way 
of formulating the doctrine, amongst mainstream theologians at any rate. Whilst 
particular groups still defend five-point Calvinism, there 
, 
is wide agreement that what 
Boettner called 'The' Reformed doctrine of predestination is unsatisfactory. Where 
there is less agreement is in the nature of the problem. 
Barth, and a series of scholars broadly following his critique, have focused on 
Christological issues, claiming that the Decree ousts Christ from His rightful place as 
49 And made all the more so if alternative loci are considered. Baptism, for example, is ethical 
response to the prior assurance of God's election, not a ground for assurance in itself 
50 Warfield, B. B. Works (in ten volumes) Baker, Grand Rapids, 198 1. one might almost say passim on 
this point, but see particularly 'Predestination' in vol. 11, Biblical Doctrines pp. 3-67; 'Calvinism' in 
vol. V Calvin and Calvinism pp. 353-369; and vol. V1, The Westminster Msembly and its Work-, 
particularly pp. 3-151. This latter makes the point that it is Westminster Calvinism more than that of 
Dort which Warfield defends - but the Westminster Divines held as firmly to the five points as any 
Anti-Remonstrant. 
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the index of all God's acts., Barth made this criticism of Calvin, as well as the 
tradition that followed him; later scholarship has tended to revise this judgement by 
suggesting that Calvin was appropriately Christological, but the tradition went wrong 
soon after - Beza often being blamed. 51 Edwards is interesting in this regard: there is 
little doubt that his doctrine of election is appropriately Christological, and yet he can 
- fairly, in the sense that it is true to sermons that he preached and never disowned - 
be held up as an example of this tradition at its worst. It may be that a consideration 
of Edwards will shed theological light on a- perhaps the - central question that has 
been asked of the Reformed tradition of theology. 
Although it has been done before, it will be instructive to review a response to this 
charge as levelled against Calvin: 52 
Whilst the final edition of the Institutes must be considered the basic source for 
Calvin's theology, the development of his treatment of election is instructive - 
through the various editions of the Institutes it grows in importance and, crucially, 
moves around. 53 The vital change in 1559 is to separate predestination from 
providence and to place it squarely under the work of the Spirit in applying Christ's 
benefits. So, as I have noted already, the end of Book III, 'The way we receive the 
grace of Christ" is the locus for predestination, in contrast to the medieval tradition, 
which made predestination a special case of providence, or Augustine and Bucer, who 
had placed the doctrine under ecclesiology. 
51 As I have indicated already in this thesis, the less-careful form of the criticism made by some 
scholars following Barth, that in the tradition the doctrine of predestination was not Christological at 
all, is not supported by the evidence. A comment of Heppe's that I have already quoted makes this 
point sufficiently well to warrant repetition: 'Of course the person of Christ is the foundation of 
election. To a certain extent he is the sole object of it... ' (p. 168; my italics). 
52 Many studies of Calvin's understanding of predestination have appeared - indeed, a disproportionate 
number, related to the importance of the doctrine in his own theology, if not in relation to that of those 
who followed him. Those I have found most instructive include: Muller, op. cit.; Niesel, Wilhelm The 
TheoloSy of Calvin (tr. Harold Knight) Lutterworth Library vol. XLVIII, Lutterworth Press, London, 
1956; Reid, J. K. S. 'The Office of Christ in Predestination' SJT 1(1948) pp. 5-19 & 166-183; Wendel, F. 
Calvin: The Origin and Development ofIlis Religious Thought (tr. Philip Mairet) The Fontana Library 
of Theology and Philosophy, Collins, London, 1963. In addition, Barth's interactions with any scholar 
in history are instructive, and he carries out a long and rich (if slightly misconstrued, in my opinion) 
dialogue with Calvin throughout CD. 11/2. 
53 See Wendel, op. cit. pp. 263ff. For an instructive survey covering not just the Institutes, but other 
writings such as the French Catechism of 1537. 
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It is important at this point that the movement of later Reformed orthodoxy is not read 
back into Calvin. This doctrine is not, for Calvin, the first word concerning humanity 
in light of which all 
* 
other words must be understood. Perhaps it should be - Barth 
certainly felt S054 - but to give the doctrine a place different from the one Calvin 
assigns and then to criticise him because it fails to fulfil that role is hardly a fair, let 
alone an appropriately generous, way to do theology. Barth suggests a via media - 
that, for Calvin, 'election was a final (and therefore a first) word on the whole reality 
of the Christian life, the word, which tells us that the existence and the continuance 
and the future of that life are wholly and utterly of the free grace of God. '55 
The first part of this formulation is acceptable, but dangerous. In reading Calvin, as 
compared to later Reformed dogmatics, I would want to insist on the radical 
difference between 'a final (and therefore a first) word' and a first (and therefore a 
final) word. For Calvin, election is the first word spoken concerning the Christian 
life, but it is this a posteriori - the position of election at the end of Book III cannot 
be stressed too strongly. If election is made the a priori basis for a doctrine of 
salvation, the oft-lamented hardening of the doctrine of predestination that we see 
historically is almost inevitable. By this placement, Calvin avoids teaching a limited 
atonernent, 56 is able to insist that assurance is found in Christ, not in the Decree, and 
generally maintains the fluidity of his treatment, preserving both a strongly 
evangelical and universalising appeal to all to repent and believe, and a doctrine of 
God that insists on His sovereignty and priority. This balance is necessary in any 
account of the doctrine which will offer assurance to the believer - the 'all' of the 
/ 
54 C. D. IM p. 86. - 
55 ibid 
56 Thisgrim doctrine'does indeed 'logically follow' from theconception of predestination' that Barth 
claims Calvin taught - see C. D. IV/I p. 57 - but, as will become clear, I believe Barth mis-read Calvin at 
this point in several important particulars. Sometimes it is argued that Calvin does in fact teach limited 
atonement (e. g. Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists op. cit. pp. 13-23); these arguments, if examined 
carefully, tend to turn on a logical deduction: Calvin taught irresistable, personal election, and did not 
teach universal salvation, so he must have taught a limited atonement. This argument is not watertight 
logically (it requires an unstated premise that the atonement is the only efficient cause of salvation), but 
even if it were, showing that a position may be deduced from someone's theology is some distance 
from showing that that theologian realised this and accepted the position. Them is no textual evidence 
that Calvin taught a limited atonement and so he did not. The most other arguments may show is that 
he was illogical in not doing this. Kendall's criticisms on this point are useful, although his alternative 
position (that the atonement was unlimited, but the heavenly intercession of Christ is limited to the 
elect) is less convincing. op. cit. p. 17. 
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promises is vital (as Calvin recognises57) to assure me that I am among the elect, and 
the sovereignty ýf God is vital to assure me that my faith rests on His constancy, not 
my weakness. 
The standard criticism of Calvin concerns the 'hidden decree'; if this stands, then 
there is no assurance in Calvin's account - election and rejection are alike secret 
decisions of God, aild I cannot know which applies to me. Reid makes this charge 
forceiully, with the help of a 'chance phrase' in Ill. 22.1: '... election precedes grace. 
If this is true, then one's worst forebodings are fulfilled. The God and Father of Jesus 
Christ is a God of grace. Who, then, is this God who determines men's election 
before grace becomes operative? 158 Certainly, as Reid contends, the idea that election 
belongs to the eternal, secret, absolute will of God is a Leitmoliv in Calvin's account; 
the question remains, however, whether this eternal, secret and absolute will can be 
revealed. -- The placing of the doctrine under the work of Christ, and the Christological 
focus of Calvin's understanding of revelation, suggest that this may be the case. 
Further, 'if, as I have argued, Calvin's aim in treating election is to give assurance to 
believers, then, making the assumption that he was not blind to the most glaring 
contradictions in his own theology, it seems likely that this will is indeed revealed. 
All revelation; for Calvin, is revelation of the Word, Jesus Christ, who is with God 
and is God (1.13.7, echoing John 1). Thus revelation is God revealing Himself by 
means of Himself. 'For this purpose the Father laid up with his only-begotten Son all 
that he had to reveal himself in Christ so that Christ ... might express the true image 
of. his glory. ' (111.2.1; my emphasis). There is nothing of God that is not in Jesus 
Christ. 59 This gives content and force to Calvin's repeated insistence that we look to 
Christ for assurance of our election (111.24.5): 'If we have been chosen in him, we 
shall not find assurance of our election in ourselves; and not even in God the Father, if 
57 'But'why does he *say "all"? It is that the consciences of the godly may rest more secure... 
111.24.17. 
58 Reid, art. cit. p. 12. Reid misreads Calvin at this point; the phrase 'election precedes grace' occurs as 
part of a rhetorical question, and Calvin's whole intention is to deny the possibility that this might be 
true, as the context makes clear. See Inst. 111.2 1.1. 
59 Calvin's statement (at least) of the extra calvinisticum is clear in asserting that there is nothing of the 
Son that is not incarnate, although the Son cannot be limited to the humanity of the incarnation. See 
Inst. I1.13A. 
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we conceive of him as severed from his Son. Christ, then, is the mirror where we 
must, and without self-deception may, contemplate our own election'. 
Election, for Calvin, is in Christ, and known only in Christ. This enables Jacobs to 
assert that, for Calvin, 'Christ and election belong to one another inextricably - as 
inseparable as water and a fountain; Christ, correctly understood, is the "index": 
Christ is election itself. 160 But Calvin goes further than this - in 111.22.7, Christ is 
called the auctor eleclionis. Auctor (Lewis and Scott's Dictionar offers 'creator', Y 
'maker' and 'founder', as well as 'author) implies that Christ for Calvin is something 
more than the decree, not less, as Reid and Barth imply. In this same section Christ is 
represented as claiming, with the Father, 'the right to choose'. Christ is the source of 
the decree, notjust its channel. The One who elects elects Himself to be the means by 
which others are elected. Calvin does not spell this out, and so perhaps leaves himself 
open to misunderstanding, but the conception is nevertheless there. 
Given this, I would contend that the standard criticism of Calvin's account, of the 
concept of hiddeness, is unfair. Calvin is straining hard to offer as clear a view as he 
is able of the certainty of perseverance and final salvation for all who have come to 
Christ in faith. - Having said this, there are two further areas where I believe there are 
weaknesses, and damaging ones, in the account of predestination Calvin offers. The 
two locations are the doctrine of eternity, and the decree of reprobation. 
Firstly, the related issues of the work of the Spirit and the nature of eternity: Calvin, 
almost in passing, offers an adequate definition of eternity as all things being present 
to God (111.21.5), but then appears to treat election as something that happened before 
all time and is fixed, rather than offering a dynamic, pneurnatological account of 
something that happens in time because it is happening in eternity. Any conception 
like this'is in grave danger of lapsing into simple fatalism, as humanity is reduced to a 
puppet theatre, playing out scenes written long before. Certainly, Calvin does not 
make so gross an error, but perhaps he does not guard sufficiently against it either in 
these passages - his account of fallen human freedom in 11.2-5 is far more careful. 
60 quoted in Muller, op. cit. p. 35. 
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Secondly, the decree that is genuinely Christless and hidden in Calvin's account is the 
decree of reprobation. The point at which he appears to engage in special pleading in 
his attempt to give assurance to believers is when he speaks of 'temporary faith' 
(111.24.7-9). Those with this 'temporary faith', according to Calvin, 'never cleaved to 
Christ with the heartfelt trust in which the certainty of election has, I say, been 
established for us. ' They may indeed 'have signs of a call that are similar to those of 
the elect, ' but lack 'the sure establishment of election. ' (111.24.7) But of course such 
phrases achieve the very opposite of their intention, raising the spectre that there is 
something that masquerades as true faith, but is not. How can any believer know 
whether he or she feels a 'sure establishment' or whether it is merely 'signs of a call 
similar to those of the elect'? The invitation for years of morbid introspection by later 
believers is surely here - at this point, with these phrases in my ears, that I cannot be 
sure of my own salvation. There is no assurance, and so the doctrine fails in its 
purpose. The weakness in Calvin's account of predestination is that the doctrine of 
reprobation is detached, Christless, hidden in the unsearchable purposes of God. As 
such it bears no comparison with the doctrine of election, but remains something less 
than a Christian doctrine. There is, in Calvin's account, a fundamental difference 
between election and reprobation. Contra Barth, Calvin's failure is not that he 
teaches a symmetrical double decree (Barth speaks of 'the classical doctrine with its 
opposing categories of "elect" and "reprobate". ' 6 1), but that he has almost no room for 
the doctrine of reprobation in his account. 
This difference, this asymmetry, is 'a very amiable fault'; it gives insight into Calvin 
the pastor, whose heart and mind were full of the glories of God's gift of salvation in 
Christ - so different from the caricature so often painted. Calvin's doctrine fails not 
because the 'No' is equal to the 'Yes', as Barth would have it, but because the 'No' 
does not really enter his thinking. It is a logical result of the 'Yes', and necessary for 
the -'Yes' truly to be 'Yes', but whereas election is bound up in his theology, it is the 
very fact that he is seemingly not interested in reprobation, that he has not brought it 
within the Trinitarian scope of his system, that makes it such a weak point. Amiable 
or not, it was a disastrous fault, however, because the failure to give the assurance 
Calvin longed to give is here, and so here is the root of all the long history of the 
61 C. D. IL12 p. 326. 
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syllogismus practicus. Calvin's account, then, is directed towards displaying the 
glories of God's grace' clearly and only in the face of Jesus Christ, but remains 
possessed of an 'Achilles heel' which, on the witness of history, was indeed the point 
at which the fatal blow was struck. 
So, I suggest that the problem in Calvin is to do with his doctrine of reprobation, 
rather than his doctrine of election, or predestination in general. If this is correct, then 
an interesting comparison is available: I have devoted my thesis to arguing that the 
same is true of Edwards. This suggests an interesting line of enquiry: 
Barth's doctrine of election in C. D. II/2. has perhaps excited more interest than any 
other area of the Dogmatics, and been widely praised. However, the very 
inventiveness of Barth's contribution makes it more difficult to decide what it is that 
is decisive in making this account theologically satisfying in a way that the earlier 
Reformed tradition was not - particularly as it has not, perhaps, been sufficiently 
recognised that, for all its novelty, this remains a contribution from within Reformed 
theology. 62 My discussion of Calvin and Edwards suggests that the earlier lack was in 
the area of reprobation, rather than election, and a glance at Barth suggests that this 
may well be key: one of his most original moves was to offer a Christologically 
determined doctrine of reprobation. 
For the Reformed tradition, to be reprobate was, by definition, to be separated from 
Christ. This point was made towards the end of chapter 4, but bears reiteration. The 
elect were in Christ, and so whatever might happen in the way of temporary 
backsliding, they remained secure. The reprobate were separated from Christ by a 
great gulf fixed, and so any goodness, religious practice, or apparent faith on their 
part was worthless. This is true of Calvin, and true of Edwards. It is not true of 
Barth. 
62 A glance at the second index, of names, demonstrates this most effectively. enabling not only a 
tracing of the detailed running debate with Calvin, but also the regular discussions of the various 
Reformed Symbols, seven references to Cocccius, eight to Polanus, five to van Mastricht, six to 
Wollebius' brief treatmen% and so on. Bruce McCormack's recent magisterial study of the 
development of Barth's theology makes this point powerfully. fie argues that Barth's first attempt to 
write a, theology text, the 'Gottingen Dogmatics', was concieved after the medieval model of the 
'Sentence Commentary', with Heppe's synopsis of the Reformed tradition taking the place of Peter 
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In discussing Barth's understanding of election, the appropriate point to begin is again 
in considering the placement of the doctrine - Barth, with his encyclopedic knowledge 
of theological history, believes himself to be the first person to place election as part 
of the doctrine of God. 63 The implications of this are immense: '[i]t is indissolubly 
part of the very being and essence of God that he elects. This cannot be put too 
strongly. The Christian God is one who elects. To be the Christian God is to be the 
one who elects, chooses, predestines. 164 These last words illuminate a second theme: 
that predestination is election. Barth is emphatic in his rejection of double 
predestination. 65 There is no balance, no equivalence, the 'No' must be heard for the 
'Yes' to be heard, but this 'No' has its existence only as part of the 'Yes' of God. 
God is free, but He is free to love. 
Following his introduction to the doctrine, Barth rejects the standard temptation of 
asking about the election of an individual first. He treats first the election of Christ, 
then the elect community, and only once these are in place wi-11 he address the 
question of the individual. Christ is both the electing God and the elected man. 
Jacobs' words are, in the light of this section, far more true of Barth than of Calvin - 
Christ is the Decree. Given this, the decree for humanity is only to life, and 
knowledge of the decree is unambiguous gospel. Christ is the decree, however, and 
that includes the decree of rejection - Christ is the rejected one - God chooses for 
Himself the suffering, death and rejection that are the inevitable concomitant of the 
decree of life - the 'Yes' has a 'No' swallowed up in it, but nevertheless there - the 
light of God's grace casts a shadow; but this 'No', this shadow, are Christ's alone. 66 
The elect community mirrors this dual role - the one community, consisting of both 
Israel and the Church, is both the passing form of the community that resists God's 
Lombard. McCormack, Bruce Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology. Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997 pp. 329-350. 
63 C. D. IL2 p. 76. 
64 Gunton, C. E. 'Karl Barth's Doctrine of Election as Part of his Doctrine of God' Journal of 
Theological Studies (new series) 25 (1974) pp. 381-392; p. 38 1. 
65 At least as the phrase was traditionally understood. Barth, as I shall argue, teaches a double decree 
far more effectively than the tradition in his insistence that Jesus Christ is both the Elect and the 
Rejected one. 
66 C. D. 11/2 pp. 162-168. 
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election and the coming form of the community that witnesses to its election. The 
one reveals God's judgement, the other God's mercy - but both are part of the one 
elect community. Barth's point here is made forcefully by his consideration of 
Pontius Pilate: 67 in Pilate, the gentiles join with the Jews in bringing the fulfilment of 
Israel's hope - 'Thus the death of Jesus unites what was divided, the elected and 
rejected. 168 We see the story of Jesus Christ in the story of the elect community. 
After this, Barth is prepared to turn to the election of the individual. 69 Each human 
person wills his or her own rejection by God; but God wills his or her election. Jesus 
Christ bears all rejection, so there is no possibility of living in the rejection that we 
will for ourselves. The only possibility is to live as the elect of God, to live as people 
loved by God. 
Nevertheless, there are those who try to live in the impossible way, and they are the 
'rejected'; Barth's crowning example is the long and rich section on Judas. 70 
Fundamentally, as the actions of giving bread and wine and washing feet show, Jesus 
was for Judas, although Judas was against Jesus. The outcome of this is not revealed: 
we cannot conceive that Judas' choice will eventually be determinative, but neither 
can we presume on the grace of God. We can only hope. 
Here, then, is a gloriously evangelical asymmetry - 'death is swallowed up in 
victory'. But for this to be truly gospel, the reality of death must be preserved. Not 
because death has any rights, but because God owes nothing to any person, and so we 
must not reach a place where we think we can presume on His grace. If we do so, it 
ceases to be grace and we cease to preach the gospel of grace. The question, then, 
turns on how Barth maintains the 'impossible possibility', how he avoids the 
necessity, if not the possibility, of universal salvation. 
The first point to make is that those critics who try to make Barth fit the standard 
Reformed structure of alternatives, where the only possible positions are Calvinism, 
67 ibid. p. 229. 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid pp. 306-506. 
70 ibid. pp. 458-506. 
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Arminianism or universalism, are simply missing the point. 71 Barth regularly and 
explicitly denies each of these. All people are elected; God's choice is sovereign; hell 
remains a possibility. The best current solution72 seems to centre on the concept of 
eternity in Barth's theology. , If election is something happening to time, not 
something that has happened before time, then the problem is lessened considerably. 
However this serves only to replace a temporal priority with a logical one, which is 
undoubtedly an improvement, but perhaps not a full solution. My own suspicion, 
although in the absence of any serious work it remains little more than that, is that 
further illumination must be sought in Barth's theodicy - it is, after all, ultimately the 
inevitability of the 'shadow' that causes him to first speak of the decree of rejection. 73 
The very fact that Barth's doctrine has been seen as dangerously close to universalism 
is, of course, a point in its favour - the question for Christian theology in the light of 
what God has done in Christ must surely be how this can fail to affect any given 
human being, how anyone can fail to be saved. Thus the radical asymmetry Barth 
gives to the doctrine of individual election by means of his symmetrical doctrine of 
the predestination of Christ is entirely appropriate, and indeed necessary for 
evangelical theology. What I hope is clear, however, is the way Barth succeeds in 
offering a theology that is genuinely gospel - good news - by giving Christological 
content to perdition. To sum up in an epigram: Barth succeeds where Calvin fails 
because Barth had a doctrine of reprobation, where Calvin did not. 
What has all this to do with my study on Edwards? I have suggested in the course of 
this study that Edwards' non-Christological doctrine of reprobation was incoherent, 
because of his doctrine of creation. Edwards has a much more Trinitarian account of 
the being of the world than the tradition in general, 74 and so even those who are 
reprobate, in that they are created beings, must have some connection to Christ and 
71 Bettis, J. D. 'Is Karl Barth a Universalist? ' Scottish Journal of Theology 20 (1967) pp. 423-436 
suggests both Brunner and Berkouwer use this structure. 
72 so Bettis, ibid.; Colwell, J. E. Actuality and Provisionality., Eternity and Election in the Thought of 
Karl Barth Rutherford I-Iouse, Edinburgh, 1989. 
73 CD. M pp. 169-175. 
74 This criticism will even stand for Calvin, whose doctrine of creation in Book I of the Institutes lacks 
the careful Christological and pneumatological shaping that characterises so much else in the work. 
See Gunton, Colin E. The Triune Creator. A Historical and Systematic Study Edinburgh University 
Press, Edinburgh, 1998 pp. 152-153. 
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the Spirit. The earlier Reformed doctrine was coherent in its own terms - although it 
failed in its purpose of providing assurance - but, we may ask, were those terms 
satisfactory? It was not just a removal of Christ from the being of the reprobate, but a 
prior removal of Christ from the being of the created world that was the problem. The 
Spirit, too, becomes an ecclesial reality, no longer in any theologically relevant sense 
the 'Lord and Giver of Life'. 75 
Returning briefly to the tradition, this failure may have something to do with the 
prevalence of the infralapsarian position. Under this understanding, creation and fall 
are potentially part of a different order from redemption, and at best a prior, and 
opaque, part of the same order. Homo was crealus el lapsus - and this by the decree 
of God. 'Our knowledge of God's character and purposes, however, begin only at this 
point. In the supralapsarian scheme, creation was the first event in the gospel 
narrative; for the infralapsarian, it is a different story. Given this, God's showing of 
Himself to be Father, Son and Spirit in the gospel story could possibly fail to be 
determinative for the act of creation, according to an infralapsarian theology. 
Whether, for this 'reason or others, it is clear that the tradition was not thoroughly 
Trinitarian in its construction of the doctrine of creation, and so created, fallen 
Iýumaruty could be what'it is without reference to the Son, and Spirit - and so 
reprobation and perdition could be constructed as Christless, Spiritless doctrines. 
This is, as I have said, coherent in its own terms - but in Christian 'terms it is 
inadequate. -As Edwards saw and argued, the God who creates is Father, Son and 
Spirit, and so no creaturely reality can be Christless and Spiritless. Edwards, 
embracing of a Trinitarian ontology was a necessary correction to the tradition. 
However, Edwards failed to make the second correction which this move made 
necessary, that of recognising that in speaking of human perdition, as much as in 
speaking of human salvation, we can only speak in Christological and 
prieumatological terms. 
7S So, for instance, Wollebius' doctrine of creation is an exposition of the six days, with the only 
reference to the Holy Spirit co; iing in an aside concerning the Incarnation. See Beardslee's translation 
in Reformed Dogmatics pp. 54-58. It may not be too fanciful to trace from this the narrowing of the 
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I have argued that the failure of the Reformed doctrine of predestination was its 
failure to be a'Christian doctrine - Le. a doctrine built and based on the gospel story, 
and so refusing to speak of God's agency without speaking of God's Son and God's 
Spirit. I have further suggested that this relates to a deeper failure within the 
Reformed tradition, a failure to construct the doctrine of creation Christologically and 
pneumatologically., Edwards, precisely because he goes half-way towards rectifying 
these failures, demonstrates these theological connections with great clarity. This, I 
suggest, is the most important result of my thesis. 
The first heresiarch in the Christian tradition was Marcion, whose particular ministry 
to the church (in common with all the heresiarchs) was to expose the dangers that 
constantly face Christian theologians in a particular area. The tradition, in speaking 
of the Creator God and the God who redeems by different names and with different 
grammar, was dangerously close to the intellectual territory that bears Marcion's 
name. Certainly, when we read in Perkins the suggestion that Adam fulfils the same 
role for the reprobate as Christ does for the eleCt, 76 we must disagree most strongly: 
this may be a sophisticated form of Marcionism, but sophistication is not enough to 
rescue a doctrine from the anathemas. 
6.5 Theologia Reformata et Semper Reformanda 
My final comment is once again about Reformed theology, and begins in some semi- 
autobiographical reflection: one of the reasons why I, as an English Baptist minister, 
became interested in Edwards was his effect on my own denomination. In the 1780s, 
the Evangelical Revival was in danger of bypassing English Baptist life altogether. 
The General (i. e. Arminian) Baptists had fallen into Unitarianism and Deism, and 
were no longer a Christian denomination in any meaningful sense. The Particular (Le. 
Calvinist) Baptists were held captive by a hypercalvinist 'orthodoxy', usually 
considered to stem from the writings of John Gill and John Brine. 77 This 
doctrine of the Spirit that has been one of the chief ironies of the rise of Pentecostal and Charismatic 
movements. 
76 Perkins speaks of God loving the elect 'in Christ with an actual love' and hating the reprobate in 
Adam with an actual hatred'. This is in connection with the creation of humanity, so we must conclude 
that some ontology is intended. Perkins, William 'An Exposition of the Symbol' in Works vol. I p. 238. 
77 On both Gill and Brine see Brown, Raymond The English Baptists of the Eighteenth Century The 
Baptist Historical Society, London, 1986 pp. 72-76. George Ella has defended Gill from the charge of 
hypercalvinism in a recent article, which is also valuable for extensive bibliographical notes. 
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hypercalvinism was distinguished by the argument that, since the reprobate could not 
respond to the gospel invitation, it was inappropriate to preach in an invitational 
manner. One could speak of Christ's salvation, but not exhort sinners to repent and 
believe. Unsurprisingly, under the influence of such 'theology', the denomination 
was in a parlous state. The escape from this came through the publication in 1785 of 
Andrew, Fuller's, The Gospel Worlhy of all . 4cceptation, expressing an evangelical 
Calvinist theology that had taken root amongst a group of ministers in 
Northamptonshire and Cambridgeshire. Fuller based his arguments upon a close 
reading of Jonathan Edwar ds, particularly the Freedom ofthe Will. 78 
Fullerism, as this transplanted Edwardsean Calvinism became known, led to a 
revitalisation of the denomination and the founding (by Fuller, William Carey and 
others) of the modem Protestant missionary movement in 1792, still my 
denomination's greatest gift to the Church Universal. Guided by Edwards' writings, 
the Baptists developed an evangelistically minded, modem, confident and relevant 
orthodox Calvinist theology, which came to fullest flower in the ministry of Charles 
Haddon Spurgeon, the 'Prince of Preachers'. Amongst many other works, Spurgeon 
founded a college for the training of pastors, and it was as a student at Spurgeon's 
College that I was first introduced to the writings of Jonathan Edwards. 
There is more to the story than that, however: under the guidance of my tutors at that 
college, I began to discover what Edwards taught Fuller two centuries before - that a 
confident, relevant, evangelistic, Reformed theology was both possible and attractive. 
It was reading Barth rather than Edwards that first opened my eyes to this, but the 
point is the same. Such Reformed and reforming theology has informed my thought 
Hypercalvinism was rife in Baptist circles; whether Gill was the source or not is not a question that 
does not need dealing with here. Ella, George M. 'John Gill and the Charge of Ilyper-Calvinism' 
Baptist Quarterly XXXVI (1995) pp. 160-177. Interestingly, there is evidence that Edwards had read 
Brine and, probably, Gill. Miscellanies entry 1357 contains material reproduced from Brine's writings 
concerning defects in philosophical morality, and Edwards' Catalogue contains two references to Gill. 
On p. 17, he has copied out a report from the Boston Gazette of December 27,1748, concerning an 
honorary D. D. awarded to Gill by the Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow, and mentioning his 
Fxposition of the New Testament. A page later, Edwards has written Wr Gill on the 5 points in four 
volumes in octavo of which Mr Prince and Mr Foxcroft Q second name unclear) [supply 'spoke'] when 
I was in Boston. ' Both entries are marked by a vertical line through the middle, and a large W at the 
beginning, suggesting that Edwards had obtained the books. 
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and my preaching ever since, and I hold the tradition that bears the name in high 
honour. But something, it seems to me, has gone badly wrong: 
In England at least, the title 'Reformed' often refers to a theology and church praxis 
that apparently lacks confidence, relevance, and intellectual rigor: the (increasingly) 
desperate attempt to hold to a mythical golden age of theology and polity defined by 
forcing figures as diverse as Owen and Baxter into a theological bed of Procrustes. 
The Reformed tradition of theology is a noble one, and at its noblest when, as with 
Edwards or Barth, it is confident enough to welcome what is new, test it by the one 
canon of the gospel, and accept and hold on to whatever may be found useful or 
interesting., Edwards rewrote Reformed theology because he found truth in the best 
secular philosophy - Locke - and science - Newton - of his day, and because he saw 
new things happening in the churches and was prepared to sift them and welcome the 
good. If a Reformed church must always be being reformed, as the noble slogan 
insists, then a Reformed theology must also always be open to the new thing that the 
Lord is doing. This thesis has been an attempt to honour a great Reformed theologian 
in the way that I believe Edwards would have wanted to be honoured: not by 
pretending that he had all things right, but by holding up the 'light and truth' that the 
Lord is still 'breaking forth from His Word' and seeking, in humble dependence on 
God's Spirit, to be ever more faithful to the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
Because only thus will God be glorified. 
Soli Deo Gloria! 
Finis. 
78 For details of Edwards' influence on Fuller see Clipsham, E. F. 'Andrew Fuller and Fullerism: A 
Study in Evangelical Calvinism' Baptist Quarterly XX (1963-64) pp. 99-114,146-154,214-225 & 268- 
276. Edwards' influence is particularly discussed on pp. 110-113. 
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